It seems to us that the construction we have placed upon this part of the section is the only reasonable construction it will bear. It certainly was not the intention of the Legislature to require such voters to designate their particular place of residence, even to their exact lodging-place, as required by the notice, in some voting precinct other than that in which they would have a right to vote, or, in other words, to require them to designate their particular lodgingplace in one precinct ninety days before an election, and yet recognize the right of such voters to change their residence sixty days after registering, and vote in another precinct, and make the evidence of the registration proof of their right to vote in a ward or precinct other than that designated in the notice of registration. This section also provides that the registration books shall be kept open at all times for the inspection of the public. Certainly the object of such registration, and the keeping of the books open to the inspection of the public, is for the purpose of requiring such voters to fix and designate their residence and voting places ninety days before the election, and affording information to the public as to the residence and lawful voting places of such persons. But if we are in error in this construction, the provision is obnoxious to the Constitution, and void for other reasons.

It is a well-settled rule of law that "when the Constitution defines the circumstances under which a right may be exercised, or a penalty imposed, the specification is an implied prohibition against legislative interference, to add to the condition, or to extend the penalty to other cases." This language of Judge COOLEY is quoted with approval by the Court in the case of Quinn v. State, supra. See, also, Mechem, Pub. Off. § 148; State v. Williams, supra; and State v. Tuttle (1881), 53 Wis. 45. In other words, when the Constitution commands how a right may be exercised, it prohibits the exercise of that right in some other way: if exercised at all it must be exercised as commanded by the Constitution. The Constitution of this State, § 14, art. 2, provides that the "General Assembly * shall provide for the

registration of all persons entitled to vote." This provision defines how the Legislature shall exercise the right of requir ing the registration of voters; that is, by providing that all voters shall register. This constitutional mandate is an implied prohibition against providing for the registration of any class, or for only a part of the voters, and this is consistent with the great weight of authorities upon the question of the validity of registration laws, which hold that such laws must be impartial, reasonable, and uniform. Judge COOLEY states the law to be that "all regulations of the elective franchise, however, must be reasonable, uniform and impartial. They must not have for their purpose directly or indirectly to deny or abridge the constitutional right of the citizen to vote or unnecessarily to impede its exercise. If they do they must be declared void." Cooley, Const. Lim. (5th Ed.) 758. See, also, authorities hereinbefore cited.

In a well-reasoned opinion in the case of Attorney General v. City of Detroit [decided in the Supreme Court, Michigan, Dec. 28, 1889], the authorities on the question are fully reviewed and considered, and it is held by the Supreme Court of Michigan in that case, that a registration law is unreasonable and void if it provides for but five registration days during the year, at one of which the elector must make personal application for registration; that it thereby disfranchises persons who are ill or absent on registration days, but who would be able to vote on election days. It also holds the same act void because it is not impartial, in that it requires a naturalized voter to produce his certificate of naturalization, or show, by evidence other than his own oath, that such certificate was issued, while it permits a native-born citizen to prove his right to vote by his own oath. The Court in that case, after citing and reviewing numerous authorities, says:

These authorities all tend in one direction. They hold that the Legislature has the right to reasonably regulate the right of suffrage, as to the manner and time and place of voting, and to provide all necessary and reasonable rules to establish and ascertain by proper proof the right to vote of any person offering his ballot, but has no power to restrain or VOL. XXXVIII-54.

abridge the right or unnecessarily to impede its free exercise. This law before us disfranchises every person too ill to attend the board of registration, and unreasonably and unnecessarily requires persons whose business duties, public or private, are outside of Detroit, to return home to register, as well as to vote, making two trips, when only one ought to be required.

See Daggett v. Hudson (1885), 43 Ohio St. 548.

Indeed, section thirteen, supra, seems to be aimed at a certain class of voters who may be absent from the State for a period of six months, either for pleasure or on business of a public or private character, and those at all times within the State who may be compelled, in order to obtain employment or for other lawful purposes, to change their residence from one county to another within the six months next preceding an election, and it imposes a burden upon them which is not imposed upon other voters, and changes their constitutional privileges and rights. It requires them to designate their particular residence and voting precinct, and prohibits them from again changing it, at a time when, under the Constitution, they are not required to do so. It imposes extra burdens and hardships on these classes of voters. In this respect it is both unreasonable and not impartial. Under the Constitution, the rights of voters who are required to move from one county to another within six months and prior to sixty days before an election, in order to obtain employment or for other lawful purposes, and those who are compelled to be temporarily absent from the State for six months, or longer, to earn a living for themselves and families, or to recuperate their health, or for other proper motives, are as sacred under the Constitution as those whose circumstances are such as not to require them to change their residence to seek employment, or to be absent from the State for that or any other lawful purpose. The Constitution guaranties the same rights to all voters who are bona fide residents of the State.

If once admitted that the Legislature has the power to enact a law requiring persons who are absent from the State six months to register ninety days before an election, why may not a law be valid requiring persons who are absent

from the State three months or one month or one day also to register? And if a law requiring a registration ninety days before an election is valid, why not a law requiring a registration six months, one year, or even a longer time before an election? If a law requiring all persons who are absent from the State six months to register, and none others, is valid, why would not a law requiring all foreignborn citizens, or all persons engaged in farming or manufacturing, and none others, to register, be valid? If this law is valid which requires all persons to register who are residents of the State six months, but not residents of the county six months, prior to an election, why may not the Legislature enact a valid law requiring persons moving from one ward to another at any time within six months, and none others, to register? Indeed, it seems to us to be beyond controversy that if the present act can be upheld, aimed, as it is, at a class of traveling men, and men whom business of a public or private character, or ill health, may take from the State six months, and persons who may be required to move from one county to another to obtain employment within six months preceding an election, and imposing, as it does, a burden upon these classes of citizens which is imposed upon none other, then the Legislature may enact a valid law relating to any class, designating them by nationality, place of birth, religious belief, professional or business pursuits, and require them, and none others, to register. If this law, which requires a registration of this class of citizens ninety days before an election, is valid, then any class of voters may be singled out and burdened, and duties imposed upon them which are not imposed upon others, and obstructing their right of suffrage as given to them by the Constitution of the State. It matters not whether this provision of the law be termed a registration of voters or a provision requiring certain proof of the class of voters named to entitle them to vote. In either event the effect is the same, for it requires proof of the qualifications to vote, which the voter under the Constitution does not have to possess, and the effect of the law is the same, and it

changes and abridges the rights of the classes of voters designated. We believe this section of the law to be in contravention of the Constitution, in opposition to all authority, and illegal and void.

As we have said, the Legislature has the right to pass a law requiring a registration of all voters, and the Constitution expressly requires the passage of such a law. But under the provisions of the Constitution, it must apply alike to all voters. One class of voters cannot be required to possess qualifications which are not required of all others. Under the Constitution, voters may change their residence from precinct to precinct up to thirty days prior to an election. This right cannot be impaired or taken from them by legislative enactment, and, until that time has occurred, they cannot be required to designate their intended residence, and voting precinct, at a future election. Up to that date they have the right to change their intention and place of residence as often as their circumstances may require, or as they may choose. The right to so change their intention and residence is given to every voter by the Constitution, and cannot be abrogated or interfered with. The authorities universally hold that registration laws must be impartial, uniform, and reasonable, giving to all who have a right to vote a fair and reasonable opportunity to exercise such right. The Constitution not only confers upon the General Assembly the power to make illegal voting an impossibility by a proper system of registration, but it makes it the imperative duty of that body to exercise that power. The imposition of unauthorized burdens and qualifications not authorized by the Constitution upon a part of the citizens of the State is not an exercise of that power, and while we would regret to declare void any law having for its object the purity of the elections, we cannot so far forget our duty as to uphold a law so plainly in conflict with the fundamental law of the State as the section of the law under consideration.

The provisions of the section we have particularly considered and discussed render the whole section void, and we deem it unnecessary to further discuss the other portions of