And let us compare the known constitution and course of things with what is said to be the moral system of nature; the acknowledged dispensations of Providence, or that government which we find ourselves under, with what Religion teaches us to believe and expect; and see whether they are not analogous and of a piece. And upon such a comparison, it will I think be found that they are very much so, that both may be traced up to the same general laws, and resolved into the same principles of Divine conduct.

The Analogy here proposed to be considered is of pretty large extent, and consists of several parts; in some more, in others less, exact. In some few instances perhaps it may amount to a real practical proof; in others not so. Yet in these it is a confirmation of what is proved other ways. It will undeniably show, what too many want to have shown them, that the system of Religion, both natural and revealed, considered only as a system, and prior to the proof of it, is not a subject of ridicule, unless that of Nature be so too. And it will afford an answer to almost all objections against the system both of Natural and Revealed Religion; though not perhaps an answer in so great a degree, yet in a very considerable degree an answer, to the objections against the evidence of it; for objections against a proof, and objections against what is said to be proved, the reader will observe are different things.

Now the divine government of the world, implied in the notion of religion in general and of Christianity, contains in it: That mankind is appointed to live in a future state; that there, every one shall be rewarded or punished; rewarded or punished respectively for all that behaviour here, which we comprehend under the words virtuous or vicious, morally good or evil: that our present life is a probation, a state of trial, and of discipline, for that future one, notwithstanding the objections which men may fancy they have, from notions of necessity, against there being any such moral plan as this at all; and whatever objections may appear to lie against the wisdom and goodness of it, as it stands so imperfectly made known to us at present: that this world being in a state of apostacy and wickedness, and consequently of ruin, and the sense both of their condition and duty being greatly corrupted amongst men, this gave occasion for an additional dispensation of Providence; of the utmost importance; proved by miracles; but containing in it many things appearing to us strange and not to have been expected; a dispensation of Providence, which is a scheme or system of things; carried on by the mediation of a divine person, the Messiah, in order to the recovery of the world; yet not revealed to all men, nor proved with the strongest possible evidence to all those to whom it is revealed; but only to such a part of mankind, and with such particular evidence as the wisdom of God thought fit. The design, then, of the following treatise will be to shew, that the several parts principally objected against in this moral and Christian dispensation, including its scheme, its publication, and the proof which God has afforded us of its truth; that the particular parts principally objected against in this whole dispensation are analogous to what is experienced in the constitution and course of Nature or Providence; that the chief objections themselves which are alleged against the former are no other than what may be alleged with like justness against the latter, where they are found in fact to be inconclusive; and that this argument from Analogy is in general unanswerable, and undoubtedly of weight on the side of religion, notwithstanding the objections which may seem to lie against it, and the real ground which there may be for difference of opinion, as to the particular degree of weight which is to be laid upon it. This is a general account of what may be looked for in the following

treatise. And I shall begin it with that which is the foundation of all our hopes and of all our fears; all our hopes and fears, which are of any consideration; I mean a future life.

Having thus explained the purpose and plan of his book, Butler proceeds to the work itself, which is in two parts, one treating of Natural, the other of Revealed Religion.

The First Part begins by inquiring what the Analogy of Nature suggests as to the effect which death may or may not have upon us, and whether it be not from thence probable that we may survive this change. Having reasoned out the credibility of a future life, he says, "That which makes the question to be of so great importance to us is our capacity for happiness and misery, and the supposition that our happiness and misery hereafter depends upon our actions here." His next chapter, therefore, argues

from analogy "Of the Government of God by Rewards and Punishments; and particularly of the latter."

Reflections of this kind are not without their terrors to serious persons, the most free from enthusiasm, and of the greatest strength of mind; but it is fit things be stated and considered as they really are. And there is, in the present age, a certain fearlessness with regard to what may be hereafter under the government of God, which nothing but an universally acknowledged demonstration on the side of atheism can justify; and which makes it quite necessary that men be reminded, and if possible made to feel, that there is no sort of ground for being thus presumptuous, even upon the most sceptical principles. For may it not be said of any person upon his being born into the world, he may behave so as to be of no service to it but by being made an example of the woful effects of vice and folly? That he may, as any if he will, incur an infamous execution from the hands of civil justice; or in some other course of extravagance shorten his days, or bring upon himself infamy and diseases worse than death? So that it had been better for him, even with regard to the present world, that he had never been born. And is there any pretence of reason for people to think themselves secure, and talk as if they had certain proof, that, let them act as licentiously as they will, there can be nothing analogous to this, with regard to a future and more general interest, under the providence and government of the same God?

one may,

The subject of the next chapter is the moral government of God in rendering to men according to their deeds; the next treats of a state of probation, as implying trials, difficulties, and danger.

The thing here insisted upon is, that the state of trial which Religion teaches us we are in is rendered credible by its being throughout uniform and of a piece with the general conduct of Providence towards us, in all other respects within the compass of our knowledge. Indeed, if mankind, considered in their natural capacity as inhabitants of this world only, found themselves from their birth to their death in a settled state of security and happiness, without any solicitude or thought of their own or if they were in no danger of being brought into inconveniences and distress, by carelessness or the folly of passion, through bad example, the treachery of others, or the deceitful appearances of things: were this our natural condition, then it might seem strange,

and be some presumption against the truth of Religion, that it represents our future and more general interest, as not secure of course, but as depending upon our behaviour, and requiring recollection and self-government to obtain it. For it might be alleged, "What you say is our condition in one respect is not in any wise of a sort with what we find by experience our condition is in another. Our whole present interest is secured to our hands, without any solicitude of ours; and why should not our future interest, if we have any such, be so too?" But since, on the contrary, thought and consideration, the voluntary denying ourselves many things which we desire, and a course of behaviour far from being always agreeable to us, are absolutely necessary to our acting even a common decent and common prudent part, so as to pass with any satisfaction through the present world, and be received upon any tolerable good terms in it: since this is the case, all presumption against self-denial and attention being necessary to secure our higher interest is removed. Had we not experience, it might, perhaps speciously, be urged, that it is improbable anything of hazard and danger should be put upon us by an Infinite Being, when everything which is hazard and danger in our manner of conception, and will end in error, confusion, and misery, is now already certain in his fore-knowledge. And indeed, why anything of hazard and danger should be put upon such frail creatures as we are, may well be thought a difficulty in speculation, and cannot but be so till we know the whole, or, however, much more of the case. But still the Constitution of Nature is as it is. Our happiness and misery are trusted to our conduct, and made to depend upon it. Somewhat, and, in many circumstances, a great deal too, is put upon us, either to do or to suffer as we choose. And all the various miseries of life, which people bring upon themselves by negligence and folly, and might have avoided by proper care, are instances of this, which miseries are beforehand just as contingent and undetermined as their conduct, and left to be determined by it.

These observations are an answer to the objections against the credibility of a state of trial, as implying temptations, and real danger of miscarrying with regard to our general interest, under the moral government of God; and they shew, that if we are at all to be considered in such a capacity, and as having such an interest, the general Analogy of Providence must lead us to apprehend ourselves in danger of miscarrying, in different degrees, as to this interest, by our neglecting to act the proper part belonging to us in that capacity. For we have a present interest under the government of God which we experience here upon earth. And this interest, as it is not forced upon us, so neither is it offered to our acceptance, but to our acquisition; in such sort as that wo are in danger of missing it, by means of temptations to neglect, or act contrary to it, and without attention and selfdenial, must and do miss of it. It is then perfectly credible that this may be our case with respect to that chief and final good which Religion proposes to us.

The fifth chapter continues the consideration of the state of Probation, by turning to the question how we came to be placed in it, and arguing from the Analogy of Nature that it was intended for moral discipline and improvement. The sixth chapter argues that the opinion of the Fatalist, who sees necessity in Nature, judged by the Analogy between Nature and Religion, does not warrant the opinion that there is no such thing as Religion; that if upon the supposition of freedom the evidence of Religion

be conclusive, it remains so upon the supposition of necessity. The last chapter of the First Book is related to the argument of Pope's "Essay on Man," in showing reason from Analogy to believe that we misjudge through ignorance of the great whole, whereof we see only a part. It is "of the Govern ment of God, considered as a Scheme or Constitution, imperfectly comprehended," and it opens thus:

Though it be, as it cannot but be, acknowledged, that the Analogy of Nature gives a strong credibility to the general doctrine of religion, and to the several particular things contained in it, considered as so many matters of fact; and likewise that it shows this credibility not to be destroyed by any notions of necessity: yet still, objections may be insisted upon, against the wisdom, equity, and goodness of the divine government implied in the notion of Religion, and against the method by which this government is conducted; to which objections Analogy can be no direct answer. For the credi bility or the certain truth of a matter of fact does not immediately prove anything concerning the wisdom or goodness of it; and Analogy can do no more, immediately cr directly, than show such and such things to be true ar credible, considered only as matters of fact. But still, if, upon supposition of a moral constitution of nature and a moral government over it, Analogy suggests and makes it credible, that this government must be a scheme, system, or constitution of government, as distinguished from a number of single unconnected acts of distributive justice and goodness; and likewise, that it must be a scheme, so imperfectly comprehended, and of such a sort in other respects, as to afford a direct general answer to all objections against the justice and goodness of it: then Analogy is remotely of great service in answering those objections, both by suggesting the answer, and showing it to be a credible one.

Now this, upon inquiry, will be found to be the case. Fur, first, upon supposition that God exercises a moral govern ment over the world, the analogy of His natural government suggests and makes it credible that His moral governm must be a scheme quite beyond our comprehension; and this affords a general answer to all objections against the juste and goodness of it. And, secondly, a more distinct observation of some particular things contained in God's schone of natural government, the like things being supposed, by analogy, to be contained in His moral government, farther shew how little weight is to be laid upon these objections.

The Second Part of Butler's "Analogy" turns from Nature to Revelation, reasoning first of its necessity, and of the importance of Christianity, whereof natural religion is the foundation and pr.2cipal part, but not in any sense the whole. The argument in the second chapter is "Of the supposed Presumption against a Revelation considered 25 miraculous." Butler here gives reasons for saying.

I find no appearance of a presumption, from the Analy of Nature, against the general scheme of Christianity, the God created and invisibly governs the world by Jesus Christ, and by Him also will hereafter judge it in righteousness, s. render to every one according to his works: and that men are under the secret influence of His Spirit. Whir these things are, or are not, to be called miraculous, a perhaps, only a question about words; or, however, is et za moment in the case. If the Analogy of Nature raises of

presumption against this general scheme of Christianity, it must be either because it is not discoverable by reason or experience, or else because it is unlike that course of nature which is. But Analogy raises no presumption against the truth of this scheme upon either of these accounts.

The next chapter argues that Analogy makes credible that a revelation must appear liable to objections; and the next considers Christianity by Analogy with the course of Nature as, like it, a scheme or constitution imperfectly comprehended. The fifth chapter of this Second Part argues from Analogy the probability" of the particular system of Christianity; the appointment of a Mediator, and the redemption of the world by Him." The next subjects of like argument are the want of universality in Revelation, and the supposed deficiency in the proof of it; the particular evidence for Christianity; and, lastly, of the objections which may be made against arguing from the Analogy of Nature to Religion. In the course of his answer to these objections, Butler

says

The design of this treatise is not to vindicate the character of God, but to show the obligations of men; it is not to justify His Providence, but to show what belongs to us to do. These are two subjects, and ought not to be confounded. And though they may at length run up into each other, yet observations may immediately tend to make out the latter, which do not appear, by any immediate connection, to the purpose of the former, which is less our concern than many seem to think. For, first, it is not necessary we should justify the dispensations of Providence against objections any farther than to shew that the things objected against may, for aught we know, be consistent with justice and goodness. Suppose, then, that there are things in the system of this world, and plan of Providence relating to it, which taken alone would be unjust; yet it has been shewn unanswerably, that if we could take in the reference which these things may have to other things present, past, and to come, to the whole scheme, which the things objected against are parts of, these very things might, for aught we know, be found to be, not only consistent with justice, but instances of it. Indeed, it has been shewn, by the Analogy of what we see, not only possible that this may be the case, but credible that it is. And thus objections drawn from such things are answered, and Providence is vindicated, as far as religion makes its vindication necessary.

One cause of the decline of faith, against which these arguments were directed, was a lowering of the chief aims of life. Among those whose example had influence, French influence in and after the time of Charles II. had quickened the development of a vain code of "honour" that made certain forms of lust and murder gentlemanly, displaced personal religion, and debased men instead of raising them. Religious life counted for little, even among theologians; it was almost lost in the conflict about forms. A deep sense of this evil led in England to another form of reaction, which had John and Charles Wesley and George Whitefield for its leaders.

John Wesley was the second son of the Rev. Samuel Wesley, and the father of Samuel Wesley had been a John, who suffered persecution as a

Nonconformist clergyman. Samuel Wesley studied in his youth at an academy for Dissenters kept by Mr. Veal, in Stepney; but while there, he turned to the Established Church, gave up the support he was receiving, walked to Oxford, and entered himself as a "poor scholar" at Exeter College. He supported himself by teaching and writing, and was a curate when he married Susannah Annesley, who, like Samuel Wesley, had a Nonconformist minister for father, and had turned to the Established Church. Of the nineteen children of this marriage, three sons and three daughters grew up. When the Revolution was effected, Samuel Wesley wrote in its defence, and obtained the living of Epworth, in Lincolnshire. His wife did not accept the Revolution, but said nothing. It was only in the year before King William died, that her husband missed her "Amen to the prayers for the king. He questioned her, and found that she would not recognise William III. as the true king; whereupon Samuel Wesley refused to live with her till she was loyal, left her, and did not return to her until after King William's death. John Wesley, eleven years younger than his brother Samuel, was the first child born after this period of separation. He was born at Epworth on the 17th of June, 1703. When John Wesley was six years old, his father's house was burnt in the night, and all of the household, including parents and eight children, were with difficulty saved. Little John had been left forgotten in the nursery, scrambled on a chest to the window, and was saved-for the house was a low one-by a man's climbing to him upon the shoulders of another. The moment after he had been rescued the roof fell in. Remembering this, John Wesley afterwards had a house on fire engraved under one of his portraits, with the motto, "Is not this a brand plucked out of the burning?"

At the time of the fire, John's younger brother Charles, who lived to share his spiritual work, was an infant two months old.

John Wesley's mother was a devout woman, and when her husband left his parish and went to London to attend Convocation she read prayers at home, to which parishioners were gradually drawn, until her husband objected that her ministration "looked particular." She replied, "I grant it does; and so does almost everything that is serious, or that may any way advance the glory of God or the salvation of souls, if it be performed out of a pulpit or in the common way of conversation; because in our corrupt age the utmost care and diligence has been used to banish all discourse of God or spiritual concerns out of society, as if religion were never to appear out of the closet, and we were to be ashamed of nothing so much as confessing ourselves to be Christians." The narrow escape of her son John from fire made his mother resolved to take especial pains with his religious training.

John Wesley was educated at Charterhouse School, and Charles at Westminster, when one of the ushers there was Samuel, the eldest brother, who had been to Christ Church, Oxford. At seventeen, John Wesley went from Charterhouse School to Christ Church. He was lively, acute in argument, and, like his father and his two brothers, could write

and be some presumption against the truth of Religion, that it represents our future and more general interest, as not secure of course, but as depending upon our behaviour, and requiring recollection and self-government to obtain it. For it might be alleged, "What you say is our condition in one respect is not in any wise of a sort with what we find by experience our condition is in another. Our whole present interest is secured to our hands, without any solicitude of ours; and why should not our future interest, if we have any such, be so too?" But since, on the contrary, thought and consideration, the voluntary denying ourselves many things which we desire, and a course of behaviour far from being always agreeable to us, are absolutely necessary to our acting even a common decent and common prudent part, so as to pass with any satisfaction through the present world, and be received upon any tolerable good terms in it since this is the case, all presumption against self-denial and attention being necessary to secure our higher interest is removed. Had we not experience, it might, perhaps speciously, be urged, that it is improbable anything of hazard and danger should be put upon us by an Infinite Being, when everything which is hazard and danger in our manner of conception, and will end in error, confusion, and misery, is now already certain in his fore-knowledge. And indeed, why anything of hazard and danger should be put upon such frail creatures as we are, may well be thought a difficulty in speculation, and cannot but be so till we know the whole, or, however, much more of the case. But still the Constitution of Nature is as it is. Our happiness and misery are trusted to our conduct, and made to depend upon it. Somewhat, and, in many circumstances, a great deal too, is put upon us, either to do or to suffer as we choose. And all the various miseries of life, which people bring upon themselves by negligence and folly, and might have avoided by proper care, are instances of this, which miseries are beforehand just as contingent and undetermined as their conduct, and left to be determined by it.

These observations are an answer to the objections against the credibility of a state of trial, as implying temptations, and real danger of miscarrying with regard to our general interest, under the moral government of God; and they shew, that if we are at all to be considered in such a capacity, and as having such an interest, the general Analogy of Providence must lead us to apprehend ourselves in danger of miscarrying, in different degrees, as to this interest, by our neglecting to act the proper part belonging to us in that capacity. For we have a present interest under the government of God which we experience here upon earth. And this interest, as it is not forced upon us, so neither is it offered to our acceptance, but to our acquisition; in such sort as that we are in danger of missing it, by means of temptations to neglect, or act contrary to it, and without attention and selfdenial, must and do miss of it. It is then perfectly credible that this may be our case with respect to that chief and final good which Religion proposes to us.

The fifth chapter continues the consideration of the state of Probation, by turning to the question how we came to be placed in it, and arguing from the Analogy of Nature that it was intended for moral discipline and improvement. The sixth chapter argues that the opinion of the Fatalist, who sees necessity in Nature, judged by the Analogy between Nature and Religion, does not warrant the opinion that there is no such thing as Religion; that if upon the supposition of freedom the evidence of Religion

be conclusive, it remains so upon the supposition of necessity. The last chapter of the First Book is related to the argument of Pope's "Essay on Man," in showing reason from Analogy to believe that we misjudge through ignorance of the great whole, whereof we see only a part. It is "of the Government of God, considered as a Scheme or Constitution, imperfectly comprehended," and it opens thus :

Though it be, as it cannot but be, acknowledged, that the Analogy of Nature gives a strong credibility to the general doctrine of religion, and to the several particular things contained in it, considered as so many matters of fact; and likewise that it shows this credibility not to be destroyed by any notions of necessity: yet still, objections may be insisted upon, against the wisdom, equity, and goodness of the divine government implied in the notion of Religion, and against the method by which this government is conducted; to which objections Analogy can be no direct answer. For the credi bility or the certain truth of a matter of fact does not immediately prove anything concerning the wisdom or goodness of it; and Analogy can do no more, immediately or directly, than show such and such things to be true or credible, considered only as matters of fact. But still, if, upon supposition of a moral constitution of nature and a moral government over it, Analogy suggests and makes it credible, that this government must be a scheme, system, or constitution of government, as distinguished from a number of single unconnected acts of distributive justice and goodness; and likewise, that it must be a scheme, so imperfectly comprehended, and of such a sort in other respects, as to afford a direct general answer to all objections against the justice and goodness of it: then Analogy is remotely of great service in answering those objections, both by suggesting the answer, and showing it to be a credible one.

Now this, upon inquiry, will be found to be the case. For, first, upon supposition that God exercises a moral government over the world, the analogy of His natural government suggests and makes it credible that His moral government must be a scheme quite beyond our comprehension; and this affords a general answer to all objections against the justice and goodness of it. And, secondly, a more distinct observation of some particular things contained in God's scheme of natural government, the like things being supposed, by analogy, to be contained in His moral government, will farther shew how little weight is to be laid upon these objections.

The Second Part of Butler's " Analogy" turns from Nature to Revelation, reasoning first of its necessity, and of the importance of Christianity, whereof natural religion is the foundation and principal part, but not in any sense the whole. The argument in the second chapter is "Of the supposed Presumption against a Revelation considered as miraculous." Butler here gives reasons for saying,

I find no appearance of a presumption, from the Analogy of Nature, against the general scheme of Christianity, that God created and invisibly governs the world by Jesus Christ, and by Him also will hereafter judge it in righteousness, i.e., render to every one according to his works: and that good men are under the secret influence of His Spirit. Whether these things are, or are not, to be called miraculous, is, perhaps, only a question about words; or, however, is of no moment in the case. If the Analogy of Nature raises any

After Whitefield had spent a year in this way, his mother failed, and was obliged to leave the inn; but it was made over to a son who had been bred to the business, and who then married. George remained at the "Bell" as an assistant, until he found that he could not agree with his brother's wife; for that cause he left, and went to his eldest brother at Bristol. There his religious enthusiasm deepened for a time, and he resolved never again to serve in a publichouse. He kept this resolve when he returned to Gloucester, "and therefore," he says, "my mother gave me leave, though she had but a little income, to have a bed upon the ground, and live at her house, till Providence should point out a place for me."

Having lived thus for some considerable time, a young student who was once my schoolfellow, and then a Servitor of Pembroke College, Oxford, came to pay my Mother a visit. Amongst other conversation, he told her how he had discharged all College expenses that quarter, and received a penny. Upon that my Mother immediately cried out, "That will do for my Son." Then turning to me, she said, "Will you go to Oxford, George?" I replied, "With all my heart." Whereupon, having the same friends that this young student had, my Mother, without delay, waited on them. They promised their interest to get me a Servitor's place in the same College. She then applied to my old master, who much approved of my coming to school again.

When near his seventeenth year, Whitefield resolved to prepare himself for taking the Sacrament on Christmas Day.

I began now to be more and more watchful over my thoughts, words, and actions. The following Lent I fasted Wednesday and Friday thirty-six hours together.

Near this time I dreamed that I was to see God on Mount Sinai, but was afraid to meet him. This made a great impression upon me; and a gentlewoman to whom I told it, said, "George, this is a Call from God."

For a twelvemonth I went on in a round of duties, receiving the Sacrament monthly, fasting frequently, attending constantly on public worship, and praying often more than twice a day in private. One of my brothers used to tell me, "He feared this would not hold long, and that I should forget all when I came to Oxford."

At eighteen Whitefield went to Pembroke College, Oxford, in the desired way, a friend lending ten pounds to pay the first expense of entering.

Soon after my admission I went and resided, and found my having been used to a public-house was now of service to me. For many of the Servitors being sick at my first coming up, by my diligent and ready attendance I ingratiated myself into the gentlemen's favour so far, that many who had it in their power chose me to be their Servitor. This much lessened my expense; and indeed God was so gracious that with the profits of my place, and some little presents made me by my kind tutor, for almost the first three years I did not put all my relations together to above £24 expense.

I now began to pray and sing psalms thrice every day, besides morning and evening, and to fast every Friday, and to receive the Sacrament at a parish church near our College, and at the Castle, where the despised Methodists used to receive once a month.

The young men so called because they lived by Rule and Method, were then much talked of at Oxford. I had heard of and loved them before I came to the University; and so strenuously defended them when I heard them reviled by the students, that they began to think that I also in time should be one of them.

For above a twelvemonth my soul longed to be acquainted with them, and I was strongly inclined to follow their good

example, when I saw them go through a ridiculing crowd to

receive the holy Sacrament at St. Mary's. At length God was pleased to open a door. It happened that a poor woman in one of the workhouses had attempted to cut her throat, but was happily prevented. Upon hearing of this, and knowing that both the Mr. Wesleys were ready to every good work, I sent a poor aged apple-woman of our College to inform Mr. Charles Wesley of it, charging her not to discover who sent her. She went; but, contrary to my orders, told my name. He having heard of my coming to the Castle and a Parish Church Sacrament, and having met me frequently walking by myself, followed the woman when she was gone away, and sent an invitation to me by her, to come to breakfast with him the next morning.

I thankfully embraced the opportunity. He put into my hands Professor Franks' Treatise against the Fear of Man; and in a short time let me have another book entitled "The Life of God in the Soul of Man."

At my first reading it, I wondered what the author meant by saying, "That some falsely placed Religion in going to Church, doing hurt to no one, being constant in the duties of the closet, and now and then reaching out their hands to give alms to their poor neighbours." Alas! thought I, "If this be not Religion, what is?" God soon shewed me. For in reading a few lines further, that "true Religion was an Union of the Soul with God, or Christ formed within us," a ray of divine light instantaneously darted in upon my soul, and from that moment, but not till then, did I know that I must be a new creature.

Upon this I had no rest till I wrote letters to my relations, acquainting them there was such a thing as the New Birth. I imagined they would have gladly received them. But, alas! they thought that I was going beside myself, and by their letters confirmed me in the resolutions I had taken not to go down into the country, but continue where I was, lest that by any means the good work which God had begun in my soul might be obstructed.

.

I daily underwent some contempt from the Collegians. Some have thrown dirt at, and others took away their pay from me. And two friends, that were very dear to me, soon grew shy of and forsook me. My inward sufferings were of a more exercising nature. God only knows how many nights I have lain upon my bed, groaning under what I felt. Whole days and weeks have I spent lying prostrate on the ground, in silent or vocal prayer; and having nobody to shew me a better way, I thought to get peace and purity by outward austerities. Accordingly by degrees I began to