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traordinary and powerful political union which now controls the public administration.

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sanctioned by this House be held in memory. Let it never be forgotten that it passed only by opposing patronage to patronage, money to money, and arraying corruption against corruption. The people and the States were brought to desire and demand a more equal division of the spoils-of that portion of the public moneys which, according to former practice, would have been employed in corrupting particular States or sections of the Union, and in attaching them to the party in power by appropriating it to various objects of local improvement. In no other way was it possible to have defeated the manifest determination of those in power to add the entire accruing surplus in the Treasury to the enormous patronage already within their control. It was by them decreed that the expenditures should be raised to the standard of the existing revenue. But mark the instant change in their policy: the moment it was ascertained, by a test vote in this House, that the surplus was about to be rescued from their insatiate grasp, the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. MCKAY] was upon his legs, proposing to reduce the revenue; and more patriots sprung up in one moment, in this House, than I had dreamed were to be found in the ranks of public men in the whole country.

It must, I think, Mr. Speaker, strike every observer, who is not blinded by interest or party rage, that some malignant distemper has seized upon, and now deeply affects, our political system. At all former periods we had, it is true, great party excitement, much crimination and recrimination between the respective parties, more or less violent denunciation, complaints of gross infractions of the constitution, and other irregularities and abuses; and, doubtless, there have been irregularities and abuses under every administration; but, sir, it must be apparent to every one that there are some features in the character of the present times, some circumstances of excess or novelty developed in the practical operation of our peculiar form of government, which were unknown and unfelt at any former period. A new character is rapidly forming and attaching to our American institutions, and birth has been given to new theories as to their ultimate destiny. I can only glance at those general results, as conclusions which present themselves upon a review of the actual state of things. It is an old maxim, or proposition, that power is never so absolute, or the danger that it will become perpetual so great, as when it is commenced and wielded in the name, and by the authority of the people. The truth of this saying is confirmed by the experience of this country at this time. It is demonstrated that the partition of power, established by the constitution between several departments of the Government, and all other barriers interposed by that instrument, have not been sufficient to prevent the practical accumulation of all power in a single depart ment. That a complete change has taken place in the action of the Government, within the last few years, is too manifest to require elaborate illustration. Take one striking evidence of the fact, which has struck me painfully, yet forcibly. I have been in the habit of making long, and often circuitous, journeys to this Capitol, from a distant residence, during the last nine or ten years; and during all that period there have been subjects of more or less interest among the people, and which were to be settled and regulated at this seat of Government and power. For the first few years of my experience in passing over the country, the inquiry was, "What will Congress do?" when any subject of public and national interest or policy was spoken of. "What will the House of Representatives do? What will the representatives of the people do?" But, sir, we hear these inquiries no longer. No one now asks, nor seems to care, what the chosen delegates of the people in Consult of a diseased instead of a healthful and prosperous gress may feel or think upon any subject. The form of interrogation is changed. The question is, both from citizen and foreigner, what will the President do? What will he say in his message? What will Andrew Jackson do? What will the people's President do? His will and purpose ascertained, it is understood that Congress will conform their action to it. This single fact in the history of this country will be sufficient to stamp the present as the period of transition from a popular representative Government to the Government of an elective presidency-of a political chief. A revolution in the Government 9, in some sense, complete. We have no longer a Goverament constituted of two or more separate departmeats of an executive and of a legislative department. All power, in substance and effect, is concentrated in the hands of one department-in one head; and that bead, I am sorry to say, is the head of a party.

The only example of the independent action of this Hasse upon any subject in which the President was pleased to manifest any decided interest, which has oc carred within the last two years, was the passage of the deroute or distribution bill at the last session. But let all the circumstances under which that measure was VOL. XIII.-92

The entire party now became satisfied that the revenue should be speedily reduced to the actual wants of the Government. The views of the President himself, it seems, underwent a great and sudden change. In his message to Congress at the last session, he thonght the surplus might be well applied to the increase of the public defences, and to various objects of national importance. Then he was of opinion that the famous compromise act, as it is called, was too sacred to be touched; that it involved too many interests, connected itself with too many delicate sympathies, to be disturbed for the mere purpose of getting clear of a surplus revenue for a few years. The extraordinary increase of the revenue from the public lands in that year he regarded only as an evidence of the increasing prosperity of the country, and practical proof of the beneficient and successful administration of public affairs, of which he was at the head. A surplus then had no terrors in it. But since the passage of the act for distributing it among the States, it would seem that nothing is so replete with hor rible mischief, in the mind of the President or of the party, as a surplus in the Treasury! The famous compromise act no longer presents any obstacle to the reduction of the tariff, the extraordinary increase of the sales of the public lands is discovered to be the re

action of the political system. It was worthy of note that the gentleman from New York [Mr. CAMBRELENG] suddenly discovered that corruption threatened the States by the distribution of the surplus, without seem. ing ever to have spent a thought about the corruptions which threatened the country from permitting the surplus to be expended, or rather prodigally squandered, by the General Government.

[Mr. BELL here gave way to a call for the orders of the day. The subject did not again come up till the following Tuesday, when Mr. BELL concluded his speech.]

Mr. BELL, after noticing an article in the morning's Globe, which reflected upon him, spoke as follows:

Before I resume my remarks, Mr. Speaker, upon the subject of my motion, I beg leave to do an act of justice to the gentleman from North Carolina, [Mr. MCKAY,] to whom I alluded when I addressed the House the other day. That gentleman has, I know, always been an advocate for a reduction of the revenue; and when I described him as having presented his resolution immedi ately after it became manifest that the surplus would be distributed, at the last session, I referred to him merely as the organ of the party in that step. I presumed that

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he was glad to avail himself of the change of sentiment which had recently manifested itself among his political associates in the House, in carrying out his own longcherished policy.

When I was interrupted by the call for the orders of the day when last up, I was digressing from the point which I had intended to establish, which was, that all actual power was now concentrated in the hands of the Executive; and I refer to the general acquiescence of this House in the will of the President, as evidence of the truth of my proposition; but the condition of the Senate will illustrate my position more clearly. According to all the early expounders of the constitution, the Senate was constituted upon the principle of long terms and a select constituency, the State Legislatures, for the purpose of giving greater stability and uniformity to the action of the Government. It was intended as a counterpoise to the Representatives of the people in this House, who were supposed to be more under the influence of popular impulses. I beg leave to quote a sentence or two from a celebrated volume, upon the subject of the peculiar structure of the Senate:

"As the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought, in all Governments, and actually will, in all free Governments, ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers, so there are particular moments in public affairs when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be most ready to lament and condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will be the interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order to check the misguided career, and to suspend the blow meditated by the people against themselves, until reason, justice, and truth, can regain the authority over the public mind."

These are the sentiments of James Madison. Now, sir, we know that the Senate is reduced to a state of absolute submission-given over to the guidance of every popular gale blown up by the artifices of as unprincipled and reckless a class of men as ever made their appearance in any age or country. If the sea of public sentiment, thrown into commotion by the puffings of that great political bellows, the Globe, shall happen to set in half a dozen different directions in the same fortnight, the unhappy Senate must tack and change its course as often, or be denounced as contumacious, and opposed to the voice of the people. In truth, the Senate described by Madison is no more. It is the most supple and compliant body of the two, not only as regards the sudden impulses of popular feeling, but also the mandates of power.

But, further, as to the Senate. The members of that body were designed by the authors of the constitution to be the advisers and counsellors of the President in the exercise of the appointing power. It is remarkable that it was the early opinion of both Mr. Jefferson and Colonel Hamilton, the leaders of the two extremes in politics, that the concurrence of the Senate was necessary before the President could remove a public officer; but I do not mean to press this point, nor do I wish to disturb the settled doctrine in relation to it. It is certain that the Senate was designed by the constitution to be taken into the council of the President in making trea ties, as well as in making the most important appointments, when it prescribed, as a condition to the validity of all treaties and appointments, "the advice and consent of the Senate." But, sir, while the power of the veto, vested in the President over the proceedings of Congress, flourishes in excess, what has become of a similar power in the Senate over the treaties and appointments of the President? Abrogated, rescinded, expunged, practically, from the constitution, and tram

[JAN. 25, 1837.

pled uuder foot. If any Senator shall dare to oppose any important nomination of the President, or to question the propriety of a treaty, he is denounced as the tool of a faction, or, if he belongs to the dominant party, his conduct is instantly branded as an act of infidelity to the party! Then, sir, I repeat that the Senate no longer exercises its most important constitutional functions; and that the design of its peculiar structure is defeated. It is also manifest that a revolution has taken place in the practical operation of the Government.

But there are other symptoms, indicating a highly diseased state of the body politic. The charges upon the people-the permanent annual expenditures of the Government-have been increased ten milions, or nearly a hundred per cent., during the present administration, and chiefly within the last two years! And, after careful examination, I am able to state, further, that this estimate of the astonishing increase of the public burdens is exclusive of the increased amount of pensions granted under the present administration, and of the large sums paid in extinguishing the Indian title to the public lands! The entire charge upon the people for support of the Government of their choice, in all the various departments of the public service, did not exceed twelve millions and a half, exclusive of the public debt, when the present Chief Magistrate assumed the management of public affairs. The present annual charge upon the people, for the same objects, and which appear to be permanent, exceeds twenty-three millions! What do you say, sir, to an increase of ten millions in eight years, and this under an administration which ousted the preceding one upon a charge of profligacy and extravagance, and came in pledged to retrenchment and reform? But what is still more surprising is, that none of the great establishments for the public defence have received any considerable augmentation in the mean time. Notwithstanding the liberal annual appropriations for the increase and support of the navy, that branch of the public defence was, last year, notoriously in a most disgraceful state of dilapidation; and what is still more surpri sing, although we have confessedly a military President, yet at no period since the foundation of the Goverment was the army in a more deplorable condition, nor our military operations more discreditable to the country! I affirm that the military service of the coun try is, at this moment, in the last stage of disorder and imbecility. Our officers, of the highest merit, are dis contented and dispirited; our highest military talents dis credited by defective organization, and the want of du attention and co-operation on the part of the Executive Government. Three major generals have had thei "Northern laurels converted into Southern willows" i the course of little more than twelve months, and th spectacle has been exhibited of a handful of savages se ting at defiance the arms and resources of this grea confederated republic for years! Yet all that devote and gallant men could do, unsupported by the Gover ment, has been done by the subordinate officers and so diers, both regulars and volunteers. These Indian war which will have cost the Government fifteen millions b fore they are concluded, it is now sufficiently manifes had their origin in the gross misconduct of our agent the frauds of our own citizens upon the Indians, and th culpable neglect, if not connivance, of the Governmen wars which have entailed disgrace upon our arms and stain upon our national character! Let us hear no mo of the moneys extorted, by the energy and address the President, from foreign Powers, when, for eve million thus restored to the pockets of our merchan the people are taxed two millions, by reason of the gr neglect of our domestic affairs.

I omit to notice the deranged condition of the curre cy and of exchange, because that is a subject whi

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must, for a long time, be judged of by prejudice. But I cannot pass over, in this enumeration of the actual state of the country, the condition of the public press. The great source of light and knowledge has been corrupted by the patronage which has been lavished upon it by this House and by the Executive Government. The most important instrument employed in the moral improvement of society has been polluted and broken up. No one knows what to believe or disbelieve, unless he shall have the evidence of personal knowledge and confidence. I, of course, do not mean that there are no exceptions among the public journals, which come under this description. A morbid appetite bas been created, and fostered chiefly by the example of the official organ, (the Globe,) for violent denunciation, insective, and calumny; and party excitement and prejudices have risen to such excess, that the mass of the followers of the leaders on either side are prone to rush into the most ruinous extremes, to gratify their own or their leaders' passions or interest, heedless of truth, reckless of justice, and often, no doubt, unconscious of the injury which they inflict upon the country. When the most important branches of the public service have thus been neglected, and suffered to fall into disorder; when our arms are disgraced, the national justice compromitted, our expenditures doubled, and our free Government changed in its practical operation; what great boon has the administration, under which all these things have come to pass, bestowed upon the country by way of recompense? It has been able to propagate itself! This, the chief end of its existence, and the only single object kept in view from the beginning to the end of it, bas been accomplished! A man has been elevated to the presidency who could and did boast, before the American people and the whole world, that he accounted it glory enough for him to have served under such a chief as General Jackson! And our boasted institutions have so soon developed such a result! The profound observer of the causes of human events will seek no other evidence, require no better proof than this simple fact, to convince him that the sun of American liberty is suffering an eclipse.

Is there nothing in this extraordinary catalogue, this enumeration of alarming results in the action of our cherished political system, to awaken inquiry or excite the fears of the patriotic citizen? But I have omitted to notice the most striking anomaly, the greatest phenomenon of the times. After all that I have said of the deranged and distempered condition of public affairs, I am still obliged to confess that the administration, which is justly responsible for every evil of the times, is popular. But it must be borne in mind that there are various kinds of popularity. It may be with administrations as it some. mes happens to individuals, that the glare of a single splendid achievement has been sufficient to cover over, as with a mantle, the errors and irregularities of a whole Life, and still leave the fortunate actor in good odor with the public. Popularity, in general, follows success in all daring enterprises, and often when they are unlawful. It follows that popularity is not always the best test of merit or general propriety; it is sometimes artificial, facious, and more seeming than real. When real, it is often the homage of the profligate and interested who are bought, or of the credulous and ignorant who are deluded. Then, whether popularity attaches to individsals or administrations, it does not always augur well for republic. Without undertaking to decide upon which of these bases the popularity of this administration Bands, I refer to the fact that it is popular merely as a further proof of the novel and alarming developments of our favorite system of government.

Now, sir, I proceed to notice the general nature and character of the malady which is attended with so many

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bad symptoms. Whence the action of our chosen form of government, in so many essential branches of it, so contrary to all that was hoped and predicted of its results by its immortal founders? I will endeavor to expound to you. In the first place, the patronage of the Government, we shall find, upon inquiry, to have been extended immeasurably beyond any thing anticipated, or even conjectured, by the framers of the constitution. I had occasion to refer to the historical fact, in addressing the House upon another subject, at a former session, that the entire patronage of the Post Office Department was wholly unnoticed and disregarded in the estimate of the amount of patronage about to be conferred upon the Federal Government by the adoption of the constitution in its present form. This single branch of patronage, unforeseen and unprovided against by the illustrious authors of the constitution, is now perhaps greater in influence than all the other branches put together. So erring and short-sighted are the wisest of mortals! In the second place, the weight and influence of this extended amount of patronage in the hands of the Executive, as an engine of power, has been increased one hundred fold, of late, by the unconstitutional abuse of it, as I will presently demonstrate. All former calculations of the probable amount and influence of patronage in our scheme of government are thus baffled and set at defiance. Some degree of influence, through the use of patronage, may be admissible in the Executive, in order to secure proper talents and respect for the office of President, and to insure a due co-operation from the other departments of the Government; but the basis of this influence has recently been enlarged to an extent which must, in the end, if not narrowed down, terminate in the entire destruction and overthrow of our system. A great misfortune is, that every other evil necessarily incident to a free Government is increased in an equal ratio. The same increase and abuse of patronage which have concentrated all power in the hands of the Executive has imparted a new stimulus, and consequently given increased fury, to party feeling and party contests. The competition for honors and offices, always a prolific source of party divisions in a free Government, has, by the multiplication of vacancies and the tenure of party service by which offices are held, become so fierce as to threaten the peace and security-much more, the comfort and happiness of society. From the same cause has also sprung the polluted and prostituted condition of the public press, and every other corruption of the times. The abuse of patronage is the Pandora's box of our system; it is the original sin of our political condition, to which every other sin of the times may be fairly ascribed.

It is idle, Mr. Speaker, it is in vain to point out, from year to year, in this hall, as has been done, the existence of the grossest irregularities and abuses in every branch of the public service. It is in vain that these abuses and corruptions shall be stripped of their disguises, and portrayed to the country in all the disgusting deformity with which a rich imagination, and an eloquence not often surpassed in this or any other country, can invest them. It is in vain that we institute investigations; resolve upon retrenchment and reform; that we enact laws to multiply checks, and increase the accountability of public officers. It will be only cutting off the beads of the Hydra, which will be eternally reproduced, until we shall have the courage to attack and destroy the monster itself. All, all, sir, will be vain, while we suffer the original source of the evil to remain undisturbed. I repeat that it is labor thrown away, it is time and talent exhausted in fruitless efforts, to pursue with research, however relentless and penetrating, the authors of corruption, of fraud and peculation, in the public offices, while the prolific parent of all is permitted to survive. When was

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Freedom of Elections.

[JAN. 25, 1837.

more time, a greater proportion of business talent, more or Eastern States, who will be bold enough to deny the patient investigation, bestowed upon such subjects than charge. In the South and Southwest, I admit, public at the close of the late administration? When was the sentiment has restrained the course of the administration, public mind better prepared, not only to sustain and and but few instances are to be found in these sections; carry out, but, as it appeared to me at the time, to com- but still, even there public officers have been taught that pel the execution of the plan of reform then pointed they indulge their independent sentiments at the hazard out and announced to the country? But, sir, such was of their places. I have heard it stated, and I believe it the charm of a new administration, so powerful was the to be true, that upwards of one thousand removals have effect of the siren whispers of executive power, that the been made since General Jackson came into office; and commotion which had so recently threatened to unhinge that, in almost every case, the only reason which could society itself was suddenly hushed into a dead calm; and with truth or plausibility be assigned for them was their it has so turned out, that all the vices of the late admin-politics. If we examine into the effect of this system of istration, which gave rise to so much excitement, would pun shment, we shall find that a few removals, judiciousnot constitute a tithe of those, of the same nature, and ly distributed over the Union, would have all the effect, others even of a more wicked and mischievous charac-in general, of a much greater number. Acting upon ter, which exist at the present moment. As a most conclusive proof that we do not set about reform at the right point, or in the right way, I refer to the enormous mass of abuses which were lately laid bare in the Post Office Department. These abuses were accumulating for years; they were repeatedly charged to exist; but inquiry was evaded from year to year, until, like the smothered flames of a pent-up and consuming fire, they burst forth at once into light, too gross to be any longer concealed from the public eye. Well, sir, do we find the progress of abuses and corruption in the other departments of the public service checked by that disclosure? Not at all. Is the Post Office itself free from abuses? I answer, it is not. The administration, which winked at the abuses of the Post Office Department for so many years, instead of suffering any disparagement in public estimation on that account, acquired new laurels and increased popularity from its ready condescension in taking upon itself the reorganization of the Department and the reform of abuses, the moment they could no longer conceal their existence from the public. I beg leave, in connexion with this subject, to notice some portion of the remarks made in this House, not long since, by a gentleman from Obio, [Mr. HAMER.] That gentleman took upon himself, rather hazardously, I think, to say that the charge of abuses in the administration was unfounded; and he said he knew about as much, in relation to the subject, as those who made the charges. That gentleman should remember that such was the unvarying response, session after session, in regard to the abuses in the Post Office Department. At the same time a gentleman, distinguished for his skill as a criminal lawyer, was placed at the head of the Committee on the Post Office in the Senate, and was heard to boast of his service to the administration in shielding the Department from the attacks of a powerful opposition! The denial of the gentleman [Mr. HAMER] is about as much to be relied upon now as were those made three years ago. But, sir, I am digressing from my subject. I was endeavoring to show that the only true and effective reform will be, to curb the abuse of patronage. Sir, if we should this day reduce the patronage of the Government one half, and suffer the remaining half to be administered upon the principles practised upon of late, it would still be sufficient in amount to taint the whole country; to make the business of politics a traffic in corruption, and drive every man of spirit and principle from the public service.

I come now, sir, to notice and identify the specific vices, in the action of the Government, which I regard as the cause and source of all public abuses of which we complain. I have given a summary of them in the preamble to the bill under consideration.

The first clause of that preamble assumes that the practice of removal from office, for opinion's sake, has prevailed under the present administration. Can there be a question as to the fact? I know there is no gentleman upon this floor, who represents any of the Northern

this principle, to some extent, the whole army of officals was decimated at the commencement of this administration. Sir, under the direction of a skilful tactician, ten removals would be sufficient to keep ten thousand office-holders in obedience. But, notwithstanding the general notoriety of this practice in some sections of the Union, there are districts in the South and Southwest in which its existence is denied. I do not mean to trouble the House with proofs, in detail, at present. I will content myself with affirming that this practice has been pursued in some sections of the Union to a most shameful extent. I have myself heard gentlemen of influence and standing in the party, from every quarter of the country, avow and vindicate the propriety of such a prac. tice. I confess I never heard any man defend a proposition so monstrous to my mind, who, in my opinion, had ever troubled himself to inquire what was either right or wrong in the practice, or who cared whether it could be defended upon principle or not; they were what are called good party men, and they feared no other responsibility. A good party man, we know, sir, fears neither God nor his own conscience, provided his party approve his conduct. I am able, sir, to make this further statement upon this subject, that I have heard gentlemen of distinction, as party leaders, maintain the doctrine that by no other device or invention can a party be kept together; that is to say, that bribery and corruption are the only lasting cements of party! It is not only the party in power which practices upon this odious policy. I am sorry to say that the opposition is not entirely free from this sin. In several of the States, as I am informed, where they have chanced at any time to succeed in the State elections, the practice has been to sweep the public of fices of every incumbent, from the highest to the lowest even a petty receiver of tolls, or a lock-keeper ̄upon a canal, cannot escape their proscriptive vengeance. Such a practice I consider a disgrace to any Government, but more especially to a free Government like our own. Νοι do I believe that any Government can continue free un der its operation. All party divisions must soon come to be founded upon the desire and a calculation of the chances of office among politicians; all elections mus come to be a mere contest for the offices and employ ments of state; and there can be but one end to such system: first, general corruption; and, finally, violenc and disorganization. I can neither sympathize with no wish success to one party more than another, whethe the contest be for power in the State or in the Feders Government, when both are, in my judgment, alike me cenary, corrupt, and unprincipled. Sir, when I think the effect of this precedent, or rather what must be th effect of this practice of removal for opinion's sake, whe it shall once be fully established and acquiesced in, I a utterly amazed that any public man who countenance such a practice should escape the open expression public indignation, instead of receiving the applause an support of the people. What is the inevitable tendend of this practice? To corrupt, to reduce to the

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Freedom of Elections.

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dition of mere creatures of executive will, every man who fills any office or holds any employment under Gov. ernment; to compel them, whatever may be their own sentiments, or whatever they may think of the conduct of our administration, to support its measures, right or wrong, or be driven from their places. Since the precedent has been established of a Government candidate for the presidency, they must support him also under a ke penalty. It is proper, upon a question of this magnitude, to have clear ideas. I have said that this system tends to corrupt the public officers. What is corruption? Whenever any public officer or other citizen is induced, either by the hope of office or promotion, or the This practice is also denounced in the preamble as a fear of losing an office or employment already in his high misdemeanor in any public officer who is guilty of possession, to give his influence or vote in favor of any it. After what I have already said, I believe I need not man's election, contrary to his private unbiased judg-occupy the time of the House in establishing this point. ment, it is a case of corruption.

But it is further declared, in the preamble to the bill which I have had the honor to submit, that the practice of removals from office for opinion's sake is an attack upon the public liberty. It is so. Whoever weakens or destroys any of the great and fundamental securities of the public liberty, attacks liberty herself. The elective franchise is undoubtedly the foundation stone of liberty in this country; and he who seeks to corrupt it is a fue to that liberty which it was intended to secure, and which cannot survive the loss of its purity and independence. Every public officer who avows and practices upon this policy is, in practice, a foe to the liberties of his country.

Any public officer who violates the freedom of elections is guilty of a high misdemeanor. Any officer who attacks the public liberty, by the corruption of any of its guards, is surely guilty of a high misdemeanor. But I will establish this proposition by an authority higher than mine, or any other living authority, however great and venerable. When the question was raised, in 1789, whether the President possessed the power of removal, under the constitution, without the consent of the Sen. ate, Mr. Madison maintained the affirmative of the proposition; and in answer to the objection that such a power would enable the President to exercise a dangerous control over the public officers, and cause them to become the creatures of his will, Mr. Madison contended, in an able argument, that no such danger was to be apprehended, for the reason" that the wanton remo. val of meritorious officers would subject him to impeachment and removal from his own high trust." To displace a worthy man from office, Mr. Madison was of opinion, would be an act of male administration, and consequently subject the President to an impeachment. The sentiments of Mr. Jefferson, in reply to an applica tion from his republican fellow-citizens of Wilmington, to remove an officer of the customs against whom no charge of official delinquency could be made out, was worthy of his high character and known devotion to the principles of civil liberty.

In the preamble to the bill which I have submitted for the action of the House, the practice of removal from office upon political grounds is denounced as a violation of the freedom of elections. It is so. Every improper or undue influence, or, in other words, every interest or temptation brought to bear upon the mind of a qualified elector, in Great Britain, to induce him to vote for men or measures contrary to the suggestions of his free and unbiased judgment, has ever been declared by the laws, and denounced by every commentator upon the British constitution, as a violation of the freedom of elections. Elections cannot be free where the voters or electors are either bribed by actual gifts or the promise of office, on the one hand, or intimidated by the fear of the loss of office, and often the means of subsisting their families, to support any particular candidate for the presidency or vice presidency. The elective franchise, or the right of the people to choose their own legislative or executive functionaries, so far from being an adequate security for the protection of the great objects for which Government was establisned, if it may be made dependent upon and subservient to the will of any man, or any set of men, will be no security at all. It will be a mere mockeryan imposition upon the people. It will only afford an opportunity to the ambitious and unprincipled to possess themselves of unlawful power, through the medium of the ordinary constitutional forms. By the theory of the constitution, all elections are to be determined by the will or choice of a majority of the qualified electors in the several States; and this is the means provided for securing a good administration and preventing a bad one-for putting good men into office and power, and keeping out bad ones. But here are one hundred thousand voters or electors, who come to the polls and declare not their own will and choice, but the will of those who gave them their employments, and who hold the power of dispossessing them. Power over a man's support and the subsistence of his family is, in general, power over his will. I am not left free to vote as I please, in elections, when I am made to understand that the office or employment which gives me bread, or supplies my family with the comforts of lfe, will be taken from me if I do not vote for a paricular candidate; and the election is not free in which one hundred thousand such votes are given. If it be said that there are not so many office-holders, I answer that all who are employed on the public works of any kind, The second clause of the preamble to the bill declares and all who are engaged in furnishing supplies, or in any that the interference of public officers in elections is a manner dependent upon the Government, may be fairly gross abuse. I have already remarked that it was a very included in the number. Let it not be said that the fallacious view to take of this subject, to say that one amber is at last insignificant. The power of the office- hundred thousand votes was the extent of the power of holders is immense, if we estimate their votes at one of the office-holders, and other dependents of the Govbundred thousand only. We have seen, by the result of ernment, in elections. The doctrine now is, that it is the recent election, that the individual votes of the de- the duty of the office-holders, not only to vote in elec pendents upon the Government were sufficient to decide tions in favor of the administration candidates, but to the vote of several of the States. But this is a very fal- support them with all their influence and all their enious view to take of the powers of the official corps inergy. Such is the necessary result of the doctrine that elections, as I will presently show.

"We have," said that illustrious man," no passions or interests different from those of our fellow-citizens. We have the same object, the success of representative government. Nor are we acting for ourselves alone, but for the whole human race. The event of our experiment is to show whether man can be trusted with self-government. The eyes of suffering humanity are fixed on us with anxiety, as their only hope; and on such a theatre, and for such a cause, we must suppress all smaller passions and local considerations. The leaders of federalism say that man cannot be trusted with his own government. We must do no act which will replace them in the direction of the experiment. We must not, by any departure from principle, dishearten the mass of our fellow-citizens who have confided to us this interesting cause."

If, sir, we are disposed to be guided by the authority of the great founder of our system, we have it here presented in the most authentic form.

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