he contends, ought to be voted, because it does not exceed the usual amount annually appropriated to the same objects. Sir, it is true that this does not exceed the amount usually appropriated, but the honorable gentle man has omitted to inform us that there was, on the 1st of January, a balance of upwards of six hundred thousand dollars remaining in the Treasury of the appro priations of the last year to the same objects, besides between two and three hundred thousand in the hands of the disbursing officers yet unexpended. He has neglected to inform us that, in fact, about nine hundred thousand dollars of the last year's appropriations to fortifications remain to be expended during the present year; for I take it for granted that the work upon the fortifications has not been persisted in to any great extent during the winter. Thus, sir, instead of the amount proposed to be applied to this branch of the public service, during the present year, we propose to apply double that amount. Is there any thing in the present high prices of labor and materials, any thing in the great demand for laborers of all kinds, or is there any thing in the present prospect of peace with all nations, which calls for this unusual amount to be applied to fortifications? Are we not pushing these works too rapidly to admit of solid constructions? But, sir, (said Mr. B.,) I do not attach much importance to this view of the subject. Not only double, but treble and quadruple the amount of these appropriations can be expended by the Government, if it is found necessary in order to increase appropriations-if we shall, by our imprudent compliance with the demand of the Executive, encourage a race between appropriations and disbursements-if the appropriations are to be increased according to the ability of the Government to expend, or rather waste, as much as this House shall, from year to year, be found willing to appropriate. I repeat, if this shall be the measure of our appropriations, we need not care how large they are, they will all be expended.

Mr. CAMBRELENG, in answer to the remarks of the gentleman from Tennessee, [Mr. BELL,] in relation to excess of appropriations in the Treasury, said he had only to remark that there was a great deal of deception in relation to those appropriations; because, although the money was in the Treasury, in most cases the works for which it was appropriated were already under con tract. The Committee of Ways and Means were at one time of opinion with the gentleman from Tennessee. They, knowing that there were large amounts of money on hand in the Treasury, made inquiries at the proper departments, and ascertained that, although there was a surplus on hand at present, yet the probability was that the appropriations would fall short du ring the ensuing year.

Mr. C. then sent to the Clerk's table a report from the engineer department, showing the objects for which the appropriations were required, which showed that all the appropriations proposed in the bill would be needed during the ensuing year.

Mr. WILLIAMS, of North Carolina, advocated the amendment of the gentleman from Tennessee, on the ground of its recognising a system of permanent distribution, from which he (Mr. W.) could see no possible

evil that could result.

Mr. GARLAND, of Virginia, said, that having voted for the deposite act of the last session, and intending to vote against the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Tennessee, he felt it due to himself briefly to state the reasons which induced him to vote as he now intended to do. He said that he felt no regret for the vote which he gave for the deposite act of the last session; he not only felt no regret, but was well satisfied that the vote was right and proper; such a one as, under like circumstances, he would give again. When the depos

[FEB. 24, 1837.

ite act passed, there was a large actually existing sur plus in the Treasury, which, upon every reasonable data of calculation, would, by the close of the year, amount to about forty millions of dollars, and which had since been ascertained to be forty-two millions. Upon every reasonable basis of estimate, the accruing revenue, down to the year 1842, would be equal to, and perhaps more, than what ought to be the actual wants and expenditures of the Government. In this state of things, this immense amount of revenue would, without some disposition of it, remain unemployed in the hands of the Federal Government, or be employed by the deposite banks for their individual profit. He said he need not say that he thought it too dangerous to permit such an immense amount of unappropriated money to remain for so long a time in the hands of the Government unemployed for any public purpose; that he would not trust this Government with such immense means of patronage and corruption, be it administered by whom it might. There is nothing so dangerous in its employment, or corrupting in its use, as money; and he did not regard any Government so inflexible in its virtue, or so far above the reach of temptation, as to trust it unnecessa. rily with means of so extraordinary and dangerous temptation.

of

He said that he was clearly convinced of the proprie ty of this sentiment, from the fact that this Government, not the executive administration, but the Government, was daily making rapid advances in the exercise of pow ers, and the increase of expenditure and patronage, not warranted by the constitution, and dangerous to the rights of the States and the liberties of the people. In appropriations, which were daily sought, for bays, harbors, roads, canals, and other like subjects, many them of a trivial and unimportant character, were indi cated a continued increase of the expenditures of this Government, and consequently the enlargement of its sphere of patronage, of a most fearful character; indications which, he candidly acknowleged, were at war with those principles of economy and simplicity which should never be lost sight of in the administration of this Government. He begged every gentleman to look at the progress of expenditure, and the indications of the future, from bills now pending, and be admonished of the necessity of a more vigilant watchfulness over the taxing and appropriating power of this Government.

He said he was unwilling to leave this immense amount of money, improperly and unnecessarily collected from the tax-paying part of the community, in the possesion of the deposite banks, to strengthen their means of speculation, always of a demoralizing tendency, and improve their profits at the expense of the people; profits which would annually exceed two millions of dollars. Between these two alternatives and that of a deposite in the State treasuries a choice was to be made; either choice was an evil, and the choice was between evils. He voted to place the funds in the State treasuries, because, in doing so, he voted to take this immense means of temptation to prodigal and extravagant expenditures, of corrupting tendency, from this Government, and took from the banks the means of extended speculations and enormous profits on money not belonging to them, but properly belonging to the people, and placed the sur plus revenue where its profits could be employed by the State Governments for the benefit of the people, from whom it had been unconstitutionally drawn. The sur plus was then an actual existing evil, tangible in form and shape, produced by accidental, uncontrollable cir cumstances. For this evil a remedy was necessary; the remedy which was applied, although an admitted evil, was the least which could be applied to such a dangerous disease.

He said he would remark one thing: that among all

the objections which had been urged to that measure, from whatever sources they came, none had recom mended a better remedy for the existing evil. Mr. G. said that the reasons which had induced him to vote for the bill of the last session did not now exist; then there was an actual existing surplus; now there was none; the amendment proposed was in anticipation of a surplus. He would not take so important and dangerous a step until the evil actually existed to render it necessary; he would not anticipate it, for he hoped and believed it would not exist, and the adoption of this amendment might prevent the reduction of the tariff, the proper remedy for a surplus. He said that, according to the estimates of the Treasury Department, the revenue of the current year would be about twenty-five millions of dollars.

Of the appropriations for the last year, $14,000,000 would be chargeable upon the revenue of the current year, on account of the operation of the deposite act. The estimate of appropriations for the service of the current year is $25,000,000. He did not doubt that, although it should not, it will be more, which will, taking these estimates to be true, leave a deficit to be drawn from the deposites with the States; but admitting the estimate to be too low, as to the receipts from the public lands, and that they will equal the last year's sales, then, under any circumstances, the surplus will not exceed $8,000,000. In addition to this, he said it was proper to remark that large appropriations might yet be required to suppress Indian hostilities, and, if he did not mistake the signs of the times, large appropriations might be necessary to meet a conflict of a far more formidable and expensive character than any which we have had with the Indian tribes. For these reasons, if he had no other, he said he should vote against this amendment.

Mr. G. said that, when he voted for the deposite act of the last session, he voted for it as being, what it professed to be, a mere deposite act, and not a distribution act in disguise, as it had been frequently characterized; nor did he intend to adopt the principles of that bill as a system; for if the deposite principle is to be adopted as a system, he would prefer the constitutional principle proposed by a distinguished Senator from South Caroli na, as more just and more equal in its operation. He said that he was utterly and entirely opposed to the distribution principle; it was corrupting in its operations and dangerous in its tendencies.

If the system be adopted, there can be no doubt that, under our indirect and insidious system of taxation, the State Governments would ultimately look to this Government for the means of conducting their domestic works and sustaining their domestic institutions; that they would make diligent and active search for every possible subject of expenditure, until, finally, the people and the State Governments would cease to watch the pecuniary operations of the Federal Government with their accustomed vigilance, and make no effort to arrest its march to consolidation, and, finally, be ingulfed in its corrupting influence. The demands of the States would be met by corresponding taxation here, and a surplus produced for the purpose of distribution. He regarded this system, as many distinguished gentlemen had heretofore regarded it, the most dangerous and corrupting which could be incorporated into our legislation.

Mr. G. said that the true remedy was to reduce the taxation of the people to the wants of the Government, and the wants of the Government to the most economiical expenditure; economy and simplicity being essential to purity, and purity to the maintenance of republican institutions. He said, Mr. Chairman, we must come to it; we must reduce the expenditures of this Government and the taxes of the people; this they will compel you to do, if they properly regard their rights and their liberties.

[H. of R.

Sir, this Government has no right to burden the taxpaying community to raise a surplus for any purpose of distribution whatever. The money beyond the demands of the Government is most secure, and most equally distributed, by remaining in the pockets of its rightful owners, (the people,) from whence, by the constitution, it ought not to be drawn except for constitutional objects. He said he could not anticipate bat with the most fearful apprehension any system which should prevent the States from relying upon their own resources for their domestic purposes, and cause them to rely upon this Government. He could not, under any circumstances, sanction such a principle. He thought there was a salutary lesson af forded in the scramble which had been produced in some of the State Legislatures for the disposition of their portions of the surplus given to them under the first experi

ment.

Mr. G. said he had another strong objection to the adoption of the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Tennessee, [Mr. BELL.] It was, in effect, a deposite law, sought to be ingrafted upon a simple appro priation bill, embracing subjects totally distinct and dissimilar in their characters; upon the same principle, a tariff or any other incongruous law might be ingrafted upon an appropriation bill, and produce the greatest confusion upon the statute book. He thought that there ought to be the greatest possible system and congruity attainable in the framing of our laws. If he were otherwise favorable to the amendment, he would not vote for its adoption as an amendment to this bill.

Mr. UNDERWOOD was in favor of the amendment of the gentleman from Tennessee, because the object of it was to send the money back to the people, instead of keeping it in the vaults of the deposite banks, to enrich their stockholders, and add to the salary of their agent at Washington. He went on to point out the large increase in the number of deposite banks, especially in the State of New York, within the last year, and contended those banks were selected, and favored, with a view to aid the administration in carrying out its political views. He then contrasted the amount of public money on deposite in the banks in New York, Philadel phia, Baltimore, Cincinnati, and Michigan, and attributed this difference more to the fact that some of those banks paid a contribution to an agent at Washington, and some did not, than to any thing else; and invariably, said he, those banks who pay a good sum to an agent get the largest amount of deposite. He feared there was some improper influence at work in the selection of these banks, and therefore he wished the source of corruption to be removed; and he considered this proposition as the best means of removing it.

Mr. GARLAND then asked the permission of his friend from Kentucky to explain; which being granted, he said that the selected banks for the deposite of the public money were not restricted as to the amount of deposites which they might receive by the amount of their capital previous to the deposite act of the last session, and that several of them had an amount on deposite equal to, if not beyond, their capital; that, by the deposite act of the last session, the Secretary of the Treasury was bound to withdraw from any bank the excess of public deposites beyond three fourths of their capital, and to place the excess in some other bank. This act rendered it neces sary, during the last summer and autumn, to make many selections of new banks. This was particularly neces sary in New York, because more than half the revenue from imports is collected in the city of New York.

The transfers which were made necessary in the execution of the deposite act did not necessarily take effect immediately, but in the usual periods of all transfers, having reference to the amount, and the distance the money was to be sent. Mr. G. said, if his friend from

Kentucky would put himself to the trouble of going to the Department and examining the proceedings of the Department, he would be perfectly satisfied that this matter was all right and proper, and that the law had been executed without any reference to electioneering purposes whatever, but in perfect good faith.

Mr. UNDERWOOD having inquired what were Mr. GARLAND's views as to the proceeds of the public landsMr. GARLAND said he would, without hesitation, answer the question, as he had no wish to conceal any opin ion he entertained. He said that, in all the acts of cession of the public lands from the States, he regarded the intention of the cessions to be to create a common fund for the common benefit of the States, to be applied to the general benefit of all the States in their federative character, and not for the individual use of any single State, or for distribution among them, in equal portions, for their separate, unconnected, individual use. He regarded the proceeds of the sales of the public lands as constituting a part of the revenue of the country, to be disposed of in the same way and under the same constitutional restrictions as revenue derived from any other source; that, to the principal tax-paying States, this appropriation of it was most beneficial, as, to that amount, it would diminish the onerous effect of the present op. pressive tariff. He said that he was opposed, upon constitutional grounds, to giving away a single acre of the public lands, or one dollar of its proceeds; that he was opposed to any pre-emption bill upon principle; and that he preferred selling the public lands, restricting inordinate speculations, bringing into the Treasury the proceeds, and, to their amount, reducing the revenue from imports.

Mr. MANN submitted an amendment to the amendment, providing that the deposite should be in proportion to the ratio of representation in the House of Representatives of the United States.

Mr. M. asked, where was the necessity of the proposition of the gentleman from Tennessee? Or had the gentleman any data upon which to estimate the amount of money to be appropriated under that proposition? And could they adopt it without that? The gentleman should have done what was done by an honorable Senator-introduced it at an early period of the session; for this amendment and that bill were identical. If, however, it should be adopted, Mr. M. had prepared his amendment to prevent the repetition of one of the greatest constitutional outrages that had ever taken place since the formation of this Government-indirectly done, to be sure, but not the less grievous. By the distribution law-for he would call it by its right name, it was "distribution," though a mental reservation had been made by the use of the word “ deposite"--the people of the large States had been sacrificed to the interest of those of the small States. He was opposed to distribution in any way whatever; and, even if his amendment should be incorporated in the provision under consideration, it would still be open to all his objections, though it would render it less unjust in its operation. He expressed his surprise at such a measure coming from the quarter it did. What bad become of the once cherished Stateright doctrines? Where the doctrine of a strict construction of the constitution? Was it the design to continue the present oppressive system of taxation, for the purpose of collecting large amounts of money from the people, to distribute it back in an unequal ratio, with the loss to the whole people of the enormous expenses of collection? He entered his solemn protest against the whole principle.

Mr. GIDEON LEE said be rose first to correct the error of the gentleman from Kentucky. He charges that the distribution of the public money, under the law of June last, has been made with political views, with

[Fвв. 24, 1837.

party purposes and motives, and cites the history of the removal in the city of New York.

He informs us that, immediately prior to the election, the funds, which had long been deposited in but three banks, on the eve of the election were distributed among eleven banks; and he asks what motive but party motives could have induced the removal, when three banks, or one bank, could have kept the money quite as safely.

Mr. Chairman, the facts are briefly these: you collect seventeen millions of revenue in that city; twelve mil lions lay in the three deposite banks on the date of the passage of the distribution bill in June last. I deem it most improper and improvident to leave such large sums in any bank, amounting to the double of their aggregate capital; so this Congress held; and one of the material essential provisions of the deposite bill was that no bank should hold an amount of public money exceeding three fourths of the capital of such bank. The whole amount of the bank capital of that city is nominally eighteen millions and a half of dollars; several of those banks would not take it. I myself advised one, in which I have some interest, not to accept the trust; it must soon be repaid; it was soon to be distributed; the receiving bank would certainly loan it; it would get invested in Western lands or city lots, or India voyages, and could

not be reached in time.

Well, sir, seven millions and a half must be removed, besides the large daily accruing revenue; the law was imperative; the coercion of the law was the motive, and not party politics, as the gentleman alleges, which distributed the money from three to eleven banks. I know the facts as to the city: party have no view or influence; the law made the distribution; and, so far as I have made myself acquainted with the distribution in all the State, and I have spent much time and pains to inform myself, no equal sum of money was ever removed with so much skill, care, and prudence.

No financier, perhaps, was ever employed in a task so delicate or difficult; compelled by law to remove nearly forty millions of money, in direct violation of all the laws of trade, against all the usual currents of money. Every financial man anticipated deep injury, perhaps ruin. I call on every financial man in this House to show me how Mr. Woodbury could have performed this unprece dented duty with less injury to the pecuniary concerns of the nation.

Mr. Chairman, it was not my purpose to say a word on this or any other question. We bave but a few remaining days, and I feel deeply the obligation to waste no time in mere words; but, being on, the floor, I must briefly notice the merits of the question. It is precisely another distribution bill. I shudder at a second distribution; though I feel too deeply the scenes we have just passed, or now passing.

Mr. Chairnian, I rarely give reasons for my vole. I shall, however, vote against this amendment, on the ground I voted against the distribution law of June; it is the same thing; my views are unchanged. I vote against it, because it leads to the collection of money which the owners had better keep than the Government; because it levies money for a purpose which the constitution docs not warrant; because it corrupts our election; because members of Congress will be chosen in reference to the amount of money they will pledge themselves to draw from the federal coffers, and plant in their several districts-I know the fact, that electioneering on this principle is now in process; because I believe that, sooner or later, the inevitable effect will be to vote as little as possible for federal purposes: to withhold from the army, the navy, the fortifications, the proper necessary appro priations, and, finally, render the Federal Government a mere rope of sand.

returned to those who had paid it there. In that way alone could justice be done to the people of his own State, to the people of the whole Western country.

He stood there not to arouse sectional prejudices. He had no disposition to make appeals to any particular section of the country. It was the duty of that House to legislate for the whole country; and he was ready to carry out such a system of legislation. If the Atlantic coast needed fortifications, he was disposed to vote for them; and, after voting to expend some twenty millions of dollars on that border, he would vote for all legitimate objects of appropriation in the Western section of the country. He had voted for the amendment of the gentleman from Connecticut, [Mr. INGHAM.] He thought it ought to prevail. He could subscribe to all that bad been said in favor of it. He would also vote for the amendment of the gentleman from Maine, [Mr. PARKS, ] for he considered that appropriation necessary also. He was disposed to vote for other appropriations for works along the coast of that State. He believed it ought to be fortified. We had a question of boundary to settle there, and it might have to be settled by a resort to arms. We ought to prepare for such an event. He would vote the fifty thousand dollars; and, if that was not sufficient, he was disposed to vote a still greater amount-for five hundred thousand dollars, if the gentleman from Maine called for it. He believed it would be needed before the question of boundary was adjusted to the satisfaction of the American people.

Mr. ROBERTSON said he was, in general, much opposed to the addition of new clauses to an appropriation bill, after it had been matured by the proper committee, particularly such as introduced matters unconnected with the main objects of the bill. This mode of legislation often left no alternative but to adopt a questionable or improper principle, or reject appropriations essential to the public service. But, in the present instance, he should overcome his repugnance, and vote for the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Tennessee, [Mr. BELL.] That amendment, it was true, involved a very important principle; but it had undergone a full discus sion; indeed, it had occupied the attention of the country for years past, and had received the deliberate consideration and sanction of Congress at the last session. He presumed, therefore, that every gentleman was prepared to vote upon it.

Having formerly expressed my views (said Mr. R.) on the propriety of distributing the surplus revenue, I should not now have risen to say a word on the subject but for the remarks of the gentleman from Michigan, [Mr. CRARY] That gentleman opposes a distribution, if I understand him correctly, upon the ground that his State has contributed more than her just proportion towards the revenue; and that any distribution, therefore, by the ratio of representation, or of actual population, would do her great injustice. How is this, sir? Upon what principle was it assumed that Michigan has paid so much more than her due proportion into the public Treas ury as to be unwilling to receive her proportional part of the surplus? Are we to understand that the gentleman considers the price paid by the people of Michigan for the public lands they have purchased as money levied in the way of a tax? Then, sir, I deny the justice of the pretension. The people of the new States have, by no means, been exclusively the purchasers of the public domain lying within their respective limits. It has been purchased, and is still owned, to a considerable extent, by the citizens of the old States--New York, Virginia, and the rest. suppose this were not so. Is the ground to be taken that the price of the public lands is to be regarded as a forced contribution to the revenue? Have not the purchasers obtained a full equivalent for what they have paid, as much as if they had purchased from private proprietors' Nay,

But

[FER. 24, 1837.

sir, as is suggested near me, have they not, on an aver age, realized double and treble the amount of their investments? Will they surrender their purchases? Or will they set up a title both to the land and the money? No, sir; I am well persuaded no gentleman here will advocate so monstrous an injustice. The old States freely gave up, for the sake of harmony, a princely territory, upon the condition simply of participating, according to a stipulated ratio, in the benefits to arise from it. They have shown in this that they were capable of a generous sacrifice for the public good. But they can never acquiesce in an open and flagrant violation of their rights. Nor can their Representatives, should such an attempt be made, sit here with their arms folded and see those rights wrested from them by force or fraud. It would really seem as if this Government had forgotten the nature of their tenure, and meant to dispute the title under which alone they acquired and hold possession of that portion at least of the public domain surrendered by the States. We constantly hear of schemes to reduce the price below the fair maket value; to yield them up to those who have lawlessly entered upon them; to make even an unconditional surrender of them to the States in which they lie. There is not one of these schemes that does not violate the compact under which they are held by the United States. Let me, sir, at least remind you of the terms of the grant made by the State I have the honor to represent.

After dedicating certain portions for specific objects, among others for compensating her revolutionary soldiers, whose valor had defended them, it explicitly declares that the whole residue shall constitute a common fund, for the benefit of all the States, Virginia inclusive, in proportion to their contributions to the public, expenditure. Upon these terms alone was the surrender made and accepted; and, so long as the proceeds have been required to meet the public exigencies, all the States have enjoyed the benefits contemplated by the deeds of cession. But for some years past the increased demand for lands, arising from the rapid settlement of the new States, and an inordinate spirit of speculation, in connexion with the operation of the tariff, have poured into the Treasury a redundant revenue, which the most extravagant appropriations have not sufficed to consume. It was in this state of things that Congress, during the last session, felt itself imperiously called on to make some disposition of the immense and accumulating surplus in the Treasury among the several States. The ratio adopted may not have done exact justice to each; the new States particularly, owing to the rapid increase of their population since the last census, have not receiv ed the proportion to which the ratio of federal numbers, as prescribed by the constitution, would perhaps entitle them. But still it was a beneficent measure, checking, as it did, the wasteful extravagance of this Government, and restoring to the people what justly belonged to them; and so long as from the same sources-the proceeds of sales of the public property, or the extortions of an unjust tariff-a revenue shall be collected, more than adequate to the reasonable wants of the Government, so long will I continue to vote for restoring the surplus to its lawful owners. I beed not the outcry raised about the corrupting effects of such a measure. The Government of the United States is a mere trustee; and the States, so far at least as respects the proceeds of the lands they ceded, are no more liable to be corrupted from receiving what is due to them from the United States, than if it were due from France or England. They solicit no favor; they demand only what belongs to them. They insist only upon the performance of the trust this Government has assumed, and which it would be coerced to perform, could the question be brought before any impartial judicial tribunal. It would not be