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Propr's v. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall. 116. But a full examination of the opinion of the court shows that its judgment was based upon the ground that the foreclosure was valid, without reference to the statute of 1857, because the method pursued was in strict conformity to the mode of foreclosure authorized, when the contract was made by the laws then in existence.. Now if the State court was right in their view of the law as it stood when the contract was made, it is obvious that the mere fact that a new law was made, does not impair the obligation of the contract.

And

it is also clear that we cannot inquire whether the Supreme Court of Maine was right in that opinion. Here is therefore a clear case of a sufficient ground on which the validity of the decree of the State court could rest, even if it had been in error as to the effect of the act of 1857 in impairing the obligation of the contract. And when there is such distinct and sufficient ground for the support of the judgment of the State court, we cannot take jurisdiction, because we could not reverse the case, though they Federal question was decided erroneously in the court below against the plaintiff in error. Rector v. Ashley, 6 Wall. 142; Klinger v. Missouri, 13 id. 257; Steines v. Franklin Co., 14 id. 15. The writ of error must therefore be dismissed for want of jurisdiction." Id. 25, 26. The result of the authorities, applying to cases of contracts, the settled rules, that in order to give this court jurisdiction of a writ of error to a State court, a Federal question must have been, expressly or in effect, decided by that court, and therefore that when the record shows that a Federal question and another question were presented to that court, and its decision turned on the other question only, this court has no jurisdiction, may be summed up as follows: When the State court decides against a right claimed under a contract, and there was no law subsequent to the contract, this court clearly has no jurisdiction. When the existence and the construction of a contract are undisputed, and the State court upholds a subsequent law, on the ground that it did not impair the obligation of the admitted contract, it is equally clear that this court has jurisdiction. When the State court holds that there was a contract conferring certain rights, and that a subsequent law did not impair those rights, this court has jurisdiction to consider the true construction of the supposed contract; and if it is of opinion that it did not confer the rights affirmed by the State court, and therefore its obligation was not impaired by the subsequent law, may on that ground affirm the judgment. So when the State court upholds the subsequent law, on the ground that the contract did not confer the right claimed, this court may inquire whether the supposed contract did give the right, because if it did the subsequent law cannot be upheld. But when the State court gives no effect to the subsequent law, but decides on grounds independent of that law that the right claimed was not conferred by the contract, the case stands just as if the subsequent law had not been passed, and this court has no jurisdiction. In the present case the Supreme Court of Louisiana did not, and the plaintiff in error does not pretend that it did, give any effect to the provision of the Constitution of 1879 abolishing monopolies. Its judgment was based wholly upon the general law of the State, and upon the construction and effect of the charter from the Legislature to the plaintiff company, and of the license from the city council to the defendant company, and in no degree upon the Constitution or any law of the State subsequent to the plaintiff's charter. The case cannot be distinguished in principle from the cases above cited, in which writs of error to State courts have been dismissed for want of jurisdiction. As was said in Bank of West Tennessee v. Citizens' Bank, above cited,

"the result in this case would have been necessarily the same if the Constitution had not contained the provision in question." March 19, 1888. New Orleans Water Works Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Refining Co. Opinion by Gray, J.

OBSTRUCTION OF

WATER AND WATER-COURSES BRIDGE-COURTS-FEDERAL JURISDICTION-IMPROVE

MENTS BY CONGRESS.-(1) The act of Congress of February 14, 1859 (11 Stat. 383), admitting the State of Oregon into the Union, provides "that all the navigable waters of said State shall be common highways, and forever free, as well to the inhabitants of said State as to all other citizens of the United States, without any tax, duty, impost, or toll therefor." Held, that the act did not prohibit obstructions to the navigation of such waters, and that Congress, not having by subsequent legislation assumed police power over the Willamette river in that State, a bill by one citizen of Oregon against another to enjoin the erection of a bridge over that river at the city of Portland, authorized by an act of the State Legislature, on the ground that the bridge impeded navigation, and that the act was passed without the consent of Congress, did not present a case arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction, both parties being residents of the same State. (2) The expenditure of money by Congress in improving the Willamette river in Oregon, and the making of Portland on that river a port of entry, do not constitute an assumption by Congress of police power over that stream, in the sense that the State is thereby deprived of the power of authorizing without the consent of Congress the erection of a bridge over that river. The power of Congress to pass laws for the regulation of the navigation of public rivers, and to prevent any all obstructions therein is not questioned. But until it does pass some such law, there is no common law of the United States which prohibits obstructions and nuisances in navigable rivers, unless it be the maritime law, administered by the courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Of course where the litigant parties are citizens of different States the Circuit Courts of the United States may take jurisdiction on that ground, but on no other. This is the result of so many cases, and expressions of opinion by this court, that it is almost superfluous to the authorities on the subject. We refer to the following by way of illustration: Willson v. Creek Co., 2 Pet. 245; Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 229; Passaic Bridge cases, 3 Wall. 782; Gilman v. Philadelphia, id. 724; Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 459; Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 id. 678; Cardwell v. Bridge Co. 113 id. 205: Hamilton v. Railroad, 119 id. 280; Huse v. Glover, id. 543; Sands v. Improvement Co., 123 id. 288; Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 id. 691, 700. The usual case of course is that in which the acts complained of are clearly supported by a State statute; but that really makes no difference. Whether they are conformable or not conformable to the State law relied on is a State question, not a Federal one. The failure of State functionaries to prosecute for breaches of the State law does not confer power upon United States functionaries to prosecute under a United States law when there is no such law in existence. March 19, 1888. Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch. Opinion by Bradley, J.

ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT DECISIONS.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CORPORATIONS-CONSOLI DATION WITH FOREIGN CORPORATION.-The Constitution of Illinois, 1870, art. 11, § 11, provides that "a ma

jority of the directors of any railroad corporation, now incorporated or hereafter to be incorporated by the laws of this State, shall be citizens and residents of this State." A railroad company was chartered by the Illinois acts of 1851 and 1861, and under its charter became consolidated in 1867 with two other railroad companies, corporations of other States, and governed by a board of thirteen directors, twelve of whom are residents of other States. Held, that upon the consummation of the consolidation, a new corporation was created, which exists by virtue of the laws of the States authorizing and consenting to its organization, and that the above provision of the Constitution does not apply. A careful examination has satisfied us that the current and weight of authority establish the principle that upon the consummation of such consolidation, authorized by the laws of the States creating the constituent corporations, a new corporation will be created. Railway Co. v. Berry, 113 U. S. 465, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 529; Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319; Graham v. Railroad Co., 118 id. 161; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1009; Bridge Co. v. Mayer, 31 Ohio St. 317; Bishop v. Brainerd, 28 Conn. 289; 2 Mor. Corp., §§ 1000, 1001. The acts of the States authorizing and consenting to the consolidation are acts of incorporation. State v. Railroad Co., 66 Me. 488 (affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States, 96 U. S. 499). And the new corporation will possess, necessarily, every requisite corporate attribute. Its capital stock, corporate name and organization, board of directors, officers and managers will be such as may be authorized by the articles of consolidation and the acts of the respective States. The new corporation will, as was said in Minot v. Railroad Co., 18 Wall. 206, become vested with "the rights and privileges which the original companies had previously possessed under their respective charters-the rights and privileges in Maryland which the Maryland company had enjoyed, and the rights and privileges in Delaware which the Delaware company had there enjoyed-not to transfer to either State and enforce therein the legislation of the other. ***The new company stood in each State as the original company had previously stood in that State, invested with the same rights and subject to the same liabilities." Unlike a corporation created by a single State, which cannot migrate or legally exist outside of the territorial limits of the State of its creation, the consolidated corporation, having a capital stock which is a unit, and only one set of stockholders, who have an interest by virtue of their ownership of shares of such stock in all of its property everywhere, and a single board of directors, will have its domicile in each State; and the stockholders, directors and officers can, in the absence of any statutory provision to the contrary, hold meetings and transact corporate business in either of the States; though in its relation to either State the consolidated company will be a separate corporation, governed by the laws of that State as to its property therein, and subject to taxation in conformity with the laws of such State, and to all the police power of the State in respect of its property and franchise within such State. Graham v. Railroad Co., 118 U. S. 161; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1009; Bridge Co. v. Mayer, 31 Ohio St. 317; Sprague v. Railroad Co., 5 R. I. 233; Pierce, R. R. 20; Minot v. Railroad Co., supra. And the same rule, as to domicile, seems to apply to a case where two corporations are created by adjoining States for the improvement of a river forming the common State boundary. "Under the joint act of two States, the powers conferred to be exercised for the benefit of both may be exercised in either. The act does not require the business to be done in either State, as regards the action of the directors; the work is to be done in both." And so it was held the corporation might be sued in either State. Culbert

son v. Navigation Co., 4 McLean, 544. And to the same effect is Railroad Co. v. Railroad Co., 6 Biss. 219. This constitutional provision, by its terms, applies only to such railroad corporations as are "now incorporated or hereafter to be incorporated by the laws of this State." It would seem that no construction of these words was necessary to demonstrate the inapplicability of the constitutional provision to appellant corporation, or those standing in like relation to the State. It is insisted however by appellee that as appellant corporation dérives its vitality from the act of the State consenting to the consolidation, and its charter powers and duties within this State are measured by the act of 1861, creating the Ohio and Mississippi Railway Company of Illinois, it falls within the spirit of the Constitution, and must therefore have a majority of its board of directors citizens and residents of this State. The object of construction, as applied to a written constitution, is to give effect to the intent of the people in adopting it. This intent is to be found in the instrument itself from the words and phrases employed. The presumption is that the language employed was intended to have its ordinary and usual meaning, and to be sufficiently perspicuous within itself to convey the intent. And where a law is plain and unambiguous, whether it be expressed in general or limited terms, the Legislature should be intended to mean what they have plainly expressed, and consequently no room is left for construction." United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358; Cooley Const. Lim. 68. And it is only when, after a consideration of the language employed, there are still doubts and ambiguities as to the meaning of the law-making power, that extrinsic circumstances may be resorted to in aid of construction. As has been seen, appellant corporation is no more a corporation existing under the laws of Illinois than it is a corporation chartered by the laws of Indiana or of Ohio. To hold that the constitutional provision is applicable to appellant corporation, would be to determine that the framers of that instrument, in drafting and submitting this section, and the people in adopting it, intended that the State of Illinois should break faith with her sister States, and should become a despoiler of private right; for on the faith of the legislation of Illinois, the other States had, by like legislative action, authorized corporations existing as domestic corporations in those States to unite their property and franchises with a corporation of this State, whereby both public and private rights were greatly affected. Upon the consummation of the consolidation, bonds and stocks of the new consolidated corporation were issued, secured by mortgages upon the consolidated line, its property and franchises, and the liens on the constituent lines discharged. The terms and conditions of the articles of consolidation are not set out in the answer; but it is manifest, from what is disclosed, that the legal effect of the consolidation, which it is averred was consummated, was to transfer to the new corporation the property of the three constituent companies wherever it might be located. When the new corporation issued its stock, it was put upon the markets of the world, and the persons becoming owners thereof acquired an interest, measured by the shares of stock owned by them respectively, in the franchise and property of the new corporation. No restriction was placed upon its ownership, and all persons everywhere were at liberty to acquire it. Although the corporation was a quasi public one, its property was the property of its stockholders, and subject to the general regulation and police power of the States in which the corporation was situate. The owners of the railway property stood on an equal footing with the owners of other species of property as to its right of control and management. An essential element of the

consent and authority given by the State to the consolidation was the right of the Illinois corporation to acquire, under the laws of the other States named, an interest in property situate beyond the limits of this State, and forming an integral part of a great railway thoroughfare, with a right to issue its bonds and stock, based on the property of the railway in the three States, whose domestic corporations were the constituent elements of such new company. The object to be attained was the corporate union of properties and interests in different States, under the management and control of a single board of directors, thereby securing the concerted and harmonious operation of a through line of railway from St. Louis to Cincinnati. If effect is to be given to the words of the Constitution as contended by appellee, the consolidated corporation must necessarily be dissolved, unless the States of Ohio and Indiana acquiesce in the assumption by this State of jurisdiction over the personnel of the directory; and also, unless the owners of appellant's stock consent to become citizens and residents of Illinois in sufficient number to constitute a majority of the directory, and a majority of the stockholders consent to commit the interests of the corporation to such resident stockholders. If all this could not be attained, appellant must forfeit its charter in this State, and its property here as well as its interest in this continuous line of railway be lost to those interested therein. Such construction would place this State in the condition of repudiating its acts upon the faith of which sister States have acted, and upon which private interests have been acquired. And although States may not enter into formal treaties and conventions, or agreements and compacts, they may, and we venture to say should, be exemplars of good faith and fair dealing, by faithfully observing such obligations as legitimately spring from their cooperating legislation. The framers of the Constitution must be presumed to have known of the status of appellant and its relation to the State at the time the language referred to was selected, and if they had inteuded the dissolution and destruction of appellant corporation as theu existing, it is also to be presumed they would have used language expressive of such intent. The language employed applies only to corporations existing by virtue of the laws of this State, and finds ample scope for application to the multitude of corporations thus existing. No reason has been suggested, nor has any occurred to us, for extending the language of this constitutional provision beyond its plain and obvious meaning; and especially would this be so, in view of the results that would follow the more latitudinous construction contended for by appellee. What would be the effect upon like corporations brought into existence since the declared policy of the State, as expressed in this constitutional provision, is not before us, and need not be discussed or determined. Ill. Sup. Ct., Jan. 18, 1888. Ohio & M. Ry. Co. v. People. Opinion by Shope, J. Scott and Magruder, JJ., dissent.

SCHOOLS-AUTHORITY OF SCHOOL COMMITTEE-LIABILITY.-Where a town has given no direction in regard to the care of its school-houses, the school committee have authority, under the Public Statutes of Massachusetts, chapter 44, section 46, to order a tree standing in a school-house lot to be cut down, and having employed a proper person to do the work, they are not liable for his negligence. The language is: the school committee "shall keep such houses in good order, and shall provide a suitable place for the schools where there is no school-house, and provide fuel and all things necessary for the comfort of the scholars therein at the expense of the town." The defendants were not themselves negligent, and if their vote was an official act, they are not responsible for

the negligence of those whom they employed in carrying it out. The doctrine of respondeat superior is founded on the supposed benefit to the master of the act of the servant, and does not apply to a public officer employing agents in the discharge of a public duty. Nowell v. Wright, 3 Allen, 166; Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344; Story Ag., §319. The case is then narrowed to the single question whether the school committee had authority to remove the tree from the lot on which the high-school building was situated. If they had, they were the judges of the necessity and propriety of its removal, and it was not necessary to recite in the vote the occasion for their action. It is immaterial whether the tree endangered the school building or the children attending the school, or what the reason for its removal was. The right to remove it involved or rather arose from the duty of determining whether the removal was necessary. The town owned the school building and lot, but it had appointed no agent to have charge of it, and no officer had any authority over it except the school committee. The duty expressly put upon the committee by statute to keep the school-house in good order and to provide all things necessary for the comfort of the scholars, included the care of the lot on which the house stood, as well as of the house. It was their duty not only to take proper measures to protect the school-house from threatened danger, but to see that the access to it over the lot from the adjoining street was safe and comfortable for the scholars, and that the lot was kept in proper condition for them to use in connection with the school-house. This would be included in their general duty of charge and superintendence of the school if it was not within their specific duty in regard to school-houses. But we cannot doubt that the statute made it their duty to keep the lot, as well as the house upon it, in good order. If snow or if a fallen tree incumbered the lot, they could remove it; and they were not obliged to wait until the tree fell. It was their duty to exercise and to act upon their judgment and discretion as to the necessity and propriety of cutting it down, and in so doing they were acting as public officers in the discharge of a public duty. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Jan. 6, 1888. McKenna v. Kimball. Opinion by W. Allen, J.

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CONTRIBU

SHIP AND SHIPPING NEGLIGENCE TORY UNLASHING WHEEL-RIGHT OF INJURED PARTY TO BE CURED AT EXPENSE OF SHIP.- Libellant, an experienced seaman, was placed to await orders in the wheel-house of a steam-barge which was being towed. He unlashed the wheel without orders, and as the rudder came into contact with an obstruction on the bottom, the wheel revolved and injured libellant who tried to hold it. Held,(1) that he was guilty of contributory negligence. (2) It is now further urged in behalf of the libellant that even if he was negligent, and if the injury occurred without any negligence on the part of the officers of the barge, the libellant is entitled to be cured or properly treated medically at the expense of the ship. There is no dispute as to the rule which prevails that a seaman shipped for a voyage, who is taken sick, or who has received injury by acci. dent, even where he is partly at fault, is entitled to medical treatment during the voyage or until he is cured; but I do not think this libellant stood in such a relation to this barge as to be entitled to invoke this rule in his own behalf. This ship was not bound upon a voyage, within the meaning of the cases in which this rule has been applied, or of the circumstances out of which the rule originated. The libellant did not ship for a voyage, but only for a temporary movement of the barge from one place in the harbor to another. It was not a case where it was expected to earn freight, or in any way engage in commerce. No shipping articles were signed; no special employment as seaman

was given to the libellant. The barge, as the libellanting operates to destroy the elementary principle of law must have known, was proceeding from one location in the harbor to another by the aid of tugs, and the main burden of handling the barge was upon the tugs. As a matter of special precaution, the captain secured the services of these few men, very few compared with those required for the navigation of such a craft if bound upon a voyage, and the libellant was directed to take his place in the wheel-house. This did not make him a seaman or put him in such a relation to this vessel as to entitle him to all the rights of a seaman who had been duly shipped for a voyage. He was merely in the position of an employee rightfully on boaad of the vessel, and if while there he had been injured by reason of the fault or negligence of the officers of the barge, he might have had his action either at law or his libel in admiralty to recover damages for such injury. All the cases which have been cited, where the rule now invoked has been applied, are cases where the seaman was shipped for a voyage from one port to another, and where the sickness or injury for which he claimed to be treated was incurred while in the discharge of his duty under such engagement. They all agree that the obligation to "cure," as the old cases say, or to give "medical treatment,' as the later cases term it, only continues to the end of the voyage. Here this man was employed to aid, we will say, in transferring this barge from a position on the North branch to the Illinois Central slip, a distance of less than two miles. Unless some unexpected delay intervened, it could not be expected to last more than an hour or an hour and a half, and at the end of that time, if you call it a voyage, the voyage would be over; so that even in the event that this man had been entitled to this right, the right would be gone so very soon that it would be of very little value to him. I think therefore that no recovery can be had for damages to the libellant by reason of his rights as a seaman under the rule referred to. U. S. Dist- Ct. N. D. Ill., Dec. 5, 1887. The John B. Lyon. Opinion by Blodgett, J.

that the State cannot go into proof of the general character of the accused until he first opens the door. The contention is not logical; the general rule remains unaffected. The accused is still safe from such an attack so long as he remains the accused only; but when he voluntarily places himself upon the stand, he assumes the character of a witness, and as such must expose himself to be attacked to the same extent as other witnesses. Surely the courts would be slow to place a construction upon an act of the Legislature (if there were room for construction) that would allow a witness to be sworn and give his testimony against that of good and true men, when the State's attorney knows and is ready to prove him wholly devoid of moral sense and utterly unworthy of belief, and at the same time prevent the State from showing the character of the witness as affecting his credit. Under this act a man repeatedly convicted of the crime of perjury can go before the jury in a community where he is unknown, and with a good manner and fair exterior give evidence in his own behalf, and the State remain powerless to impeach him, if the position contended for were tenable. Prior conviction of an infamous crime, it would seem, does not incapacitate him, as the statute gives him the right to testify on his own behalf, as was held by the courts of New York under a statute in the main similar to our own. Newman v. People, 63 Barb. 630. But under the rule contended for the record of such conviction could not be introduced, because as a defendant, evidence of a distinct felony could not be proven against him. The statement of the proposition would seem to carry with it its own refutation. That such conviction can be shown to affect his credibility as a witness has been expressly adjudged. State v. Kelsoe, 76 Mo. 505. It must be borne in mind that in Tennessee it has been long and well settled that in impeaching the credibility of a witness, the inquiry is not, as in some of the States, restricted to the general reputation for veracity, but it involves his whole moral character. It WITNESS-DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL ACTION-IM- has been regarded as essential to the ends of justice PEACHMENT.- A defendant in a criminal prosecution, that both the court and jury should have full opporwho voluntarily takes the stand in his own behalf, tunity of knowing the entire moral character of the subjects himself to the same rules as to cross-exam- witness whose credit is sought to be impeached; "in ination and impeachment as other witnesses; and in view of all of which," as was said by Judge McKinney impeaching his credibility as a witness the inquiry is in Gilliam v. State, 1 Head, 38, "it may be safely left not restricted to his general reputation for veracity, to the jury to determine what degree of credit the but involves his whole moral character. The act un- witness is entitled to for truth, notwithstanding his dertakes to distinguish him from other witnesses in other vices and immoralities of character, as his claim only three particulars: (1) He is not to be called ex- to veracity is the primary and important consideracept upon his own request; (2) his failure to take the tion." According to our practice then, the proper instand is not to create any presumption against him; quiry is whether the witness knows the general char(3) he must be the first to testify for the defense when acter of a person whose credibility is in question, and he proposes to become a witness. The first two are whether from such knowledge the witness would be. privileges not enjoyed by other parties; the last is a lieve him on oath. Ford v. Ford, 7 Humph. 92; Merburden. The Legislature having seen fit to make the riman v. State, 3 Lea, 394. So we see this witness has three exceptions, the courts are not authorized to only been made to carry the same burden that rests make any other. With the wisdom and the policy of upon all witnesses under our practice. The charge of the act we have nothing to do; this concerns the Leg- the court, as far as language can do, so confines the islature only. It is a natural step in the line of pro- effect of the testimony to his credibility. If such evigress that began with the removal of the disqualifica- dence, notwithstanding the charge, may by possibility tion of interest in civil suits, now removed by legisla- prejudice him with the jury (and we have no right to tion in England, and in almost all of the American suppose that the jurors, on their oaths, will not be States, and to a large extent applied to criminal trials controlled by the charge), the defendant cannot comby most of the States of this Union. Speaking for plain, since he voluntarily placed himself in a position myself, I agree with the views expressed by the where such evidence was admissible. But we are not learned writer quoted in the notes to Wharton's left alone to reason out our conclusions upon this Criminal Evidence: "But though the new rule may question. It and kindred questions have been pretend, and very properly, to an increase in the number sented and adjudicated in accordance with the views of convictions, there is not the slightest doubt that it here expressed in other States. The best-considered will also prevent a number of wrongful convictions, if case perhaps to which we have had access is State v. not make wrongful convictions almost impossible." Clinton, 67 Mo. 380, where many cases are cited susTo return to the objections made to the evidence intaining the conclusion there reached-that the defendthe case at bar. It is earnestly insisted that such rul-ant, as a witness in a criminal case, subjects himself

to the same rules as to cross-examination and impeachment as other witnesses. Similar statutes have been similarly construed in Nevada, New York, California, Massachusetts, Indiana, Connecticut, New Hampshire and other States. State v. Cohn, 9 Nev. 179; Brandon v. People, 42 N. Y. 265, where on crossexamination, "Have you ever been arrested for theft?" was held a proper question, no suggestion of privilege having been made; Conners v. People, 50 N. Y. 240; McGarry v. People, 2 Laus. 227; State v. Pfefferle, 36 Kan. 90; People v. McGungill, 41 Cal. 429; Mershon v. State, 51 Ind. 14; State v. Ober, 52 N. H. 459; Town of Norfolk v. Gaylord, 28 Conn. 309. The rule as to the general character of witnesses is the same in Missouri as in this State. State v. Breeden, 58 Mo. 507. In Massachusetts it is held that where the defendant is a witness he may be asked "whether he has been in prison on other charges." Com. v. Bonner, 97 Mass. 587. See also Whart. Crim. Ev., § 427 et seq., where the author takes this view of similar statutes. Tenn. Sup. Ct., Jan. 14, 1888. Peck v. State Opinion by Folkes, J.

CORRESPONDENCE.

A QUESTION of Contract. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

A. asks B. to let him have the job of threshing his oats and receives an affirmative reply. He entered upon the performance thereof and threshed 200 bushels, reserving and retaining to himself six bushels on each hundred, which together with board of team and two men, was shown to be the general custom of the neighborhood and so understood and agreed between the parties. B. (without cause) refused to allow A. to thresh the balance of the grain, which upon the trial was shown to be 1,200 bushels. His readiness and willingness to continue and his inability to find work during the period which it would have required to complete defendant's job were facts duly proven. Plaintiff testified that while working he paid his men $1 per day, and that they threshed 250 bushels per day, and that oats were worth forty cents per bushel. The defendant having put in no evidence, was a case made out, and if so, for how much?

Yours truly,

LAW STUDENT.

NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.

HEARD'S SHORTT ON CRIMINAL INFORMATIONS (CRIMINAL AND QUO WARRANTO), MANDAMUS AND PRO

HIBITION.

This English work, edited by Mr. Franklin Fiske Heard, of Boston, seems to be the first volume of a new series of English text-books with American notes, to be called American Law Series, and published monthly, by Charles H. Edson & Co., of Boston, at $15 a year. It is a beautifully printed book of 800 pages, but is in paper sides and with trimmed edges. which in our judgment is injudicious, because it must be bound, and in binding it must be still more cut down. The price of course is amazingly cheap, and of course is only to be accounted for by the fact that there is no international copyright. We have often said we do not much care for English books with American notes. Our own text-books are infinitely superior, with few exceptions, as to the law common to both countries, and every English book has much that is superfluous to us. This criticism is fairly applicable to this work, and yet it may well be that with the notes of Mr. Heard, a very competent editor, it may prove useful, especially as to Informations and

Prohibition. It has a large number of Forms, Its principal virtue however, and that a very important one, is probably its marvellous cheapness. We shall await future volumes with interest and curiosity.

THE

COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS.

HE following decisions were handed down Friday, May 4, 1888:

Judgment affirmed with costs-Henry K. Stevens, appellant, v. Ella S. Comstock and others, respondents. Judgment affirmed with costs-Charles Burley and another, appellants, v. Orsell H. Hartson and others, respondents.-Judgment affirmed with costs -John Langford and another, respondents, v. Orsell Cook, impleaded, etc., appellant. Judgment affirmed with costs - Martin Mulligan, respondent, v. Knickerbocker Ice Company, appellant.-Judgment affirmed with costs-Frank D. Wright, respondent, v. William D. Andrews and another, appellants.Appeal dismissed with costs-Bridget Cashen, appellant, v. City of Auburn, respondent.-Motion to prefer cause granted-George L. Kingsland and others v. City of New York.-Conviction of murder in the first degree affirmed-People v. Edward A. Deacons.

Ordered: That the court take a recess until Monday, June 4, then to meet in the town hall in the village of Saratoga Springs, and proceed with the call of the present calendar juntil its numbers are concluded. It is also ordered that a new calendar be prepared for that date, upon which will be placed only those cases in which the returns, with notices of argument and proofs of service, shall have been filed with the clerk in Albany on or before Saturday, May 26.

Motion days will be Tuesdays, June 5 and 12.

NOTES.

The Troy Times supplies us with the best legal stories that we meet with. We like them a great deal better than its editorial opinions about law and lawyers. But then its stories are selected. The two following are from its columns: Miss Jane Wyatt, a bulky Englishwoman,educated at Kensington,and now teaching music at Eau Claire, Wis., had a misunderstanding with little grocer Kneeland over his bill, and the result was a suit against the grocer for $5,000 damages for assault and battery. Mr. Kneeland's lawyer, it is reported, furnished more fun for the large audience that heard the trial than a circus, and it was such passages as the following that led the jury to bring in a prompt verdict of "No cause of action:" "Gentlemen of the jury, compare the proportions of the parties in this action, and remember, gentlemen, that several dollars' worth of the aliment which has gone to make up the large physique of this plaintiff was furnished by the defendant, and that it is claimed that he has not received adequate pecuniary return therefor."-Senator Wade Hamptou tells this story about Senator "Zeb" Vauce's first case in the North Carolina Supreme Court: His client had been worsted in the lower court, and Vance took an appeal. It was his first argument in the court, and he took great pains with it. When the court came to render a decision the chief justice quoted Vance's argument in full. As he was proceeding Vance looked proudly around at the other lawyers and cheerfully rubbed his hands. To his mind that was the greatest argument ever presented to a court. The court read Vance's argument through, and then said: "For these reasons we affirm the decision of the court below." Vance was dumbfounded. His own argument was used as the basis of a decision against his client.

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