exaction, the obligation was felt by the former of uniting their counsels and efforts, to avert the impending calamity.

As early as the year 1754, indications having been given of a design in the British government to levy contributions on the colonies without their consent, a meeting of colonial deputies took place at Albany, which attempted to introduce a compromising substitute, that might at once satisfy the British requisitions, and save their own rights from violation. The attempt had no other effect than, by bringing these rights into a more conspicuous view, to invigorate the attachment to them, on the one side, and to nourish the haughty and encroaching spirit on the other.62

In 1774, the progress made by Great Britain in the open assertion of her pretensions, and the apprehended purpose of otherwise maintaining them by legislative enactments and declarations, had been such, that the colonies did not hesitate to assemble, by their deputies, in a formal Congress, authorized to oppose to the British innovations whatever measures might be found best adapted to the occasion; without, however, losing sight of an eventual reconciliation. 63

The dissuasive measures of that Congress being without effect, another Congress was held in 1775, whose pacific efforts to bring about a change in the views of the other party being equally unavailing, and the commencement of actual hostilities having at length put an end to all hope of reconciliation, the Congress, finding, moreover, that the popular voice began to call for an entire and perpetual dissolution of the political ties which had connected them with Great Britain, proceeded, on the memorable Fourth of July, 1776, to declare the thirteen colonies Independent States.

During the discussions of this solemn act, a committee, consisting of a member from each colony, had been appointed, to prepare and digest a form of Confederation for the future management of the common interests, which had hitherto been left to the discretion of Congress, guided by the exigencies of the contest, and by the known intentions or occasional instructions of the colonial legislatures.

It appears that, as early as the 21st of July, 1775, a plan, entitled "Articles of Confederation and perpetual union of the Colonies," had been sketched by Dr. Franklin—the plan being on that day submitted by him to Congress, and, though not copied into their Journals, remaining on their files in his handwriting. But notwithstanding the term "perpetual" observed in the title, the articles provided expressly for the event of a return of the colonies to a connection with Great Britain.64

This sketch became a basis for the plan reported by the committee on the 12th of July, now also remaining on the files of Congress in the handwriting of Mr. Dickinson. The plan, though dated after the declaration of independence, was probably drawn up before that event, since the name of colonies, not states, is used throughout the draught.65 The plan reported was debated and amended from time to time, till the 17th of November, 1777, when it was agreed to by

Congress, and proposed to the legislatures of the states, with an explanatory and recommendatory letter.66 The ratifications of these, by their delegates in Congress, duly authorized, took place at successive dates, but were not completed till the 1st of March, 1781, when Maryland, who had made it a prerequisite that the vacant lands acquired from the British crown should be a common fund, yielded to the persuasion that a final and formal establishment of the federal union and government would make a favorable impression, not only on other foreign nations, but on Great Britain herself.67

The great difficulty experienced in so framing the federal system as to obtain the unanimity required for its due sanction, may be inferred from the long interval and recurring discussions between the commencement and completion of the work; from the changes made during its progress; from the language of Congress when proposing it to the states, which dwelt on the impracticability of devising a system acceptable to all of them; from the reluctant assent given by some, and the various alterations proposed by others; and by a tardiness in others, again, which produced a special address to them from Congress, enforcing the duty of sacrificing local considerations and favorite opinions to the public safety and the necessary harmony: nor was the assent of some of the states finally yielded without strong protests against particular articles, and a reliance on future amendments removing their objections. It is to be recollected, no doubt, that these delays might be occasioned, in some degree, by an occupation of the public councils, both general and local, with the deliberations and measures essential to a revolutionary struggle; but there must have been a balance for these causes in the obvious motives to hasten the establishment of a regular and efficient government; and in the tendency of the crisis to repress opinions and pretensions which might be inflexible in another state of things.

The principal difficulties which embarrassed the progress, and retarded the completion, of the plan of Confederation, may be traced to-first, the natural repugnance of the parties to a relinquishment of power; secondly, a natural jealousy of its abuse in other hands than their own; thirdly, the rule of suffrage among parties whose inequality in size did not correspond with that of their wealth, or of their military or free population; fourthly, the selection and definition of the powers, at once necessary to the federal head, and safe to the several members.

To these sources of difficulty, incident to the formation of all such confederacies, were added two others - one of a temporary, the other of a permanent nature. The first was the case of the crown lands, so called because they had been held by the British crown, and, being ungranted to individuals when its authority ceased, were considered by the states within whose charters or asserted limits they lay, as devolving on them; whilst it was contended by the others that, being wrested from the dethroned authority by the equal exertions of all, they resulted of right and in equity to the benefit of all. The lands

being of vast extent, and of growing value, were the occasion of much discussion and heart-burning, and proved the most obstinate of the impediments to an earlier consummation of the plan of federal government. The state of Maryland, the last that acceded to it, held out, as already noticed, till the 1st of March, 1781, and then yielded only to the hope that, by giving a stable and authoritative character to the Confederation, a successful termination of the contest might be accelerated. The dispute was happily compromised by successive surrenders of portions of the territory by the states having exclusive claims to it, and acceptances of them by Congress.

The other source of dissatisfaction was the peculiar situation of some of the states, which, having no convenient ports for foreign commerce, were subject to be taxed by their neighbors, through whose ports their commerce was carried on. New Jersey, placed between Philadelphia and New York, was likened to a cask tapped at both ends; and North Carolina, between Virginia and South Carolina, to a patient bleeding at both arms. The articles of Confederation provided no remedy for the complaint, which produced a strong protest on the part of New Jersey, and never ceased to be a source of dissatisfaction and discord, until the new constitution superseded the old.

But the radical infirmity of the "Articles of Confederation" was the dependence of Congress on the voluntary and simultaneous compliance with its requisitions by so many independent communities, each consulting more or less its particular interests and convenience, and distrusting the compliance of the others. Whilst the paper emissions of Congress continued to circulate, they were employed as a sinew of war, like gold and silver. When that ceased to be the case, and the fatal defect of the political system was felt in its alarming force, the war was merely kept alive, and brought to a successful conclusion, by such foreign aids and temporary expedients as could be applied a hope prevailing with many, and a wish with all, that a state of peace, and the sources of prosperity opened by it, would give to the Confederacy, in practice, the efficiency which had been inferred from its theory.

The close of the war, however, brought no cure for the public embarrassments. The states, relieved from the pressure of foreign danger, and flushed with the enjoyment of independent and sovereign power, instead of a diminished disposition to part with it, persevered in omissions and in measures incompatible with their relations to the federal government, and with those among themselves.

Having served as a member of Congress through the period between March, 1780, and the arrival of peace, in 1783, I had become intimately acquainted with the public distresses and the causes of them. I had observed the successful opposition to every attempt to procure a remedy by new grants of power to Congress. I had found, moreover, that despair of success hung over the compromising principle of April, 1783, for the public necessities, which had been so elab

orately planned, and so impressively recommended to the states. Sympathizing, under this aspect of affairs, in the alarm of the friends of free government at the threatened danger of an abortive result to the great, and perhaps last, experiment in its favor, I could not be insensible to the obligation to aid, as far as I could, in averting the calamity. With this view I acceded to the desire of my fellow-citizens of the county, that I should be one of its representatives in the legislature, hoping that I might there best contribute to inculcate the critical posture to which the revolutionary cause was reduced, and the merit of a leading agency of the state in bringing about a rescue of the Union, and the blessings of liberty staked on it, from an impending catastrophe.

It required but little time, after taking my seat in the House of Delegates in May, 1784, to discover that, however favorable the general disposition of the state might be towards the Confederacy, the legislature retained the aversion of its predecessors to transfers of power from the state to the government of the Union, notwithstanding the urgent demands of the federal treasury, the glaring inade quacy of the authorized mode of supplying it, the rapid growth of anarchy in the federal system, and the animosity kindled among the states by their conflicting regulations.

The temper of the legislature, and the wayward course of its proceedings, may be gathered from the Journals of its sessions in the years 1784 and 1785.68

The failure, however, of the varied propositions in the legislature for enlarging the powers of Congress, the continued failure of the efforts of Congress to obtain from them the means of providing for the debts of the revolution, and of countervailing the commercial laws of Great Britain, a source of much irritation, and against which the separate efforts of the states were found worse than abortive; these considerations, with the lights thrown on the whole subject by the free and full discussion it had undergone, led to a general acquiescence in the resolution passed on the 21st of January, 1786, which proposed and invited a meeting of deputies from all the states, as follows:

"Resolved, That Edmund Randolph, James Madison, Jr., Walter Jones, St. George Tucker, and Merriwether Smith, Esquires, be appointed commissioners, who, or any three of whom, shall meet such commissioners as may be appointed in the other states of the Union, at a time and place to be agreed on, to take into consideration the trade of the United States; to examine the relative situations and trade of said states; to consider how far a uniform system in their commercial regulations may be necessary to their common interest and their permanent harmony; and to report to the several states such an act, relative to this great object, as, when unanimously ratified by them, will enable the United States, in Congress, effectually to provide for the same."

The resolution had been brought forward some weeks before, on the failure of a proposed grant of power to Congress to collect a revenue from commerce, which had been abandoned by its friends in consequence of material alterations made in the grant by a committee of the whole. The resolution, though introduced by Mr. Tyler, an

influential member, who, having never served in Congress, had more the ear of the house than those whose services there exposed them to an imputable bias, was so little acceptable, that it was not then persisted in. Being now revived by him, on the last day of the session, and being the alternative of adjourning without any effort for the crisis in the affairs of the Union, it obtained a general vote; less, however, with some of its friends, from a confidence in the success of the experiment, than from a hope that it might prove a step to a more comprehensive and adequate provision for the wants of the Confederacy.69

It happened, also, that commissioners, appointed by Virginia and Maryland to settle the jurisdiction on waters dividing the two states, had, apart from their official reports, recommended a uniformity in the regulations of the two states on several subjects, and particularly on those having relation to foreign trade. It appeared, at the same time, that Maryland had deemed a concurrence of her neighbors, Delaware and Pennsylvania, indispensable in such a case, who, for like reasons, would require that of their neighbors. So apt and forcible an illustration of the necessity of a uniformity throughout all the states could not but favor the passage of a resolution which proposed a convention having that for its object.

The commissioners appointed by the legislature, and who attended the convention, were Edmund Randolph, the attorney of the state, St. George Tucker, and James Madison. The designation of the

time and place, to be proposed for its meeting and communicated to the states, having been left to the commissioners, they named, for the time the first Monday in September, and for the place the city of Annapolis, avoiding the residence of Congress, and large commercial cities, as liable to suspicions of an extraneous influence.

Although the invited meeting appeared to be generally favored, five states only assembled; some failing to make appointments, and some of the individuals appointed not hastening their attendance: the result in both cases being ascribed mainly to a belief that the time had not arrived for such a political reform as might be expected from a further experience of its necessity.

But, in the interval between the proposal of the convention and the time of its meeting, such had been the advance of public opinion in the desired direction, stimulated as it had been by the effect of the contemplated object of the meeting, in turning the general attention to the critical state of things, and in calling forth the sentiments and exertions of the most enlightened and influential patriots, that the convention, thin as it was, did not scruple to decline the limited task assigned to it, and to recommend to the states a convention with powers adequate to the occasion. Nor had it been unnoticed that the commission of the New Jersey deputation had extended its object to a general provision for the exigencies of the Union. A recommendation for this enlarged purpose was accordingly reported by a committee to whom the subject had been referred. [See Vol. I