sequence is that we are remitted to the inquiry whether an equitable freeholder could by the common law vote at an election for a coroner.

Sir John Jervis (p. 24) has no doubt respecting the affirmative of this question. We have learned with surprise, however, from so distinguished an authority that the recognition of a merely equitable estate by a Common Law Court is so much a matter of course. The point is one, we think, of extreme difficulty, though it will probably not arise until there shall have been some express legislation on the matter.

That a repeal of the Act of Edward III. is eminently required is obvious at a glance. What lawyer could satisfactorily answer the question, "What is a freeholder at common law?" Is a right of way a freehold? Is any incorporeal right a freehold within the meaning of the Acts? It is astonishing what a number of long-shoremen, grave-holders, watermen, et hoc genus omne, is evoked from all the nooks of a district whenever their electoral services are brought into request. There being no registry, no revising barrister, to prune the freehold tree, it spreads its branches on all sides, while in its obscure shade repose many living things of

an unclean nature.

Suburban parishes being comparatively small, there is a vast number of small patches of ground, originally devoted to purposes of religion, education, or charity, that have for many years fallen into the hands of private owners. These persons, indeed, would be entitled to vote at Parliamentary elections. But it is the door, which the rule as to admitting every freeholder to vote opens for fraud, that is censurable. Even these infinitesimal properties and rights are claimed by numbers whose claim to vote it is impossible to anticipate or scrutinize beforehand. It is monstrous to consider that watermen and graveholders, if not owners of apple-stalls and movable conservatories, may hold in their hands the important appointment of coroner. The Parliamentary should be regarded as the model franchise. But, if it is not, then

VOL. XXVII.-NO. LIII.

H

But there cer

let us substitute therefor what is better. tainly should not in any civilized State be two different modes of holding popular elections to public offices.

It is hardly necessary to endeavour to prove modo et formâ that there ought to be only one mode of popular election. If the present system of voting at elections for members of Parliament is not the best, it ought of course to be improved, and perfection either exactly or at least proximately attained. But, whatever mode of election is used for returning members to serve in Parliament, a precisely similar system ought to be adopted upon every occasion of a popular election, that is, in which the general sense of the public in a certain district is sought to be ascertained.

There is a distinction, indeed, between deliberative and merely elective assemblies. For instance, without offering any opinion with respect to the ballot (which would be entirely extra-judicial on our part), it is abundantly clear that any objection founded upon the inappropriateness of the ballot in the case of divisions in Parliament does not at all apply to the preliminary election of the members themselves. An M.P. is one who, ex vi termini, is likely to influence other members of the Legislature, not only by his example, but by what is sometimes equally powerful, by persuasion. Eloquence and argument, however, are incompatible with secret voting. In the case of the voters, however—without referring to the press, which discharges to a great extent the educational functions of the several classes towards each other politically— the chief difficulties in the way of a fair election of representatives are bribery, intimidation, and other similar agencies, which have not the same influence on those who sit in the Lower House. At all events, even if they were venal they are sent to Parliament to speak as well as act, and therefore secresy is out of the question.

But with regard to all purely elective assemblies, e.g., clubs, debating societies, elections of members of Parliament, or of coroners, whatever mode is best suited to one such

meeting is equally suited to all. We do not by any means wish to intrude upon debateable ground. Politics are not our sphere; we breathe the calmer atmosphere of judicial investigation, and, if we have referred to the ballot, it is merely to its principle viewed indifferently on both sides. Certainly, if the qualification of voters at Parliamentary elections be determined on after great care and anxious consideration by the Legislature, it follows as a necessary consequence that the Parliamentary should be deemed the model franchise. A Bill should therefore be introduced in the House of Commons to assimilate the right of voting at elections of county coroners to the right now exercised under the Representation of the People Act, 1867.

After reciting the inconvenience to which the present law respecting the qualification of voters at elections for county coroners has given rise, it should provide that the qualification of such voters should be in future the same as that of freeholders at Parliamentary elections, and disqualify all other persons. It should confine its operation to election for county coroners under the writ de coronatore eligendo, and save from its purview coroners virtute officii, as also all appointed by charter, commission, or privilege, or in accordance with any prescription or custom. It should also re-enact the 7 & 8 Vict., c. 92, except as to the single point of electoral qualification, and the Bill should be exclusively confined to England. Its set effect would be to limit the coroner's franchise to those freeholders whose names are on the parliamentary register, but not to extend the coroner's franchise to any one not at present entitled to vote at such elections.

A short Bill on coroners' appointment has been brought in by Mr. Goldney. But of this measure we cannot speak very favourably. Mr. Goldney proposes to place the appointment of coroners in the hands of the executive. We thought that one of the greatest reforms of our time was the transference of patronage from Secretaries of State to

personal merit, as tested by a competitive examination. The next best test of merit is an election by public poll. But to give the Home Secretary or the Lord Chancellor an increase of patronage appears to us to be as inexpedient as it is retrogressive and opposed to every principle and idea of modern legislation.

Out of 21,801 inquests, verdicts of homicide were returned only in 482 cases. In what a vast number, therefore, must suspicion have been nipped in the bud. The evidence on a post mortem examination is essentially technical, in other words, the logic of certain facts known only to the medical practitioner. There seems every reason to think, therefore, that medical gentlemen are the best fitted for the office of coroner. The functions of the legal world in the matter appear to be to institute the necessary legal reforms, but to halt there.

ART. X.-INDEXING AND DIGESTING.

An Index to all the Reported Cases in the several Courts of Equity in Ireland, from Trinity Term, 1838, to Hilary Term, 1867, with a complete Table of Cases. By RICHARD WILSON GAMBLE, Esq., M.A., Barrister-at-Law, and WILLIAM BARLOW, Esq., B.A., Barrister-at-Law. In 2 vols. Dublin: Hodges, Smith & Foster, Booksellers to the Hon. Society of King's Inns. 1868.

Digest of Cases decided in the Supreme Courts of Scotland, from

1800 to 1867, and, on appeal, from the House of Lords from 1726 to 1867, being a new edition of the Digest from 1800 to 1852, by Mr. SHAW; and from 1851 to 1862. By Messrs. MACPHERSON, BELL, and LAMOND, Advocates; Revised, Consolidated, and Continued to 1867. By ANDREW BEATSON BELL, and WILLIAM LAMOND, Advocates. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1869.

THE

HE value of an index to reported cases can neither be exaggerated nor denied. Cui bono the words of an Act of

Parliament, if it is overridden by judicial comments? Indeed the letter of a statute is not devoid of life, although there may be a considerable number of decisions to a contrary effect, provided that none of these has been pronounced by the Supreme Court of Appeal. If it has, then all arguments to the contrary founded upon statute law are vain. For the House of Lords confessedly never abrogate any principle necessarily involved in any case decided by them. No one can doubt the expediency of such an ultimatum. Expedit ræpublicei ut sit finis litium

But, until a case or principle has reached that gate of ivory, it may be reconsidered afresh. Decisions by the superior courts are not binding upon the House of Lords, nor necessarily upon any tribunal except that which pronounced it. There are cases which at this present moment would probably receive a different determination in the Court of Common Pleas from what they would experience in the Queen's Bench or Exchequer-Quot homines; tot sententiæ. Mr. Justice Blackburn may decide a point of martial, or election, law differently from adjudications on the same question by Chief Justice Cockburn or Baron Martin.

In the evidence given before the Bankruptcy Committee of 1864, frequent proofs will be found that the various Bankruptcy Commissioners have so varied in their judgments, that there was a general outcry for a legal dictator in the shape of a Chief Judge.

As it is not every case that reaches a haven of rest in the House of Lords, a vast number of disputed points still hover around the superior tribunals, affording materials for forensic and judicial disquisition. To find a case, therefore, either for plaintiff or defendant is often a matter of great case, while sometimes it becomes the function of the advocate to tot up a considerable number on both sides in order to see where the net balance lies. Cases, therefore, are the proximate data with which the lawyer deals. A rule of statute or common law may underlie these. But although the foundation, it is