night of the 8th, the Alliance again parted company, | again, at a much faster rate than he had entered it. in a gale of wind. Jones kept well off the land, the weather being thick, and the wind foul. On the 13th, however, the Cheviot Hills, in the southeastern part of Scotland, became visible, and the commodore now seriously set about the execution of some of his larger plans. His intention was to land at Leith, the port of Edinburgh itself, and, not only to lay the place under contribution, but to seize the shipping he might find in the Forth. He had hopes that even the Scottish capital might be frightened into a temporary submission. This was a highly characteristic project, and one worthy of the military audacity of the man. Its great merit, in addition to its boldness, and importance, was the strong probability of success. The late Com. Dale, who was to act a most important part in the enterprise, and who was a man of singular simplicity and moderation of character and temperament, assured the writer that he never could see any reason why the attack should have been defeated, beyond the obstacle that actually arose. Jones himself intimates that his two colleagues, present, (for so he bitterly styled his captains, in consequence of the terms of the concordat,) threw cold water on his views, until he pointed out to them the probable amount of the contributions of two such places as Leith and Edinburgh. A delay occurred, moreover, in consequence of the momentary absence of the Pallas and Vengeance, which vessels had given chase to the southward, a circumstance that compelled the Richard to quit the Forth, after she had entered it alone, and this at a moment when she might have secured a twenty-gun ship, and two cutters, all of which were lying in Leith roads, unsuspicious of danger; though it would have compelled him to abandon the other and principal objects of the attempt. In order to join his consorts, and consult his captains, therefore, Jones was compelled to quit the Forth, after having once entered it. It appears he had found a man ready to give him information, but the golden opportunity was lost, in consequence of the doubts and misgivings of his subordinates. Still Jones determined to make the attempt. On the 15th, the Richard, Pallas and Vengeance entered the Forth in company, turning up with the tide, against a head wind. By this time, the alarm had been given on the shore, and guns were mounted at Leith to receive the strangers. A cutter had been watching the squadron for several hours, also; but Jones deemed all this immaterial. The ships had got up as high as Inchkeath, the island which shelters the roads seaward, and the boats were in the water, and manned. Mr. Dale, who was to superintend❘ and command the maritime part of the debarkation, had received his instructions, and was on the point of descending into his boat, when a squall struck the ships, and induced an order to take the people from the boats, to clew up and clew down. Jones held on against the wind as long as he found it possible, but, the squall turning to a gale, he was compelled to bear up before it, and was driven out of the Frith The gale was short, but so severe that one of the prizes in company foundered. It moderated in the afternoon, but Jones, having plainly seen the cutter watching him, conceived it too late to hope for a surprise, his only rational grounds for expecting success.. It is a proof how much doubt existed concerning the true character of Jones' vessels, among the people on shore, that a member of parliament sent off, to the Richard, a messenger to ask for powder and shot; stating that he had heard Paul Jones was on the coast, and that he wished to be ready for him. A barrel of powder was sent in answer, but the "honorable gentleman" was told the vessel had no shot of the size he requested. On this occasion, the ships were seen turning up the Forth, as they stood in quite near to the north shore, and, it being Sunday, thousands were out viewing the scene, which caused a great clamor, and made a deep impression.* Jones had now fresh projects to annoy the enemy; designs on Hull or New Castle, as is thought. His captains, however, refused to sustain him, and he was reluctantly obliged to abandon his plans. His object was glory; theirs appear to have been profit. It ought to be mentioned that all the young officers sustained the commodore, and professed a readiness to follow wherever he would lead. Jones had a respect for the opinion of Capt. Cottineau, of the Pallas, and it is believed he yielded more to his persuasions than to those of all the rest of his commanders. This officer seemed to think any delay of moment would bring a superior force against them. The commodore viewed the matter more cooly, well knowing that the transmission of intelligence, and the collection of three or four vessels, was a matter that required some little time. Between the 17th and 21st, many colliers and coasters were captured. Most of them were sunk, though one or two were released, and a sloop was ransomed by the Pallas, contrary to orders. On the latter day, the ships were off Flamborough Head, where the Pallas chased to the northeast, leaving the Richard and Vengeance in pursuit of vessels in a directly opposite quarter. Jones overtook and sunk a collier, late in the afternoon. Several craft then hove in sight, and one was chased ashore. Soon after, a brig from Holland was captured, and, at daylight next morning, a considerable fleet was seen in shore, which kept aloof, on account of the appearance of the Bon Homme Richard. Finding it impossible to decoy them out, Jones used some artifices to decoy a pilot, and two boats came alongside. The pilots were deceived, and gave Jones all the information they possessed. As it was now impracticable to bring the shipping out of the Humber, on account of the state of the *The Edinburgh Review, in an article on Cooper's History of the Navy, which has been pretty effectually answered, gives its readers reason to suppose that Jones' appearance on the coast produced no uneasiness. Sir Walter Scott told the writer he well remembered the feeling excited by this event, and that it was wide spread and general. As Scott was born in 1769, his recollection might be relied on. wind and tide, and the Pallas not being in sight, the commodore turned his attention to looking for his consorts. He hauled off the land, therefore, making the best of his way back to Flamborough Head, after passing several hours in endeavoring to entice the ships out of the Humber. In the course of the night of the 22d, two ships were seen, and chased for several hours, when, finding himself near them, Jones hove-to, about three in the morning, waiting for light. When the day returned, the strangers were found to be the Pallas and the Alliance; the latter of which had not been seen since she parted company off Cape Wrath. After communicating with his consorts, Jones chased a brig that was lying-to to windward. About meridian, however, a large ship was observed coming round Flamborough Head, when Mr. Henry Lunt, the second lieutenant of the Richard, was thrown into one of the pilot boats, with fifteen men, and ordered to seize the brig, while the Richard made sail toward the strange ship. Soon after, a fleet of forty-one sail was seen stretching out from behind the Head, bearing N. N. E. from the Richard. The wind was light at the southward, and these vessels were a convoy from the Baltic, turning down the North Sea, toward the Straits of Dover, bound to London. This placed Jones to windward and a little in-shore, if the projection of the headland be excepted. On the part of the enemy, many of the convoy were armed, and, by acting in concert, they might have given a good deal of occupation to the Pallas and Vengeance, while the two men of war fought the Richard and Alliance. As was, however, all of these ships sought safety in flight. The Serapis was a new vessel, that both sailed and worked well, of a class that was then a good deal used in the North Sea, Baltic, and the narrow waters generally; and which was sometimes brought into the line, in battles between the short ships that were much preferred, in that day, in all the seas mentioned. She was a 44, on two decks; having an armament below of 20 eighteens; one of 20 nines, on the upper gun-deck; and one of 10 sixes, on her quarter-deck and forecastle. This is believed to have been her real force, though Jones speaks of her, in one place, as having been pierced for 56 instead of 50 guns. The former was the usual force of what was called a fifty-gun ship, or a vessel like the Leander, which assailed the Chesapeake in 1807. Sands, the most original writer of authority on the subject of Paul Jones, or of any reasoning powers of much weight, infers from some of his calculations and information that the Serapis had 400 souls on board her at the commencement of the action which is now to be related. The English accounts state her crew to have been 320; a number that is quite sufficient for her metal and spars, and which is more in conformity with the practice of the English marine. The India men, stated by Sands to have been obtained by Capt. Pearson, in Copenhagen, may have been 15 Lascars, who are known to have been on board, and to have been included in the 320 souls. It is not probable that the crews of the Richard and Serapis differed a dozen in number. The Countess of Scarborough was a hired ship in the British navy, differing in no respect from a regular man-of-war, except in the circumstance that she belonged to a private owner instead of the king. This was not unusual in that marine, the circumstance being rather in favor of the qualities of the vessel, since the admiralty, on the coast of England, would not be likely to hire any but a good ship. Her officers and people belonged to the navy, as a matter of course. There is a trifling discrepancy as to the force of the Scarborough, though the point is of no great moment, under the circumstances. Jones states that she was a ship As soon as the commodore ascertained that he was in the vicinity of this fleet, he made a signal of recall to the pilot boat, and another of a general chase to his squadron. The first was probably unseen, or disregarded, for it was not obeyed; and the officer and men in the pilot boat remained out of their vessel during most of the trying scenes of that eventful day. As twenty-four officers and men had been captured, or had deserted, off Cape Clear, these sixteen in creased the number of absentees to forty; if to these we add some who had been sent away in prizes, the crew of the Richard, which consisted of but three hundred and eighty, all told, the day she sailed, was now diminished to little more than three hundred souls, of whom a large proportion were the quasi marines, or soldiers, who had entered for the cruise. Jones now crossed royal yards and made sail for the convoy. He had intelligence of this fleet, and knew that it was under the charge of Capt. Pearson, of the Serapis 44, who had the Countess of Scar-mounting 24 guns on one deck, while other accounts borough 20, Capt. Piercy, in company. As the scene we are about to relate is one memorable in naval annals, it may be well to mention the force of the vessels engaged. give her armament as 22 guns, in all. She probably had a crew of from 120 to 150 men. As soon as the leading English vessels saw that strangers, and probably enemies, were to the southward, and to windward, they gave the alarm by firing guns, letting fly their top-gallant sheets, tacking to That of the Richard has been already given. The Pallas mounted thirty guns, of light calibre, and was perhaps more than a third heavier than the Scar-gether, and making the best of their way in toward borough, the vessel she subsequently engaged. The Alliance was a large thirty-two, mounting forty guns, mostly twelve pounders. She had a full, but indifferent crew of about 300 souls, when she left the Roads of Groix, of which near, if not quite, fifty were absent in prizes. Of the Vengeance, who had no part in the events of the day, it is unnecessary to speak. the land again. At this moment the men-of-war were astern, with a view to keep the convoy in its place, and being near the shore, the authorities of Scarborough had sent a boat off to the Serapis, to apprise her commander of the presence of Paul Jones' fleet. By these means, the two senior officers were fully aware with whom they had to contend. Capt. Pearson fired two guns, and showed the proper signals, in order to call in his leading ships, but, as is very customary with merchant vessels, the warning and orders were unattended to, until the danger was seen to be pressing. While the merchantmen were gathered in behind the Head, or ran off to leeward, the Serapis signaled the Scarborough to follow, and stood gallantly out to sea, on the starboard tack, hugging the wind. Jones now threw out a signal to his own vessels to form the line of battle. The Alliance, which ought to have dropped in astern of the Richard, paid no attention to this order, though she approached the enemy to reconnoitre. In passing the Pallas, Capt. Landais remarked that if the larger of the enemy's ships proved to be a fifty-gun ship, all they had to do was to endeavor to escape! This was not the best possible disposition with which to commence the action. Soon after the Pallas spoke the Richard, and asked for orders. Jones directed her to lead toward the enemy, but the order was not obeyed, as will be seen by what followed. | Richard and Serapis drew near to each other. The former was to windward, both vessels being on the larboard tack. The Serapis now hailed, demanding "What ship is that?" "I can't hear what you say," was returned from the Richard. "What ship is that?" repeated the Englishman-"answer immediately, or I shall be under the necessity of firing into you." The Richard now delivered her broadside, which was returned from the Serapis so promptly as to render the two discharges nearly simultaneous. In an instant the two ships were enveloped in smoke and darkness. The Richard backed her topsails, in order to deaden her way and keep her station, firing several times to windward. She then filled and passed ahead of the Serapis, crossing her bows, becalming the Serapis partially. The latter was a short ship, and worked quick. She was, moreover, a good sailer, and Capt. Pearson keeping his luff, as soon as his canvas filled again, he came up on the weather quarter of Jones, taking the wind out of his sails; both vessels fighting the other broadsides, or using the starboard guns of the Serapis, and the The wind being light, several hours passed before larboard of the Richard. It will be remembered that the different evolutions mentioned could be carried the Richard had six eighteens mounted in her guninto execution. As soon as Capt. Pearson found him- room. As the water was smooth, Jones relied self outside of all his convoy, and the latter out of greatly on the service of this battery, which, in fact, danger, he tacked in shore, with a view to cover the was his principal dependence with an adversary like merchantmen. This change of course induced the Serapis. Unfortunately two of these old, defecJones to ware and carry sail, with a view to cut him tive pieces burst at the first discharge, blowing up off from the land. By this time it was evening, and the main-deck above them, beside killing and woundthis sudden change of course on the part of the Se- ing many men. The alarm was so great as to derapis seems to have given rise to a distrust on the stroy all confidence in these guns, which made but part of Capt. Cottineau, of the Pallas, concerning eight discharges, in all, when their crews abandoned the direction she was under. There were so many them. This, in addition to the actual damage done, disaffected men in the Richard, English and other was a most serious disadvantage. It reduced the Europeans, that the security of the ship appears to Richard's armament, at once, to 32 guns, or, as some have been a matter of doubt among all the other authorities say, to 34; leaving her with the metal of vessels. When those on board the Pallas, therefore, a 32 gun frigate, to contend with a full manned and perceived the Richard crowding sail in shore, they full armed 44. The combat, now, was in fact bebelieved Jones was killed by his own people, and tween an eighteen-pounder and a twelve-pounder that the mutineers had run away with the ship, in- ship; an inequality of metal, to say nothing of that tending to carry her into a British port. With this in guns, that seemed to render the chance of the impression, Capt. Cottineau hauled his wind, tacked, | Richard nearly hopeless. and laid the Pallas' head off shore. In consequence of this manœuvre, and the Vengeance being far astern, nothing like a line was formed on this occasion. Jones' object was to cut his enemy off from the land. Keeping this in view, he pressed down in the Richard, regardless of his consorts, passing the Alliance, lying-to, out of gun-shot, on the weather quarter of the principal English ship. It was now dark, but Jones watched his enemy with a night glass, and perceiving that he could cut off the Serapis from getting under the guns of Scarborough Castle, he continued to approach the Englishman under a press of sail. Soon after the Pallas wore round and followed. The Vengeance had directions to order the pilot boat back, and then to pick off the convoy, but as these last were in shore, and tolerably safe, she seems to have done little, or nothing. In the action that ensued she took no part whatever. Half an hour was consumed in these preliminary evolutions, the wind being light, and the vessels nearly stationary a part of the time. When the Richard first approached her adversary, it will be remembered she was quite alone, the Vengeance having been left leagues behind, the Alliance lyingto, out of gun shot, to windward, and the Pallas not bearing up until her commander had ascertained there was no mutiny on board the Commodore, by seeing him commence the action. All this time the Countess of Scarborough was coming up, and she now closed so near as to be able to assist her consort. The Americans affirm that this ship did fire at least one raking broadside at the Richard, doing her some injury. On the other hand, Capt. Piercy, her commander, states that he was afraid to engage, as the smoke and obscurity rendered it impossible for him to tell friend from enemy. It is possible that both accounts are true, Capt. Piercy meaning merely to excuse his subsequent course after having fired once It was half past seven, or eight o'clock, when the | hanging loose beneath the spar. Other fastenings or twice at the Richard. At all events, the connec- soon made all secure.* tion of this vessel with the battle between the two principal ships, must have been very trifling, as she soon edged away to a distance, and, after exchanging a distant broadside or two with the Alliance, she was brought to close action by the Pallas, which ship compelled her to strike after a creditable resistance of an hour's duration. This vessel fully occupied the Pallas, first in engaging her, then in securing the prisoners until after the conflict terminated. When the Serapis came up on the weather quarter of the Richard, as has been mentioned, she kept her luff passing slowly by, until she found herself so far ahead, and to windward, as to induce Capt. Pearson to think he could fall broad off, cross the Richard's fore foot and rake her. This manœuvre was attempted, but finding there was not room to effect her purpose, the Serapis came to the wind, again, as fast as she could, in order to prevent going foul. This uncertain movement brought the two ships in a line, the Serapis leading. It so far deadened the way of the English ship, that the Richard ran into her on her weather quarter. In this situation neither vessel could fire, nor could either crew board, the collision being necessarily gentle, and nothing touching but the jib-boom of the American. In this state the two vessels remained a minute or two. While in this singular position, the firing having entirely ceased, and it being quite dark, a voice from the Serapis demanded of the Richard, if she had struck. Jones answered promptly, "I have not yet begun to fight." As the ships had now been engaged nearly, or quite, an hour, this was not very encouraging certainly to the Englishman's hope of victory, though he immediately set about endeavoring to secure it. The yards of the Serapis were trimmed on the larboard tack, and her sails were full as the Richard touched her; the latter ship bracing all aback, the two vessels soon parted. As soon as Jones thought he had room, he filled on the other tack and drew ahead again. The Serapis, however, most probably with a view of passing close athwart, either the Richard's fore foot or stern, luffed into the wind, laid all aback forward, and keeping her helm down while she shivered her after sails, she attempted to break round off on her heel. At this moment, Jones seeing his enemy coming down, thought he might lay him athwart hawse, and drew ahead with that object. In the smoke and obscurity, the moon not having yet risen, each party miscalculated his distance, and just before the Serapis had begun to come up on the other tack, her jib-boom passed in over the Richard's poop, getting foul of the mizen rigging. Jones was perfectly satisfied, by this time, that he had no chance in a cannonade, and gladly seized the opportunity of grappling. He had sent the acting master for a hawser as soon as he perceived what was likely to occur, but it not arriving in time, with his own hands he lashed the enemy's bowsprit to the Richard's mizen-mast by means of the Serapis' rigging that had been shot away, and which was The wind being light, the movements of the two vessels were slow in proportion. It was owing to this circumstance, and to the fact that the Serapis was just beginning to gather way as she came foul, that the collision itself did little damage. As soon as Capt. Pearson perceived he was foul, he dropped an anchor under foot, in the hope that the Richard would drift clear of him. The fastenings having been already made, this aid was not obtained, and the ships tending to the tide, which was now in the same direction with the wind, the latter brought the stern of the Serapis close in, alongside of the bows of the Richard. In this position the ships became so interlocked, by means of their spars, spare-anchors and other protruding objects, for the moment, as to become inseparable. As the stern of the Serapis swung round, her lower deck ports were lowered in order to prevent boarding. The ships' sides touching, or at least being so close as to prevent the ports from being opened Capt. Mackenzie, in his Life of Paul Jones, has the following in a note, p. 183, vol. 1, viz: "As considerable difference will be observable between the account of this battle, given in Mr. Cooper's Naval History,' and the above, (meaning his own account of the action,) it is proper to state that Mr. Cooper has followed Mr. Dale's description of the manoeuvres antecedent to the ship's being grap pled; whilst in the present account more reliance has been placed on those of the two commanders who directed the evolutions. Mr. Dale was stationed on the Richard's main deck in a comparatively unfavorable position for observing the manoeuvres. The evolution of box-hauling his ship, ascribed by Mr. Cooper to Capt. Pearson, would, under the circumstances, have been highly unseamanlike." In answer to this the writer has to say that he nowhere finds any reason for thinking that either of the commanders contradicts his account, and as the late Com. Dale, in a long personal interview, minutely described all the manœuvres of the two vessels, as he has here given them, he feels bound to believe him. The argument that Mr. Dale could not see what he described, is fallacious, since an officer in command of a gun deck, finding no enemy on either beam, would naturally look for him, and by putting his head out of a forward port, Mr. Dale might have got a better view of the Serapis than any above him. But Com. Dale states a thing distinctly and affirmatively, and with such a witness, the writer feels bound much more to respect his direct assertions than any of the very extraordinary theories in history, of which Capt. Mackenzie has been the propagator. The manœuvres were probably discussed, too, between the younger officers after the surrender of the Serapis. The writer dissents, also, to Capt. Mackenzie's views of seamanship. Bringing ships round before the wind, in the manner described, was far more practiced in 1779 than it is to-day; it was more practiced with the short ships of the narrow seas than with any other. The river vessels, in particular, frequently did it twenty or thirty times in a single trip up the Thames, or into the Nore. The writer has seen it done himself a hundred times in those waters. Many reasons may have induced Capt. Pearson to practice what, with a Baltic and London ship, must have been a common manœuvre, especially with a master on board who was doubtless a channel pilot. He might have wished, at first, to preserve the weather gage; he might not have desired to take the room necessary to ware with his helm ing on account of the lightness of the wind, or the want of hard aweather, or might have attempted to tack, and failsufficient headway, brought his ship round as described. For the writer, it is sufficient that a seamnan and a moralist like Richard Dale has deliberately told him in detail, that this manoeuvre was practiced, to upset the vague conjectures of a historian of the calibre of Capt. Mackenzie. A published statement from Com. Dale is given by another writer, in which that truth-loving and truth-telling old officer is made to say, "The Serapis wore short round on Bon Homme Richard." This is giving in brief what he her heel, and her jib-boom ran into the mizen rigging of the gave to the writer in detail. again, the guns were fired inboard, blowing away the lids. This was renewing the action, under circumstances which, in ordinary cases, would have soon brought it to a termination. Wherever a gun bore, it necessarily cleared all before it, and in reloading, the rammers were frequently passed into a hostile port in order to be entered into the muzzles of their proper guns. It is evident that such a conflict could be maintained only under very extraordinary circumstances. shot to be used under such circumstances; then keeping away a little, he actually fired into the Richard's larboard quarter, or that most distant from the enemy. Some of the witnesses even affirm that this fire was maintained until the Alliance had actually passed the Richard's beam, on her way to leeward. These movements of the Alliance induced Sands aptly to term that frigate the comet of this bloody system. It is difficult to account for her evolutions without supposing treachery, or insanity, on the part of her commander. For the latter supposition there are some grounds, his subsequent deportment indu The eighteens of the Serapis soon destroyed every thing within their range, nor was it long before the main deck guns of the Richard were, in a great mea-cing the government to put him out of employment, sure, silenced. A considerable number of the men who had been at the eighteens of the Richard's gun room had remained below after their pieces were abandoned, but the heavy fire of the Serapis' lower guns soon started them up, and joining some of those who had been driven away from the twelves, they got upon the forecastle. As the Richard was a longer ship than the Serapis, this point was comparatively safe, and thence a fire of musketry was kept up on the enemy's tops and decks. These men, also, threw grenades. The tops, too, were not idle, but kept up a smart fire of muskets, and the men began to resort to grenades also. In this stage of the action, the Serapis had the cannonading nearly to herself. All her guns, with the exception of those on the quarter-deck and forecastle, appear to have been worked, while, on the part of the Richard, the fire was reduced to two nines on the quarter-deck, two or three of the twelves, and the musketry. The consequences were that the Richard was nearly torn to pieces below, while the upper part of the Serapis was deserted, with the exception of a few officers. Capt. Pearson himself appears to have sent his people from the quarter-deck guns. An advantage of this sort, once gained, was easily maintained; rendering it virtually impossible for the losing party to recover the ground it had lost. The moon rose about the time the ships came foul. Until this occurred, the Alliance had not been near the principal combatants. She now passed some distance to leeward, and crossed the bows of the Richard and the stern of the Serapis, firing at such a distance as rendered it impossible for her to make sure of her enemy, even if she knew which was which. As soon as her guns ceased to bear, she up helm and ran a considerable distance farther to leeward, hovering about until the Scarborough submitted. Capt. Landa is now spoke the Pallas, when Capt. Cottineau begged him to go to the assistance of the Richard, offering, at the same time, to go himself if the Alliance would take charge of his prize. All these facts appear under oath in the course of the controversy which grew out of the events of this memorable night. Ashamed to remain idle at such a moment, and in the face of such remonstrances, Capt. Landais hauled up, under very easy canvas, however, for the two combatants, and making a couple of stretches under his topsails, he passed the bows of the Serapis and stern of the Richard, opening with grape, the last as a man at least partially deranged. Still it is diffi cult to suppose the officers would allow their men to fire into the Richard's quarter, as mentioned, unless they mistook the ship. On the other hand, it is affirmed by the witnesses that three lanterns were shown on the off side of the Richard, the regular signal of reconnoisance, that fifty voices called out, begging their friends to cease firing, and this, too, when so near that the remonstrances must have been heard. By direction from Jones, an officer hailed, too, and ordered Landais to lay the enemy aboard; a question was then put to ascertain whether the order was understood, and an answer was given in the affirmative. The effect of this transit of the Alliance was very disastrous to the Richard. Her fire dismounted a gun or two on board the latter ship, extinguished several lanterns, did a good deal of mischief aloft, and induced many of the people to desert their quarters, under the impression that the English on board the Alliance had got possession of the ship, and were aiding the enemy. It is, indeed, an important feature in the peculiarities of this remarkable cruise, and one that greatly enhances the merit of the man who used such discordant materials, that the two principal vessels distrusted each other's ability to look down revolt, and were distrusted by all the rest, on account of the same supposed insecurity. It may be added as one of the difficulties in explaining Capt. Landais' conduct, that the moon had now been up some time, and that it was very easy to distinguish the ships by their off sides; that of the Serapis having two yellow streaks, dotted as usual with ports, while the Richard was all black. Not satisfied with what he had done, Capt. Landais shortly after made his re-appearance, approaching the Richard on her off side, running athwart her bows this time, and crossing the stern of her antagonist. On this occasion, it is affirmed, her fire com. menced when there was no possibility of reaching the Serapis unless it were through the Richard, and her fire, of grape especially, was particularly destructive to the men collected on the Richard's forecastle. At this spot alone ten or twelve men appear to have been killed or wounded, at a moment when the fire of the Serapis could not possibly injure them. Among those slain was a midshipman of the name of Caswell, who affirmed with his dying breath that he had been hit by the shot of the Alliance. After this last exploit, Capt. Landais seemed satisfied with his own efforts and appeared no more. |