may, that unless an essentially different course is in due time adopted and pursued, the French will enter upon a war with a decided naval superiority; and may for months, if not for years, maintain it in the Channel or in whatever part of the world they may prefer.

What would be the effect on our ships and commerce, as well as on our interests and possessions beyond the sea, we are not now called upon to inquire; our subject points to a nearer and dearer interestthat of our home. The loss of a limb may be painful and crippling, but at least let us guard our head and heart, both of which may be powerfully assailed if the road is thus opened for the attack.

Before quitting this naval branch of the question, we may advert to the author's omission of any mention of the resources provided by the coast guard for manning our ships, consisting of some 5000 enrolled seamen.

The state of these men, and the terms of their engagement would hardly affect the difficulties that are described as inherent in the mode of fitting out, and preparing our men-of-war for effective service; and we are the more satisfied that this is the case, from the circumstance of Admiral Bowles, one of the most calm, but at the same time powerful advocates for the increase of our national defences, having, for some years, commanded that force, and being, in consequence, fully aware of their value.

Should we, however, happily adopt a new and better system with regard to the maintenance of our naval power, however perfect that system may become, our safety from the awful consequences of invasion will be far from complete, unless we can be prepared with some adequate forces on shore. The author has adopted an ingenious device for the purpose of bringing into view at one glance the comparative strength of the land forces of France and England, by the relative length of straight lines: and while that representing the force of Great Britain scarcely extends over the span that would be covered by a word of eight or nine letters, the length of the "sword" of France, as it is called, requires a fly-leaf of three folds.

Contemptible, as it thus appears, our means on shore are for the resistance of invasion. We do not agree in opinion with those who think that the French could make the attempt with any reasonable prospect of success, without a naval superiority in the Channel; but let them obtain such a superiority for a single week, either by the superior state of preparations for war-attributed to them by our naval authorities-or with a general inferiority by threatening other points, and concentrating in the Channel (as they only failed in doing in 1805 by the blunder of their admiral), there would be ample time for the introduction of 200,000 men, with cavalry, artillery and horses, into the country.

:

We have now to reflect upon our means of resistance. There are at this stage three favourite topics advanced for our consolation:First-That the disembarcation must be so slow, that it might be successfully opposed, even by a small collected force.

Secondly-That hundreds of thousands of brave Englishmen would arise, arm, and sweep the invaders into the sea; or, failing in that attempt, it would only be necessary that each individual, by an act of self-immolation, should, at any personal risk, kill one of the foe, by which means the whole army would be destroyed.

Lastly-That, by husbanding our pecuniary resources, we are accumulating the acknowledged sinews of war, and may thus be prepared to defy the world.

We have only space for a few words on each of these fallacies, for as

such we cannot but consider them. A landing of troops in very considerable numbers, from a fleet of ships after a long voyage, is scarcely practicable. The greatest recorded effort of this kind, was the landing of the British forces in Egypt, on the 8th March 1801, when 6,000 men simultaneously jumped on shore; but where the passage required is only across a narrow channel, and where there would be no difficulty in previously preparing a system of floating jetties, applicable at any state of tides by means of a very numerous craft, drawing not more than from three to six feet water, with other contrivances quite within the reach of those who, in 1804, could embark at Bologne 100,000 men in the space of half an hour, it would be perfectly practicable to land 50,000 men, or more, within a few hours; and others, in succession, as fast as they could be brought up. We fear, therefore, we should have but a slender reed to rest on in the assumed impossibility of a successful invasion. At the same time, in the enumeration of the facilities for invasion afforded by steam, the consideration of the number of days when, from stress of weather, the old sailing vessels would have been prevented from making the attempt, will apply with equal force to steamers, and more particularly to small craft. The time required to collect our own forces to repel the attack, is unfortunately not to be measured by that which would enable a gentleman, with his carpet bag, to run down to Dover to fulfil an engagement; but will be prolonged by all the difficulties of the arrangements for the simultaneous conveyance of many thousands of soldiers. And then, the French general will hardly be so polite as to send a card presenting his compliments to the Duke of Wellington, and requesting the honour of his attendance at a ball, at Eastbourne, on Wednesday 27th June, at six A.M; but it is more than probable that, by a show of engagements, at other places, he will make him take in his arrival, and thus secure for himself time to be fully prepared for his Grace's reception.

The next prop proffered for our support, is the power that would be brought against the enemy's army, if landed. In addition to the troops which we all know to be available but in very small numbers, we are told that we may with confidence rely on the hundreds of thousands of stout hearts and hands that would be prepared to resist the invader.

No one can doubt the courageous and excited feeling that would animate our countrymen in numbers adequate for every purpose that could be required; but what could such feelings effect opposed to an equipped, organised, and disciplined army in the field?

There is no instance on record, of a populace, however superior in numbers, successfully opposing an organised army, except by a very prolonged desultory warfare; and every year the advantages of disciplined against untrained forces are increased in proportion to the improvements made in military science.

There is as much difference, now, between a French army, and a British untrained levée en masse, as there was in ancient times between our painted ancestors and the Roman legions of Julius Cæsar.

The British, as the least military nation in Europe, would be peculiarly feeble in such efforts, and what was impracticable against regular armies to the Prussian, Russian, Spanish, and French populace will be

even more so to them.

It is worthy of observation that those who have seen most actual service

against French armies, are those who have least confidence in our means of national defence, while those who attach so much importance to the resistance to be offered in the case of invasion by a small body of troops, or a large mass of armed populace are persons who have never seen a shot fired, who, indeed, are totally ignorant of military matters, or of the arrangement and movement of large bodies of men in any kind of order.

We form many speculations which, in the abstract, appear as matters of course; but looked into more closely they are soon found to be full of difficulties.

Let us then put this to such a test. In the first place, what are the classes of persons who would so readily abandon their families at such a moment? where would they get arms, and of what description? where procure ammunition, and how would they carry it? How would they arrange their little kitts, of which a great coat, and blanket, and good spare shoes, would be essential articles? how provide themselves, or be provided with provisions? What would become of these masses the first night or two, particularly if there should be rain? Would they march at once, or would they go to the railway station, like the crowd on an Epsom day.

We will, however, suppose all these LITTLE difficulties satisfactorily arranged, and that there are twenty thousand men on the Dover or Hastings road, some fifty or sixty miles from London, toiling along that road for five or six miles at least, when a few horsemen, who have been in front gallop back with the news that the French troops are approaching, and about three miles distant; and soon after small dispersed bodies are discovered coming towards them, while, from a height presenting a good view, may be seen large black looking compact bodies moving in the same direction.

At this period what would our heroes do, admitting them to be full of gallantry and animation? Would those in front hasten onwards to meet their detested foes, calling and sending to those in rear to close up as rapidly as possible; or would they spread out right and left of the road to form a front?

We will suppose a Gough, a Hardinge, or a Wellington to be present, and we will propose to them as a problem what to do on the occasion; and if they had the smallest body of regulars in company, we would ask whether they would not prefer, nay, decidedly prefer, to be altogether without this armed population.

Under any circumstances, a levée en masse of the people is worse than useless in opposing an enemy invading England; they can only be turned to account in desultory warfare, in mountainous countries, or in defensible towns; and even then with more or less effect in proportion to the amount of system adopted for the regulation of their proceedings.

There is one other resource suggested by persons of a romantic turn of mind, which is, that every man should seek for means to kill one of the enemy, which would speedily lead to their entire destruction: this is not new, it has been urged as a system in other countries on similar emergencies, a few hundreds of stragglers have been made away with in this manner; but with no perceptible effect on the strength of the armies; and with a certainty of entailing cruel measures of retribution on the inhabitants generally, which usually puts an end to the proceeding. The next point we have to consider is the propriety of husbanding our pecuniary resources, that is, to accumulate wealth to be available

when called for, by avoiding present expenditure in preparing for exigencies which may not occur for an indefinite period.

It has been quaintly said that three things were necessary successfully to carry on war-the first being money! the second money! and the third money! a fourth requisite might be added, time to make use of your money!

As on this principle it would be very necessary that we should have time for preparation, it would be the policy of the French not to afford it to us; consequently, when determined on war (assuming them to be so much better prepared for it than ourselves), they would temporise for a time, then suddenly close the negociation, and proceed with activity to business.

If we could then, like Cadmus, with his dragon's teeth, raise any given number of good troops, by sowing our collected gold broad-cast over the ground, it would be well; but we shall find it a slow operation to obtain soldiers capable of opposing a French army.

It is not easy to raise regular soldiers in numbers; men do not enlist from patriotism, and the profession is not popular in England. Hence, the very recruiting is a tardy process, even with high bounties.

Again, it is asserted by officers of experience, that eighteen, or at least twelve months, are required to make a young soldier, a character said to be very inferior to that of the good old soldier. All this tends to prove the length of time that must necessarily elapse before we could be prepared to bring into the field what could be called a respectable force.

We have, now, no means available for accelerating the raising of recruits, rapidly, in large numbers; enormous bounties might answer to a certain extent, but this is a system attended by many evils, in addition to the cost. We are willing, however, on such an emergency, to admit of the troops being brought into the field, after a slight training of about three months; and, with plenty of good officers, by superior numbers, and being mingled with a few old troops, they might make head, as was done by the French at the commencement of their first Revolution; but still a preparation of months is required, where weeks are of consequence. From the above sketch, it will be seen that we adopt very much the views of the author. We do so with sorrow, because we find that there is no disposition in the country to pay any attention to the subject.

It is not from the perusal of this little Essay alone, that we have come to these conclusions; but from the previous consideration given to the subject by that part of our body politic that pens these lines.

We are not surprised that the nation should despise the idea of such inferiority as is here described, still less that they should scorn the notion of danger from an enemy of whom they have hitherto never entertained a fear; but we do wonder, that when such strong opinions have been given, by many who ought to be the best authorities, that no inquiry even should be instituted into our actual condition, nor the slightest attempt be made for drawing up some system for the application of the best resources that may be made available within the shortest period. As we are now circumstanced, in the event of an alarm, how much precious time will be lost, before the measures necessary to be taken can even be defined.*

* Might not the Police force throughout the United Kingdom he drilled as a military force at regular intervals, and be called out for a certain number of days like the Out Pensioners, and their place supplied at such times by special constables? On all other occasions the Police to have only their batons.-ED.

THE HISTORY AND MYSTERY OF THE

GLASS-HOUSE.

of

UPWARDS of two thousand years ago, perhaps three, a company merchants, who had a cargo of nitre on board their ship, were driven by the winds on the shores of Galilee, close to a small stream that runs from the foot of Mount Carmel. Being here weather-bound till the storm abated, they made preparations for cooking their food on the strand; and not finding stones to rest their vessels upon, they used some lumps of nitre for that purpose, placing their kettles and stewpans on the top, and lighting a strong fire underneath. As the heat increased, the nitre slowly melted away, and flowing down the beach, became mixed up with the sand, forming, when the incorporated mass cooled down, a singularly beautiful, transparent substance, which excited the astonishment and wonder of the beholders.

Such is the legend of the origin of GLASS.*

A great many centuries afterwards-that is to say towards the close of the fifteenth century of the Christian era-when some of the secrets of the Glass-house, supposed to have been known to the ancients, were lost, and the simple art of blowing glass was but scantily cultivated-an artificer, whose name has unfortunately escaped immortality, while employed over his crucible accidentally spilt some of the material he was melting. Being in a fluid state it ran over the ground till it found its way under one of the large flag-stones with which the place was paved, and the poor man was obliged to take up the stone to recover his glass. By this time it had grown cold, and to his infinite surprise he saw that, from the flatness and equality of the surface beneath the stone, it had taken the form of a slab-a form which could not be produced by any process of blowing then in use.

Such was the accident that led to the discovery of the art of casting PLATE-GLASS. †

These are the only accidents recorded in the History of Glass. For the rest-the discovery of its endless capabilities and applicationswe are indebted to accumulated observation and persevering experiment, which, prosecuting their ingenious art-labours up to the present hour, promise still farther to enlarge the domain of the Beautiful and the Useful.

It would be a piece of pure pedantry to attempt to fix the origin of glass-making. Some writers assert that glass was known before the flood. No doubt it was, since it would be impossible to light a fire, and urge it to a great heat, without vitrifying some part of the bricks or stones of which the furnace was built. And that very vitrifaction contained the secret of glass. But such rude hints of the mysteries of

This story is related by Pliny, but disbelieved by many modern authors of Treatises on Chemistry, upon no better ground than the probability that glassmaking was known long before. The supposition is as vague as the tradition, to which no date is assigned. The circumstance itself, however, is extremely probable, as the sand on the shore to which the legend is assigned was peculiarly adapted to the manufacture of glass, and is supposed to have supplied the materials for the glass-houses of Tyre and Sidon.

+ Blancourt-"Art de la Verrerie."