If, however, we advert to some circumstances in the opinions and evidence that were given, we shall be convinced that those who doubt ed of success were entitled to more attention and confidence than those who predicted the full and complete accomplishment of the objects of the expedition. Of course ministers consulted those military and naval officers who had been in that part of the continent to which the armament was to be sent; but it is to be remarked, that, with scarcely a single exception, they all spoke to the state of the fortifications, and the degree of resistance and opposition likely to be expected, not from what they knew it to be a few months before the time when they were consulted, but from what they had witnessed 14 or 15 years before. Now whoever has attended to the wars arising from the French revolution, and more especially to the whole system and plans of Bonaparte, must be convinced that it would be absurd, and productive of disappointment and disaster, to act against him in any country, on the supposition that the natural and artificial strength of that country would not, in his hands, be rendered much more effectual and formidable than it ever had been before. This supposition ought to have been admitted in a still greater latitude, when his eager desire to possess a navy was taken into the account. It might surely have hence been inferred, that no means of protecting his arsenals and ships would be neglected; and that a picture of the fortifications on the Scheldt, before Bonaparte obtained the chief power in France, and especially before he selected Antwerp for his great naval depôt, would present a very faint and inadequate

resemblance to them after that period. When ministers, therefore, had heard the opposite opinions of military and naval men respecting the chance of succeeding against Antwerp, all grounded on their knowledge of the country before it had become of such consequence and moment to Bonaparte, they undoubtedly ought to have consi dered this circumstance as detracting from the weight of the opinion of those who were advocates for the expedition, while they should have regarded it as strength, ening the opinion of those who doubted of its success. It by no means followed, that what was easy or practicable in 1794 or 1795 was a fair and justifiable object of attack in 1809; nor that the knowledge which was applicable and accurate at the former period was to be depended and acted upon after the lapse of 14 most momentous years. But the very same circumstance, the lapse of so many years, most of which had been years of the power of Bonaparte, which ought to have weakened the confidence of ministay in the opinion and knowledge of those who were advocates for the expedition, ought to have induced them to have given more than its intrinsic and real weight to the knowledge and opinions of those who expressed doubts respecting its success, If in 1794 or 1795 there was room for difference of opinion and for doubtand that there was, appeared from the evidence given-it ought to have been inferred that in 1809, when Antwerp had been for some years the principal naval arsenal of the French emperor, nothing short of the positive testimony of skilful and impartial men, who had lately been on the spot, should be put in

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competition with the opinion of those who at the former period thought Antwerp unassailable.Every year that Bonaparte possess ed the country, and every addition which he made to his navy or his arsenals, added force to the objections that were urged against the expedition; while it weakened, in the same proportion, the arguments that were advanced in support of its probable success; unless our knowledge of the character of Bonaparte had given us reason to believe that he did not protect and secure every object, in proportion to the value he placed upon

it.

As far as the equipment of the expedition was concerned, every thing appears to have been complete and ready when wanted; if we except a sufficient number of boats for the purpose of landing the troops in South Beveland: for want of these it appears in evidence that the enemy were enabled to throw succours into Flushing, and thus the defence of that place was greatly protracted.. But when it is stated that every thing necessary for the expedition was provided, the assertion must be confined to military and naval stores. We shall shortly have to advert to the lamentable and most culpable inattention, with respect to the regular and full supply of medicines for the troops, when they laboured under the pestilential disease of Walcheren.

In every joint operation where naval and military forces are employed, the success of the measure depends in a great degree upon the commanders of the respective forces having their particular duty clearly sketched out; upon their possessing a complete and accurate knowledge of the times and occa

sions when mutual co-operation may be requisite and necessary; and, above all, upon a hearty zeal and good understanding between them.-From the evidence adduced before the house of commons, it appears that there was some failure in this respect; which, if the expedition had proceeded to more intricate and difficult operations, might have been productive of se rious mischief; but which, from the ultimate and great object being abandoned, led only to some trifling mistakes and delay.

Hitherto we have considered the question as affecting ministers directly and alone; in pointing out the blunders and mismanagement that occurred in executing the plan, and endeavouring to attain the object, ministers had in view, the commander-in-chief must be regarded as the responsible person; unless it can be shown that an improper person' was chosen for this high and arduous office; and, in that case, ministers must divide the blame with him.

All the military and naval men who were consulted by ministers respecting the practicability and the arrangement of the expedition, agreed that the utmost promptitude, alertness and vigour, would be indispensably necessary in carrying it into execution. Even those who were most sanguine and confident of a prosperous and glorious result, deprecated in the strongest terms any delay; either in dispatching it from the British shores, or any tardiness in its operations when landed at the mouth of the Scheldt. As, therefore, the utmost alacrity and vigour were stated to be essentially necessary, it certainly became the most imperious duty of ministers to select a commander-in-chief who was well

known

known for making use of his military faculties and skill in the most comprehensive and decisive manner; on whom both they and the nation could depend, for devoting his whole time and thoughts on the accomplishment of the object committed to his care; and on whom no imputation of deficiency, either in respect to experience, talent, and skill, or to his fixed and regular habit of calling these into regular and constant action, rested in the opinion of those best qualified to judge and decide on such subjects.

At the commencement of our observations on this topic, we remarked, that we should have to take notice of some causes of the failure of the expedition, to which little or no attention, or evidence, had been called in the house of commons. The qualifications of the earl of Chatham were once incidentally introduced: sir David Dundas, the commander-in-chief, during his examination on other points, was asked, if he had ever witnessed the military skill and talent of lord Chatham. His reply cannot go further in their commendation than by asserting, that he had seen him put 10,000 men through their manœuvres. Here then was ground and reason for further investigation, as it was indisputable that great delay had taken place in the operations of the army; and as it must be evident that all the successes which the most powerful and best equipped force is capable of achieving, even when directed against an object easily and completely attainable, may be speedily and entirely blasted by the unskilfulness or inactivity of the general;-on no point might ministers, who selected such a general, have been more clearly

and satisfactorily convicted of gross and culpable misconduct. No delicacy towards the general ought to have restrained investigation into his fitness, and the exposure of his want of all the requisite qualifications:-delicacy in such circumstances was treason to the country. And that lord Chatham was recommended to the command by no one requisite qualification, few will doubt, who will consider his notorious habits of indolence and inactivity; setting aside all consideration of the total absence of proof that he possessed military experience and skill, if he had power to call them into action. In all expeditions, indecision and inactivity are to be guarded against in the choice of a commander: in such an expedition as that to the Scheldt, no person ought to have been selected as commander, in whom a spark of them was supposed to exist, however latent or small.

It may be urged, that there was no proof exhibited in evidence be-" fore the house of commons of lord Chatham's unfitness: those who brought forward the charges against ministers, certainly did not make the selection of him as one of them; and for this the country deemed them censurable. But if ministers thought themselves justified in appointing lord Chatham, they ought, out of regard to their own character as well as to that of their chosen commander, to have repelled the very damning commendation contained in the opinion of sir David Dundas, and to have wiped off the strong public belief entertained of his unmilitary talents, by bringing forward those proofs of his merit, on account of which they had selected him for his high and arduous office. They must

bave known, that till his military character was established by indubitable evidence, they would be charged by those who did not give credit to the accounts of his habitual and unconquerable inactivity, with having selected a man not proved or known to be possessed of the requisite military qualifications; and by those who did give credit to the indolent character that lord Chatham bore, they would be accused of having chosen a man, not known or proved to be possessed of the requisite military qualifications; and the confirmed habits of whose disposition must have rendered those qualifications useless, even if they did exist.

Proved, as it has been, that the expedition to the Scheldt was planned and undertaken without the requisite knowledge of the obstacles and difficulties, as they then existed, but on the belief that every thing would be found at Flushing, on the banks of the Scheldt, and at Antwerp, nearly as it was in the years 1794 and 1795;-the fact having been established in evidence,

that neither ministers nor the commanders were in possession of a plan of the fortifications of the latter town; and that, when the expedition actually arrived at the mouths of the Scheldt, several of the channels of the river were found to run in a different direction from what had been previously supposed; and the distances between the forts on its banks were found to be very erroneously marked in the charts, according to which they had arranged their operations: and, above all, when the character of the commander is considered, is it to be wondered at, if the operations were carried on in a languid and confused manner; if Flushing opposed a resist

ance infinitely longer than it could have done against an active and enterprising general, while the great body of our troops were kept cooped up, useless and exposed to disease, on board the transports, and actually returned to England without ever having landed on the shores of the enemy? The result was disastrous and disgraceful in the highest degree; but it certainly was not more so than any wellinformed and impartial person would have predicted before the departure of the expedition, if he had known the vague and inapplicable information on which ministers proceeded, and the character and habits of the commander whom they had chosen.

Before proceeding to the detail and examination of that portion of the evidence which relates to the causes and reasons for the retention of Walcheren after the ulterior and grand objects of the expedition were abandoned; and which unfolds to the public the incapacity, ignorance, and gross inattention, which greatly aggravated the pes

tilential effects of the climate of that island; it may be proper to notice a very extraordinary eir cumstance, which was brought to light during the inquiry in the house of commons.

Lord Chatham, sensible that his want of capacity was generally deemed one of the principal causes of the failure and disgrace of the expedition, was very naturally anxious to clear himself from the charge: he was, however, more anxious to satisfy his majesty than the nation on this point; and preferred a mode of doing it which, even if his vindication respecting his military character and proceedings had been completely satisfac tory, must have exposed him to the