stance from supply or assistance, The only mode of accounting for Massena's advance towards Lisbon, under these circumstances, is by supposing that he thought it possible lord Wellington meant to abandon Portugal; and that he was driven on, in some measure, contrary to his own judgement, by the taunting letters which it is known he received from Bonaparte; accusing him of delay and unwill ingness to fight; and calling upon him to drive the English army, so inferior to his own, out of Portugal.

As soon as Massena advanced near enough to Torres Vedras to reconnoitre the British lines, he must have been convinced that he could not attack them with the least prospect of success. They were naturally very strong; and labour and art had been brought to assist their natural strength. The line extended from Alhandra on the right to Mafra on the left, forming a distance of about thirtyfive miles, flanked on one side by the sea, and on the other by the Tagus. "This line is protected by nature by a range of mountains, through which there are four roads to Lisbon, formed by a hollow space between the mountains, by which they are completely commanded, and on which have been erected a long range of batteries." Besides, in many places the roads were undermined, and trains laid. The British army, which occupied these lines, was divided into four bodies each guarding one of the passes of the mountains. It consisted of 35,000 fighting men; besides 25,000 regular Portuguese troops; 40,000 militia of that nation, and about 10,000 Spaniards. The French army could not, when they reached the vicinity of Torres Ve

dras, consist of more than 60,000 men, harassed, fatigued, much straitened for provisions, many sick.

and

The Germans and Italians were continually deserting; and the foraging parties were daily cut off either by the armed peasantry, or by the Portuguese militia in their rear under the command of Trant and Silviera.

When these circumstances were known in England, the destruction of Massena's army was regarded as inevitable; and the period was eagerly anticipated, when want of provisions would compel him either to attack the British lines, or to commence his retreat. Either it was supposed must be fatal. It was indeed possible, that he might receive supplies and reinforcements from Spain; but the state of the roads, the season of the year, and above all the continued hostility of the people, rendered their arrival very doubtful. It was known that he could not for many weeks convey intelligence to Paris of the battle of Busaco; and that the messengers he employed on this and other occasions, he was under the necessity of guarding through Portugal with a large body of troops. Besides, it was not easy to conjecture from what quarter he could derive reinforcements or supplies: the French armies were scarcely equal to the difficulties and opposition they met with in every part of the Peninsula.

Massena, however, contrary to the expectation of the British na❤ tion, and contrary it would seem to the expectation and conjectures of lord Wellington, kept his position in front of Torres Vedras long af ter his army was said to be literally and actually starving. At length, on the 14th of November he left his position: on the morning of the following

following day the allied army broke up and followed the march of the enemy, firmly hoping that the time was now ariived for his destruction. Massena retreated to Santareni, where he made a stand; and when the new position he took up there was examined, it was found to be so strong by nature and art,

that it would, have been madness to have attacked him in it. Lord Wellington therefore contented himself with fixing his head-quarters at Cartaxo, and watching the further movements and operations of the French; and in these posi. tions the two armies remained at the close of the year.

N determining the probable issue

as it depends upon the Spaniards themselves, perhaps a cool and comprehensive view of what has actually taken place would lead us to this conclusion: Tha while the disposition and the exertions of the people continue to be such as they have hitherto been, Bonaparte will not be able to gain possession of the Peninsula; but that, on the other hand, while the Spanish government, and the Spanish leading men, both in council and in war, continue to act as they have hither to done, the French armies will not be driven completely and permanently beyond the Pyrennees. We by no means think that the Spanish provisional government, by abolishing what in this country would be deemed intolerable hardships, and certain proofs of slavery, would materially increase the num.

ber or the energy of the opponents

the middling ranks in Spain, men neither sunk into ignorance, superstition, or habits of slavery, like the mass of the people, nor, like the higher classes, afraid of making use of that mass to expel their invaders, would undoubtedly come forward with more zeal and effect, if what they deem abuses and imperfections in the laws and constitution were abolished. But the great advantage which would be derived from a wise and efficient government (to which revolutionary Spain has hitherto been a stranger) would be, that the mass of the people, such as they are, inveterate against the French, not perhaps from the purest or most enlightened motives, would be directed and enabled to use their efforts to the best advantage. System would be given to their operations; and consequently

consequently they would te minate in effects more permanently and generally beneficial to the common cause than they have yet done. The armies, however, would reap the greatest advantage from a radical change in the character of the provisional government: they would gain more discipline, be better officered, and gradually advance to an equality in point of courage and success with the troops of France.

It was an extremely difficult and delicate thing for the British government to interfere in the organization or the principles of the Spanish government. As there could be no doubt of our well. wishes and zeal for the cause in which the Peninsula was engaged, there could be no impropriety in suggesting such alterations in the mode of conducting the war, as our cabinet thought would be beneficial. We might perhaps even go further: and if we could fully and satisfactorily trace the want of success in the Spanish armies to radical defects in the government; we did not go beyond propriety in pointing out the causes and requesting that they should be removed. But merely as allies, and while only the common cause was suffering, it was scarcely proper that we should add remonstrance to our advice: when, however, the defects in the organization of the Spanish armies led our troops into danger, or snatched away the fruits of that victory which British valour and skill had gained; and when that defective organization could be di stinctly traced to the government, we were perfectly justified in adding remonstrance to advice; and in pointing out those defects, upon the removal of which our future cooperation entirely depended.

The marquis of Wellesley, there. fore, while he was ambassador at Seville, considered it as his duty to write an official letter to the secretary of the supreme junta, repeating what he had frequently before urged, on "the necessity of strengthening and amending the frame of the government, by concentrating the executive power in a more compact form, and by resting that power on the direct support of the collective wisdom of the nation, and on the immediate aid of a due representation of the several states of the realm." He remarks that he had also pointed out the causes which had rendered vain and fruitless the efforts of the British in the last campaign; and the only practicable means of enabling Spain to derive and enjoy that species of assistance which she most anxiously desired. In consequence of this representation, the supreme central junta determined to delegate the military branch of the executive power to a committee of seven of its members. Lord Wellesley very justly remarks upon this proposed arrangement, that it would be weakening instead of concentrating and strengthening the executive power; that it would take away activity and vigour from what already was deficient in these qualities. Its effects upon the organization and success of the armies would be prejudicial; they had failed, because there was no unity in the councils which directed them; and certainly their failure was much more likely to be increased than removed, when that part of the executive which was hereafter to superintend them, was not only separated from the other branches of the government, but split into parts.

Another part of lord Wellesley's

letter

letter referred to the meeting of the cortes; a measure which the junta had long and frequently promised to adopt, but the execution of which they had always delayed under some vague and frivolous pretext. There is great manliness in the following passage of the letter; and the sentiments which it breathes, as well as the language in which they are expressed, are so creditable to the noble marquis, and so different from those which his general character, and the spirit of his government in India, would have led us to expect, that justice to him, not less than the merit of the passage itself, induces us to give it in his own words. "The intention of assembling the cortes was announced in the month of May 1809. It will be difficult to persuade the world, that all the necessary regulations, with a view to that important event, might not have been completed before the month of March 1810." (The period the supreme junta had fixed). "I am well aware of the absolute necessity of preparing the principal rules and orders for the regular dispatch of business before that assembly shall meet; but it would have been highly desirable that the utmost degree of expedition should have been used in calling the aid of the cortes to support the executive government in the great work of delivering the Spanish nation from the French usurpation, and of restoring the independence of the monarchy, together with the prosperity and happiness of the people. These objects are inseparable from the interests of the alliance: and it is therefore with the deepest regret that I witness any course of proceedings tending to procrastinate those improvements in the condition of Spain, which alone can enable her

to receive the auxiliary armies of Great Britain.”

Lord Wellesley then adverts to the plan which he had submitted to the supreme junta; according to which, every branch of the executive power was to be lodged in the hands of a council, of not more than five persons, to be chosen either from the body of the junta, or from the nation at large, with references exclusively to the character and qualifications of the persons to be elected. This council of regency was to exercise the executive power till the cortes were assembled: every exertion was to be made to expedite the meeting of the cortes: a deliberative council was to be formed, for the purpose of selecting and preparing such business as it might be proper to bring before the early consideration of the cortes. "The same act of the junta by which the regency shall be appointed and the cortes called, shall contain the principal articles of redress of grievances, correction of abuses, and relief of exactions in Spain and the Indies, and also the heads of such concessions to the colonies as shall fully secure to them a full share in the representative body of the Spanish empire. " The last head of the plan which marquis Wellesley submitted to the junta, was, that the regency, as soon as ever they met, should immediately issue the necessary orders for correcting the whole system of the military department in Spain. This plan was given in on the 8th of September 1809: and the junta fixed the meeting of the cortes for the 1st of March 1810! On the other points they were not more yielding to lord Wellesley's representations: nor did the withdrawing of British assistance, unless they altered their

measures

measures and system, which was very strongly hinted at in his letter, appear to give them the least apprehension. A strong suspicion of disaffection, or at least coolness, to the cause of their country, hangs over all who have yet directed the councils of Spain, and most who have headed her armies; which suspicion, if it should be found that there are no grounds for it, must be consequently changed into a thorough contempt for their abilities.

Early in the year 1810, the instructions to be observed in the election of deputies to the cortes were published. The object and purpose of the assembling of the cortes is first set forth: on it was declared to depend the successful termination of the contest, in which the people of Spain were engaged with Bonaparte for the salvation of their country; the restoration of their beloved sovereign;" and the re-establishment of an ameliorated constitution worthy of the Spanish nation. The general rules by which those qualified to send members to the cortes ought to proceed, are sufficiently simple and common-place: the interest of individuals is not to be preferred to the interest of the nation at large: no person destitute of talent, or in other respects not qualified for the situation, ought to be chosen; nor ought the people to view the business as of such subordinate and trifling moment as to deem any person qualified to fill the situation of member to the cortes. The supreme junta, from whom these instructions proceeded, seems to have dreaded most, however, lest any friends to anarchy or revolution, or any disposed to abuse the power committed to them, should have been returned. If in this descrip

tion they adopted the literal and just meaning of the words, the advice was good; but if under them they ranged and included all who were anxious and determined to remove grievances, and really to ameliorate the constitution of Spain and the condition of the inhabitants, they sought to render ineffectual the grand and only desirable object of the meeting of the cortes. Indeed the extreme and shuffling backwardness which they manifested towards issuing the proclamation for the assembling of the cortes; their own conduct, marked and distinguished by any thing except an enlightened and liberal love of their country or regard to the liberties of their fellow-citizens, unavoidably raised a suspicion, that the members of the cortes, when at last assembled, would not, so far as depended upon them, be of much service or utility to the nation.

The instructions were divided into six chapters. In the first chapter it is directed that parochial and district juntas should be assembled through the medium of the justices, for the purpose of nominating electors. These electoral provincial juntas are to appoint a deputy to the cortes, in the proportion of one to every 50,000 inhabitants, estimating the population according to the census which was taken in 1787: an additional deputy is to be allowed and chosen in every province which contains 25,000 inhabitants more than that number. In the 10th article of the first chapter, a statistical table of Spain is given, from which it appears that the population is rated at 10,534,985; consequently the number of effective deputies would be 208: besides this regular number, 68 supplemental deputies were to be return- ́

ed