Proceeding to the night, the alleged incompetency and misconduct of watchmen formed the great pretext for establishing the Police. Admitting their incompetency and misconduct, we must still say, the watch men were, on ordinary occasions, about as efficient in keeping order on the streets as their successors are. They were more easily found, and they were less seen conversing with prostitutes. It must be remembered, that their instructions and powers were more limited than those are of the Police. In regard to robberies, it is asserted, that the latter has not reduced their numbers; at any rate, it has produced no perceptible improvement.

The defects of the watching system could have been easily remedied. The age and pay of watchmen might have been made matter of legal regulation; government might have been safely intrusted with a limited negative on the appointment of each; and the power to dismiss them on proper grounds, in case of refusal in the parish to do so. This would have been sufficient for compelling the parish to employ none but fit men.

The great defect was, the watch men were not under due inspection and control. They had in the nightconstables confederates, and they dragged their prey to the watch house, confident of finding there only accomplices in extortion and perjury; they therefore made an infamous trade of imprisoning the innocent for the benefit of their own pockets. That is a most hateful power, which authorizes an ignorant peace-officer to put people in prison for the night, on his own testimony, and often for alleged wrong done to himself; saying nothing of other things, it is hateful, as a sure means of destroying his morals, and making him a villain; and, at the least, it ought only to be exercised under every possible restriction.

If a number of the most respectable housekeepers of a parish had singly, in rotation, attended nightly at the watch-house, from eleven until two or three o'clock, for the purpose of being present when each prisoner was brought in, dismissing petty offenders, preventing combination and fraud amidst the watchmen,

inspecting their general conduct, hearing complaints against them, &c., this might have proved a remedy. The duty would have come seldom, and it would not have kept them later from their beds than pleasure often does. Or a magistrate, or respectable agent appointed by government, might have attended nightly for the same purpose.

But what remedy to this is supplied by the New Police? None. The officers drag their victims to the station, and there is no proper person at it to keep them from extortion and conspiracy. With wider powers, they are on duty as free from effectual inspection and check as the watchmen were.

With regard to negligence in protecting property, &c., the watchmen might, with the greatest ease, have been placed under all the inspection and stimulants which operate on the Police. In truth, for all proper purposes, they might have been, without difficulty, made infinitely more efficient than this Police is; for, notwithstanding its expensive character, it is about as destitute as it could well be of effective inspection in the discharge of its more important duties.

Before we speak farther of the pretexts for creating it, let us look at the reasons for giving England hired magistrates. The system is extending, and the wish prevails in many quarters to make it general. It is easy to see, that, if it be not checked, most populous places will soon be placed wholly, or in a large degree, under such magistrates. Let the latter be done, and it will be a matter of minor moment if country parts retain their unpaid magistracy. If the Executive get large cities and towns under the yoke of its hired magistrates and police, it need not desire to extend this yoke farther, whatever arbitrary projects it may entertain.

In duty, a magistrate differs altogether from a judge. To enable him to dispense cheap law and justice, to prevent litigation, and give it the right character, he must be invested with very large discretionary powers. In most of the cases which come before him, he must decide according to equity and circumstances, rather than law and evidence; in many, he

must disregard the latter, to redress or prevent wrong. It is, therefore, essential for him to possess a benevolent, manly heart; and to be, from experience, intimately acquainted with real life and business,-with the habits, feelings, maxims, interests, and relations of society; these form the equity-principles and precedents which ought to govern his decisions. He needs little knowledge of law, and he has the attorney, who acts as clerk to him, and his brethren, to aid him.

In reason, therefore, the man who has been extensively engaged in business, and compelled to mix largely with general society, makes the best magistrate; and this is confirmed by all experience. No better magistrates exist than the mayors and aldermen of corporations; if they do not know much of law, they know much of right and justice. The case is the same with those invaluable magistrates, the country gentlemen. Legal education forms a great argument with the advocates of stipendiary magistrates. To give it validity, they ought to prove that the magistrate can only acquire a proper knowledge of law through such education; but no such proof can be discovered. The general knowledge of law he requires is easily gained; he has no intricate legal cases to decide; if he live in a town, he has an attorney and barrister constantly at his elbow; if he dwell in the country, he refers serious cases to the meeting of the magistrates, at which he has an attorney to advise with; and the party who applies to him frequently does it through an attorney, and can always consult one if he think justice is refused him. Speaking generally, the whole stream of evidence furnished by the most ample experiment proves these matters-]. The unpaid magistrates possess a sufficient knowledge of law. 2. Their decisions are governed by it to the utmost extent called for by right and justice. 3. They are surrounded with adequate restrictions for preventing in them pernicious violation of, and departure from, it.

Every Englishman who can speak from personal observation will join us in asserting, that frequently barristers, retired attorneys, and even clergymen, make the worst magistrates.

They follow law the most servilely, and in consequence their decisions are the most harsh, unjust, and unsatisfactory; they are the most disliked and avoided.

A stipendiary magistrate of legal education must, in general, be a man who knows nothing besides lawmay be destitute of acquaintance with men and things, and moreover, little gifted with capacity. There is not in nature a more silly, mischievous animal than such a man. Even eminent lawyers, on the whole, have been always remarkable for ignorance of general life, and inability to judge of it correctly-narrow views and mistaken conclusions; and in legal matters they have afforded abundant proof that law, without sagacity and knowledge of the world to guide its application, may easily be made an engine of wrong and oppression. Such a magistrate must be destitute of most of the essentials demanded by his office; and his legal education will make him measure every thing by the severe, strained, and often perverted letter of the law, to the destruction of right and denia! of justice. The unpaid magistrates now act under the direction of men of legal education as far as the good of society requires: but their benevolence and sense of equity soften and correct their legal instruction; if men of such education only are magistrates, all must be ignorant, blind, violent, unfeeling law, with nothing to temper and restrain it.

In our judgment, it would be quite as wise to insist that none but men of legal education ought to serve on juries, as that none but such men ought to act as magistrates. The magistrate has to act as juror, as well as judge; and in very many cases he is really an arbitrator, to settle them according to custom and equity, without being bound by law: yet we are gravely assured that he alone is qualified to be one, whose life has been spent in schools and law-courts, and who is acquainted with nothing else, saving perhaps a newspaperoffice. It will have small weight with those who think with the constitution, that even an experienced, able, upright judge ought, in the trial of causes, only to be intrusted with the power to state law and sum up evidence, and that their merits ought to be de

cided on by men destitute of legal education and connexion.

Farther, divers of the magistrate's duties have nothing to do with law, and his discharge of them must be governed by his discretion. He has the power to prevent the holding of public meetings-in case of apprehended or actual disturbance, he has under his command both the civil power and the military; therefore, he possesses the means of suppressing all manifestation of popular feeling the exercise of popular rights is, to a large extent, under his control-he reports on the state of public feeling to government-and in several cases he forms a court of appeal against the agents of the Executive. Without mentioning other matters, it is very evident that other essentials ought to be found in him than legal education; that the latter must tend to lead him into abuse and error in the exercise of his discretionary powers; and that a briefless barrister or unsuccessful attorney is about the very last person who ought to be made a magistrate.

The unpaid magistrates are so numerous, that every village has one in or near it; their time is so little occupied, that they can mix largely with society, and in emergencies they act in bodies, which has the best effects in regard to both counsel and influence. Stipendiary magistrates would be far less numerous, because the country could not afford to have men to do nothing the greater part of their time. These would be some of the consequences-most parts of the country would be many miles distant from a magistrate-the benefits drawn from law and order would be greatly reduced-the magistrate would be constantly confined to his office, and have no leisure for acquiring the information and spirit called for by many of his duties, and in emergencies he would have to act almost alone on his own judgment and without moral weight.

The unpaid magistrates are men of great political influence; they have a deep stake in the public weal and the preservation of popular liberties; they are divided into opposite political parties; and they expect to draw no promotion from their office. All this, combined with their num

bers and connexion, places them rather above, than under the Executive. While it is their personal interest to exercise their discretionary powers in the best manner, it is hopeless for the Executive to attempt to intimidate or corrupt them in it. But stipendiary magistrates would have no stake in the country, and every thing in interest and circumstance would combine to make them the tools of the Ministry; they would servilely follow the commands of the latter in all things relating to national liberties and privileges. The unpaid ones, in habits, feelings, intercourse, and interest, really form part of the people; but stipendiary ones would be an essential part of the Executive, as opposed to the people. The latter it now restrained and influenced by the magistrates; but the stipendiary system would make it a despot over them.

Unprejudiced people will find in all this abundant cause for believing the outcry to be ludicrously preposterous, that penniless, place-hunting, mercenary, ignorant, and shallow lawyers, are the only persons who ought to be magistrates; the more especially when they know, that it is chiefly raised by the lawyers themselves. The world proclaims custom to be a second nature; a man's heart and principles must take their character in a large degree from his daily occupation. The lawyers' trade is, for hire, to support law and wrong against justice and right, to argue on the false and oppressive side, to quirk, misrepresent, intrigue, overreach, and take unjust advantage, to maintain falsehood and fraud against truth and honesty. All history and experience assert the principle-Keep political trust and power from lawyers.

But it is urged, that there is a growing reluctance in country gentlemen to enter the magistracy, and that in some places men cannot be found to act as unpaid magistrates. Thecountry gentlemen,in plain terms, entertain this reluctance from sheer cowardice, flowing from the war waged against them in certain newspapers by barristers and attorneys, Scotch, Irish, and English. In it, they are making a dastardly surrender to the lawyers, not only of their own interests, but of those of the commu

nity, of the constitution in both principle and institution. This forms but a miserable pretext for the stipendiary system.

The alleged inability to find men willing to act as unpaid magistrates, is confined to populous places. If these had each a corporation, they would always have excellent unpaid magistrates; and what is there to prevent it?

A corporation often has privileges which are injurious to the public, but these have so little to do with its welfare, that they are generally useless to it. Considered apart from them, it is of the highest value as a local and subsidiary government. It gives to the inhabitants of a place the selection of their magistrates; it secures to them an abundance of magistrates who are men of business, perfectly independent,identified with them in feeling and interest, and possessed of the greatest moral influence in character, fortune, and connexions. They draw from it general guardians, and promoters of every thing that can benefit them. It is of the greatest national value, in causing the people to confide in, and combining them with, the magistracy. Some idea of the advantages it yields may be gained by contrasting the government of the city of London with that of Westminster.

It could not be a difficult matter to found corporations, free from the defects and errors of the old ones, in the populous places which are now nearly destitute of local government. If the name be obnoxious, such government might be established under a new one, and limited in its objects to the creation of a proper magistracy, ready and cheap law, and efficient guardians of the peace. If this were done, it would not only remove all necessity for stipendiary magistrates, by providing different ones of far better character, but yield other great advantages.

The very heavy expense which stipendiary magistrates would impose on the community, not only in salary, but also in increase of litigation, is a matter not to be overlooked.

These hateful changes are defended on the ground, that the fearful extension of vice, crime, turbulence, and disorder amidst the people makes

them necessary. It is one of the worst signs of the times, that while the conduct of the people is exactly calculated to supply bad rulers with pretexts for establishing arbitrary government, nothing but such government is thought of as a means of correcting it. The two evils have continually enlarged each other-popular misconduct has been met with despotic law, and despotic law has increased popular misconduct, until it has become a question, whether the freedom of the empire can be longer preserved. Before the last plunge into tyranny is taken, it may be as well to suspend this savage cry for coercion and punishment; and enquire whether better means of ruling cannot be employed than the iron arm of the law and the brute force of hired mercenaries.

Self-government in the peoplemeaning by the latter term not the lower orders only, but the population at large-forms the end and essence of national freedom. The great fathers of English liberty had too much knowledge and wisdom to content themselves with merely establishing a representative form of government; independently of this, they secured to the people the right to govern themselves to the farthest point, without the use of delegated authority; and then to do it by means of functionaries of their own selecting, armed only with powers of their own defining. They studiously laboured to make the people, and not only the Legislature, but also the general Executive, one in feeling, interest, and even person-to connect the whole in both deliberation and action-to incorporate the Executive with the people in every thing. The English monarchy, in its best days, was, much more than many republics ever were a popular government.

Without this, there can be no national freedom, either really or nominally. If the people be thrown out of the government, despotism-no matter what forms of freedom may be retained-is practically established; and they must be thrown out of it, if they be not combined with the Executive as well as the Legislature. Separate them from the former in sentiment and functionary, and they will be arrayed against it as an ene

my; nothing but brute force, or their proper spiritual and bodily incorporation with it, can keep them from waging against it regular warfare. Such warfare must fill them with the worst feelings, and make the command of the Legislature a matter of eternal contention between them and the Executive. They will use the elective franchise to return unprincipled demagogues, merely on the ground of their being enemies to the latter, and then it will buy up the demagogues, who are always the most easy of purchase, or adopt their destructive doctrines. The Legislature must either, in corrupt alliance with the Executive, fiercely oppose national feeling, or, in destructive obedience to such feeling, incapacitate the Executive for the discharge of its duties. A wicked, imbecile, revolutionary, denationalized, anti-popular Legislature-one, in respect of honour and patriotism, drawn from the scum of society-must inevitably flow from the warfare we have named: and whether it support the people or the Executive, it must, combined with such warfare, insure arbitrary government.

It has been the system in late years to throw the general population out of the government. Public meetings and petitions have been wholly disregarded, and they have nearly fallen into disuse. A greater mockery could hardly be conceived than to call that a popular government, the functionaries of which, without distinction or discrimination, treat with contempt the sentiments and feelings of the body of the people. While the Executive has thus been separated from the people in opinion and spirit, it has been continually engrossing their right of self-rule in regard to person; and thus the separation has been extended to every thing. The consequences are before the eyes of

all.

By the laws of nature, therefore, tranquillity and freedom cannot exist if the people at large and the Executive be not combined as we have stated; and, in order to produce and maintain the combination in its proper character, it is essential to keep the people under the influence of right principles and feelings. To keep them thus, it is evidently essential:-1. To promote morals to the

utmost; 2. To preserve the sources of public opinion free from error and impurity; and, 3. To make local government as perfect and as independent of the Executive as possible. These three matters form the root of free government; they must give to a representative system its value, and prevent it from being a plague.

It is of the first importance that these matters should be especially attended to in the metropolis. While it is peculiarly exposed to every thing which can operate against them, it exercises overpowering influence over the country at large, and the government. There is, perhaps, no other place in which they are so much neglected.

With regard to morals, they are pre-eminently bad in the metropolis. In looking first at the great source— violation of the Sabbath-we will observe, that, putting a future state wholly out of the question, there is nothing in the social system of more value to the body of the people, than a due observance of this day. Neither body nor mind can bear continual toil, and both require a seventh day of rest to keep them in health and vigour; the abolition of it would considerably reduce the demand for labour, and a vast portion of the working classes would have to labour seven days instead of six for the wages they now receive: to this must be added, the loss these classes would sustain, in respect of cleanliness, intercourse with friends, and the means of instruction. Looking beyond its religious objects, the Sabbath may be regarded as a merciful concession to human nature, an invaluable boon to the poor-a divine interposition to give that protection to the health, comforts, and privileges of the mass of mankind, which, perhaps, nothing else could bestow. The workman who establishes the precedent for making it a day of labour, attacks the best temporal interests of himself and his brethren.

The violation of the Sabbath begins with the great. Giving to Royalty its due precedence, it, in times much too recent, has given its magnificent Sunday dinners. Ministers have given theirs, and besides, have had their Sunday Cabinet meetings-and to these must be added, the Sunday entertainments of the nobility in ge