From Fraser's Magazine. THE BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR.—NO. L. THE memory of great deeds is a part of the true wealth of a people, a property that ought to be as jealously guarded as any portion of their riches; and they who protect it from unjust invasion do good service to their country, because they thus contribute to keep alive, in health and vigor, the spirit by which those great deeds were originally achieved. Believing this to be true philosophy, we have determined to bestow a portion of our labors upon a remarkable portion of a very remarkable work, we mean the continuation of his history of the French Revolution by M. Thiers, in which wrong is done to the victors of Trafalgar. We seek to vindicate their renown, and to show that the historian lacks not only good faith, but generosity and good feeling, when he endeavors to impeach it. military skill, the French are immeasurably our seperiors. In the way of, and opposed to, this result are certain inconvenient events, among which two shine out with an exceeding lustre,-Nile and Trafalgar; victories which placed Nelson incontestably at the head of all naval chieftains, and insured for England, even after his death, the supremacy of the seas all the remaining years of her gigantic strife with Napoleon. But M. Thiers, not satisfied with placing the hero of his historical romance "above all Greek, above all Roman fame," as a soldier, and a statesman and legislator, endeavors to prove him superior to all other men upon the ocean also; and to that end he attempts to explain away these two overwhelming defeats, by showing that Napoleon's naval policy failed rather from untoward accidents than by reason of the valM. Thiers writes history as he would a or or the skill of his opponents. In the narpamphlet. He is always thinking of M. Thiers rative of M. Thiers, English sailors are always and the portefeuille of a minister. His His- beaten by his countrymen when the forces toire du Consulat et de l'Empire is an elab-approximate even to equality. Overwhelmorate political paper, and not a history; aning numbers alone give, in any case, the vicattempt to win popularity and power for the tory to the English; and the Nile and Trafalwriter by flattering the national susceptibili- gar are made to be disasters, not defeats. ties of his very susceptible countrymen, and not what a history ought to be, an honest, because an accurate record of those events which it proposes to retain in the memory of mankind. His theme has given him many legitimate occasions for triumphant descriptions of the successful valor of French soldiers, and the wondrous skill of their great Chieftain, Napoleon. With these, however, he was not content, but seeks to gather laurels for France in fields wherein victory has not hitherto been of her achievement. There is a point upon which French national vanity is peculiarly sore, and that is the raval superiority of England; and any politician who wishes easily and certainly to win popular favor in France, has only to give the nation a reason, or the semblance of a reason, for believing that this superiority on the part of England is a mere pretence, and to prove by the aid of elastic figures and hardy asserons, that in valor, in seamanship, in naval A politician-an unscrupulous politicianstriving for popular favor by thus falsifying history, and endeavoring, by unfair and disparaging glosses, to soothe a wounded national vanity, exhibits no uncommon, though it be a very unedifying spectacle; but that one who pretends to the character of a philosopher, statesman, and historian, should stoop to such low arts, is verily a painful and humiliating subject of contemplation for those who have hitherto vainly flattered themselves with the belief that in all that belongs to, and constitutes true civilization in the present age, we surpass all the ages that have gone by, and are destined to hold out a high example even for ages yet to come. Painful, we say, this spectacle is, because it proves, we fear, but too surely that the standard of public morality in France, even as set up by the most distinguished of her citizens (and France, be it remembered, calls herself the head of European civilization), is a low and debasing standard, because it admits as a principle | droite. Les Autrichiens défilaient entre deux, déthat truth may be sacrificed without hesitation or shame even for mere personal ends; and that to mislead and deceive a people is justifiable, when such deception merely leads to personal aggrandizement. This mode of writing history is not, however, very satisfactory, neither can it be supposed to promote any really desirable end. The French nation cannot derive any benefit from being deceived; and no people, we should suppose, could better afford to acknowledge themselves defeated when they really were so than they. Their valor is beyond dispute, whether at sea or on the land. They need no false glosses upon their history to make succeeding generations look with wonder and admiration upon the heroic achievements of their arms under the guidance of the great chief who so often led them to victory. They can afford to trust to simple truth; and he is not a faithful historian, in any sense of the term-he is not a loyal and true friend to the peace of France, who seeks to enhance the real successes of her warriors by attempting to convert their defeats into victories, or to exalt their glory by unfairly disparaging their opponents. The attempt, on the contrary, seems to throw discredit upon his whole history; for had we no evidence beyond that of M. Thiers by which to establish Napoleon's title to be deemed a successful general, we should hesitate and doubt, simply because we find the historian dealing thus unscrupulously with the facts which he professes to describe. Facts are sometimes called stubborn things; they are not so in the hands of M. Thiers. By him they are made to square with his theories, to suit his predetermined views and opinions. This is done by a short, if not a satisfactory process. The facts are the subject of change, and not the views which are supposed to result from them. posant leurs armes a l'entree de cette espece d'amphitheatre. On avait préparé un grand feu filé. Le GeneralMack se presenta le premier, et de bivac, aupres duquel Napoléon assistait au délui remit son epee en s'ecriant avec douleur, 'Voici le malheureux Mack! Napoleon le recut lui et les officiers avec une parfaite courtoisie, et les fit ranger a ses cotes. Les soldats autrichiens avant d'arriver en sa presence, jetaient leurs armes avec un depit honorable pour eux, et n'etaient arraches a ce sentiment que par celui de lr curiosite qui les saisissait en approchant de Napoleon. Tous devoraient des yeux ce terrible vainqueur qui, depuis dix annees, faisait subir de si cruels affronts a leurs drapeaux." At the very time that Napoleon was enjoying this great triumph, and gratifying his soldiers by the proud spectacle of a mighty army laying down their arms before their conqueror, a signal was made by the Euryalus frigate, lying off Cadiz, which communicated to Lord Nelson the intelligence that the combined fleets of France and Spain having on the evening of the 19th left the harbor of Cadiz, appeared at that time-5 P. M. of the 20th-" determined to go to the westward." Night soon after fell: rejoicing and triumph were in the camp of Napoleon; anxiety, not to say alarm, reigned throughout his fleet then lying outside of Cadiz. And why were the brave seamen of that formidable and gallant fleet anxious that night? and why did they anticipate with the coming day disaster and defeat? Was it that they were about, with numbers inferior to that of their enemy, to try the fate of a battle? This could not be the reason. The English had that day twenty-seven sail of the line: the combined fleets of France and Spain amounted to thirty-three. Did they feel themselves inferior in courage to their opponents? That could not be braver men never bore arms than those, whether Frenchmen or Spaniards, who manned that combined fleet. the prestige of victory was with the English. Throughout the war that had, with only a slight interruption, raged for many years between the two nations, victory in naval combats had invariably been on the side of England. Her sailors were more skillful, and, as seamen, more hardy and resolute, than the French. The commander of the French fleet, Villeneuve, went into battle a desponding, in fact, a beaten man. Nelson assumed with undoubting confidence that victory would be the certain consequence of the enran-gagement which he expected, and hoped would take place. The only doubt in his mind was as to the extent of that victory, es To describe one case in which this has been done, and upon a subject of no ordina. ry importance, is the object of the present paper. On the 20th of October, 1805, Napoleon saw a whole Austrian army defile before him prisoners of war. Let M. Thiers relate this remarkable event: "Le lendemain, en effet 20 Octobre, 1805, jour a jamais mémorable, Napoléon placé au pied au Michalsburg, en face d'Ulm vit défiler sous ses yeux l'armée autrichienne. Il occupait un talus élevé, ayant derrière lui son infanterie gée en demi-cercle sur le versant des hauteurs, et vis-a-vis sa cavalerie deployée sur une ligne But timated by the number of vessels he was destined to capture. The history of these hostile fleets before the terrible engagement of the 21st (which history is now fully known) is, as respects England, the most deeply interesting portion of the annals of that eventful period. The future destiny of England was more intimately connected with the motions of those fleets than men generally at that period knew, or could imagine; and one move in the great game played by Napoleon against England had for the time entirely failed, before the battle of Trafalgar took place. But had success attended the French on that day, that move would assuredly have been renewed. The vigor and sagacity of Nelson, and the velocity of his movements, caused the first failure of Napoleon's plan-his victory of the 21st prevented the possibility of its ever by him being again attempted. In the autumn of 1804, Napoleon had collected upon the coasts of the Continent opposite to England an army of no less than 160,000 men. His first project was to send an army of about 36,000 men, in old vessels of war, under General Decaen, to India, in order to destroy our empire in that part of the world, and also to attract the attention and the fleets of England from the Channel. This plan, however, as it would delay, and perhaps might defeat his great object of invading England, was eventually abandoned, and his whole mind directed to that which he always considered the most vast and important project his fertile brain ever conceived, viz., the invasion of the great enemy which had hitherto lain beyond his reach. But England fortunately was surrounded by the ocean, and defended by her fleets; and Napoleon's hitherto unconquered legions sighed in vain on the shore of Boulogne for an opportunity of combating upon their own territory the soldiers and the people of England. While her fleets rode triumphant in the Channel, this was impossible. Her danger, nevertheless, was great, though now, after the failure of Napoleon's project, we treat it lightly. That he was sanguine of success is well ascertained : "Le lendemain meme de son arrivée [à Boulogne] il fit rassembler toute l'infanterie sur la laisse de basse mer. Elle occupait plus de trois lieues, et présentait la masse énorme de cent mille hommes d'infanterie, rangés sur une seule ligne. Depuis qu'il commandait, il n'avait rien vu de plus beau. Aussi rentré le soir à son quartier général il écrivit à l'Amiral Decrès ces mots significatifs: Les Anglais ne savent pas ce qui leur pend à l'orielle. Si nous sommes maître douze heures de la traversée, l'Angleterre a vecu.'”—Vol. v. p. 436. Napoleon's inventive genius was now employed in devising a scheme by which he might have the Channel thus to himself, free from interruption by an English fleet for three days, or, at the least, for eight-andforty hours-he even spoke of twelve being sufficient. The plan he framed was worthy of his genius. By the good fortune of England it failed indeed, but was nevertheless a long-sighted and well-concerted schemeone apt for its purpose, though in the end rendered abortive, partly by chance, partly by the want of enterprise in Villeneuve, and partly, and in fact mainly, by the fiery energy of Nelson, who, keeping like a bloodhound upon the traces of Villeneuve, filled his mind with such anxiety and alarm as utterly to paralyze both his spirit and his intellect. The plan as devised by Napoleon was as follows:-The precise object was to have for three days the Channel between England and France entirely free for him to act in. This could be done in two ways: some of our vessels were to be drawn away in chase, and those which remained kept occupied in action by an equal or superior force, which should engage them in the Channel, while his flotilla conveyed across the Channel the vast army congregated on the shores of France, Belgium, and Holland. The steps by which it was proposed to attain this object were,― 1. Villeneuve, who was in Toulon watched by Nelson, was on the first favorable occasion, and during a storm, to escape from Toulon unperceived of Nelson, to pass the Straits of Gibraltar, and proceed at once to Cadiz, where he would find Gravina, the Spanish admiral, with six or seven vessels belonging to Spain, and one, l'Aigle, a vessel of France. Taking these under his command, he was thence to sail direct to Martinique. Where, 2. He was to unite, if he were still there, with Admiral Missiessy, who had been sent to the West Indies early in January. He was then, 3. To await the arrival out of Ganteaume, who, being blockaded in the harbor of Brest, by an English fleet under Admiral Cornwallis, was ordered in the same mode as that prescribed to Villeneuve to seize the first opportunity and escape from the blockading squadron, with one-and-twenty ships of the line. Ganteaume was first to proceed to Ferrol, to unite with the French and Spanish vessels he would find there, and then sail to the rendezvous at Martinique. 4. Thus there would be, if all things went well, united at Martinique, twelve vessels under Villeneuve, six or seven under Gravina, five under Missiessy, twenty-one under Ganteaume, together with the Franco-Spanish fleet of Ferrol, making between fifty and sixty sail of the line. A larger fleet," says M. Thiers, echoing Napoleon himself," than was ever at any one time united upon one So united, they were to return to the sea. Channel. 66 5. The most profound secrecy was to be observed. The Spaniards were to be kept entirely ignorant of the object of the enterprise, and were ordered to obey without inquiry. The two French admirals, Villeneuve and Ganteaume, were alone to be cognizant of the plan and its purpose; and they were to learn that purpose at sea. Lest the secret should escape if they were made acquainted with it while in communication with the land, they would receive sealed orders, which were to be opened at sea. None of the captains in the fleet were trusted, but were told merely the names of certain places of rendezvous in case of accidental separation. 6. In the meantime reports were to be industriously circulated that the fleets which had escaped had proceeded to India; and in order to give a color to this statement, a certain number of soldiers were embarked as if for the purpose of attacking our forces in Hindostan. There were, however, in reality only about 5000, who were to be left in the West Indies, in the French garrisons there, in the place of the old soldiers, who were to be brought back and added to the army at Boulogne. Such was the plan.* In furtherance of it the fleets were to escape at the end of March; taking a month, it was expected, to reach Martinique, April would be passed before they arrived; May was to be occupied in joining and arranging the fleets; and June would be passed in the passage back to Europe. So that the united fleet was to be expected in the Channel early in July. * Knowing now what Napoleon's plan was, we can find various indications of it in the events of the day. But Nelson was evidently unaware of the object for which Villeneuve was sent to Martinique, and was mistaken as to his destination on his return. Writing on the 17th August, 1805, Nelson says,-"By all accounts I am satisfied their original destination was the Mediterranean, but they heard frequently of our track."-Desp. vol. vii. p. 5. Napoleon himself, during the whole period, that is, between March and July, determined to remain in Italy, living an ostentatious life, reviewing troops, giving fêtes, and otherwise spending his time so as completely to hide from England the imminent danger which threatened her very existence as a nation, and which, if the projected scheme succeeded only so far as to bring a hostile fleet of fifty or sixty sail in one body into the Channel, would, it was supposed, require. all, and more than all, the means she possessed to shield her from the ruin which impended. The means of England were, however, vast, and Mr. Pitt at this period was busy in forming the last coalition of the European powers against Napoleon, which fate permitted him to accomplish. England, Austria, Russia, Sweden, Naples, united with the determination of assailing the French emperor immediately. Prussia was expected to join the coalition, and 500,000 men were, by the will of Mr. Pitt and the money of England, to be equipped and organized into invading armies, and thrust rapidly forward upon the forces and the territories of Napoleon. Before these armies, however, could be brought to bear effectively upon him, Napoleon hoped to make his descent upon England. England alone stood between him and dominion over the whole of Europe; but so long as she remained erect, and mistress of the sea, his present power was precarious, and every extension of his dominion increased the chances of disaster. England's chief strength lay in her navy; without it at that time, against such a gigantic military power as that wielded with unrivaled skill by Napoleon, she could not have stood a daywith it, in that full supremacy she sought and attained, she kept him a prisoner in Europe. The cage, indeed, was a large one, and he possessed nearly the whole of it; still he felt the humiliation, and in an evil hour for himself, and perhaps for the world, he staked his power against that of England, and in his anger determined to risk that great stake prodigieuse entreprise, et demeurant calme, confiant, heureux même tant il était plein d'espérance en présence d'une tentative qui devait conduire, ou à être le maître absolu du monde, ou à s'engloutir lui, et son armée et sa gloire, au fond de l'océan."-Vol. iv. p. 386. So soon as the hollow peace of Amiens was broken, Napoleon turned his whole thoughts to this one object of curbing, if not of conquering, England; and the time had now arrived, viz., in the spring of 1805, when he hoped for the fulfillment of his long-deferred and most earnest hopes. His orders were issued, and Villeneuve escaped from Toulon. Missiessy had already, in January, sailed for the Antilles, and had excited the attention of England by causing alarm for the safety of some of her West Indian colonies. Villeneuve, escaping from Toulon on the 30th of March, had, in compliance with his orders, sailed to Cadiz, taken Admiral Gravina, with six Spanish ships and one French ship, l'Aigle, under his command, and sailed thence to Martinique. But Ganteaume was unable to escape from Brest. An uninterrupted course of fine weather allowed the English fleet to keep steadily before that port, and no opportunity was offered of getting out without fighting; but fighting was not judged expedient, and the expression of M. Thiers upon the subject, escaping from him by accident, reveals the whole mystery of the matter, if mystery there be, to anything but a willfully blinded national vanity: "Il n'y avait d'autre ressource que de livrer un combat désavantageux à une escadre qui était à peu près égale en nombre à l'escadre française, et très supérieure en qualité." tion, which always occurs in French history vaises que l'Angleterre eût mises en mer dans ces Now this description, which is all perfectly true, is given to exculpate himself. He sought to prove, and he did prove, that the French admiral had every means of defending himself. Yet, in spite of this overwhelming superiority of force, Napoleon considered the French fleet in danger so long as it was within reach of the English inferior fleet commanded by Nelson, and with strange inconsistency says: the third person) fut grand d'apprendre que l'es"Son étonnement (Napoleon's, who writes in cadre n'était par en sûreté, qu'elle ne se trouvait ni dans le port d'Alexandrie, ni dans celui de Corfu, ni même en chemin pour Toulon; mais qu'elle était dans la rade d'Aboukir exposée aux attaques d'un ennemi supérieur." Let us stop here a moment. We find in all French accounts of their naval affairs two classes of description relating to the same circumstances. The description of a fleet This superior enemy being that same fleet and the crews which man it before an action which he had just described as the worst ever and during an action are in striking opposi- sent out by England, composed of small vestion one to the other. In the first case, that sels, about half the size of the magnificent is, before the action, every effort is made to ships which conveyed his army to Egypt, prove the fleet ineffective, and inferior to its and which sailed away from that country English opponent in everything excepting captive to the English. M. Thiers adopts simple valor, which a French writer never the same system. The enemy, that is, the allows to have forsaken his countrymen. English, are always superior just when going They may lack spirit, audacity, presence of into action-during the action they are beatmind, coolness, but never courage. They en at every point, and in every seaman-like may be weak, vacillating, anxious, despond-quality-but at the end they always come ing, but never cowardly. We believe this; and herein lies the explanation of what we are about to describe. But, then, what is the meaning of the second class of descrip out the conquerors, and that is simply the result of their overwhelming superiority of force. Now we shall be able to prove just the reverse of this to be the truth. In num |