WHY THE MARINES SUFFERED. 103 which left Cape Coast to be quartered at Elmina grounded on a sand-bank, from which cause the men were detained for two hours under an excessively heavy downpour of rain, most of them, it is believed, afterwards sleeping all night in their wet clothes. 66 'These conditions are then, I submit, as in the case with the expedition of 1863-64, so exceptional as to afford no grounds for the belief that similar sickness would attack picked troops actively employed on the line of march during the healthy season. "I have no desire to underrate the risks to health caused by a prolonged stay in this climate, but not only do I find a remarkable unanimity of opinion here as to the possibility of undertaking a march of limited duration into the interior under such conditions as I propose, but I think the existing conditions of health of the troops on this station show that such an expedition does not involve great risk. "I would here remark that, notwithstanding all the unfavourable conditions reported as regards the Royal Marines, Dr. Home remarks that their entire non-effective list, all casualties included, was on the thirty-first day after landing only 17 per cent., the remaining 83. per cent. being thoroughly effective. "In my despatch I drew your attention to the remarkable healthiness of the troops in camp at Napoleon and Abbaye, as compared with those in barracks at Elmina. "On the 11th instant, Dr. Home reports, as under, of the troops at Cape Coast and Elmina. The health of the troops in the command has improved with the partial cessation of the rains and morning mists (locally called smokes).' At Elmina the sick rate per cent. of strength is 6.76. At Cape Coast Castle 11.51 (West Indians in both cases). There is less sickness amongst the European officers.' "I have now before me the Weekly Return of Sick of the Abbaye Detachment of 100 men, from 4th to 10th October. It is blank. There was not one case of sickness. The surgeon in charge reports the detachment, in camp now from four to six weeks, as quite healthy. "These facts prove clearly the fact that while sickness is diminishing throughout the whole Coast, by reason of the improving season, it is far less in the camps inland than in the barracks on the Coast. "Since arriving here, I have received a letter, of which I enclose a copy, from Captain Thompson, Queen's Bays, in which he withdraws the opinion he had expressed to His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding-inChief, before leaving England, that Europeans could not live in the bush. "But, Sir, still more strong is the report of Dr. Home, V.C., C.B., the Principal Medical Officer, my responsible adviser on sanitary questions. "I beg to refer you to his despatch to the DirectorGeneral of the Medical Department, by which it will be seen that he is of opinion that European troops may be employed without extraordinary risk, under those conditions which I propose-viz., that the men be landed the day they are to march, that every recognised sanitary THE THIRD BATTALION IS DEMANDED. 105 precaution be taken, as far as possible, and that the longest time the men will remain in the country is two months. "It now remains for me only to repeat my request that as soon as possible after the receipt of this despatch, the troops above specified may be embarked for this station, and to add that I attach the greatest possible importance to the men being selected for this service, and to good accommodation being provided for them on board ship, so that they may arrive here in thoroughly healthy condition. "Should my request be complied with, and the troops be despatched, I undertake not to land them, if, in the time which must elapse before their arrival, circumstances should induce me to consider that the object of my mission can be accomplished without their aid, and further, I undertake, should it seem possible to do with any smaller number, not to land one man more than I consider absolutely necessary to the success of my expedition. "I have, &c., 66 (Signed) G. J. WOLSELEY, Major-General. "The Right Honourable the Secretary of State for War, War Office." This letter is, it will be observed, dated the day before the fight at Essaman. Another despatch which went by the same mail, written after the fight at Essaman, which has apparently not been published, but which is referred to in a despatch in reply, applies for an additional battalion expressly in order to have a reliable force in hand in the event of heavy loss during early engagements with the Ashantees. Unhappily, such was the irregularity of the mails, that these two most important letters do not seem to have left Cape Coast till a fortnight after they were written. CHAPTER IV. THE ASHANTEES BREAK UP THEIR CAMP AT MAMPON, AND ARE BELIEVED TO BE FALLING BACK ON THE PRAH-A TO ABRAKAMPA-FROM THE ASHANTEES ARE SIMILARLY HARASSED-GREAT DEPRESSION AMONG THE ENEMY. We are now concerned with a series of movements all more or less desultory, but the important effect of which will be seen somewhat later. The following letters scarcely need comment. They show the way in which the plot developed itself under our eyes at the time, and as there are no errors of fact to correct, may stand as they were written :— "CAPE COAST CASTLE, October 26. "Great news has come in. A Fantee woman, who has been long a slave in Ashantee, and has been for some time the mistress of one of the Chiefs, fled for fear of her |