Every one of

"Two curious facts are worth recording in this matter. The Barracouta' men had had for some time a daily increasing sick list which had reached twenty-two. Captain Fremantle had the crew up on the quarter-deck, and addressed them thus:-'You men are all going about with your heads under your arms. you is expecting all day long to get fever. Now, I tell you that if you are such geese as that you will all get it. If you hold up your heads none of you will.' Next day the sick list had fallen to sixteen. The other is one of the few sound pieces of advice I heard of before we left England from one of the few old Gold Coast inhabitants, who really did supply good advice. 'No one,' he said, but volunteers ought to go out there, men or officers, and not a soul who cannot read or write. Men who can't read and write have nothing to occupy their minds, and they brood and die. Men who are not volunteers think it very hard they should be sent there against their will, get nostalgia, and die.''

CHAPTER VIII.

THE ASHANTEES PASS THE PRAH-THE ENGLISH REGIMENTS ARRIVE, AND ARE SENT TO SEA AGAINSUFFERINGS OF PRISONERS ESCAPING FROM THE ASHANTEES TO US-REPORTS FROM THE VOLTA-THE PICANINI BRIGADE-THE SAILORS AS OVERSEERSTHE BRILLIANT GOVERNOR- -THE GOVERNOR WHO DIED FOR FANTEES-A DEADLY HULK-THE IMAGINARY MARCH.

Two events now occurred, each of immense importance in the conduct of the war, and the facts as to which require noting. By about the 5th or 6th of December we obtained definite proof that the Ashantees had entirely abandoned the Protectorate. By the 10th and 11th of December the English regiments arrived.

It will have been observed that in his application for the English troops, quoted on page 90, Sir Garnet urged that they should be sent as rapidly as possible. It would have been impossible for any Cabinet to have acceded more promptly to such a request than did that which received the application. The troops were sent at once.

But it is to be noted that Sir Garnet, in a despatch to

Lord Kimberley, dated October the 21st, immediately after the fight at Essaman, and by the same mail which carried the application for troops, writes thus :—

"I mentioned to your lordship in writing by last mail that I intended to apply to the Secretary of State for War for the contingent of English troops which was to be held in readiness. A full statement of A full statement of my motives for that application has been despatched by the present mail. But I find myself compelled to ask for a battalion in addition. The motive for my doing so is this. Our road having reached Mansue, I can advance no further till I have cleared all Ashantees out of the whole territory included between the Mansue road to the east, the Prah on the west, the sea to the south, and, roughly speaking, a parallel of latitude through Mansue to the north.

"My experience on the 14th has taught me that I can place no dependence on the character of any native levies that may be raised.

66

'The Houssas, and even the 2nd West Indian Regiment, were so excitable that, had I not been accompanied by the small European contingent, I should have been fortunate had I escaped disaster.

"I am, as I have already stated, equally doubtful as to the number of native levies that may be raised within the required time.

"Hence I am uncertain whether I shall be able to undertake any serious operation until the arrival of the English troops. I have at present 100 West Indian troops and 150 Marines as the sole force on which I can rely.

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WHY THREE BATTALIONS WERE DEMANDED.

191

Thus, while adhering to my original estimate of the number of European troops who will be required for an advance beyond the Prah, should that become necessary, I find myself compelled to apply for an additional European regiment. For, as I must employ these regiments not only in any advance beyond the Prah, but in preliminary operations to make clear the way for that purpose, I must anticipate losses, perhaps serious ones, before I arrive upon that river. I need, therefore, some means of making up my strength to the full force on which I had at first based my calculations, and I am convinced that an additional regiment will be a moderate. and indispensable reserve to allow for this purpose."

It will thus be seen that Sir Garnet, in applying for three battalions, desired to be prepared for an event the possibility of which was at the time he wrote one of the things for which he was bound to be ready. The Ashantees might offer a very serious resistance on the Cape Coast side of the Prah.

He used his utmost exertions to render this impossible, and he succeeded in inducing the Ashantees to retire without offering a very serious resistance at this point. But it would have been criminal six weeks beforehand to base demands upon any assumption of that kind. It was necessary, therefore, for him to urge that the troops should be sent as rapidly as possible, in order that he might be able, if necessary, by their aid to turn the Ashantees out of the protected territory, and then to march upon Coomassie as soon as stores had been collected at the front sufficient for that purpose.

But by the time the troops arrived the Ashantees had just been driven out of the territory. The troops were not needed for that purpose, and Sir Garnet had pledged himself not to employ the troops on shore in that deadly climate for a day more than was necessary, or to employ a man that could be spared. The troops were therefore immediately ordered out to sea again, whilst stores were being accumulated at the front.

The following letters, which in consequence of the delays in the mails did not leave till the middle of December, describe the situation at the time of the arrival of the troops.

"CAPE COAST CASTLE, Dec. 15.

"The Himalaya' came in on the 10th with the second battalion Rifle Brigade on board. The friends of officers and men will be glad to hear that had they been in England they could hardly have looked in better condition and more healthy. I heard from an officer a faint grumble that his men were very crowded; but I suspect what was meant was only the usual amount of shipcrowding, and I heard nothing at all that tended to show that they had been crowded in the sense in which the Marines who originally came out in the 'Barracouta' were crowded. Your readers will remember that those unhappy men were said to have been literally condensed together with the water, their berths being next to the fires of the condensing apparatus. Nor was there anything like such packing as went on in that most delightful of vessels, the steam-ship 'Ambriz.' In any case, no