creek was 66 feet further west from the point indicated by the call in the deed, and ran southeasterly, or within about 30 feet south of that point. The words used in the deed should be construed according to the intention of the parties making it, and when the intention of the parties can be ascertained therefrom, nothing remains to effectuate that intention. By the deed Canyon Creek is made the south boundary of the land. The creek is a natural monument. The end of the second call in the deed is not at any monument or stake. The beginning of the third call indicates a natural monument, and explains the meaning of the second call, showing that the intention of the parties was to carry the north line to the creek. In a conveyance by natural monuments, distances and quantity being the most uncertain, must yield to the former. "But when there are no natural monuments or lines called for by which the closing line is to be fixed or ascertained, and no line on the ground, it follows of necessity that the survey is to be closed by a direct line between the termini of the lines on the ground, or as fixed by the courses and distances returned to ascertain those termini." The natural monuments govern and control the other description. Evidently the intention of the parties was that the north line should run to the Canyon Creek, for from its terminus, as described, the boundary runs from thence up Canyon Creek in a southeasterly direction to the east line of lot 20." This creek gives the southeasterly boundary line of the land. We are of the opinion that the court correctly carried the north line of the lot to Canyon Creek, and that the Creek was the west terminus of the second call described in the deed. Upon this subject see, Wharton v. Garvin, 34 Pa. St., 340; Chandler v. Me Card, 38 Me., 564; Higginbotham, et al., v. Stoddard, 72 N. Y., 94; 2 Devlin on Deeds, Sec. 835. The appellants also complain that after the testimony was taken the court improperly dismissed the jury and made its findings. In the defendant's cross-complaint equitable relief is asked, and an injunction prayed against the plaintiff. Actions to quiet title or to determine adverse claims under Sec. 3511, Rev. Stat. 1898, may be of a legal or equitable character, depending upon the pleadings. In the present case, defendant, in her cross-complaint, asks for equitable relief. The court heard the case before. the jury until the facts were disclosed, and then discharged the jury, and found the issues for the plaintiff. The action was in the nature of one in ejectment. Such are law cases in which a jury may properly be demanded, unless equitable questions are involved. In such cases the equitable issue should first be passed upon by the court, and whenever an issue of fact, as distinguished from an equitable issue, is to be determined, that question should be left to the jury under proper instructions from the court. In Steele v. Boley, 7 Utah, 67, this court said: "Under our system of practice equitable defenses may be interposed in an action of ejectment, and, if the answer contain all the essential averments of a bill in equity, affirmative relief may be granted thereon. The equitable issues should first be passed upon by the court, for upon such determination as to the relief claimed by a defendant will the necessity of proceeding with the action at law depend. In this case the trial of the legal defense to a jury ignoring the equitable defense and cross-complaint was regular. Sec. 3128, Rev. Stat. 1898. To the same effect is Cohn v. Mining Co., 2 Utah, 174; Donohue v. Meister (Cal.), 25 Pac., 1096; Newman v. Duane, 27 Pac. (Cal.), 66. The question of the construction of the deed in question, and what were boundaries, was a question of law for the court. Where the boundaries were, as shown by measurements, courses, and distances, were questions of fact for the jury. Whether the defendant was entitled to an injunction restraining plaintiff from setting up or making claim to and occupying the premises, was an equitable issue, the granting of which would depend upon the facts. After determining the equitable issue the court should have submitted the case to the jury upon proper instructions. We are of the opinion that the court should have submitted the facts to the jury, and in failing to do so, erred. The cause is reversed and remanded with directions to set aside the judgment and to grant a new trial. BARTCH, C. J., and BASKIN, J., concur. 21 286 024 166 j24 167 LARS HANSEN, PLAINTIFF, v. A. J. ANDERSON FROM JUS SUPREME COURT - POWERS OF— - BY CERTIORARI UNDER SEC. 4, - DEPOSIT-SECS. 3747 AND Under Section 4, Article 8, of the constitution, and Section 3630, decisions and judgments rendered by district courts, in cases appealed from justices of the peace, but only when district courts exceed their jurisdiction or fail to acquire jurisdiction.1 Appeal-From Justice of the Peace - Undertaking — Deposit - Secs. 3747 and 3748, R. S. 1898. Sections 3747 and 3748 refer to one undertaking only, and it is optional with an appellant in taking his appeal to either file an undertaking as provided in Sec. 3747, or make a deposit as provided in Sec. 3748. (Decided April 9, 1900.) Original application in this court for a writ of certiorari to review the action of the district court in and for Weber County, in refusing to dismiss an appeal from jus. tice's court, upon the ground that no appeal bond had been filed as provided by Section 3747, R. S. 1898. Writ denied. M. D. Lessenger, Esq., for plaintiff. N. J. Harris, Esq., for defendant. STATEMENT OF FACTS. It ap This is an application for a writ of certiorari. pears from the petition and affidavit of the applicant that Anderson, one of the defendants, brought an action against the plaintiffs in a justice of the peace court of Weber County, and subsequently appealed the case to the district court for said county. Anderson, the plaintiff and appellant in said action, failed to file an appeal bond, but in lieu thereof deposited $13 with the justice of the peace before whom the case was tried, the same being the amount of the judgment for costs rendered against him in the justice court. Larsen, the defendant in said ac 1 Crooks v. Fourth District Court, 21 Utah, 98, distinguished. tion, and plaintiff in the case at bar, moved the district court to dismiss the appeal on the ground that no appeal bond had been filed as provided by Sec. 3747, Rev. Stat., relating to appeals from justice of the peace courts to the district courts. The district court overruled the motion to dismiss, and proceeded to try the case, and submitted the issues to a jury, which resulted in a verdict against Larsen, the defendant in the case. Thereupon Larsen filed in this court the petition above mentioned. A writ and an order to show cause were issued ex parte. Defendants have demurred to the petition on the ground that said petition shows that the district court and the judge thereof proceeded in the regular manner, and within the jurisdiction of said court, and that this court has no jurisdiction to issue the said writ nor to hear and determine the same. Defendants also filed a motion to quash the writ and the order to show cause. Mc Carty, Dist. Judge, after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court. There are two questions presented by the pleadings in this case. 1st. Has this court jurisdiction to review by writ of certiorari the decision of the district courts rendered in cases appealed from justices of the peace, when the district courts have exceeded their jurisdiction in such cases? 2d. Did the district court in the case at bar exceed its jurisdiction by overruling the motion to dismiss the appeal, and in proceeding to try the case? Sec. 4, Art. 8, Const. Utah, provides that the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction to issue certain writs therein enumerated, one of which is the writ of certiorari. This provision of the constitution invests this court with the general common law powers, heretofore |