supports this argument be true, we neither have, nor ought to have, any regard to God or man, but for our own sake. But if so, the command ought not to have been, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and soul and mind and strength, and thy neighbour as thyself;" but, Thou shalt love thyself with all thy heart and soul and mind and strength, and thy God and thy neighbour so far as they are subservient to thee.' Moreover, if so, the world, instead of being greatly depraved, is very nearly what it ought to be; for it is certainly not wanting in self-love, though it misses the mark in accomplishing its object.

Some have allowed that it is our duty to love God supremely, whether he save us or not; but that, nevertheless, the thing is impossible." If it be physically impossible it cannot be duty; for God requires nothing in respect of obedience but that we love him with all our strength. If it be only morally impossible, that is the same as its being so owing to the corrupt state of our minds. But we are not to suppose that God, in saving sinners, any more than in judging them, consults their depraved spirit, and adapts the gospel to it. On the contrary, it is the design of all that God does for us, to restore us to a right spirit. His truth must not bend to our corruptions; but our hearts must be "inclined to his testimonies." So far, therefore, as any man is renewed by the Spirit of God, so far is he brought to be of God's mind, and does what he ought to do. God's law is written in his heart.

Farther: If the principle that supports this argument be true, it will hold good in reference to men, as well as to God. And is is true that a man who is under just condemnation for breaking the laws, and who has no hope of obtaining a pardon, ought not to be expected to repent for his crime, and, before he die, to pray God to bless his king and country? On this principle, all confessions of this kind are of necessity mere hypocrisy. Even those of the dying thief in the gospel, so far as they respect the justice of his doom from his countrymen, must have been insincere; for he had no hope of his sentence being remitted. What would an offended father say, if the offender should require, as the condition of his repentance, a previous declaration of forgiveness, or even of a willingness to forgive? A willingness to forgive might be declared,

and it would heighten the criminality of the offender if after this he continued hardened; but for him to require it, and to avow that he could not repent of his sin upon any other condition, would be the height of insolence. Yet all this is pleaded for in respect of God. If I be a Father, where is mine honour!

Besides, how is a sinner to "know that he is of God," otherwise than as being conscious of repentance towards God and faith toward our Lord Jesus Christ? Till he is sorry at heart for having dishonoured God, he is not of God, and therefore cannot know that he is so.

If some have gone into extremes in writing of "disinterested love," as Mr. M'Lean suggests, it does not follow that true reli gion has its origin in self-love. Most men, who make any pretence to serious Christianity, will allow that if sin be not hated as sin, it is not hated at all; and why we should scruple to allow that if God be not loved as God, he is not loved at all, I cannot conceive. I am not surprised however, that those who have been so long and so deeply imbibed in a system, a leading principle of which is, "that godliness consists in love to that which first relieves us," should write in the manner they do.

On some occasions, however, Mr. M'Lean himself can say as much in favour of" disinterested love," as his opponent, and can represent that which arises from " a mere principle of self-love" as being of no value. "There may be some resemblances of repentance," he says, "in fear, remorse, and sorrow of mind, occasioned by sin; as in Cain, Judas, Felix, &c. But a mere principle of self-love will make a man dread the consequences of sin, while he has prevalent inclinations to sin itself. There is a difference between mere fear and sorrow on account of sin, and a prevalent hatred of it; between hatred of sin itself, and mere hatred of its consequences; between that sorrow for sin which flows from the love of God and of holiness, and that which flows from an inferior principle. Men may have an aversion to some kinds of sin, because they interfere with others, or because they do not suit their natural constitutions, propensities, tempers, habits, age, worldly interests, &c. while they do not hate all sin universally, and consequently bate no sin as such, or from a proper principle." Works, Vol. II p. 95. I am yours, &c.

LETTER VI.

ON THE CONNEXION BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE AND DISPOSITION.

My Dear Friend,

You need not be told that this is a subject of prime importance, in the Sandemanian system. It every where considers knowledge as the one thing needful, and disposition as its natural and proper effect.

Mr. M'Lean represents me as maintaining that the understanding, or perceptive faculty in man, is directed and governed by his will and inclinations; and this he supposes to be the principle on which my arguments are principally founded; a principle which can only be true, he thinks, in cases where the original order of things is perverted by sin. Whether these sentiments be just, or contain a fair statement of my views, we shall inquire as we proceed at present, I only observe, that the state of the will, or disposition, is, in Mr. M'Lean's account governed invariably by the understanding; or, if in any instance it be otherwise, it is owing to the disorder introduced by sin. I should not have supposed, however, that sin could have perverted the established laws of nature. It certainly perverts the moral order of things, that is (as Dr. Owen represents it, to whom Mr. M. refers,) instead of the will being governed by judgment and conscience, judgment and conscience are often governed by prejudice. But there is nothing in all this subversive of the established laws of nature:

* Reply, p. 8, 9.

for it is a law recognized both by nature and scripture, that the disposition of the soul should influence its decisions. A humble and candid spirit is favourable, and a proud and uncandid spirit is unfavourable, to a right judgment.

"It is a maxim," says Mr. Ecking, "that has not yet been refuted, that the determination of the will must evermore follow the illumination, conviction, and notice of the understanding."* By the illumination, conviction, and notice of the understanding, must be meant, either what the mind judges to be right, or what it accounts agreeable. If the will were always determined by the first, there could be no such thing as knowing the will of God and not doing it. But I suppose this will not be pretended. It must, therefore, be of the last that Mr. Ecking writes. His meaning must be, that the will evermore follows the mind's view of the object as agreeable. But is it certain that the viewing of an object agreeable is properly and perfectly distinct from choosing it? President Edwards conceived it was not, and therefore did not affirm that the will was determined by the greatest apparent good, but merely, that "the will always is as the greatest apparent good, or as what appears most agreeable is." This is not saying that the will is determined by the understanding: for, as the same author goes on to prove, the cause of an object appearing agreeable to the mind may be the state, frame, or temper of the mind itself." But so far as this is the case, the judgment is determined by the state of the mind, rather than the state of the mind by the judgment.

A great deal of confusion on this subject has arisen from confounding simple knowledge, pertaining merely to the intellectual faculty, with that which is compound, or comprehensive of approbation. The former is with propriety distinguished from whatever pertains to the state of the will; but the latter is not, seeing it includes it.

Mr. M'Lean, speaking of certain characters, who had heard the gospel, says, "It is supposed that such men have now received some information which they had not before, both with respect to their danger, and the remedy of it, and”—what? that * Essays, p. 54. + On the Will, Part I. Section II. p. 11.