their wills or dispositions are in that proportion changed? No, but that they are hereby rendered quite inexcusable if they should neglect so great salvation; which neglect must now be the effect of perverseness and aversion, and not of simple ignorance. John iii. 19. xv. 2. 25."* I do not say of Mr. M. as he did of me, When I was only reasoning upon the principles of my opponents, that "he can take either side of the question as he finds occasion:" but this I say, that when writing in favour of the calls of the gospel, he felt himself impelled to admit principles of which, in his controversy on the other side, he has quite lost sight. The above statement appears to me to be very just, and as he here so properly distinguishes simple ignorance from ignorance which arises from aversion or neglect; the one as tending to excuse, the other to criminate he cannot consistently object to my distinguishing between simple knowledge, which barely renders men inexcusable, and knowledge inclusive of approbation, which has the promise of eternal life.

:

Simple knowledge, or knowledge as distinguished from approba tion, as a mere natural accomplishment, necessary to the performance of both good and evil, but in itself neither the one nor the other. Instead of producing love, it often occasions an increasing enmity, and in all cases renders sinners the less excusable. In this sense, the term knowledge and others related to it are used in the following passages: The servant who KNEW his Lord's will, and did it not, shall be beaten with many stripes.-When they KNEW God, they glorified him not as God.-If ye KNOW these things, happy are ye if ye do them.—If I had not come and spoken unto them, they had not had sin, but now they have no cloak for their sin.—If I had not done among them the works which none other man did, they had not had sin; but now they have both SEEN AND HATED both me and

my

Father.

But knowledge is much more frequently used in the scriptures, as including approbation. The Lord is said to know the righteous, and never to have known the workers of iniquity. To understand this of simple knowledge, would deprive God of his omniscience.

Thoughts on Calls, &c. p. 17.

As ascribed to men, it is what is denominated a spiritual understanding. It is not necessary to an obligation to spiritual duties, but it is necessary in the nature of things to the actual discharge of them. It may be said of the want of this, "The Lord hath not given you eyes to see, and ears to hear, to this day;" and that, without furnishing any excuse for the blindness of the parties. It is the wisdom from above, imparted by the illuminating influence of the Holy Spirit.

That knowledge, in this sense of the term, produces holy affections is not denied. It is in itself holy, and contains the principle of universal holiness. It is that by which we discern the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ, which glory being beheld, assimimilates us into the same image from glory to glory, as by the Spirit of the Lord. But the question at issue respects knowledge in its simple and literal sense, or that which is purely intellectual, exclusive of all disposition; otherwise it would amount to no more than this, whether that which includes the seminal principle of holy affection (namely, a sense of heart) tends to produce it: which never was disputed.

The ground on which I am supposed to have proceeded is, "that the understanding, or perceptive faculty in man, is directed and governed by his will:" but this is a mistake: I ground no doctrine upon any theory of the human mind which I may have entertained; but on what I consider as the scriptural account of things; in which I find spiritual perception impeded by evil disposition, and promoted by the contrary.* Neither is the above a fair statement of my views. If what I have written implies any theory of the human mind, it is not that the understanding is in all cases governed by the will; but rather that they have a mutual influence on each other. I have allowed, in my Appendix, that volitions are influenced by motives or considerations which exist in the view of the mind; and I should think it is equally evident on the other hand, that our judgments are, in a great number of instances, determined by a previous state or disposition of the soul. In objects which do not interest the affections, the judg

* 1 Cor. ii. 14.

ment may be purely intellectual, and the choice may naturally follow according to its dictates; but it is not so in other cases as universal experience evinces.

But must it not be owned," says Mr. M. in his Reply, "that so far as this is the case in man, it is an irregular exercise of his faculties, arising from the moral disorder of his lapsed nature, whereby judgment, reason, and conscience are weakened, perverted, and blinded, so as to be subjected to his will and corrupt inclinations?" (p. 8.) It must undoubtedly be owned that the influence of an evil disposition in producing an erroneous and false judgment is owing to this cause; and if that for which I plead were what Mr. M. elsewhere represents it, viz. a prejudice in favour of a report which renders the mind regardless of evidence, (p. 67.) the same might be said of all such judgment. But how, if the state of the will contended for should be that of a deliverance from prejudice, by which evidence comes to be properly regarded? It is not to the disorder introduced by sin, that we are to ascribe the general principle of the moral state or disposition of the soul having an influence on the judgment: for it is no less true that a humble, candid, and impartial spirit influences the belief of moral truth, or truth that involves in its consequences the devoting of the whole life to God, than that a selfish and corrupt spirit influences the rejection of it. Surely it is not owing to the human faculties being thrown into disorder, that a holy frame of mind in believers enables them to understand the scriptures better than the best expositor! The experience of every Christian bears witness that the more spiritually-minded he is, the better he is prepared for the discernment of spiritual things.

Mr. M'Lean thinks I have mistaken the meaning of the term heart, in applying it to the dispositions and affections of the soul, as distinguished from the understanding. When such phrases as a heart of stone, a heart of flesh, a hard and impenitent heart, a tender heart, a heart to know the Lord, &c. occur, though they suppose the intellectual faculty, yet there can be no doubt, I should think, of their expressing the state of the will and affections, rather than of the understanding. I have no objection, however, to the account given of the term by Dr. Owen, that "it generally denotes

the whole soul of man, and all the faculties of it, not absolutely, but as they are all one principle of moral operations, as they all concur in our doing good or evil." The term may sometimes apply to what is simply natural; but it generally, as he says, denotes the principle of moral action, which being comprehended in love, must in all cases, whether it relate to good or evil, include affection. And thus, in his Treatise on Justice, Dr. Owen observes that, “Assent is an act of the understanding only; but believing is an act of the heart, which in scripture compriseth all the faculties of the soul as one entire principle of moral and spiritual duties. With the heart man believeth unto righteousness. Rom. x. 10; and it is frequently described by an act of the will, though it be not so alone.

But without an act of the will no man

can believe as he ought. See John v. 40. i. 12. vi. 35. We come to Christ as an act of the will; and let whosoever will, come : and to be willing is taken for believing. lief is disobedience. Heb. iii. 18, 19."

Psa. cx. 3. And unbeChap. I. p. 108.

Nay, Mr. M. himself acknowledges nearly as much as this. He says, "The scriptures always represent the regenerating and sanctifying influences of the Spirit as exerted upon the heart, which includes not only the understanding, but the will and affections, or the prevalent inclinations and dispositions of the soul." Works, Vol. II. p. 91.

That disposition, in rational being, presupposes perception, I never doubted; but that it is produced by it, is much easier asserted than proved. Knowledge is a concomitant in many cases where it is not a cause. If all holy disposition be produced by just perceptions, all evil disposition is produced by unjust or erroneous ones. Indeed this is no more than Mr. M'Lean, on some occasions at least, is prepared to admit. He tells us that "the word of God 'represents the darkness, blindness, and ignorance of the mind, with regard to spiritual things, as the source of men's alienation from the life of God, and of their rebelling against him." (p. 77.) Does he really think, then, that the passages of scripture to which he refers mean simple ignorance ?* If not, they make nothing

Ephes. iv. 18, 19. Acts xxvi. 18. Ephes. vi. 12. Col. i. 13,

for his argument. Does he seriously consider the blindness, or hardness of heart, in Ephes. iv. 18, as referring to ignorance, in distinction from aversion, or as including it?* Can he imagine that the darkness in which Satan holds mankind is any other than a chosen and beloved darkness, described in the following passages? They LOVED darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil.-The heart of this people is waxed gross, and their ears are dull of hearing, and their eyes have they closed.

That voluntary blindness renders sinners estranged from God, I can easily understand, nor am I at any loss to conceive of its be ing "that by which Satan reigns, and maintains his power over the minds of men:" but I do not perceive, in any of these facts, the proof of disposition having its origin in ignorance. Twofriends whom I will call Matthew and Mark, were one evening conversing on this subject, when the following sentiments were exchanged. All sin (said Matthew) arises from ignorance.-Do you think then, (said Mark,) that God will condemn men for what is owing to a want of natural capacity? O no, (said Matthew,) it is a voluntary ignorance to which I refer; a not liking to retain God in their knowledge. Then (said Mark) you reason in a circle: your argument amounts to this: All sin arises from ignorance, and this ignorance arises from sin; or, which is the same thing, from aversion to the light?

If Mr. M'Lean, or others, will maintain that sin is the effect of simple ignorance, (and this they must maintain, or what they hold is nothing different from that which they oppose,) let them seriously consider a few of its consequences, as drawn by some of our modern Infidels. It is on this principle that Mr. Goodwin, in his treatise on Political Justice, denies the original depravity of human nature; explains away all ideas of guilt, crime, desert, and accountableness; and represents the devil himself as a being of considerable virtue! Thus he reasons:

Tape, Parkhurst observes, is from www, and signifies, hardness, callousness, or blindness. "it is not mere ignorance," says Dr. Owen. "but a stubborn resistance of light and conviction; an obdurate hardness, whence it rejects the impressions of divine truth." Discourses on the Holy Spirit, Book III. Chap. III.