Stringfield vs. The State.

It was, therefore, a case over which no Court of the State, had, or could have, any jurisdiction-a case to which no law of the State could possibly extend.

We think, therefore, that the Court was right, in refusing to "allow service to be perfected by publication."

Judgment affirmed.

JOHN P. STRINGFIELD, plaintiff in error, vs. THE STATE OF GEORGIA, defendant in error.

An indictment charging the accused with the offence of trading with a slave without written permission from his owner, &c., need not charge the name of the owner or the slave, nor the ownership of the property traded.

Misdemeanor, from Richmond county.

Judge HOLT, at October Term, 1858.

Decided by

The indictment charged that the defendant, on the 23d day of December, A. D., 1856, in the county of Richmond "did receive from a certain negro slave, then and there the property of one Mr. Warren, a certain jar containing lard of the value of six dollars, without written permission from the owner, overseer or employer of said slave, or from any other au thorizedto give such permission, authorizing said slave to sell and dispose of said jar containing lard," &c.

The defendant was arraigned and pleaded to the indictment. He was tried and found guilty by the jury.

Before sentence on the verdict he moved the Court in arrest of judgment, on the following grounds, to-wit:

1st. Because the indictment is not sufficiently certain to warrant the conviction of the defendant.

Stringfield vs. The State.

2d. Because the indictment does not charge the name of the negro from whom the articles were charged to have been received.

3d. Because the indictment does not charge the name of the owner of the slave, the language of the indictment being, that the defendant did receive from a certain negro man slave, then and there the property of one Mr. Warren.

4th. Because the indictment does not charge that the jar of lard, alleged to have been received was the property of any person.

The presiding Judge overruled the motion, and counsel for defendant assigns error on the three last grounds in the motion, to-wit:

1st. That the indictment does not charge the name of the negro.

2d. That it does not charge the name of the owner of the slave.

3d. Because it does not charge that the jar of lard was the property of any person.

WALKER & RODGERS, for plaintiff in error.

Attorney General, McLaws, for defendant in error.

By the Court.--MCDONALD, J. delivering the opinion.

Every ground in the motion in arrest of judgment on which error is assigned, has been decided by this Court. In the case of Ricks vs. the State, the plaintiff in error, was indicted for buying cotton from a slave without permission; the Judge of the circuit Court charged the jury that it was not necessary to allege or prove the ownership of the cotton in any person, and this Court sustained the charge. 16 Ga. 600, 603.

Fardy Sweeney was indicted in the Superior Court of Bibb county, for selling and furnishing a slave with spirituous liquors, for the slave's own use, he the said Sweeney not being the owner, overseer or employer of said slave, and not then and

Stringfield vs. The State.

there having the said slave under his custody or care. The jury found him guilty. It was objected to the indictment on a motion in arrest of the judgment, that it did not aver the name of the negro or contain any other allegation by which his identity might be sustained or proved. In delivering the judgment, the Court remarked that it was insisted that unless the indictment had stated the name of the negro and the name of his owner, the judgment would not serve as a bar to another indictment for the same offence. This Court held otherwise. 16 Ga. R. 467. These cases settle the points made in this case. It is true that in the case of Sweeney vs. State, the indictment charged that the name and owner of the slave were unknown. But the Court decided the case without reference to that allegation. Indictments for larceny must charge the ownership of the property alleged to have been stolen to be in some person, and if the owner be unknown that must be alleged. But that is a rule not without a reason, for the jury on conviction of the accused find all the facts charged and among them the ownership of the property alleged to have been stolen. On conviction of the defendant, the owner, if known, is entitled to have the property restored to him and if he be not known, it goes, in England, to the crown. 2 East's. Cr. Law, 651. Larceny and Robbery, Sec. 88.

In this State every negro is presumed to be a slave and to have an owner, and proof of his color is sufficient prima facie evidence of his being a slave and supports that allega

tion.

Judgment affirmed.

McLeland vs. The State.

BENJAMIN F. MCLELAND, plaintiff in error, VS. THE STATE OF GEORGIA, defendant in error.

If the Court charge the jury in a criminal cause, that if they believe that one of two or more acts, necessarry to constitute the offence charged in the bill of indictment be proven, they should find the defendant guilty, it is error.

Adultery, from Scriven county. Decided by Judge HOLT, April Term, 1857.

The plaintiff in error in this case was indicted for "living in a state of adultery and fornication" with Marion Scott.

Upon the trial in the Court below, the State introduced as a witnessGreen, who testified that some time in September or October, 1855, he saw the defendant and Marion Scott lying together in a storehouse of the defendant, under the counter, thinks they committed the act of adultery, they were doing something particular-that defendant had carnal knowledge of and with said Marion Scott. This was in the county of Scriven, State of Georgia. Marion Scott at that time was living in the house with defendant and his wife. Marion Scott was a single woman. Witness and witness' wife, and Marion Scott, who was his wife's sister, were lying under the counter, when the defendant came in the store and went under the counter to the place where they were lying. That he (witness) believed at the time that defendant was having carnal knowledge, but he did not interfere to prevent it.

John Burcer, testified that the defendant was a married man that he saw him married eight or ten years before, and that his wife was then living.

The State then closed, and the defendant introduced no evidence.

Defendant's counsel asked the Court to charge:

1st. "That under this indictment the defendant must be proved to have lived in a state of adultery and fornication with Marion Scott, and that proof of a single act of adultery only, is not sufficient to authorize a conviction.

McLeland vs. The State.

This charge the Court refused to give, but charged the jury "that although the defendant was indicted for "living in a state of adultery and fornication" yet if they believed from the testimony that the defendant had been guilty of a single act of adultery, they should find him guilty under the indictment."

Defendant's counsel requested the Court to charge.

2d. "That though no witness was put upon the stand to impeach the witness Green, yet nevertheless the jury were not bound to give full faith and credit to his statements. But they can reject the testimony in toto if they think proper."

3d. "That the defendant is entitled to the benefit of the reasonable doubts of the jury."

These charges were given by the the Court further charged the jury.

Court as requested, and "That the proof must

produce in the mind of the jury a reasonable certainty of guilt before they could convict; that if they entertained a reasonable doubt they should acquit."

The jury found the prisoner guilty, and the defendant's counsel filed his bill of exceptions saying that the Court erred in refusing to charge as firstly requested by the defenant's counsel and in charging, as lastly above set out.

GORDON, SINGLETON & WRIGHT, for plaintiff in error.

Attorney General, McLaws; and A. H. H. DAWSON, con

tra.

By the Court.-MCDONALD, J. delivering the opinion.

The act of the Legislature of 1850, Cobb 462, prohibits the Judge presiding at the trial of a defendant, in an indictment, from intimating his opinion to the jury in his charge as to the guilt of the accused. If he violates this statute, this Court is required to reverse the judgment.

Under the charges of the indictment in this case, it is ne