3. Ecclesiastical bodies, which are called to decide the question of the dismission of a pastor, ought to have weighty reasons presented if they determine on his dismission. It is our opinion, that the simple desire of a pastor to be dismissed, or of his people that he should be, or of both of them united, is not a sufficient reason for dissolving a relation of this nature. When a pas

tor is settled, he is installed by an ecclesiastical council. He is placed over the people as their Shepherd. He is set apart to this office, and they are committed to his care with all the solemnity that attaches to any transaction. A charge is given to the pastor, and usually one to the church and people. All this is in harmony with the principle that a pastor is an ascension gift; and that the setting of him over the church is the act of God, signified by the solemnities performed by the council. But if he is a mere hirelingcomes without deliberation, and goes without a reason—are these solemnities the proper means of indicating such a relation? On this supposition, is there not something in them of the nature of profaneness? Once, the installation and the dismission of a pastor, were both very solemn transactions. Can either of them be so, if great care is not exercised in regard to them?

It appears to us, that no pastor ought to be dismissed without an imperative reason. The council who dismiss him, ought to take the responsibility of removing from a church, one whom God has set over it; and to show, truly and distinctly, the grounds on which they take such a step. These ought not to be trivial or common grounds. They ought to be of such weight and importance as shall make his dismission, equally with his installation, an act of the Great Shepherd and Bishop of souls.

Like every thing which is subject to the action of depraved human nature, this relation is liable to evils; and a great degree of stability in it may occasionally produce evils and inconveniences on both sides. But the only scriptural and effectual way of remedying them is by patience and prayer, "endeavoring to keep the urity of the Spirit, in the bond of peace, with all lowliness and meekness, with long-suffering, forbearing one another in love." If either pastors or people think that they can remedy or avoid them by other means, they err. For evils extreme and intolerable, the providence of God is, usually, not long in providing a remedy. In the

present state of society, there appears to be no danger that the pastoral relation will fail to be dissolved, in any case, in which, according to the will of its founder, it ought not to continue.

ART. II.-THE ARMINIAN DOCTRINE OR SELF-DETERMINATION AND CONTINGENCY IN VOLITION.

By S. C. BRACE, New Haven.

THE controversy respecting the leading tenets of that Theology, which, in the last century, was called Arminianism, and which found in JONATHAN EDWARDS, of Northampton, an antagonist, who, at least, immortalized his own name, is but the theological modification of that dispute respecting liberty and necessity, which has so long occupied and perplexed the minds of philosophers. "The question about predestination and free will, (to quote the language of Dugald Stewart,) has furnished in all ages and countries, inexhaustible matter of contention both to philosophers and divines. In the ancient schools of Greece, it is well known how generally and how keenly it was agitated. Among the Mahometans, it constitutes one of the principal points of division between the followers of Omar and those of Ali; and among the ancient Jews it was the subject of endless dispute between the Pharisees and Sadducees. It is scarcely necessary for me to add, what violent controversies it has produced, and still continues to produce in the Christian world." (Stewart's Works, Vol. V. p. 571.) Lord Kames has remarked, that "the disputes about liberty and necessity have subsisted through all ages in the inquiring world; since the earliest accounts of philosophy, they have run through all the different sects of philosophers, and have been engrafted into most of the religious systems." Edwards saw that the Arminian theology rested mainly upon a single metaphysical theory respecting liberty; and accordingly in his Inquiry on the Freedom of the Will, he struck at the root of Arminianism. He says, "on the determination of this one leading point, depends the issue of almost all controversies we have with such (Arminian and

Pelagian) divines." He continues, "I stand ready to confess to the forementioned modern divines, if they can maintain their peculiar notion of freedom, consisting in the selfdetermining power of the will, as necessary to moral agency, and can thoroughly establish it in opposition to the arguments lying against it, then they have an impregnable castle to which they may repair, and remain invincible in all the controversies they have with the reformed divines, concerning original sin, the sovereignty of grace, election, redemption, conversion, the efficacious operation of the Holy Spirit, the nature of saving faith, per severance of the saints, and other principles of the like kind." "But," he adds, "I am under no apprehensions of any danger the cause of Christianity, or the religion of the reformed is in, from any possibility of that notion's ever being established, or of its being ever evinced that there is not proper, perfect, and manifold demonstration lying against it." (Original Sin, Part IV. Chap. I.)

The metaphysical theory which Edwards here declares to be the "one leading point on which depends the issue," has been known under the name of the doctrine of a SELFDETERMINING POWER OF THE WILL. It is our design now to inquire, what was this doctrine, as held by the writers whom President Edwards mentions, and opposes in his 'Inquiry'? It is surely proper, at this time, to urge a close and thorough examination of this question. It becomes those who interest themselves in the theological controversies of the present day, to "understand whereof they affirm." If there is occasion to compare the views of one of the parties with those against which Edwards contended, and to pronounce them but "a reproduction of Arminianism," let it be done with that secure accuracy which is neither to be evaded by ingenuity, nor intimidated by denial. We might add, let none exhibit to the world the weakness of repelling a charge, of which they know not the import.

Within the last ten years, the assertion has repeatedly been made, and evidence adduced to sustain it, that the theology of one class of our divines, has revived the Arminian doctrine of a self-determining power, under a new name, and rests upon that doctrine some of its main peculiarities. This assertion has, on the other hand, been steadily denied, as not only incorrect, but calumnious. The

question of fact must therefore be brought to a severer test; and, in order to do this, we must take a more definite aim. To discover what the Arminian doctrine in reality was, we must resort to standard Arminian authors; and surely, if the usage of the community has given the epithet, Arminian, to any theological views, it is to those which President Edwards opposed under that name. The writers to whom he chiefly refers in his "Inquiry," are Dr. Whitby, Dr. Samuel Clarke, Dr. Turnbull, and Dr. Watts, the latter of whom he strenuously opposes as holding "a leading article in the Arminian scheme," a doctrine which, he says, "is never the better for being held by such an one."

Before we proceed to offer quotations from these writers, we will attempt to state clearly the propositions, in support of which they are to be adduced, in order that our readers may be better prepared to judge of their pertinency and weight. We believe, then, that a thorough examination of the authors above mentioned, will show the following statements to be correct.

1. In the varied forms of expression and modes of argument employed by them respecting the freedom of the will, they aim at a single principle, the same principle at which all Libertarians have aimed, viz: that of POWER TO THE OPPOSITE CHOICE. This principle may be stated in a variety of ways. It implies, for instance, that when two or more objects of choice are presented to the mind, it is possible for the mind to choose any other one of the objects, instead of that which will actually be chosen, without any change in the comparative estimate of the objects as related to its own happiness. It implies, that "while the same mind continues in precisely the same state, in the same circumstances, and under the same influences of every kind," it has power to choose in opposite directions at different times. It implies, that the same cause, in the same circumstances, has power to produce different effects, at different times.

2. The terms self-determination and self-determining power, arose naturally from the above theory. Whatever may be the state of mind antecedent to the act of volition, in respect to feelings, desires, comparative estimate of the objects presented, &c. &c.; it is supposed that there is still a posibility of either choice; one of the objects is, indeed, that which the mind will in fact choose, but the questionwhat decides or determines which of the objects shall be the VOL. V.

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one actually chosen is still unanswered. To this question the reply is given, "the mind itself determines; it is a selfdetermining power." By this is meant, not that there is a determining act distinct from the act of choice,* and prior to it, but (to use the language of Edwards,) "that the exertion of the act is the determination of the act; that for the soul to exert a particular volition, is for it to cause and determine that act of volition." Edwards has clearly shown that the language used by the Arminian writers on this subject, must involve either an infinite series, or the true idea of chance. The latter was undeniably, the doctrine of the Arminians, although they rejected the name. To the question, what determines the mind to choose as it does, rather than otherwise? they should have answered, "nothing; the mind cannot be said to be determined; it chooses one of the objects, and not another, and this is all." But such an answer might have opened their eyes to the error of their theory.

3. The word cONTINGENCY is used by the writers in question, to denote the absence of that connection which exists between a cause and its effect, when the existence of the particular cause renders the failure of the particular effect an impossibility in the nature of things.

It has been supposed, (but without the shadow of a reason, so far as we can judge,) that the word contingency was used by these writers to denote the absence of that previous certainty which must be conceived of as having existed from eternity, in reference to every event which actually takes place, even though the event take place without a cause. In other words, it has been supposed that the doctrine of contingency consisted in the denial of the following propositiou as stated by Dr. Samuel Clarke :-"Whatever at any time is-it was certainly true from eternity that that thing would be." That no such notion of contingency ever disgraced the pages of those whom Edwards opposed, or re

"If, to evade the force of what has been observed, it should be said, that when the Arminians speak of the will determining its own acts, they do not mean that the will determines them by any preceding act, or that one act of the will determines another, but only that the faculty or power of will, or the soul in the use of that power, determines its own volitions; and that it does it without any act going before the act determined; such an evesion would be full of the most gross absurdity. I confess, it is an evasion of my own inventing; and I do not know but I should wrong the Arminians in supposing that any of them would make use of it. But it being as good a one as I can invent, I would observe upon it a few things."-PRESIDENT EDWARDS.