advanced, and then retired to Middlebrook, in New Jersey. During this period nothing of more importance occurred than skirmishes, in which Washington was not particularly He was nevertheless fully em

engaged. ployed.

His mild, conciliatory manners, and the most perfect subjection of his passions to reason, together with the soundness of his judgment, enabled him to serve his country with equal effect, though with less splendour, than is usually attached to military exploits.

The French fleet, the expectation of which had induced the evacuation of Philadelphia, arrived too late for attacking the British in the Delaware. It was also deemed unadvisable to attempt New York. But the British posts on Rhode island were judged proper objects of a conjunct expedition with the sea and land forces of France and America. This being resolved upon, general Sullivan was appointed to conduct the operations of the Americans. When the preparations for commencing the attack were nearly completed, a British fleet appeared in sight. D'Estaing, who commanded the French fleet, put out to sea to engage them; but a storm came on, which crippled both fleets to such an extent, as induced the one to go to New York, and the

The determi

other to Boston, for the purpose of being repaired. While the fleets were out of sight, Sullivan had commenced the siege, and flattered himself that a few days co-operation of the returned French ships, could not fail of crowning him with success. nation of D'Estaing to retire to Boston, instead of co-operating in the siege, excited the greatest alarm in Sullivan's army. By this dereliction of the original plan, the harbours of Rhode island were left open for reinforcements to the British, which might easily be poured in from their head quarters at New York. Instead of anticipated conquests, Sullivan had reason to fear for the safety of his army. Irritated at the departure of D'Estaing, he expressed in general orders to his army, "his hope that the event would prove America able to procure that by her own arms, which her allies refused to assist in obtaining."

These expressions were considered as imputing, to D'Estaing and the French nation, a disinclination to promote the interests of the United States. When intreaties failed of persuading D'Estaing to return to the siege, a paper was drawn up and signed by the principal officers of the Americans, and sent to him, in which they protested against his taking the

fleet

fleet to Boston," as derogatory to the honour of France, contrary to the intentions of his most christian majesty, and the interest of his nation; destructive to the welfare of the United States, and highly injurious to the alliance between the two nations." So much discontent prevailed, that serious apprehensions were entertained, that the means of repairing the French fleet would not be readily obtained.

Washington foresaw the evils likely to result from the general and mutual irritation which prevailed; and exerted all his influence to calm the minds of both parties.

He had a powerful powerful coadjutor in the marquis de la Fayette, who was as deservedly dear to the Americans as to the French. His first duties were due to his king and country; but he loved America, and was so devoted to the commander in chief, as to enter into all his views, and second his conciliatory measures with truly filial affection.

Washington also wrote to general Heath, who commanded at Boston; and to Sullivan and Greene, who commanded at Rhode island. In his letter to the former, he stated his fears," that the departure of the French fleet from Rhode island, at so critical a moment, would not only weaken the confidence

of

of the people in their new allies, but produce such prejudice and resentment as might prevent their giving the fleet, in its present distress, such zealous and effectual assistance as was demanded by the exigence of affairs, and the true interests of America;" and added, “that it would be sound policy to combat these effects, and to give the best construction of what had happened, and at the same time to exert ourselves to put the French fleet as soon as possible in a condition to defend itself and be useful to us. The departure of the fleet from Rhode island is not yet publicly announced here; but when it is, I intend to ascribe it to necessity, produced by the damage received in the late storm. This, it appears to me, is the idea which ought to be generally propagated. As I doubt not the force of these reasons will strike you equally with myself, I recommend to you to use your utmost influence to palliate and soften matters-To induce those whose business it is to provide succours of kind for the fleet, and to employ their utmost zeal and activity in doing it. It is our duty to make the best of our misfortunes, and not to suffer passion to interfere with our interest and the public good."

every

In a letter to general Sullivan he observed,

"The

"The disagreement between the army under your command and the fleet, has given me singular uneasiness. The continent at large is concerned in our cordiality, and it should be kept up by all means consistent with our honour and policy. First impressions are ge nerally longest retained, and will serve to fix, in a great degree, our national character with the French. In our conduct towards them, we should remember, that they are a people old in war, and very strict in military etiquette,

and apt to take fire when others scarcely seem warmed. Permit me to recommend, in the most particular manner, the cultivation of harmony and good agreement, and your endea vours to destroy that ill humour that may have found its way among the officers. It is of the utmost importance too, that the soldiers and the people should know nothing of this misunderstanding, or, if it has reached them, that means may be used to stop its progress, and prevent its effects." In a letter to ge

neral Greene he said, "I have not now time to take notice of the several arguments which were made use of, for and against the count's quitting the harbour of Newport, and sailing for Boston. Right or wrong, it will probably disappoint our sanguine expectations of success; and, which I deem a still worse conse

quence,