Maxwell, “that while they continued to do their duty, he should only regret the part they had taken.” The legislature of New Jersey, roused by these events, made some partial provision for their troops. The officers withdrew their remonstrance, and continued to perform their duty.

The consequences likely to result from the measures adopted by the Jersey officers being parried by the good sense and prudence of general Washington, he improved the event when communicated to congress, by urging on them the absolute necessity of some general and adequate provision for the officers of their army, and observed, "that the distresses in some corps are so great, either where they were not until lately attached to any particular state, or where the state has been less provident, that officers have solicited even to be supplied with the clothing destined for the common soldiery, coarse and unsuitable as it was. I had not power to comply with the request.

"The patience of men, animated by a sense of duty and honour, will support them to a certain point, beyond which it will not go. I doubt not congress will be sensible of the danger of an extreme in this respect, and will pardon my anxiety to obviate it.'

The members of congress were of different opinions respecting their military arrangements. While some were in unison with the general, for a permanent national army, well equipped and amply supported, others were apprehensive of danger to their future liberties from such establishments, and gave a preference to enlistments for short periods, not exceeding a year. These also were partial to state systems and occasional calls of the militia, instead of a numerous regular force, at the disposal of congress and the commander in chief. From the various as pects of public affairs, and the frequent change of members composing the national legislature, sometimes one party predominated, and sometimes another. On the whole, the support received by Washington was far short of what œconomy as well as sound policy required.

The American army, in these years, was not only deficient in clothing, but in food. The seasons both in 1779 and 1780 were unfavourable to the crops. The labours of the farmers had often been interrupted by calls for militia duty. The current paper money was so depreciated, as to be deemed no equivalent for the productions of the soil. So great were the necessities of the Ame

rican

army, that Washington was obliged to call on the magistrates of the adjacent counties for specified quantities of provisions, to be supplied in a given number of days; at other times, he was compelled to send out detachments of his troops, to take provisions at the point of the bayonet from the citizens. This expedient at length failed, for the country in the vicinity of the army afforded no further supplies. These impressments were not only injurious to the morals and discipline of the soldiers, but tended to alienate the affections of the people. Much of the support which the American general had previously experienced from the inhabitants, proceeded from the difference of treatment they received from their countrymen, compared with what they suffered from the British. The general, whom the inhabitants hitherto regarded as their protector, had now no alternative, but to disband his troops or to support them by force. His situation was eminently embarrassing. The army looked to him for provisions, the inhabitants for protection of their property. To supply the To supply the one, and not offend the other, seemed little less than an impossibility. To preserve order and subordination in an army of free republicans, even when well fed, paid, and clothed, would have been a work

a work of difficulty; but to retain them in service, and restrain them with discipline, when destitute not only of the comforts, but often of the necessaries, of life, required address and abilities of such magnitude as are rarely found in human nature. In this choice of difficulties, Washington not only kept his army together, but conducted it with so much discretion, as to command the approbation both of the soldiery and of the citizens.

With an army so badly provided, and so deficient in numbers, nothing of decisive importance could be attempted by the American general. The whole force under his immediate command, did not exceed 13,000; while the British, strongly fortified in New York and Rhode island, amounted to 16 or 17,000. These were supported by a powerful fleet, which, by commanding the coasts and the rivers, furnished easy means for concentrating their forces in any given point, before any part of the American army could effectually interpose the least check to their progress. This disparity was particularly striking in the movements of the two armies in the vicinity of the Hudson. Divisions of both were frequently posted on each side of that noble river. While the British could cross directly over, and unite their forces in any enterprise, the Americans could not safely effect a correspondent

respondent junction, unless they took a considerable circuit to avoid the British shipping.

To preserve West Point and its dependencies was a primary object with Washington. To secure this, he was obliged to refuse pressing applications from the neighbouring states, for large detachments from the continental army, for their local defence, Early in the year, sir H. Clinton made some movements up the North river, which indicated an intention of attacking the posts in the highlands; but in proportion as these were threatened, Washington concentrated his force for their defence. This was done so effectually, that no serious direct attempt was made. upon then. Clinton, hoping to allure the Americans from these fortresses, sent detachments to burn and lay waste the towns on the coasts of Connecticut. This was done extensively. Norwalk, Fairfield, and New London were destroyed, Washington, adhering to the principle of sacrificing small objects to secure great ones, gave no more aid to the suffering inhabitants than was compatible with the security of -West Point. Though the force under the immediate command of general Washington throughout the campaign of 1779, was unequal to any great undertaking, yet his active mind sought for and embraced such oppor

tunities