will produce frequent desertion in all armies, and so it happened with us, though it did not excite a single mutiny.”

The paper money with which the troops were paid, was in a state of depreciation daily increasing. The distresses from this source, though felt in 1778, and still more so in 1779, did not arrive to the highest pitch till the year 1780. Under the pressure of sufferings from this cause, the officers of the Jersey line addressed a memorial to their state legislature, setting forth, "that four months pay of a private would not procure for his family a single bushel of wheat, that the pay of a colonel would not purchase oats for his horse, that a common labourer or express rider received four times as much as an American officer." They urged, “that unless a speedy and ample remedy was provided, the total dissolution of their line was inevitable;" and concluded with saying, "that their pay should either be made up in Mexican dollars, or in something equivalent." In addition to the insufficiency of their pay and support, other causes of discontent prevailed. The original idea, of a continental army, to be raised, paid, subsisted, and regulated upon an equal and uniform principle, had been in a great measure exchanged

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changed for state establishments. This mischievous measure partly originated from necessity; for state credit was not quite so much depreciated as continental. Congress not possessing the means of supporting their army, the business devolved on the component parts of the confederacy. Some states, from their internal ability and local advantages, furnished their troops, not only with clothing, but with but with many conveniencies. Others supplied them with some necessaries, but on a more contracted scale. A few, from their particular situation, could do little, or nothing at all. The officers and men in the routine of duty mixed daily, and compared circumstances. Those who fared worse than others, were dissatisfied with a service which made such injurious distinctions. From causes of this kind, superadded to a complication of wants and sufferings, a disposition to mutiny began to shew itself in the American army. Very few of the officers were rich. To make an appearance suitable to their station, required an expenditure of the little all which most of them possessed. The supplies from the publie were so inadequate, as to compel frequent resignations. The officers of whole lines announced their determination to quit the service. The personal influence

of

of general Washington was exerted with the officers in preventing their adoption of such ruinous measures, and with the states, to remove the causes which led to them.

Soon after the surrender of the whole southern army, and at the moment the northern was in the greatest distress for the necessaries of life, general Kniphausen passed over from New York into New Jersey, with 5,000 men. These were soon reinforced with a detachment of the victorious troops returned with sir Henry Clinton, from South Carolina. It is difficult to tell what was the precise object of this expedition. Perhaps the royal commanders hoped to get possession of Morristown, and destroy the American stores. Perhaps they flattered themselves, that the inhabitants, dispirited at the recent fall of Charleston, would submit without resistance, and that the soldiers of the continental army would desert to the royal standard. Several movements took

place on both sides, and also small skirmishes, but without any decisive effect. At one time, Washington conjectured that the destruction of his stores was the object of the enemy; at another, that the whole was a feint to draw off his attention, while they pushed up North river, from New York, to attack West Point.

The American army was stationed with a view to. both objects. The security of the stores was attended to, and such a position. taken as would compel the British to fight under great disadvantages, if they risked a general action to get at them. The Ameri can general, Howe, who commanded at the highlands, was ordered to concentrate his force for the security of West Point; and Washington, with the principal division of his army, took such a middle position as enabled him either to fall back to defend his stores, or to advance for the defence of West Point, as circumstances might require. The first months of the year were spent in these desultory operations. The disasters to the south produced no disposition in the north to give up the contest; but the tardiness of congress and of the states, the weakness of government, and the depreciation of the money, deprived Washington of all means of attempting any thing beyond defensive operations. In this state of languor, marquis de la Fayette arrived from France, with assurances that a French fleet and army might soon be expected on the coast. This roused the Americans from that lethargy into which they seemed to be sinking. Requisitions on the states for men and money were urged

with uncommon earnestness. Washington, in his extensive correspondence throughout the United States, endeavoured to stimulate the public mind to such exertions as the approaching crisis required. In addition to arguments formerly used, he endeavoured on this occasion, by a temperate review of European politics, to convince his countrymen of the real danger of their independence, if they neglected to improve the decisive adyantages they might obtain by a great and manly effort, in conjunction with the succours expected from France. The resolutions of congress for this purpose were slowly executed. The quotas assigned to the several states were by their respective legislatures apportioned on the several counties and towns. These divisions were again subdivided into classes, and each class was called upon to furnish a man.

This predominance of state systems over those which were national, was foreseen and lamented by the commander in chief. In a letter to a member of the national legislature, he observed," that unless congress speaks in a more decisive tone, unless they are vested with powers by the several states competent to the great purposes of the war, or assume them as a matter of right, and they and the

states