recourse had been had to military impressments for supporting the army, which, if continued longer or urged farther, would probably disgust the people, and effect a revolution of public sentiment. That the relief procured by these violent means was so inadequate, that the patience of the army was exhausted, and their discontents had broken out in serious and alarming mutinies. That the relief necessary was not within the power of the United States, and that from a view of all circumstances a loan of money was absolutely necessary for reviving public credit, and giving vigour to future operations." It was farther stated, "that next to a loan of money, a French naval superiority was of so much consequence, that without it nothing decisive could be undertaken against the British, who were in the greatest force on and near the coasts."

The future capacities of the United States to repay any loan that might be made were particularly stated, and that "there was still a fund of resource, and inclination in the coun try equal to great exertions, provided a liberal sum of money would furnish the means of stopping the progress of disgust which resulted from the unpopular mode of supplying the army by requisition and impressment."

Such interesting statements, sanctioned by the American chief, and enforced by the address of colonel Laurens, directly from the scene of action, and the influence of doctor Franklin, who for the five preceding years had been minister plenipotentiary from the United States to the court of Versailles, produced the desired effect. His most christian majesty gave his American allies a subsidy of six millions of livres, and became their security for ten millions more, borrowed for their use in the united Netherlands. A naval co-operation was promised, and a conjunct expedition against their common foe projected.

The American war was now so far involved in the consequences of naval operations, that a superior French fleet seemed to be the only hinge on which it was likely soon to take a favourable turn. The British army being parcelled in the different sea ports of the United States, any division of it blocked up by a French fleet could not long resist the superior combined force which might be brought to operate against it. The marquis de Castries, who directed the marine of France with great precision, calculated the naval force which the British could concentre on the coast of the United States, and disposed his owngin such a

manner as ensured him a superiority. French

fleets

fleets from Brest, the West Indies and Rhodé liland, rendezvoused in the Chesapeak about the 30th of August 1781. These fleets, notwithstanding their original distance from the scene of action, and from each other, coincided in their operations in an extraordinary manner, far beyond the reach of military cal culation. They all tended to one object, and at one and the same time, and that object was neither known nor suspected by the British, till the proper season for counteraction was elapsed. This coincidence of favorable circumstances extended to the marches of the French and American land forces. The plan of operations had been so well digested, and was so faithfully executed by the different commanders, that general Washington and count Rochambeau had passed the British head quarters in New York, and were considerably advanced in their way to Yorktown, before count de Grasse had reached the American coast. This was effected in the following manner: Monseiur de Barras, appointed to the command of the French squadron at New Port, arrived at Boston with dispatches for count de Rochambeau. An interview soon after took place at Weathersfield between generals Washington, Knox, and du Portail, on the part of the Americans, and count de Rochambean

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Rochambeau and the clevalier de Chastelleux on the part of the French. of the French. At this interview an eventual plan of the whole campaign was fixed. This was, to lay siege to New York, in concert with a French fleet which was to arrive on the coast in the month of August. It was agreed that the French troops should march towards the North river. Letters were addressed by Washington to the executive officers of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New Jersey, requiring them to fill

up their battalions, and to have their quotas of 6,200 militia in readiness within a week of the time they might be called for. Conformably to these outlines of the campaign, the French troops marched from Rhode island in June, and early in the following month joined the American army. About the time this junction took place, Washington marched his army from their winter encampment, near Peckskill to the vicinity of Knightsbridge. General Lincoln fell down the North river with a detachment in boats, and took posses sion of the ground where fort Independence formerly stood. An attack was An attack was made upon him, but was soon discontinued. The British, about this time, retired with almost the whole of their force to York island. Washington hoped to be able to commence operations

against New York about the middle, or, at farthest, the latter end of July. Flat-bottomed boats, sufficient to transport 5,000 men, were built near Albany, and brought down Hudson's river to the neighbourhood of the American army before New York. Ovens were erected opposite to Staten island for the use of the French troops. Every movement was made which was introductory to the commencement of the siege. It was not a little. mortifying to Washington, to find himself, on the 2d of August, to be only a few hundreds 1781. stronger than he was on the day his army first moved from their winter quarters. To have fixed on a plan of operations with a foreign officer at the head of a respectable force; to have brought that force from a considerable distance, in confident expectation of reinforcements sufficiently large to commence effective operations against the common enemy; and at the same time to have engagements in behalf of the states violated, in direct opposition to their own interest, and in a manner derogatory to his personal honour; was enough to have excited storms and tempests in any mind less calm than that of Washington. He bore this hard trial with his usual magnanimity, and contented himself with repeating his requisitions

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