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commanders, and to give up the contest. Such a letter, at such a time, in unison with the sentiments of many desponding citizens, from a person whose character and connexions placed him above all suspicion of treachery, and whose attachment to his native country, America, was unquestionable, could not have failed to make an impression on minds of a feeble texture; but the labored epistle of the honest, but timid divine, received no farther notice, than a verbal message to its author, "That if the contents of his letter had been known, it should have been returned unopened."

While sir William Howe was succeeding in every enterprise in Pennsylvania, intelligence arrived, that general Burgoyne and his whole army had surrendered prisoners of war to the Americans. Washington soon after received a considerable reinforcement from the north

érn army, which had accomplished this great event. With this increased force, he took a position at and near Whitemarsh. The royal army having succeeded in removing the obstructions of the river Delaware, were ready for new enterprises. Sir William Howe marched out of Philadelphia with almost his whole force, expecting to bring on a general engagement. The next morning he appeared

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on Chesnut hill, in front of and about three miles distant from the right wing of the Americans. On the day following, the British changed their ground, and moved to the right. Two days after they moved still far ther to the right, and made every appear ance of an intention to attack the American encampment. Some skirmishes took place, and a general action was hourly expected: instead of which, on the morning of the next day, after various marches and countermarches, the British filed off from their right, by two or three different routes, in full march for Philadelphia.

While the two armies were manoeuvring, in constant expectation of an immediate ens gagement, Washington rode through every brigade in his army, and, with a firm steady countenance, gave his orders in person how to receive the enemy, and particularly urged them" to place their chief dependence on the bayonet." His position in a military point of view was admirable. He was so sensible of the advantages of it, that the manœuvres of sir William Howe for some days could not allure him from it. In consequence of the reinforcement lately received, he had not in any preceding period of the campaign been in an equal condition for a general engagement.

gagement. Though he ardently wished to be attacked, yet he did not relinquish a position, from which he hoped for reparation for the adversities of the campaign. He could not believe that general Howe, with a victorious army, and that lately reinforced with 4,000 men from New York, should come out of Philadelphia only to return. He therefore presumed, that to avoid the disgrace of such a movement, the British commander would, from a sense of military honor, be compelled to attack him, though under great disadvantages. When he found him cautious of engaging, and inclining to his left, a daring design was formed, which would have been executed, had the British either continued in their position, or moved a little farther to the left of the American army; this was, to have attempted in the night to surprise Philadelphia.

Three days after the retreat of the British, Washington communicated, in general orders, his intention of retiring into winter quarters. He expressed to his army high approbation of their past conduct, gave an encouraging statement of the prospects of their country, exhorted them to bear the hardships inseparable from their situation, and endeavoured to convince their judgements, that these were

necessary

necessary for the public good, and unavoidable from the distressed situation of the new formed states.

The same care to cut off all communication between the enemy and the country was continued, and the same means employed to secure that object. General Smallwood was detached to Wilmington, to guard the Delaware, colonel Morgan was placed on the lines on the west side of the Schuylkill, and general Armstrong near the old camp at the Whitemarsh, with a respectable force under the command of each, to prevent the country people from carrying provisions to the market in Philadelphia.

Valley Forge, about twenty-five miles distant from Philadelphia, was fixed upon for the winter quarters of the Americans. This po sition was preferred to distant and more comfortable villages, as being calculated to give the most extensive security to the country adjacent to Philadelphia. The American army might have been tracked by the blood of their feet, in marching without shoes or stockings over the hard frozen ground between Whitemarsh and Valley Forge. Under these circumstances they had to sit down in a wood, in the latter end of December, and to build huts for their accommodation. To a want of

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clothing was added a want of provisions. For some days there was little less than a famine in the camp. Washington was compelled to make seizures for the support of his army. Congress had authorised him so to do; but he wished the civil authority to manage the delicate business of impressment, and regretted the measure, as subversive of discipline, and calculated to raise in the soldiery a disposition to licentiousness and plunder. To suffer his army to starve, or disband, or to feed them by force; were the only alternatives offered to his choice. Though he exercised these extraordinary powers with equal reluctance and discretion, his lenity was virtually censured by congress as proceeding from a delicacy in exerting military au thority, which might prove prejudicial to the general liberties of America;" at the same time his vigour was condemned by those from whom provisions were forcibly taken. The sound judgment and upright principles of the commander in chief, gave a decided preference to the mode of supplying his army by fair contract. But the necessities thereof, proceeding from bad management in the commissary department, the depreciation of the congress bills of credit, the selfishness of the farmers in preferring British metallic to Ame

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