Opinion of the Court. 368 U.S. the state appellate court may have thought. But when those listed are compared with the 30 or 35 women who had registered since 1952 (note 11, p. 66) the proportion rises to around 33%, hardly suggestive of an arbitrary, systematic exclusionary purpose. Equally unimpressive is appellant's suggested "male" proportion which we are asked to contrast with the female percentage. The male proportion is derived by comparing the number of males contained on the jury list with the total number of male electors in the county. But surely the resulting proportion is meaningless when the record does not even reveal how many of such electors were qualified for jury service, how many had been granted exemptions (notes 3 and 4, p. 61), and how many on the list had been excused when first called. (Id.) This case in no way resembles those involving race or color in which the circumstances shown were found by this Court to compel a conclusion of purposeful discriminatory exclusions from jury service. E. g., Hernandez v. Texas, supra; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587; Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128; Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400; Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U. S. 584. There is present here neither the unfortunate atmosphere of ethnic or racial prejudices which underlay the situations depicted in those cases, nor the long course of discriminatory administrative practice which the statistical showing in each of them evinced. In the circumstances here depicted, it indeed "taxes our credulity," Hernandez v. Texas, supra, at 482, to attribute to these administrative officials a deliberate design to exclude the very class whose eligibility for jury service the state legislature, after many years of contrary policy, had declared only a few years before. (See p. 64, supra.) It is sufficiently evident from the record that the presence on the jury list of no more than ten or twelve women in the earlier years, and the failure to add in 1957 more women to those already on the list, are attributable 57 Opinion of the Court. not to any discriminatory motive, but to a purpose to put on the list only those women who might be expected to be qualified for service if actually called. Nor is there the slightest suggestion that the list was the product of any plan to place on it only women of a particular economic or other community or organizational group. Cf. Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217; Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60, 83-87. And see also Fay v. New York, supra, at 287. Finally, the disproportion of women to men on the list independently carries no constitutional significance. In the administration of the jury laws proportional class representation is not a constitutionally required factor. See Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 403; Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282, 286-287; Fay v. New York, supra, at 290-291. Finding no substantial evidence whatever in this record that Florida has arbitrarily undertaken to exclude women from jury service, a showing which it was incumbent on appellant to make, Hernandez v. Texas, supra, at 479– 480; Fay v. New York, supra, at 285, we must sustain the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida. Cf. Akins v. Texas, supra. Affirmed. THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring. We cannot say from this record that Florida is not making a good faith effort to have women perform jury duty without discrimination on the ground of sex. Hence we concur in the result, for the reasons set forth in Part II of the Court's opinion. Per Curiam. 368 U.S. MCLEMORE v. MISSISSIPPI. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI. No. 410. Decided November 20, 1961. Appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Reported below: 241 Miss. 664, 125 So. 2d 86, 126 So. 2d 236. W. E. Gore, Sr. for appellant. PER CURIAM. The appeal is dismissed. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. FRUHLING v. AMALGAMATED HOUSING APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK. No. 419. Decided November 20, 1961. Appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. Samuel B. Waterman for appellant. Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, Paxton Blair, Solicitor General, and Daniel M. Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees. PER CURIAM. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. Syllabus. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO. v. PENNSYLVANIA. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA. No. 15. Argued October 12, 1961.— Decided December 4, 1961. 1. Appellant was incorporated under the laws of New York and has its principal place of business there. It transacts a world-wide telegraphic money order business. Pennsylvania sued in a state court and obtained a judgment under a state statute for the escheat to itself of the amount of unclaimed money held by appellant and arising out of money orders bought in Pennsylvania and never cashed by the payees or refunded to the senders. Held: Pennsylvania had no power to render a judgment of escheat which would bar New York or any other State from escheating the same property, and, therefore, the judgment was void under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 72-77. 2. The controversy between the States as to which of them is entitled to this money can be settled by a suit in this Court under Art. III, § 2, of the Constitution. Pp. 77-80. 400 Pa. 337, 162 A. 2d 617, reversed. John G. Buchanan, Jr. argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were John G. Buchanan and John H. Waters. A. Jere Creskoff argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were David Stahl, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, and Jack M. Cohen, Deputy Attorney General. Ruth Kessler Toch, Assistant Solicitor General of New York, argued the cause for the State of New York, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. With her on the brief were Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General, and Paxton Blair, Solicitor General. Opinion of the Court. 368 U.S. MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. Pennsylvania law provides that "any real or personal property within or subject to the control of this Commonwealth... shall escheat to the Commonwealth" whenever it "shall be without a rightful or lawful owner," "remain unclaimed for the period of seven successive years" or "the whereabouts of such owner. . . shall be and remain unknown for the period of seven successive years." These proceedings were begun under that law in a Pennsylvania state court to escheat certain obligations of the Western Union Telegraph Company-alleged to be "property within" Pennsylvania-to pay sums of money owing to various people who had left the monies unclaimed for more than seven years and whose whereabouts were unknown. The facts were stipulated. 1 Western Union is a corporation chartered under New York law with its principal place of business in that State. It also does business and has offices in all the other States except Alaska and Hawaii, in the District of Columbia, and in foreign countries, and was from 1916 to 1934 subject to regulation by the I. C. C. and since then by the F. C. C. In addition to sending telegraphic messages throughout its world-wide system, it carries on a telegraphic money order business which commonly works like this. A sender goes to a Western Union office, fills out an application and gives it to the company clerk who waits on him together with the money to be sent and the charges for sending it. A receipt is given the sender and a telegraph message is transmitted to the company's office nearest to the payee directing that office to pay the money order to the payee. The payee is then notified and upon properly identifying himself is given a negotiable draft, which he can either endorse and cash at once or keep for use in the future. If the payee cannot be located for 1 Act of July 29, 1953, P. L. 986, § 1 (27 Purdon's Statutes § 333). |