selves under a state government · that every argument which shows one man ought not to have more votes than another, because he is wiser stronger, or wealthier, proves that one state ought not to have more votes than another, because it is stronger, richer, or more populous; and that, by giving one state, or one or two states, more votes than the others, the others thereby are enslaved to such state or states, having the greater number of votes, in the same manner as in the case before put of individuals, when one has more votes than the others. -that the reason why each individual man, in forming a state government, should have an equal vote, is, because each individual, before he enters into government, is equally free and independent; so each state, when states enter into a federal government, are entitled to an equal vote, because, before they entered into such federal government, each state was equally free and equally independent

that adequate representation of men, formed into a state government, consists in each man having an equal voice; either personally, or if by representatives, that he should have an equal voice in choosing the representatives - -so adequate representation of states in a federal government, consists in each state having an equal voice, either in person or by its representative, in every thing which relates to the federal governmentthat this adequacy of representation is more important in a federal, than in a state government, because the members of a state government, the district of which is not very large, have generally such a common interest, that laws can scarcely be made by one part oppressive to the others, without their suffering in common; but the different states composing an extensive federal empire, widely distant one from the other, may have interests so totally distinct, that the one part might be greatly benefited by what would be destructive to the other.

They were not satisfied by resting it on principles; they also appealed to history. They showed that, in the Amphictyonic confederation of the Grecian cities, each city, however different in wealth, strength, and other circumstances, sent the same number of deputies, and had each an equal voice in every thing that related to the common concerns of Greece. It was shown that, in the seven provinces of the United Netherlands, and the confederated cantons of Switzerland, each canton, and cach province, have an equal vote, although there are as great distinctions of wealth, strength, population, and extent of territory, among those provinces, and those cantons, as among these states. It was said that the maxim, that taxation and representation ought to go together, was true so far that no person ought to be taxed who is not represented; but not in the extent insisted upon, to wit, that the quantum of taxation and representation ought to be the same; on the contrary, the quantum of representation depends upon the quantum of freedom, and therefore all, whether individual states or individual men, who are equally free, have a right to equal representation that to those who insist that he who pays the greatest share of taxes ought to have the greatest number of votes, it is a sufficient answer to say, that this rule would be destructive of the liberty of the others, and would render them slaves to the more rich and wealthy-that, if one man pays more taxes than another, it is because he has more wealth to be protected by government, and he receives greater benefits from the government; so, if one state pays more to the federal government, it is because, as a state, she enjoys greater blessings from it; she has more wealth protected by it, or a greater number of inhabitants, whose rights are secured, and who share its advantages.

It was urged that, upon these principles, the Pennsylvanian, or inhabitant of a large state, was of as much consequence as the inhabitant of Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, or any other state- that his consequence was to be decided by his situation in his own state; that, if he was there as free, if he had as great share in the forming of his own government, and in the making and executing its laws, as the inhabitants of those other states, then was he equally important and of equal consequence. Suppose a confederation of states had never been adopted, but every state had remained absolutely in its independent situation, no person could, with propriety, say that the citizen of the large state was not as important as the citizen of the smaller. The confederation of states cannot alter the case. It was said that, in all transactions between state and state, the freedom, independence, importance, and consequence, even the individuality, of each. citizen of the different states, might with propriety be said to be swallowed up or concentrated in the independence, the freedom, and the individuality, of the state of which they are citizens; that the thirteen states are thirteen distinct, political, individual existences, as to each other; that the federal government is, or ought to be, a government over these thirteen political, individual existences, which form the members of that government; and as the largest state is only a single individual of this government, it ought to have only one vote; the smallest state, also being one individual member of this government, ought also to have one vote. To those who urged that the states having equal suffrage was contrary to the feelings of the human heart, it was answered, that it was admitted to be contrary to the feelings of pride and ambition, but those were feelings which ought not to be gratified at the expense of freedom.

It was urged that the position that great states would have great objects in view, in which they would suffer the less states to thwart them, was one of the strongest reasons why inequality of representation ought not to be admitted. If those great objects were not inconsistent with the interest of the less states, they would readily concur in them; but if they were inconsistent with the interest of a majority of the states composing the government, in that case two or three states ought not to have it in their power to aggrandize themselves at the expense of all the rest. To those who alleged that equality of suffrage, in our federal government, was the poisonous source from which all our misfortunes flowed, it was answered that the allegation was not founded in fact that equality of suffrage had never been complained of, by the states, as a defect in our federal system that, among the eminent writers, foreigners and others, who had treated of the defects of our Confederation, and proposed alterations, none had proposed an alteration in this part of the system; and members of the Convention, both in and out of Congress, who advocated the equality of suffrage, called upon their opponents, both in and out of Congress, and challenged them to produce one single instance where a bad measure had been adopted, or a good measure had failed of adoption, in consequence of the states having an equal vote. On the contrary, they urged that all our evils flowed from the want of power in the federal head, and that, let the right of suffrage in the states be altered in any manner whatever, if no greater power were given to the government, the same inconveniences would continue.

It was denied that the equality of suffrage was originally agreed to on principles of necessity or expediency; on the contrary, that it was adopted on the principles of the rights of men, and the rights of states, which were then well known, and which then influenced our conduct, although now they

seem to be forgotten. For this, the Journals of Congress were appealed to. It was from them shown, that, when the committee of Congress reported to that body the Articles of Confederation, the very first article which be came the subject of discussion was that respecting equality of suffrage that Virginia proposed divers modes of suffrage, all on the principle of inequality, which were almost unanimously rejected that, on the question for adopting the article, it passed, Virginia being the only state which voted in the negative — that, after the Articles of Confederation were submitted to the states, by them to be ratified, almost every state proposed certain amendments, which they instructed their delegates to endeavor to obtain before ratification; and that, among all the amendments proposed, not one state, not even Virginia, proposed an amendment of that article securing the equality of suffrage; the most convincing proof it was agreed to, and adopted, not from necessity, but upon a full conviction that, according to the principles of free government, the states had a right to that. equality of suffrage.

But, sir, it was to no purpose that the futility of their objections was shown. When driven from the pretence that the equality of suffrage had been originally agreed to on principles of expediency and necessity, the representatives of the large states persisted in a declaration, that they would never agree to admit the smaller states to an equality of suffrage. In answer to this, they were informed, and informed in terms the most strong and energetic that could possibly be used, that we never would agree to a system giving them the undue influence and superiority they proposed that we would risk every possible consequence that from anarchy and confusion order might arise-that slavery was the worst that could ensue, and we considered the system proposed to be the most complete, most abject system of slavery that the wit of man ever devised, under the pretence of forming a government for free states - that we never would submit tamely and servilely to a present certain evil in dread of a future, which might be imaginary that we were sensible the eyes of our country and the world were upon us that we would not labor under the imputation of being unwilling to form a strong and energetic federal government; but we would publish the system which we approved, and also that which we opposed, and leave it to our country and the world at large to judge, between us, who best understood the rights of freemen and free states, and who best advocated them; and to the same tribunal we would submit, who ought to be answerable for all the consequences which might arise to the Union, from the Convention breaking up without proposing any system to their constituents. During this debate, we were threatened that, if we did not agree to the system proposed, we never should have an opportunity of meeting in convention to deliberate on another; and this was frequently urged. In answer, we called upon them to show what was to prevent it, and from what quarter was our danger to proceed. Was it from a foreign enemy? Our distance from Europe, and the political situation of that country, left us but little to fear. Was there any ambitious state or states, who, in violation of every sacred obligation, was preparing to enslave the other states, and raise itself to consequence on the ruin of the others? Or was there any such ambitious individual? We did not apprehend it to be the case. But suppose it to be true; it rendered it the more necessary that we should sacredly guard against a system which might enable all those ambitious views to be carried into effect, even under the sanction of the Constitution and government. In fine, sir, ail

these threats were treated with contempt, and they were told that we apprehended but one reason to prevent the states meeting again in convention; that, when they discovered the part this Convention had acted, and how much its members were abusing the trust reposed in them, the states would never trust another convention.

At length, sir, after every argument had been exhausted by the advocates of equality of representation, the question was called, when a majority decided in favor of the inequality-Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, voting for it; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware, against; Maryland divided. It may be thought surprising, sir, that Georgia, a state now small, and comparatively trifling, in the Union, should advocate this system of unequal representation, giving up her present equality in the federal government, and sinking herself almost to total insignificance in the scale; but, sir, it must be considered that Georgia has the most extensive territory in the Union, being larger than the whole island of Great Britain, and thirty times as large as Connecticut. This system being designed to preserve to the states their whole territory unbroken, and to prevent the erection of new states within the territory of any of them, Georgia looked forward when, her population being increased in some measure proportioned to her territory, she should rise in the scale, and give law to the other states; and hence we found the delegation of Georgia warmly advocating the proposition of giving the states unequal representation. Next day, the question came on with respect to the inequality of representation in the second branch; but little debate took place; the subject had been exhausted on the former question. On the votes being taken, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina, voted for the inequality. Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland, were in the negative. Georgia had only two representatives on the floor, one of whom (not, I believe, because he was against the measure, but from a conviction that he would go home, and thereby dissolve the Convention, before we would give up the question) voted also in the negative, by which that state was divided. Thus, sir, on this great and important part of the system, the Convention being equally divided, — five states for the measure, five against, and one divided, there was a total stand and we did not seem very likely to proceed any farther. At length, it was proposed that a select committee should be balloted for, composed of a member from each state, which committee should endeavor to devise some mode of reconciliation or compromise. I had the honor to be on that committee. We met, and discussed the subject of difference. The one side insisted on the inequality of suffrage in both branches; the other side, equality in both. Each party was tenacious of their sentiments. When it was found that nothing could induce us to yield the inequality in both branches, they at length proposed, by way of compromise, if we would accede to their wishes as to the first branch, they would agree to an equal representation in the second. To this it was answered, that there was no

On this question, Mr. Martin was the only delegate for Maryland present, which circumstance secured the state a negative. Immediately after the question had been taken, and the president had declared the votes, Mr. Jenifer came into the Convention; when Mr. King, from Massachusetts, valuing himself on Mr. Jenifer to divide the state of Maryland on this question, as he had on the former, requested of the president that the question might be put again. However, the motion was too extraordinary in

its nature to meet with success.

merit in the proposal; it was only consenting, after they had struggled to put both their feet on our necks, to take one of them off, provided we would consent to let them keep the other on; when they knew, at the same time, that they could not put one foot on our necks, unless we would consent to it; and that, by being permitted to keep on that one foot, they should afterwards be able to place the other foot on whenever they pleased. They were also called on to inform us what security they could give us, should we agree to this compromise, that they would abide by the plan of government formed upon it any longer than suited their interests, or they found it expedient. "The states have a right to an equality of representation. This is secured to us by our present Articles of Confederation; we are in possession of this right. It is now to be torn from us. What security can you give us that, when you get the power the proposed system will give you, when you have men and money, you will not force from the states that equality of suffrage, in the second branch, which you now deny to be their right, and only give up from absolute necessity? Will you tell us we ought to trust you because you now enter into a solemn compact with us? This you have done before, and now treat with the utmost contempt. Will you now make an appeal to the Supreme Being, and call on him to guaranty your observance of this compact? The same you have formerly done for your observance of the Articles of Confederation, which you are now violating in the most wanton manner.

"The same reason which you now urge, for destroying our present federal government, may be urged for abolishing the system you propose to adopt and as the method prescribed by the Articles of Confederation is now totally disregarded by you, as little regard may be shown by you to the rules prescribed for the amendment of the new system, whenever, having obtained power by the government, you shall hereafter be pleased to discard it entirely, or so to alter it as to give yourselves all that superiority which you have now contended for, and to obtain which you have shown yourselves disposed to hazard the Union."- Such, sir, was the language used on that occasion; and they were told that, as we could not possibly have a stronger tie on them for the observance of the new system than we had for their observance of the Articles of Confederation, (which had proved totally insufficient,) it would be wrong and imprudent to confide in them. It was further observed, that the inequality of the representation would be daily increasing-that many of the states whose territory was confined, and whose population was at this time large in proportion to their territory, would probably, twenty, thirty, or forty years hence, have no more representatives than at the introduction of the government; whereas the states having extensive territory, where lands are to be procured cheap, would be daily increasing in the number of inhabitants, not only from propagation, but from the emigration of the inhabitants of the other states, and would have soon double, or perhaps treble, the number of representatives that they are to have at first, and thereby enormously increase their influence in the national councils. However, the majority of the select committee at length agreed to a series of propositions by way of compromise,- part of which related to the epresentation in the first branch, nearly as the system is now published, and part of them to the second branch, securing in that equal representation, and reported them as a compromise upon the express terms that they were wholly to be adopted or wholly to be rejected. Upon this comromise, a great number of the members so far engaged themselves,