"Provided, That no act or acts done by one or more of the states against the United States, or by any citizen of any one of the United States, under the authority of one or more of the said states, shall be deemed treason, or punished as such; but in case of war being levied by one or more of the states against the United States, the conduct of each party towards the other, and their adherents respectively, shall be regulated by the laws of war and of nations."

But this provision was not adopted, being too much opposed to the great object of many of the leading members of the Convention, which was, by all means to leave the states at the mercy of the general government, since they could not succeed in their immediate and entire abolition.

By the third section of the fourth article no new state shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other state, without the consent of the legislature of such state.

There are a number of states which are so circumstanced, with respect to themselves and to the other states, that every principle of justice and sound policy requires their dismemberment, or division into smaller states. Massachusetts is divided into two districts, totally separated from each other by the state of New Hampshire, on the north-east side of which lie the provinces of Maine and Sagadohock, more extensive in point of territory, but less populous, than old Massachusetts, which lies on the other side of New Hampshire. No person can cast his eye on the map of that state, but he must in a moment admit, that every argument drawn from convenience, interest, and justice, requires that the provinces of Maine and Sagadohock should be erected into a new state, and that they should not be compelled to remain connected with old Massachusetts, under all the inconveniences of their situation.

The state of Georgia is larger in extent than the whole island of Great Britain, extending from its sea-coast to the Mississippi, a distance of eight hundred miles or more; its breadth, for the most part, about three hundred miles. The states of North Carolina and Virginia, in the same manner, reach from the sea-coast unto the Mississippi.

The hardship, the inconvenience, and the injustice, of compelling the inhabitants of those states who may dwell on the western side of the mountains, and along the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, to remain connected with the inhabitants of those states, respectively, on the Atlantic side of the mountains, and subject to the same state governments, would be such as would, in my opinion, justify even recourse to arms, to free themselves from, and to shake off, so ignominious a yoke.

This representation was made in Convention; and it was further urged, that the territory of these states was too large, and that the inhabitants thereof would be too much disconnected for a republican government to extend to them its benefits, which is only suited to a small and compact territory that a regard also for the peace and safety of the Union ought to excite a desire that those states should become, in time, divided into separate states; since, when their population should become proportioned in degree to their territory, they would, from their strength and power, become dangerous members of a federal government. It was further said that, if the general government was not, by its Constitution, to interfere, the inconvenience would soon remedy itself; for that, as the population increased in those states, their legislatures would be obliged to consent to the erection of new states, to avoid the evils of a civil war.

But as,

by the proposed Constitution, the general government is obliged to protect each state against domestic violence, and consequently will be obliged to assist in suppressing such commotions and insurrections as may take place from the struggle to have new states erected, the general government ought to have a power to decide upon the propriety and necessity of establishing or erecting a new state, even without the approbation of the legislature of such states within whose jurisdiction the new state should be erected; and for this purpose I submitted to the Convention the following proposition: "That, on the application of the inhabitants of any district of territory within the limits of any of the states, it shall be lawful for the legislature of the United States if they shall, under all circumstances, think it reasonable to erect the same into a new state, and admit it into the Union, without the consent of the state of which the said district may be a part.' And it was said, that we surely might trust the general government with this power with more propriety than with many others with which they were proposed to be intrusted; and that, as the general government was bound to suppress all insurrections and commotions which might arise on this subject, it ought to be in the power of the general government to decide upon it, and not in the power of the legislature of a single state, by obstinately and unreasonably opposing the erection of a new state, to prevent its taking effect, and thereby extremely to oppress that part of its citizens which live remote from and inconvenient to the seat of its government, and even to involve the Union in war to support its injustice and oppression. But, upon the vote being taken, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, were in the negative. New Hampshire, Connecticut, Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland, were in the affirmative. New York was ab

sent.

That it was inconsistent with the rights of free and independent states to have their territory dismembered without their consent, was the principal argument used by the opponents of this proposition. The truth of the objection we readily admitted, but at the same time insisted that it was not more inconsistent with the rights of free and independent states than that inequality of suffrage and power which the larger states had extorted from the others; and that, if the smaller states yielded up their rights in that instance, they were entitled to demand from the states of extensive territory a surrender of their rights in this instance; and in a particular manner, as it was equally necessary for the true interest and happiness of the citizens of their own states, as of the Union. But, sir, although, when the large states demanded undue and improper sacrifices to be made to their pride and ambition, they treated the rights of free states with more contempt than ever a British Parliament treated the rights of her colonial establishment, yet, when a reasonable and necessary sacrifice was asked from them, they spurned the idea with ineffable disdain. They then perfectly understood the full value and the sacred obligation of state rights, and at the least attempt to infringe them, where they were concerned, they were tremblingly alive, and agonized at every pore.

When we reflect how obstinately those states contended for that unjust superiority of power in the government which they have in part obtained, and for the establishment of this superiority by the Constitution; when we reflect that they appeared willing to hazard the existence of the Union rather than not to succeed in their unjust attempt; that, should their legislatures consent to the erection of new states within their jurisdiction, it

would be an immediate sacrifice of that power, to obtain which they appeared disposed to sacrifice every other consideration; when we further reflect that they now have a motive for desiring to preserve their territory entire and unbroken which they never had before, the gratification of their ambition in possessing and exercising superior power over their sister states, and that this Constitution is to give them the means to effect this desire of which they were formerly destitute, -the whole force of the United States pledged to them for restraining intestine commotions, and preserving to them the obedience and subjection of their citizens, even in the extremest part of their territory; I say, sir, when we consider these things, it would be too absurd and improbable to deserve a serious answer, should any person suggest that these states mean ever to give their consent to the erection of new states within their territory. Some of them, it is true, have been, for some time past, amusing their inhabitants in those districts that wish to be erected into new states; but should this Constitution be adopted armed with a sword and halter, to compel their obedience and subjection, they will no longer act with indecision; and the state of Maryland may, and probably will, be called upon to assist, with her wealth and her blood, in subduing the inhabitants of Franklin, Kentucky, Vermont, and the provinces of Maine and Sagadohock, in compelling them to continue in subjection to the states which respectively claim jurisdiction over them.

Let it not be forgotten, at the same time, that a great part of the territory of these large and extensive states, which they now hold in possession, and over which they now claim and exercise jurisdiction, were crown lands, unlocated and unsettled when the American revolution took placelands which were acquired by the common blood and treasure, and which ought to have been the common stock, and for the common benefit of the Union. Let it be remembered that the state of Maryland was so deeply sensible of the injustice that these lands should be held by particular states for their own emolument, even at a time when no superiority of authority or power was annexed to extensive territory, that, in the midst of the late war, and all the dangers which threatened us, it withheld for a long time its assent to the Articles of Confederation for that reason, and, when it ratified those Articles, it entered a solemn protest against what it considered so flagrant injustice. But, sir, the question is not now whether those states shall hold that territory unjustly to themselves, but whether, by that act of injustice, they shall have superiority of power and influence over the other states, and have a constitutioual right to domineer and lord it over them- nay, more, whether we will agree to a form of government by which we pledge to those states the whole force of the Union to preserve to them their extensive territory entire and unbroken, and with our blood and wealth to assist them, whenever they please to demand it, to preserve the inhabitants thereof under their subjection, for the purpose of increas ing their superiority over us of gratifying their unjust ambition- in a word, for the purpose of giving ourselves masters, and of riveting our chains!

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The part of the system, which provides that no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States, was adopted by a great majority of the Convention, and without much debate. However, there were some members so unfashionable as to think that a belief of the existence of a Deity, and of a state of future rewards and punishments, would be some security for the good 33

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conduct of our rulers, and that, in a Christian country, it would be at least decent to hold out some distinction between the professors of Christianity and downright infidelity or paganism.

The seventh article declares, that the ratification of nine states shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution, between the states ratifying the same.

It was attempted to obtain a resolve that, if seven states, whose votes in the first branch should amount to a majority of the representation in that branch, concurred in the adoption of the system, it should be sufficient, and this attempt was supported on the principle, that a majority ought to govern the minority; but to this it was objected that, although it was true, after a constitution and form of government is agreed on, in every act done under and consistent with that constitution and form of government, the act of the majority, unless otherwise agreed in the constitution, should bind the minority, yet it was directly the reverse in originally forming a constitution, or dissolving it—that, in originally forming a constitution, it was necessary that every individual should agree to it, to become bound thereby, and that, when once adopted, it could not be dissolved by consent, unless with the consent of every individual who was party to the original agreement that, in formning our original federal government, every member of that government (that is, each state) expressly consented to it—that it is a part of the compact, made and entered into in the most solemn manner, that there should be no dissolution or alteration of that federal government without the consent of every state, the members of, and parties to, the original compact that, therefore, no alteration could be made by the consent of a part of these states, or by the consent of the inhabitants of a part of the states, which could either release the states so consenting from the obligation they are under to the other states, or which could in any manner become obligatory upon those states that should not ratify such alterations. Satisfied of the truth of these positions, and not holding ourselves at liberty to violate the compact, which this state had solemnly entered into with the others, by altering it in a different manner from that which, by the same compact, is provided and stipulated, a number of the members, and among those the delegation of this state, opposed the ratification of this system in any other manner than by the unanimous consent and agreement of all the states.

By our original Articles of Confederation, any alterations proposed are, in the first place, to be approved by Congress. Accordingly, as the resolutions were originally adopted by the Convention, and as they were reported by the committee of detail, it was proposed that this system should be laid before Congress, for their approbation. But, sir, the warm advocates of this system, fearing it would not meet with the approbation of Congress, and determined, even though Congress and the respective state legislatures should disapprove the same, to force it upon them, if possible, through the intervention of the people at large, moved to strike out the words "for their approbation," and succeeded in their motion; to which, it being directly in violation of the mode prescribed by the Articles of Confederation for the alteration of our federal government, a part of the Convention, and myself in the number, thought it a duty to give a decided negative.

Agreeably to the Articles of Confederation, entered into in the most solemn manner, and for the observance of which the states pledged themselves to each other, and called upon the Supreme Being as a witness and

avenger between them, no alterations are to be made in those Articles, unless, after they are approved by Congress, they are agreed to, and ratified, by the legislature of every state; but by the resolve of the Convention, this Constitution is not to be ratified by the legislature of the respective states, but is to be submitted to conventions chosen by the people, and, if ratified by them, is to be binding.

This resolve was opposed, among others, by the delegation of Maryland. Your delegates were of opinion that, as the form of government proposed was, if adopted, most essentially to alter the Constitution of this state, and as our Constitution had pointed out a mode by which, and by which only, alterations were to be made therein, a convention of the people could not be called to agree to and ratify the said form of government without a direct violation of our Constitution, which it is the duty of every individual in this state to protect and support. In this opinion all your delegates who were attending were unanimous. I, sir, opposed it also upon a more extensive ground, as being directly contrary to the mode of altering our federal government, established in our original compact; and as such, being a direct violation of the mutual faith plighted by the states to each other, I gave it my negative.

I was of opinion that the states, considered as states, in their political capacity, are the members of a federal government-that the states in their political capacity, or as sovereignties, are entitled, and only entitled, originally to agree upon the form of, and submit themselves to, a federal government, and afterwards, by mutual consent, to dissolve or alter it — that every thing which relates to the formation, the dissolution, or the alteration, of a federal government over states equally free, sovereign, and independent, is the peculiar province of the states in their sovereign or political capacity, in the same manner as what relates to forming alliances or treaties of peace, amity, or commerce; and that the people at large, in their individual capacity, have no more right to interfere in the one case than in the other that according to these principles we originally acted in forming our Confederation. It was the states as states, by their representatives in Congress, that formed the Articles of Confederation; it was the states as states, by their legislatures, who ratified those Articles; and it was there established and provided that the states as states (that is, by their legislatures) should agree to any alterations that should hereafter be proposed in the federal government, before they should be binding; and any alterauons agreed to in any other manner cannot release the states from the obligation they are under to each other by virtue of the original Articles of Confederation. The people of the different states never made any objection to the manner in which the Articles of Confederation were formed or ratified, or to the mode by which alterations were to be made in that government: with the rights of their respective states they wished not to interfere. Nor do I believe the people, in their individual capacity, would ever have expected or desired to have been appealed to on the present occasion, in violation of the rights of their respective states, if the favorers of the proposed Constitution, imagining they had a better chance of forcing it to be adopted by a hasty appeal to the people at large, (who could not be so good judges of the dangerous consequence,) had not insisted upon this mode. Nor do these positions in the least interfere with the principle, that all Dower originates from the people; because, when once the people have oxercised their power in establishing and forming themselves into a state government it never devolves back to them; nor have they a right to