"We know that the Son of God is

es his convictions on this point. come, and hath given us an understanding, that we may know him that is true." The marriage supper of the Lamb, in the nineteenth chapter of the Apocalypse,2 is but a prophecy of that full and joyful knowledge of God, and communion with him which the church is destined yet to reveal on earth, when all those causes of ignorance of God that sin has introduced shall be removed.

It being then the fundamental doctrine of the Bible that God may be known, and its avowed end to give a knowledge of God, and to bring man into a state of communion with him, we are authorized to conclude that the mode adopted therein to effect these results is based on the truth. But it is a fact too notorious to need proof, that the same assumption pervades the Bible which, as we have shown, pervades all our common systems of theology, that man is the image of God in his fundamental constitution, as an intelligent, voluntary, affectionate, and moral person. Throughout, God is described in language taken from the human mind. Nor is there in the Bible any intimation that in the use of such language there is a necessity, or even a danger of delusion. It nowhere stigmatizes it as anthropomorphism, or anthropopathy. Nor does it even call in question the accuracy of the fundamental and necessary conceptions of the human mind concerning time and space, and justice, honor, and rectitude. It always uses the common language of men concerning time and space, with reference to God and to man, and never intimates that as God views things they are illusive. God also appeals to common principles of right between him and his creatures, as for example when he refers to them as requiring the death of the soul that sins, for its own sins, and those only, and repudiating the idea of treating the righteous and the wicked alike, as a procedure undeniably and necessarily unjust.3 Moreover when Abraham in his plea for Sodom said to the Lord, be it far from thee to slay the righteous with the wicked, shall not the Judge of all the earth do right? God admitted the binding force of the plea.4

It must indeed be admitted that one or two rhetorical representations of the enlarged scale on which God plans, and views the events of successive ages, have been pressed into the service of a delusive philosophy, and forced to utter the theory of God's eternal now; and we have accordingly been reminded that one day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day. But that the idea is not philosophical and scientific, but that it is a rhetorical presentation of the relative brevity of human periods compared with eter

1

1 John 5: 20.

2 Rev. 19: 7-9.

4 Gen. 19: 25.

3 Ezek. 18: 19-32. 52 Pet. 3: 8.

nity is too plain to admit of denial. So it is said, a thousand years, are in thy sight, as yesterday when it is past, and as a watch in the night. God's scale is eternity. Compared with this, one day, or a thousand years, are like infinitesimal quantities in mathematics, when connected with an infinite quantity - differing it may be among themselves—but all so relatively minute as to be alike disregarded and dropped. Excepting one or two such passages, the main current of the Bible all runs one way. Time appears to God as it does to us. The basis therefore of the whole Bible is the great principle that man in his fundamental mental constitution, is the image of God, and that his fundamental conceptions as to time, space, and moral rectitude, agree with the reality of things as seen by God, and that on these grounds alone is a knowledge of God or communion with him possible.

No book on earth is so entirely free from the taint of a spurious and delusive philosophy as the Bible. None tends so powerfully to retain the mind in the domains of a sound and healthy common sense, and to establish it in that abiding assurance of a real knowledge and heartfelt love of God, which is the essential element of eternal life.

It now remains that we consider the bearings of the principles thus far discussed and illustrated upon the promises of a more full knowledge of God, and perfect communion with him than has hitherto been enjoyed by his church on earth. This inquiry will have reference in part to the effects of a restoration to the mind of God's moral image to increase its power of truly representing him to us. It will also consider the question at present exciting some interest, whether the divine Being is as truly the subject of painful emotions as of those that are pleasant, or whether those portions of Scripture that ascribe such emotions to God are to be regarded in such a sense anthropopathetic, as to require us to interpret them as they have hitherto been interpreted by most divines. But this subject is one of such importance that the limits imposed upon us by the circumstances of the case will not allow us at this time to enter upon the inquiry.

1 Ps. 90: 4.

36*

ARTICLE II.

REVIEW OF CHAMPLIN'S ESCHINES.

The Oration of Eschines against Ctesiphon, with notes by J. T. Champlin, Professor of Greek and Latin in Waterville College. Cambridge: John Bartlett, 1850.

Two editions of the oration of Eschines on the Crown have been presented to the American public. Of the first, prepared by Mr. Negris, a Greek then domiciliated in this country, it will not be thought harsh to affirm that the editor was very inadequate to his task; that his principles of criticism led him into the most rash alterations of the text; that he betrays great ignorance of Greek history and antiquities; and that he has either misinterpreted or passed over in silence the few difficult passages which interrupt the easy flow of this oration. Mr. Champlin, on the other hand, has adopted a reputable text; he has explained all the difficulties which demanded an explanation from his hands; and is usually au courant of Grecian antiquities. In one particular, to say nothing of others, he has improved upon his edition of the rival oration of Demosthenes, by more mastery over the English language in his translations, which in his earlier work are sometimes not a little awkward.

Mr. Negris published the orations of Eschines and Demosthenes together, but with no preface calculated to make known to the student how and why the suit was brought. Mr. Champlin's edition of the oration of Eschines being apparently an afterthought, he has not been able to pursue a well ordered plan, including both the orations. This is to be regretted, and it is greatly to be desired, that at some future day Mr. C. should publish the two together, with a common introduction embracing the most important historical, and archaeological topics; to which reference might continually be made throughout the notes. There are no remains of antiquity where the allusions to the events and institutions of the day are more frequent than in these very orations; and without some such introduction, even when supplied with books of reference, the student will be apt to grope in the dark. Thus the first thing that an intelligent student will say is, "how could such a suit be brought, and why could not the Athenian people do as they pleased, in respect to passing a resolution to crown Demosthenes?" Here then at the outset, he needs to have an idea of

the difference between a psepleisma and a law; of the different methods observed in passing them, and of the yoag nagovóμaw, by which illegal resolutions were rendered perilous to their proposer. The way in which this process suspended further proceedings in the Senate or before the people upon a resolution, and the course of the trial, until the time of pleading, will also need explanation. Again the cause was delayed a number of years. Can any reason be given for this? What had been the relations of the parties anterior to the trial to which Æschines subjected Ctesiphon, and what was his political aim in instituting the trial? Here a compressed chronological table might be embodied in the introduction, in which all the events referred to by either orator, occurring during their age, could be found under their appropriate dates, and we should like to see exhibited in the same way, but in a different type, so as not to be confounded with the truth, the various attempts which Boeckh, Böhneke and others have made to assign the documents inserted in the oration of Demosthenes to their historical position.

The remainder of our remarks will be occupied in following Mr. Champlin through his notes, and in discussing certain topics to which he there calls attention. This we shall attempt to do in a spirit of impartial criticism, being convinced that it is only in such a way that American scholarship can be honored or be improved. We must lay in an apology beforehand for the length of some of our remarks, which may seem to some of our readers to lose sight of the book which is under examination, and to wander off into perplexed questions of history. May we say then that having at a former period studied these orations with care, having begun to lay up materials for editing them before Mr. Champlin's edition of Demosthenes on the Crown appeared in 1843, and having felt an interest in the progress of investigation into them since that time, we have cherished the fond, although perhaps the groundless hope that we might offer a contribution to the criticism of these orations which would not be regarded as entirely without value.

We follow Mr. C. according to the sections of Bekker, which accompany his text.

§ 4. At the close of this section, Eschines says that the orators had become so disorderly, that neither the prytanes nor the proedri, nor the tribe enjoying the precedency and constituting a tenth of the whole people were found sufficient to preserve the assemblies of the people from confusion. This passage affords very clear proof that the prytanes still had something to do with the preservation of order at public meetings; although Mr. Champlin assigns this duty entirely

to the proedri and the epistates. As for the proedri, it is known that some antiquaries, as Boeckh and Schömann,1 following the authority of one class of grammarians, hold that there were two sorts of them, those from the tribe which had the prytany and those from the nine other tribes; while K. F. Hermann 2 regards the existence of the former class of proedri as extremely improbable. All agree that the proedri here named were those who have been termed non contribules. And this Mr. C. has correctly stated. And an argument in favor of this view may be derived from § 3, where the orator speaks of proedri fraudulently chosen by lot to fill their office. If there were proedri from the presiding tribe in the senate, that is, if the prytanes were divided into five decades, each of which presided about seven days, as this allotment must have happened at the commencement of their prytany, it is not easy to see what collusion could have taken place. But it is very easy to see how the epistates of the senate on the day of a public assembly may have made a fraudulent election by lot of proedri out of the nine other tribes.

That the epistates of the day was one of the presidents of the assembly, as Mr. C. asserts, is denied, probably without good reason, by Hermann, who confines that duty to the nine proedri non contribules. But this passage shows that Hermann goes too far when he says that the prytanes had nothing to do with the assemblies of the citizens at all except to summon them.

ἡ προεδρεύουσα φυλή. What was that? We are not sure that Mr. C. has explained the usage correctly, for while in his note on § 3, he speaks of "a tribe selected for this purpose," [for the purpose of presiding or keeping order]; he explains these same words, in his note on § 4, as referring to the representatives of one of the ten tribes. The usage is alluded to only in three passages, in the present passage; in the first oration against Aristogiton, § 90,3 Bekker, where the same phrase occurs; and also in the oration of Eschines against Timarchus, where an explanation is given of its origin. Eschines there says, (§ 33 Bekker,) that after some gross proceedings of Timarchus, a new

1 Boeckh, C. I. No. 1. Vol. 1, p 180. Schöm. Antiq. Juris. publ. Græc. p. 216 etc. 2 Lehr. 6. d. Gr. Alt. § 127.

3 As the spuriousness of this oration is probable, the reference to this usage is a proof of nothing more than that the author had read the orations of Eschines. His words οὐ πρύτανις, οὐ κῆρυξ, οὐκ ἐπιστάτης, οὐκ ἡ προεδρεύουσα φυλὴ τοῦτον KрaTεiv dúvaraι afford some proof that he read, in the orators whom he imitates, of prytanes and epistatae as concerned in keeping order; but is it not rather singular that he omits the most important officers of the assembly, the proedri? Does he jumble together what he has found in several passages of ancient authors without a definite idea of the meaning of the words?