the people--rendering justice to all. Mr. Giles could not help expressing his surprise, that several gentlemen, and amongst the rest, the gentleman from Brooke, who seemed to be most desirous of great changes in the Constitution, after throwing the most serious imputations against it, had resorted to the Bill of Rights as the consummation of human wisdom, and insisted upon the observance of the rules there laid down by the present Convention, particularly the first three articles; and some of them have also called to their aid the 15th article, with the practical commentary upon them in the Constitution itself; and the gentleman from Brooke, had gone so far as to assert that in demanding a free white basis of representation, he demanded nothing new under the sun. It was the slave-holding minority, who were demanding a new thing under the sun. The following are the gentleman's own words: "He, (Mr. Doddridge) therefore, concluded that, in demanding a free white basis of representation, he and those who acted with him, were asking no new thing under the sun; but were forwarding a principle already existing and recognized; principles deeply founded in the nature and necessities of society. It was the slave-holding minority who were demanding a new thing." Here the gentleman admits that he is demanding something, and that thing, a change; he yet denies that this change is a new thing under the sun, and proceeds to charge the slave-holders with demanding a new thing under the sun, whilst they demand nothing at all, under the sun, neither new nor old, but are perfectly content with the Constitution in that respect as it now stands. Mr. G. said, he was willing to be governed by the Bill of Rights according to his interpretation of it. The Bill of Rights detracted nothing from the Constitution by preceding it, and he deemed it an essential part of the Constitution. Permit me, said Mr. Giles, to turn to the sections to which gentlemen invited our attention. The first article is: "That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.'

The eloquent and learned gentleman from Loudoun, read to us a number of Constitutions, and particularly that of Massachusetts, in the formation of which he told us, the Convention sat in deliberation for months.

He (Mr. G.) had already read the first article of the Virginia Bill of Rights. Let us look at the comparative merits of the Bill of Rights of Virginia and Massachusetts. The first article of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights says, that "all men are born free and equal." He denied this to be true, either in law or in fact; while he agreed that "all men are by nature equally free and independent." The condition of man, from free to bond, or from bond to free, is changed by municipal or conventional, and recognized by international law. Slaves are born slaves before us every day, which directly disproves the assertion, that "all men are born free and equal." Yet the Constitution of Massachusetts unequivocally asserts, that all men are born equally free. Are slaves born free? No. And if an enquiry be made as to the means, by which their condition is changed, the answer is, by municipal law-by conventional law-by force-or by conquest. Upon what authority do we hold Africans in bondage? Surely, by the municipal laws of that country, recognized by international law. Slavery was not only recognized by international law, but it was acknowledged by the law of God, if the scriptures may be deemed sufficient evidence of that law. As to matter of fact and of law, directly the reverse of the declaration in the Massachusetts Bill of Rights, is the universal legal maxim, "purtus sequitur ventrem"-the offspring follows the condition of the mother.

This Constitution is presented to us as a model of excellence for our imitation, which declares that the bond are not born bond, which is not true-in preference to our own, which asserts the truth, that "all men are by nature free." And this strange preference has been strangely attributed to a greater degree of deliberation in the one case than in the other. He observed that this clause in the Bill of Rights contained another important declaration, that man possesses the means of "acquiring and possessing property" in a state of nature, thereby clearly sanctioning the existence of such a state. The second section is in the following words:

"That all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people; that Magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them."

This section contains the great declaratory principle in direct hostility to the basis upon which all pre-existing Governments were founded; that "all power is derived from the people"-and that Magistrates are the servants of the people-and affords the first great example of reducing that principle to use in the affairs of mankind. It meets my most hearty approbation, and exalted admiration. The third section is:

"That Government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security, of the people, nation, or community of all the various modes and forms of Government, that is best, which is capable of producing the greatest degree of happiness and safety, and is most effectually secured against the danger of mal

administration; and that, when any Government shall be found inadequate or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the community hath an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right, to reform, alter, or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal."

His worthy colleage, (Mr. Leigh) had so fully explained his views on one branch of this subject, and particularly on the clause, omitted by the gentleman who had introduced this section, that he considered all repetition superfluous. This section clearly proves that conditions are imposed upon majorities. His colleague had pointed out one, he would point out another. Whilst the majority have a right to alter, reform, or abolish the Government, there is no right conferred on them to do so, according to their own unlimited, capricious will. An obligation is imposed upon them, to act "in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal." This is the very business we are now engaged in performing-" to alter, amend, or abolish the Constitution, in such manner, as we shall judge most conducive to the public weal." Surely we should feel ourselves restrained by this clause from injuring, or even putting at hazard, any local or particular interest, even should it be the interest of the minority. Mr. G. called the attention of the Committee to that clause in the Bill of Rights, which required a permanent attachment to the community, as a qualification for voting, and asserted that the word 'permanent' was introduced with reference exclusively to land, nothing being deemed permanent but land; and the provision in the Constitution, which requires, that the Right of Suffrage should remain as it then was-being the freehold Right of Suffrage, was the practical commentary of the framers of our Constitution, upon the word 'permanent' in the Bill of Rights. This demonstrably proves that there is no discrepancy whatever between the two in

struments.

Some gentlemen plumed themselves upon a notion that our forefathers had earnestly invited us to a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles, with a view, as they suppose, to change those principles. This notion they had derived from the 15th section, in the following words:

"That no free Government, or the blessing of liberty, can be preserved to any people, but by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and virtue, and by frequent recurrence to fundamental principles."

Why recur to fundamental principles? If these principles were true at that time, they are true now. Fundamental principles are eternal and unchangeable. Could our forefathers invite us to recur to fundamental principles, for the purpose of changing unchangeable things? But, if this were not the object, what could the object be for inviting a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles? Evidently for the purpose of watching the proceedings of the practical Government, and to draw them back from their aberrations, if any they had committed, to these great fundamental principles. It was not his intention to have referred to the General Government, if it had been possible to avoid it, notwithstanding its intimate connection with the State Governments, and its even constituting a part of them. But he found it impossible to avoid it. It would be all important, if we could prevail on that Government to recur to fundamental principles. Such had been its monstrous aberrations from the fundamental principles of the Federal Constitution, that they were violated every day. Scarce a semblance of its most important, original features remained. After he had been absent from the Government for some time, when he returned to it, he was astonished at the new-fangled nomenclature, which was introduced in substitution of the old Governmental phraseology; one effect of which was a splendid Government which the people are made to feel. How important then, would it be, could we prevail on this Government to have recurrence to original, fundamental principles. Instead of a splendid Government, which the people are now made to feel, we should then have a happy Government which they could not feel. He feared he had detained the Committee very unprofitably in presenting to their view mere general propositions without any attempt at minute, logical demonstrations. Those he left to the intelligence of the Committee. He would now examine some points of difference between himself and other gentlemen more especially, and as far as possible, would avoid repetitions. He would come to consider the actual difference of local interests as regards the slave population. The point is, whether there shall be any special provision for this local interest.

Mr. Giles was proceeding to remark on the argument of the gentleman from Loudoun, (Mr. Mercer) with respect to the salt-works of New York, and to deduce from it a confirmation of the views of the gentleman from Orange, (Mr. P. P. Barbour) with respect to those cases where a minority governs a majority; when

Mr. Taylor (of Chesterfield) rose, and moved that the Committee rise, in order to give his colleague another opportunity of presenting his views to the Committee, which, as he was then considerably fatigued, he could do more to his satisfaction and

ease.

Mr. Giles expressed his willingness to proceed, although he was much exhausted, rather than protract the business of the Committee. He was willing to strain every power, physical and mental, he possessed, to continue his remarks.

The motion that the Committee rise was then put and carried, and the Convention adjourned.

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1829.

The Convention met at eleven o'clock, and was opened with prayer by the Rev. Mr. Sykes of the Methodist Church.

According to the standing order, the House went into Committee of the Whole, Mr. Powell in the Chair.

Mr. GILES then rose in continuation of his remarks. He said, that he had never, at any period of his life, been in the habit of complaining, and as little now as ever, but it was only common justice to himself to state that he had risen yesterday, under a sense of debility so paralyzing, that he feared he would not be able to controul the operations of his own mind, nor to command that portion of physical strength which was requisite to sustain hin through the task he had before him. This naturally produced some delay and confusion both in his manner, and in the course which he had prescribed for his own government. When he first rose, he had intended to read several extracts, but soon found himself compelled to change that determination, and to avoid reading as much as possible; being aware that reading tends much more to debilitate, than even the effort of speaking. He had intended to have read some of those extracts in relation to the first point which he had yesterday brought into discussion: he alluded to the remarks which had fallen from the venerable gentleman from Loudoun (Mr. Monroe) respecting the emancipation of slaves. This was a subject of such peculiar delicacy, that it was proper to present to the Committee the character of the existing relations, in respect to jurisdiction over slaves between the General and State Governments. He thought it proper now to complete what he had yesterday intended.

The General Government, at all times, from the first Congress, had disclaimed all sort of jurisdiction over the emancipation or the management of slaves; and thus jurisdiction, in both cases, was peremptorily denied to the General Government. He intended to have introduced the Journal of the twenty-first session first Congress, but as it was not before him, he would state from his recollection, what the resolution contained in the Journal upon that point was. The resolution went to disclaim on the part of the General Government, all jurisdiction over the emancipation or treatment of slaves. This resolution was entered on the Journal, as declaratory at that time, of the true interpretation of the Constitution; and at that day such an excitement existed among the Southern members against having the subject even mentioned, that they voted against this declaratory resolution. The honorable and venerable gentleman who is a member of this Convention, and who was then a member of Congress, he meant the gentleman from Orange, voted decidedly in favor of it. This was the mere declaratory act of one House; but in consequence of it two bills were passed, either at that or at some subsequent session, prohibiting the citizens of the United States from interfering with the slave trade, for the purpose of supplying foreign nations with slaves.

Mr. G. then referred to a memorial, which was presented to Congress by the representatives of several societies of Quakers. He happened to be a member of the Committee, to whom the subject was referred. He had relied on the declaratory resolution, in the negotiation which he had to carry on with the Quakers. All the Committee were, in principle, in favor of the measure; but it was his duty to satisfy these persons, that Congress had no right to interfere with the subject of slavery at all. He was fortunate enough to satisfy the Quakers, and they agreed, that if Congress would pass a law, to prohibit the citizens of the United States from supplying foreign nations with slaves, they would pledge themselves and the respective societies they represented, never again to trouble Congress on the subject. The law did pass, and the Quakers adhered to their agreement. He did not know whether or not the documents, on the subject of this negotiation, were still in existence; but he believed they had been filed away with other papers.

Subsequently, an Act was passed, prohibiting the introduction of slaves into the United States, in which this principle was again touched, in a more specific, but a different form. It was again his fortune to be on the Committee to whom that subject was referred, and he drew up two provisos to a bill then pending before Congress, for prohibiting the introduction of slaves into the United States after the year 1807; the object of which, was to draw a distinct line of demarcation, between the powers

of Congress, for prohibiting the introduction of slaves in the United States, and those of the individual States and territories. It was then decided, by an unanimous vote, that when slaves were brought within the limits of any State, the power of Congress over them ceased, and the power of the State began, the moment they became within those limits. He would beg leave to refer to these provisos. He would read as little as possible; but recent events made it important to revive the recollection of these facts, which appear strangely to have been forgotten. He had drawn up these provisos with all imaginable care.

The first proviso, after the powers of Congress to a certain extent had been declared, and the words therein were critically examined—and, indeed, he might say, not only every word, but every syllable, and even every stop, by the best talents which Congress could afford, be found-proceeded thus: "And neither the importer, nor any person, or persons, claiming from, or under him, shall hold any right or title whatever, to any negro, inulatto, or person of colour, nor to the service or labour thereof, who may be imported, or brought into the United States, or territories, in violation of this law; but the same shall remain subject to any regulations, not contravening the provisions of this Act, which the Legislatures of the several States or territories, at any time hereafter, inay make, for disposing of any such negro, mulatto, or person of colour."

This was then considered as a legislative interpretation of the Constitution, as may be seen by its phraseology. It disclaimed all power over slavery, in all time to come. But it did not stop there. The power was not only relinquished to the States, but also to the territories, to wit: the unlimited jurisdiction over all the slaves brought within their limits respectively.

The second proviso is in the following terms: "Provided, that the aforesaid forfeiture, shall not extend to the seller, or purchaser, of any negro, mulatto, or person of colour, who may be sold, or disposed of, in virtue of any regulation which may hereafter be made, by any of the Legislatures of the several States, in that respect, in pursuance of this Act, and the Constitution of the United States."

Here, then, in these declaratory provisions of the Act, there is an explicit demarcation of the boundary line between the power of Congress, and of the Legislatures of the several States and territories. The Committee would observe that the word "territories" was omitted in the last proviso. An abstract right is admitted to the territories in the first proviso, but the word territories was not used in the second proviso, Congress having had a revisory power over the laws of the territories, and were unwilling to yield that power. The word was therefore omitted, but the right in the territories was recognized to exercise exclusive power over slaves, within their limits. He had understood that the Legislature of South Carolina, passed a law on. the subject, and the State of Georgia assumed similar jurisdiction, in consequence of this law of Congress. This had led to two results-first, the admission on the part of Congress, that the State Governments are vested with the authority to declare persons within their limits, slaves; and second, the exercise of that authority, by the State Governments.

This brought him to the consideration of the proceedings which have lately taken place in the State of Ohio, and which had been very properly referred to by several gentlemen in this debate. It appears that Ohio, acting under a mistaken zeal, amounting to a fanatic desire, to meliorate the evils of slavery, invited a number of those unfortunate persons to take refuge in that State. Some remarks appeared in the newspapers, some years since, in regard to the State of Ohio, in which was suggested the possibility that in some future capricious mood, she might convert the coloured persons, who had been induced to enter her limits, into slaves, and that this she might do, because Congress had no right to prevent it. The remarks to which he referred, were as follow:

"Again, suppose Congress even could constitutionally exercise such power, would it be wise, or desirable that it should do so? when the 'effect would be, to place the different States in the Union upon different footings, as to rights? Nay, as to the most important right, with which the original States are invested? That is, the right of jurisdiction over persons within its own limits. This inquiry may be extended further. Suppose any of the free States, self-called, Ohio for instance, in some capricious mood, should determine that all the coloured people, who have been invited to take refuge in that State, against the slavery of other States, should be slaves within that State; would the Federal Government have the right to exercise any control over such determination? Certainly not-the jurisdiction over persons within the limits of Ohio, being exclusively with the State authorities. Here, then, Ohio would be invested with the power of jurisdiction over persons within its limits, which would be denied to another State admitted to the Union, subject to the bargained condition. Such are always the consequences of substituting bargains for principles in legislation."

What has Ohio now done? Becoming perfectly sensible of the mischiefs which have resulted from her former fanaticism, she has passed a law, which, if carried into execution, must entail upon those unfortunate and deluded people, who came into her State, in the belief that they should find protection there, a greater evil than slavery itself. The inischief has arrived at such a pitch, that the State has passed a law, requiring that all coloured persons in the State, should give security for their good behaviour, to an amount beyond their means to obtain. And not being able to do this, they must either be incarcerated, or quit the State. No asylum is provided for them, but if the law should be carried into effect, they must be driven forth-find refuge where they can-perhaps in Virginia; and surely Virginia ought to be upon the alert to counteract this most probable effect of the law. The next step which Ohio may take, may be to declare those people slaves, and it is more likely now that she should do so, than it was when the preceding remarks were made, that she should now take this step, which is more onerous and disastrous to her invited guests than slavery itself. It is, indeed, strange, that these coloured people should have been invited into that State, and should now be driven abroad as vagabonds, not on the face of the earth, but to find their way to the clouds, if they can, or wherever else they could find a refuge. He mentioned this subject to show how scrupulous the States ought to be, in touching the subject of slavery, and particularly of emancipation.

There was another point, which he was compelled yesterday to omit, having then been nearly exhausted. It was the difference between the rights of the majority, claimed from the various misconceived sources, to which gentlemen had referred, and such as were given by the Constitution or Social Compact. The specific question before us, is, not what relates to the powers of the majority, nor who shall be the ma jority but who shall be the constituents to make that majority. The question now is, who are to be the constituents? By whose votes a majority of the members forming the practical Government, is to be created? And, then, what degree of jurisdiction should this majority have? This must depend on the Social Compact, or written Constitution we are now engaged in forming; and that brought him to the real point of inquiry, as contained in the Bill of Rights. In determining who shall be the constituents, the rule he had agreed to observe, which he still agreed to observe, and which he hoped all gentlemen would observe, is, that these constituents are to be made," in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal." The rule imposed on us, is to perfect the great work now before us, in such manner as may be most conducive to the public weal. He had now arrived at the point at which he left off yesterday.

He would now consider the actual, local differences, arising from the unequal, sectional divisions of our slave property. The question which has arisen, is, whether slaves ought to be counted, in forming the basis of representation, either as persons or property? It is a plain question, if we agree as to the objects of the formation of Government. Why should they not be counted? They are persons and property both. Because they are property, shall we divest them of their existence of their personal character? They are both persons and property in law and in fact. He did not state this with such positiveness, because he pretended to claim any superiority for his own opinions. Far from it. He would present to the Committee the few grounds on which his opinion rests, and leave them to decide. He would point out some of the supposed aberrations of the gentlemen on the other side. The fact, that they are property, is authorised by the federal law, the laws of the State, international law, and the sanctions of all laws. Great Britain may be referred to on this subject, on account of the peculiarity of her policy in that respect. She is so fastidious in her ideas of the relation of master and slave, that the moment they touch British ground, in that relation, such relation between them is entirely cut asunder. Where then shall we look for the British sanction of slavery? We found it first here-we found the curse upon us, for a curse he must consider it. It is admitted that we cannot avoid it. That very nation which is so fastidious on the subject of slavery in British land, fixed it on us against our consent. She has lately, in a treaty with this country, admitted slaves to be property, and has paid for them as such, and thus she has again admitted the principle of slavery. Look first at her West India possessions. Slavery is there, in its essence. The condition of the slave there is miserable in comparison with what it is here. There is abundant evidence around us to prove that we are making the best use of our power, to meliorate the condition of slaves.

He here begged to correct an aberration of the gentleman from Loudoun (Mr. Mercer,) as he conceived it to be. That gentleman had laid it down positively, that a slave in Virginia had no civil rights-that he was property-mere property. He compared him even to cattle. He presumed, however, that that gentleman would admit the existence of laws which treat slaves as persons: protecting them as far as wrongs are committed on persons in the character of persons, and consequently that slaves have civil rights. All persons, whether they be bond or free, not even excepting the master himself, who commit the higher order of wrongs, such as murder, &c.