the several districts East of the Alleghany-and unequal in the Western district, no doubt, because of the accidental under value of its lands as already explained. The taxes of the several districts for the year 129, distributed among all the inhabitants of each, gives an average, per capita, nearly as follows: In the first district, 15 cents; in the second, 20 cents; in the third, 31 cents; and in the fourth, 30 cents.

Mr. Johnson being much exhausted, asked the indulgence that the Committee should rise.

It was accorded to him on the motion of Mr. Giles, and the Committee rose accordingly-and on the motion of Mr. Mason of Southampton, the Convention immediately adjourned.

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1829.

The Convention met at eleven o'clock, and its sitting was opened with prayer by the Rev. Mr. Horner, of the Catholic Church.

Mr. Joussos resumed his speech of yesterday, and continued to occupy the floor till the hour of adjournment.

I have been thus particular in examining the manner in which the taxes are distributed among the different districts of the Commonwealth, not because it was essential to the merits of the question now before the Committee, but because I thought it would remove from our minds the alarming spectacle of poverty making war upon wealth, and would satisfy impartial men that each district pays, as nearly as the operation of laws always imperfect could be expected to produce, a just contribution to the Government-that no district is in a state of pauperism-none in a situation to be tempted to seize unlawfully on its neighbor's property-and that in all human probability, when, hereafter, a Western man shall vote from the pocket of his Eastern brother, one dollar, in the form of taxes, he will vote from his own pocket, at the same time, nearly an equivalent sum, one at least, which he can as ill spare, and will be as little able to pay. I regretted very much to hear that part of the remarks of the gentleman from Accomack, (Mr. Joynes) in which he endeavored to show that the whole country West of the Blue Ridge did not pay into the treasury a sum sufficient to defray the expenses of its delegation to the General Assembly, and of the administration of justice within its own limits. Remarks tending to institute odious. comparisons, and to excite unpleasant sensations, coming froin a gentleman who has manifested so much liberality, so much kind and good feeling, are exceedingly to be regretted-and I felt them the more because they came from that part of the State, the extreme East, from which on former occasions, I have so often heard remarks leading to collision and controversy, between the extreme West and extreme East, which required the interposition of moderate men to compose. I have not examined the gendeman's calculation to ascertain whether his conclusion is right or wrong. After having ascertained the precise amount of taxes paid by each district; after ascertaining the average amount per capita, paid in each-what possible influence on the question before us can it have-to know that the contributions of any district are not adequate to that part of the expenses of the Government, which the calculations of gentlemen may choose to assign to it? Surely the expenses of legislation, and of the administration of justice are not local in their character, pertain to no district, and can be charged to none. They are, if any can be, the expenses of the whole Commonwealth, incurred for the common weal and justly payable from the common purse. Such imputations as these, if it were proper to repel them, would lead to the unpleasant and unprofitable enquiry, into the objects to which the public revenue was applied; the districts in which it was expended; the local causes which increased the expense of Government, and would impose on us the invidious duty, which I certainly shall not perform, of indicating the various counties, in the Eastern district, which do not contribute their share of the expenses of Government. But we must forbear from such topics, they do not become the occasion.

It will be proper, Mr. Chairman, to disarm this question of some of its terrors to one party; disrobe it of some of its charms for the other, by examining with care its effects on the distribution of power, among the different districts of the Commonwealth. The calculations on this subject, have been made with reference to the House of Delegates, and upon the supposition that that House should consist of an hundred and twenty members. They are made upon the Auditor's estimates of the population of the present year. These are supposed by some gentlemen to be inaccurate, and the Auditor does not himself rely with confidence upon them;-but I assume them as approximating the truth sufficiently for the purposes of the present argument.

Let us, then, compare the power of the four great districts of the State, in such a House of Delegates, as it would be on the present basis, the equal representation of counties, as it would be on the compound basis proposed by the gentleman from Culpeper, and as it would be on the basis of white population. The Committee will understand my references to the districts, if they will remember, that I number them from West to East, denominating the Western, the first district.

In such a House of Delegates, the relative power of the several districts would stand thus:

On the basis of equal county representation.

First district, 27-2d, 16-3d, 32-4th, 43.

Compound basis.

First district, 21}—2d, 214—3d, 42—4th, 35.

Simple basis of white population.

First, 32-2d, 31-3d, 35-4th, 29.

Divided by the Blue Ridge, the East and West, would stand thus:

By equal county representation, W. 45—E. 75

By the combined ratio,

White population,

43.77
56 664

In making these calculations, we disregard small fractions, and convert large ones into integers, that we may give the results in whole numbers.

By this method of calculating the effect of the two propositions, it would appear, that, adopting the compound basis, the West would lose, and the East gain two members out of one hundred and twenty, and that, adopting the simple basis, the West would gain, and the East lose eleven. But if instead of taking the whole number of white persons, as the basis, you take such only as are qualified to vote, there is reason to believe that the result would be materially varied. We have no means of ascertaining the number of qualified voters; there is no record of them any where, and we have certainly no data from which we would estimate them accurately. But we may approximate them perhaps sufficiently near, to answer the purpose of illustration, by estimates from such data as we have.

Until I came into this Convention, Mr. Chairman, I had habitually considered a representation apportioned according to the whole number of white people in the different districts, and one apportioned according to the qualified voters in each, as substantially equivalents. I had supposed, that the ratio of the one, would be a fair index of the ratio of the other. I had never carefully examined the subject, 'till my duties in the Legislative Committee, called my attention to it, and induced me to doubt the correctness of my former impressions. The able argument of the gentleman from Chesterfield, rivetted my attention to it, and induced me to think, that those impressions were probably wrong. There is much weight due to the consideration, that those who perform menial services-the day-labourers, the cultivators of land which they do not own, are in the Eastern districts, principally slaves-while those who perform similar functions, in the Western districts, are chiefly white persons; and this consideration tends to the conclusion, that the ratio of qualified voters, to the whole white population, would be greater in the East than in the West. I have appealed to the only documents in my power, to test this conclusion-the lists of persons charged with taxes, furnished us by the Auditor. He has furnished two liststhe one, of the number of persons in each county and corporate town, charged with any tax, on a town lot, or part of a town lot, or any parcel of land, not less than twenty-five acres the other, of the number charged with any tax on property. Now, although each of these lists, contains male and female, young and old, black and white, without discrimination; and, therefore, cannot inform us correctly of the actual number of adult white males, upon either, yet I have thought, that, probably, they would not very far mislead us, if we regard them as an index of the relative number of free adult white males, in the several districts, and as an index of the relative number of qualified voters in each. If we take the list of those charged with taxes on land, as giving the ratio of freehold voters, and the other list as giving the ratio of voters, when the Right of Suffrage shall be extended to house-keepers, who pay a revenue tax, then, upon the basis of the qualified voters, the relative power of the districts would stand thus:

According to the land list-1st, 27-2d, 20-3d, 37-4th, 36.

According to the property list-1st, 29-2d. 21-3d, 39-4th, 34.

Dividing by the Blue Ridge, the power would be,

According to the first-West, 47-East, 73.

According to the second-West, 50-East, 70.

Thus, according to the most favourable of these estimates, the West would gain, and the East lose five members, in a House of an hundred and twenty, and the majority on the Eastern side of the Blue Ridge, would remain twenty.

These statements may serve to show, that although upon any basis of representation which has been yet suggested, a large portion of power will pass from the tide

water district, to those above it-yet upon no basis, can the power pass now, from the Eastern to the Western side of the Blue Ridge, and that upon the principle for which we contend, if it pass at all, it must pass at a distant day, slowly, gradually, safelyunaccompanied by the dangers winch have been apprehended-they may serve to show to calm reflection, that the stake depending on the present contest, is not so great, the prize to be won not so valuable, the loss to be sustained not so dreadful, as has been pictured to our imaginations. I may have occasion again to refer to them in illustration of my views.

In taking leave, for the present, of those calculations which I have introduced as correctives of the estimates made on the other side, I cannot forbear remarking on the seeining inconsistency of gentlemen, who' losing no occasion to throw ridicule on numbers, and political arithmetic, have arrayed them against us, in a most formidable phalanx, and have drawn from them their strongest and most impressive arguments. I have no doubt, that the tables of population and taxes, which have gone out to the public, with the arithmetical calculations of gentlemen, on the other side, which have accompanied them, and their inferences of change of power, and danger of oppressive taxation, have been the principle cause of the great excitement in the public mind, and of the alarm which is felt in the Eastern districts of the Commonwealth; an excitement and alarm which have already done mischief, and threaten to do more; which have already, through the instrumentality of instructions, deprived an honorable member of his seat on this floor, and may soon confound the councils of this Convention. I mean not at all to interpose between the district and its delegate:-it is not for me to enquire into the causes which led to the instruction and the consequent resignation-but as a member of this Convention, anxious for the harmony and profitable issue of its labours-as a c.tizen of the Commonwealth, deeply interested in its welfare, I cannot but lament the example, which, if followed generally, must deprive this Assembly of its deliberative character, and deprive it of all power to effect the purposes for which it was appointed. While we are sitting here deliberating on the great interests of the State, candidly comparing our opinions, endeavouring to reconcile discordant views, adjust conflicting claims, secure every right, and protect every interest, ambiguous words are to be scattered among the people, scraps from newspapers and shreds of arguments to be circulated among them-in a moment of tumultuous agitation, they are to be collected, at the hustings and muster grounds, at the taverns and cross roads, to form specific instructions, for their delegates on the most delicate and diflicult of all the subjects of their deliberation-thus, depriving them of the power of making or receiving concessions, and putting an end to all further consultation. Can any considerate man be blind to the confusion and mischief to which such measures must tend? Do not understand me, Sir, as questioning the right of the constituent to instruct his representative-this I regard as one of the settled doctrines of our Government, to which I most cheerfully subscribe. But surely I cannot be mistaken in supposing that there never was a more unfit occasion for exercising it, than that on which the people have endeavoured to put in requisition, the experience, the wisdom, and prudence of the State, not to enact laws, but to propose for the consideration of the people themselves, amendments to their fundamental law. If this example is to be followed, had we not better return home, restore to the people the trust they have confided to us-tell them that all hope of amending their Constitution is perfectly illusory-that the solemn declaration of the right of the majority to reform, is indeed a visionary theory, since it is utterly impracticable for the people to exercise this right without the aid of representatives, and since those representatives cannot be trusted even to confer together, and propose amendments? I beg pardon for this digression, and will return to the question before the Committee, whether the compound or simple basis shall be preferred.

It has been urged as an objection to the report of the Select Committee, that it proposes to introduce something new into the Constitution. It certainly is not new to the American Republics, to apportion representation according to the ratio of white population; and whether it is new to our own Constitution, it cannot be material, to enquire, since the objection must equally lie against the proposed amendment. Both propose a change in the Constitution, and the question is, which is preferrable.

We are cautioned, however, against all change, unless called for, by strong reasons; we are referred to the nearly equal division of parties, which probably exists here, on this question-and are emphatically warned against the impropriety of an important change, by a lean majority of one or two, forcing upon a large minority, a Constitution that would be abhorrent to them. I readily admit, that no important changes should be made, that are not called for by clear and strong reasons, and no one can be more sensible than I am, of the imprudence of forcing upon a large minority, a Government that is odious to them. But the existing inequalities in the representation are so glaring, and the discontents produced by it are so strong, that every one seems to concede the propriety of some reform, and both the propositions under consideration will effect that reform to a considerable extent. If the reform

proposed by the Select Committee, be objectionable, because it is unacceptable to a large minority, would the reform proposed by the gentleman from Culpeper, be the less objectionable, it being at least as disagreeable to a small majority? Or, shall we be told that the gentleman from Culpeper, and his friends, are not insisting on any reform, but are content with the present Constitution? Still, however, the objection recurs-it is with the present Constitution, that we suppose the majority is discontented, and the question again arises, shall they be compelled to submit to it? In whatever light we view it, therefore, a nearly equal division of opinion would present matter for serious consideration, and not less serious regret. In this view of the case, it may be worthy of some attention, that if the majority here should be found in favour of the report of the Committee, and we faithfully represent the will of our constituents, it is probable that the majority of the people who approve it, will be larger. This House being composed of an equal number of members from each Senatorial district, these districts having been arranged according to the Census of 1810, so as to contain as nearly as convenient, equal numbers of white population-and the population of the Western districts, having since increased by a much greater ratio than that of the Eastern districts, it is fair to conclude, that a proposition sustained here, by a majority consisting chiefly of Western members, would be sustained by a larger majority of the people. We have no warrant, however, for counting majorities, at present, on either side, and it is our duty to proceed with candour, and liberality to examine the merits of both propositions, and to recommend that which shall be found best, to as much favour as possible.

When we have established that the people are the fountain of political power, and their happiness its object-that a majority of those entitled to suffrage have a right to reform their Constitution, and thereby regulate the political power-it must necessarily follow, that the majority may rightfully retain the power of ordinary legislation, unless it can be shown that the object of good Government will not thereby be obtained. Gentlemen have, therefore, with great propriety, assumed upon themselves the burthen of proving, that in Virginia, this power in the hands of the majority, would be inconsistent with the public welfare. They insist, that as a leading object of all Government, is the protection of property.so, there is no mode of affording that protection so effectual and so proper, as giving it a direct influence in the Government, by entitling it to representation. It is by thus claiming representation for property, that they insist on placing power in the hands of the minority. Let us examine the arguments by which this claim is sustained.

Gentlemen tell us, that by our own concessions, we surrender the power of numbers, the right of the majority, and admit the propriety of giving property an influence in Government, when we agree to exclude many from the polls, and require a qualification in property, to give the Right of Suffrage. This argument is founded in mistake; we have never advocated the power of numbers without distinction of persons; all that we have endeavoured to maintain, is the equal power of those who share the sovereignty and the consequent right of their majority. The qualification of property which we require, to give admission into this number is, with no view to give power to property, but is, like the qualification of age, and sex, an evidence only of fitness for the exercise of political power. If it were intended to give power to property, the richest and the poorest voter could not enjoy equal portions of power. So far then, as this illustration is entitled to respect, the argument founded upon it turns in favour of the equal right of every voter, without reference to property, in favour of the simple basis of representation.

Experience and precedent have been appealed to, and the learned gentleman from Orange, (Mr. P. P. Barbour,) has warned us of the very just distinction between experience and experiment; and giving us wise caution against the dangers of the one, has prudently commended us to the guidance of the other. It was hardly to have been expected, after this salutary lesson, that the gentleman, to sustain his argument, and to enlighten the path of our duty, would have looked for examples in the twilight of Roman history. When we substitute for our own, the experience of other nations, and other ages, we should at least require that it should come to us well attested by authentic history. But I am willing to allow to the argument all the aid it can derive, and avail myself of all the light that can flow from the example referred to. The centuries and tribes of Rome are the examples to which our attention has been called -the former as furnishing a precedent of the representation of property in a republic. The centuries, it is true, in which the richest class of society was represented, furnish to my mind, so far as the dim light of my information enables me to judge, a fair illustration of the representation of property; and I ask whether this example in the Roman Government is seriously recommended to our imitation?

[Here Mr. Barbour, in explanation, said, that he had referred to the Roman republic as furnishing an example at one time of the representation of property alone, by centuries, and at another time, of the representation of numbers alone, by tribes.

He had said that he did not approve either of these extremes-he would prefer to combine them, as in the proposition of the gentleman from Culpeper.]

This explanation, Mr. Chairman, does not vary the view I have taken of the subject, nor can it add force to the example which has been quoted. The centuries and tribes of Rome, were not extremes of aristocracy and democracy of which the Ro man people made experiment at different times and separately. They existed together, and for ages. They were at the foundation of the patrician and plebeian orders -originated during the monarchy, and were continued in the time of the republic. They were the inspiring cause of the angry dissentions between the different orders of the people-of the grinding oppressions of the poor, and the lawless inroads upon the property of the rich. The power of the monarch was necessary to balance the contending factions, and restrain the dangerous excesses of each-and in a few short years, less than twenty, after the expulsion of the Tarquins, and the destruction of the monarchy, these excesses led to the appointment of the first Dictator, the recession of the people to the sacred mount, and the first serious petition for an agrarian faw. In the tribes the people were not represented, but appeared in proper person to act their part in public affairs. The scheine of centuries and tribes was designed to balance numbers and wealth against each other; but, the history of the republic affords more of warning against its mischiefs than commendation of its success. I will not, however, clain the benefit of this example and urge it as a caution against the danger of giving representation to property in our republic. I know that our condition and that of the Roman people is so essentially unlike—our representative republic so radically different from their mixture of aristocracy and democracy, that it is not safe to reason from one to the other. The Roman Government, indeed, in the op nion of Cicero, its greatest admirer, and ablest vindicator, owed its chief excellence to its strong aristocratic character-a merit to which our Government surely has no claim. It is utterly in vain, Mr. Chairman, that we appeal to any of the ancient republics for information to guide us. We know them all most imperfectly, and the little we do know teaches us only that they contain no instruction for us.

The modern European republics will supply as little aid to our deliberations. We should look in vain to Venice or St. Mar.no, to Helland or Switzerland, for the experience of a system like ours, operating upon a people like ours-or for information to guide us to the best means of protecting the peculiar interests which arise out of the peculiar population of Virgina. How would it avail us. for example, to know what causes preserved so long the little Italian republic, with a few thousand inhabitants only on a mountain top, contented and happy, though poor, safe amidst surrounding nations, though without military force, and per:ectly tranquil in the operations of its Government, though without the ordinary checks and balances! Or what would it profit us to inquire, how it has happened that in the small democratic cantons the liberty of the people, with all the rights of person and property, were preserved for centuries, though every inale citizen, above fifteen years of age, was adinitted, in proper person, to share in the legislation of the country?

Just as little useful information or salutary warning is furnished us on this question by the experience of the French republic-a Government that was thrown up by a convulsion froin the abyss of despotism, floated for a few years on the waves of a bloody revolution, and sank again, as they subsided, into the bottomless deep. Such experience might teach us the utter unfitness of any people for a Government to which they have been wholly unused-and the great dangers which attend violent and sudden transitions from one extreme to another-but, none of the examples of the European republics can assist us in deciding, whether it is wisest in Virginia to base the representation upon numbers, or property, or a combination of both."

The British House of Commons has been referred to, for the purpose of showing the intimate connexion between taxation and representation, and of proving that in England, where our system of representation had its birth, its foundations were laid in the power of imposing taxes.

To the experience of England, Mr. Chairman, the American Statesman may in general safely refer. We are better acquainted with her history, more familiar with her institutions, than with those of any other foreign country. From her common law, her jury trial, habeas corpus and magna charta, we learn the most valuable lese sons of jurisprudence, and from these our ancestors imbibed their love of civil liberty, their respect for the rights of persons and the rights of property. In her Govern, ment we see a well-adjusted balance of power; and with all its imperfections on its head, it is probably better suited than any other to her own peculiar condition. I can readily understand how its king, lords and commons, with all the inequalities of its representation, may be well adapted to the Government of England, and yet neither of then be a fit model for our imitation. A mixed monarchy, for the Government of an insular people, surrounded by powerful nations, and under the necessity of maintaining expensive naval and military establishinents, may find its strength and its ef