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ing the preliminary proofs that avoids the policies, and it was for the jury to determine whether that swearing was false and fraudulent; Republic Fire Ins. Co. vs. Weide, United States Supreme Court, May 6, 1872.

FRAUD, ACCIDENT OR MISTAKE.

Parol declarations of Agent.—In a suit on a life insurance policy, parol declarations made by the agent of the company prior to the execution, delivery and acceptance of the policy cannot be received to vary or contradict the terms of the written contract, in the absence of any allegation and evidence as to fraud, accident or mistake, at the time of its execution, delivery and acceptance by the contracting partics. Sullivan vs. The Cotton States L. Ins. Co., 423, 43 Ga. FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT.

Non-lisclosure of former Insanity.

1. Defendant issued an accident policy of insurance upon the life of M., who prior to procuring the policy, had been a canvasser for applications for insurance with defendant. The president had directed him to be cautious, as the company did not wish to insure insane persons, etc. Some time prior to the issuing of the policy, M., had been insane, had been sent to an asylum, and discharged cured, and from that time forward had been sane. He did not disclose the fact of his former insanity upon application for a policy, but stated there were no circumstances rendering him peculiarly liable to accident. Held, that the conservation with the president had no tendency to show a fraudulent concealment of material facts, and that it was not error in the court to charge, that the conversation had no bearing upon the application: Mallory vs. The T. Ins. Co., 52, 47 N. Y.

2. Also held, that the court was correct in charging that if the deceased did not conceal any facts which in his own mind were material, in making the application, the policy was not void: Ib.

POWERS.

Incidental Powers.

1. An insurance company, the same as other corporations, possesses all incidental or implied powers necessary or proper to carry into effect its general and express ones in respect to the transaction of its busiThe Home Insurance Co. rs. The Great Western Packet Co.,

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2. It is accordingly held, where the assured in a policy of insurance upon produce lost in being transported down the Mississppi river

made a claim and instituted suit against the insurance company to recover the amount of the policy, that it was competent for the insurance company, for the purpose of effecting a settlement with the assured, and of the litigation commenced, to arrange with him for, and receive an assignment of the bill of lading and his claim against the owners of the vessel occasioning the loss, and that it might maintain in its own name and recover in an action thereon, the full amount of the loss though it exceeded the amount of the policy: Ib.

Settlement of Doubtful Claim.

3. Nor would the claim on the part of the defendants, in such an action, that the vessel on which the produce was shipped was unseaworthy, and that, hence, the policy did not attach nor any liability of the insurers occur thereunder, invalidate such settlement and assignment or affect the right of the plaintiff to recover thereon: 1b.

TRUSTEE

Personal Representative of Assured—Benefit of Third Person. 1. Where, by a policy of life insurance, the sum insured is made payable to the "assured, his executors, administrators and assigns," for the benefit of a third person, an action thereon is properly brought in the name of the personal representative of the assured, who, by the policy, is constituted trustee of an express trust, within the meaning of sec. 113 of the Code: Greenfield vs. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 430 47 N. Y.

Parties-Beneficiaries—Motion.

2. Where, in such action, upon motion of the insurance company, the beneficiaries named in the policy are ordered to be and are made parties, the company is precluded from objecting that they are not properly joined with it as defendants: Ib.

Waiver.

3. An insurance company has the right to waive any of the conditions of the policy as to proof, presentation of the claim, etc., and a promise to pay, with knowledge of the facts, is such waiver. Ib.

Digest of Recent State Reports on the Law of Corporations.

[From 8 Bush., (Kentucky,) 32 Iowa, and 47 New York.] ASSOCIATIONS.

For pleasure Purposes-Can not maintain action.--A member of a voluntary unincorporated association for pleasure purposes, can not maintain an action in his own name upon a contract made with the association; nor has he an interest therein which he can so transfer that his assignee can maintain an action against the contractor with the association. Nor can one member maintain an action at law, in behalf of the association, against another member upon any agreement made with the association: McMahon vs. Rauhr, 67, 47 N. Y.

ESTOPPEL.

Capacity to contract.-It seems that where a person contracts with a corporation, he is, under our laws, thereby estopped from denying the validity of its organization and its capacity to contract: Howe Machine Co. vs. Snow, et al., 433, 32 Iowa.

FERRY.

Owner of Ferry can not Recover Damages for loss of Profits by reason of the Erection of a Bridge near by.-The appellants, the owners of exclusive ferry privileges between Cincinnati and Covington, brought this suit against the appellee for damages resulting from a loss of custom sustained by them in consequence of the erection of its bridge, and a diversion of transportation from the ferry to the bridge, whereby their property and the profits of their business were rendered almost worthless, laying damages at five hundred thousand dollars. They claimed, also, that the bridge was built on a portion of their land without their consent, and without payment therefor but, produced no evidence to sustain this. The court below instructed the

jury to find for the company.

Held, where the construction of a bridge will interpose no physical obstruction to the enjoyment of a ferry franchise across the same river, the owners of the ferry are not entitled to compensation for any incidental impairment of the profits of their ferry, resulting merely from the use of the bridge instead of the ferry by the public.

(1 Duvall, 135; 11 Peters, 420.) It can not be pretended that the laws of this State for establishing and regulating prices, contain any express provision prohibiting the erection of bridges across our rivers, however near may be the site of a bridge to the landing of a ferry; and, for obvious reasons of policy and necessity, no such prohibition should be raised by implication. Neither bridges nor ferries are authorized by legislative sanction for remunerative purposes to the owners only, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest is their first and paramount object, and in the absence of express law, the legislature should not be presumed to have intended to deprive itself of the power of promoting that object.

Judgment affirmed: Piatt et al vs. Covington and Cincinnati Bridge Co., 8 Bush (Kentucky) Reports.

MUNICIPAL.

1. Liability of--Street obstructions--Notice.--A municipal corporation is not liable for injuries caused to individuals by obstructions on the highway not placed there by its own officials, or by authority of the city government, until after actual notice of their existence, or until by reason of the lapse of time it should have had knowledge, and therefore actual notice may be presumed: Hume vs. Mayor, &c., of New York, 639, 47 N. Y.

2. Police regulations-Wharfage.--Where a city is authorized by its charter to establish and regulate the use of wharves, fix the rate of wharfage, and regulate the anchorage and moorings of boats and rafts, it possesses and may, by ordinance, exercise the incidental power of prohibiting any and all persons, including those owning lots abutting on the stream navigated, from using any place other than the wharf as established by the city authorities without permission of the city and payment of the ordinary wharfage fee: City of Dubuque vs. Stout, 80, 32 Iowa.

3. Taxation.-Where a city charter refers to a general law of the State for the subjects of taxation, any change in the general law in respect thereto works a corresponding change as regards the subjects of taxation by the city for municipal purposes: Trackaberry & Co. vs. The City of Keokuk, 155, 32 Iowa.

4. Liability for failure to keep streets in repair.--A municipal corporation is liable for damages caused by its neglect to keep its streets in proper repair: Collins et ux. vs. The City of Council Bluffs, 324, 32 Iowa.

5. Accumulation of snow and ice on sidewalk.-Suffering an accumulation of snow and ice on the sidewalk, whereby injury is caused VOL. II.-NO. I.-9.

to an individual in consequence of a fall occasioned thereby, will render the city liable, in damages, for the injury sustained. The duty on the part of a city to repair its streets is not discretionary: Ib.

6. Negligence in employment of Physician.-To entitle a person thus injured to recover of the city the damages sustained, it is not necessary that he employed the best medical and surgical skill to be had in effecting a cure. If he used reasonable and ordinary care in the selection of a physician or surgeon it is sufficient: Ib.

7. Damages.--An instruction to the jury in such case, to the effect that if they found the injury to be of a permanent character they should consider that fact as an element in enhancing the damages, was held not erroneous, on the ground that under it the jury might take into consideration and allow for future sufferings of the plaintiff: Collins et ux vs. The City of Council Bluffs, 324, 32 Ioa.

8. Excessivs Damages.--In an action against a city to recover for injuries caused to the plaintiff, a married woman, from a fall occasioned by ice accumulated on the sidewalk of a city, a verdict for $15,000 was held not so excessive as to justify its disturbance: 1b.

9. Bridges. A city is liable for lumber furnished to repair a bridge situated on a county road, but within the corporate limits of the city: Tubbs vs. The City of Maquoketa, 564: 1b.

10. Streets--Contractor-In pari delictu.--Where one contracts with a municipal corporation to keep any portion of its streets in repair, in consideration of a license to use them to his benefit in an especial manner, he, in effect, contracts to perform that duty to the public, in the place and stead of the municipality, which, by the acceptance of its charter, was imposed upon it, i. e. to keep its ways in repair, so that they may be safe for the passage of the public; and the contractor is liable for any damages which naturally and proximately fall upon the corporation in consequence of a defect in a street embraced in such a contract, injury results to one of the public, who recovers of the corporation his lawful damages, the latter can recover them over of the contractor. As between the parties to the contract, the corporation is not in pari delictu: City of Brooklyn vs. B. C. R. Co., 475, 47 N. Y.

OUSTER.

Forfeiture--Breach of Condition.--To form a sufficient foundation for a judgment of ouster against a corporation for the forfeiture of a franchise, not originally usurped, but legally vested, because of the breach of a condition subsequent, the verdict must show the fact, not

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