clusion of law, liable as a joint-maker or original promisor, and in an action against him, to enforce this liability, evidence that he signed his name on the back of the note as indorser, at the request of the drawer, and for his benefit, is inadmissible, it not appearing that the plaintiff, the payee knew of such agreement, or in any way assented to it: Ives vs. Bosley, 262, 35 Md.

Payment-Extension of Time of

2. An agreement by the payee and holder of a promissory note, after its maturity, to allow the maker further time for its payment, being without consideration, is not a binding obligation upon either party, and does not operate to discharge an indorser of the note from his liability: Ib.

INSOLVENCY.

Liability of Indorser.

Where a note is indorsed "to be liable only in the second instance,' the indorser is not liable, until the maker of the note has been sued to insolvency, or some legal excuse alleged for not having done so; but if it be alleged and proved that the maker is notoriously insolvent, and was so at the time of the indorsement, that would be a sufficient legal excuse for not suing the maker to ascertain that fact: Pittman vs. Chisolm, 442, 43 Ga.

JUDICIAL SALE.

Action-Parties.

1. A person who has transferred, by indorsement, promissory notes secured by mortgage on real estate, has, by virtue of his collateral liability as indorser thereon, such an interest in having the mortgaged premises sell for their fair value at foreclosure sale thereof, as will entitle him to maintain an action in equity to set aside such sale on the ground of irregularity or fraud when it appears that the premises were sold for less than their value: Whitney vs. Armstrong, 9, Iowa.

Judgment Lien-Attachment.

32

2. Where lands of the defendant are attached, and judgment is afterward rendered against him in the proceeding, the lien of the judgment will take relation back to the lien of the attachment: Hill vɛ. Baker, et al., 303, Ib.

NEGLIGENCE.

Fraud--Notice-Stolen Negotiable Paper.

The title of a purchaser for value of stolen negotiable paper, including bonds payable to bearer, is not impaired by negligence. It will only be defeated by proof of fraud or bad faith. Notice of

such facts as would put a prudent man upon his guard will not defeat a recovery therefor: Welch vs. Sage, 143, 47 N. Y.

PAYMENT.

The taking of a promissory note by the vendor of real estate for a part of the purchase money does not; in the absence of an express agreement to that effect, operate as a payment of so much of the purchase money: Hurley vs. Hollyday, 469, 35 Md.

PLEADING.

1. Consideration of Indorsement-Sufficient Averment.-In an action upon a promissory note brought by the payee against the indorser, the complaint alleged that the note was executed and indorsed as a condition of a loan by the payce to the makers, and as security for the payment thereof, and then set out the note, which, by its terms, was given "for value received;"

Held, That the averments were sufficient to authorize evidence of the indorser's privity with the negotiation, and if he indorsed with a knowledge that his name was required by the payee as a condition. of making the loan, and as security for its payment, he was placed in the same condition to the payee as though it had been done by agreement; that the value received, expressed in the note, was a sufficient averment of consideration, which, by the other allegations, was shown to be the loan, and that these averments of making, execution and indorsement over were equivalent to an averment of delivery, and that, although to negotiate the note, plaintiff must become the first indorser, being privy to the transaction, and knowing the apparent relation was not the actual one, was liable: Mayer vs. Hibsher, 265, 47 N. Y.

2. Averment Must be Specific.-A declaration upon a written promise by the assignor of a note to pay it, with a recital that it has been put into a deed of trust of the maker, concluding: "If said deed satisfies the above ncte, then this obligation to be void," must contain an averment that the deed of trust has been foreclosed. An averment that the deed has failed to satisfy the note, is not good: Hyde rs. Darden, 515, 3 Heiskell, Tenn. Reports.

PRESENTMENT AND DEMAND.

1. What Sufficient to Constitute.-Where a note is made payable at a certain locality, without designation of a particular place therein, if the maker has no place of business or residence in the place where

it is in general made payable; if the holder of the note is within such locality on the day of payment with the note ready to receive payment, that is sufficient to constitute a presentment and demand: Austin vs. Munro, 360, 47 N. Y.

2. Place of Oral Agreement.-It is competent for all the parties to a note to agree orally that the note shall be payable at a particular place, so far as to make a demand of payment there sufficient to bind the indorser: Ib.

3. Statute of Limitations.-A promissory note, payable on demand, whether with or without interest, is due forthwith, and an action thereon, against the maker, is barred by the statute of limitations, if not brought within six years after its date: Wheeler vs. Warner, 519, 47 N. Y.

SURETY.

Consileration -Demurrer.—A surety to a promissory note pleaded that he had signed the same after it had been executed and delivered by the principals and accepted by the holder, and that there was no consideration to him for such promise;

Held, That the Court below committed no error in sustaining the demurrer to such plea, as it was insufficient in law to bar a recovery against him, without further alleging that there was no consideration moving from the holder to the original promisors for such contract of suretyship: Gay vs. Mott, 252, 43 Georgia.

Selected Digest of Recent State Reports and Decisions on the Law of Carriers.

[For the following Digest, selections have been made from 47 New York, and 32 Iowa; and from decisions by the Supreme Court of California, July Term, 1872; Supreme Court of Illinois, Oct. Term, 1872; Supreme Court of Mississippi, Nov. 1872; United States Circuit Court for the District of Iowa, Oct. Term, 1872; and Kankakee Circuit Court of Illinois, Dec. Term, 1872.]

BANKRUPTCY.

1. Liability of Railroad Company to be thrown into.-Held, That railroad companies are within the operation of the bankrupt

act.

2. That a railroad company can not be proceeded against in bankruptcy for the mere suspension or non-payment, however long continued, of its commercial paper.

3. That an unexecuted agreement by a company to transfer certificates of its stock is not an act for which it can be forced into bankruptcy.

4. That if stock owned by the company is disposed of by the authorized act of the corporation to creditors under circumstances to give them an illegal preference, no reason is perceived by the court why it would not be an act for which the corporation could be proceeded against under the bankrupt act: L. C. Winter vs. The I. M. & N. P. R. R. Co., U. S. Cir. Court, Dist. of Iowa, Oct. Term, 1872.

CAUSE OF ACTION.

Plaintiff, a merchant in New York, received from N. and T., of Rochester, an order in writing for certain goods to be sent them "via canal." The goods were delivered to defendants, common carriers upon the canal, consigned to N. & T., pursuant to the order. The goods were lost en route. Held, That upon the delivery to the carcarrier, the title passed absolutely to the consignees, subject only to the right of stoppage in transitu, and that plaintiff, the consignor, could not maintain an action for their loss: Krulder vs. Ellison, 36, 47 N. Y.

CONSIGNOR AND CONSIGNEE.

1. Liability of intermediate consignee.--In the absence of a stipulation or condition in a contract of transportation, by which an intermediate consignee is to pay the freight, such consignee is not liable for the freight of goods sent to and received by him in the course of transit to forward the same to the ultimate consignee, when the agency is known to the carrier at the time of the delivery of the goods, and he delivers the same without making any claim for back freight, or giving notice that any claim or lien existed on his part: Dart vs. Ensign, 619, 47 N. Y.

2. Idem-Implied promise of intermediate con-ignee. —No promise by an intermediate consignee, who is not the owner of the goods, to pay the freight thereon, will be implied from a bill of lading con. signing the goods to the care of such intermediate consignee for the owner at the place of ultimate destination: 16.

3. Title acquired by consignee--Intent of consignor.--Where property is delivered to a carrier upon consignment to a factor for sale, the consignee only acquires title thereto in case the shipment is accompanied by an unconditioned consignment in pursuance of an agree ment to ship, thus showing that the delivery to the carrier was with intent to give the consignee a right of property, free from any condition whatever. An agreement to ship, although founded upon a good consideration, gives no title. An owner of property, therefore, who has made a prior agreement to consign the same, may, notwithstanding, impose any conditions upon the consignment he chooses, and the consignee can only acquire title thereto by performing the conditions: Cayuga Nat. Bank vs. Daniels, 631, 47 N. Y.

DAMAGES.

Measure of, in case common carrier negligently omits to transport within reasonable time, and market value falls.-In the absence of any special contract, the law implies an agreement upon the part of a common carrier to transport merchandise within a reasonable time. If he negligently omits so to do, and the market value of the merchandise falls, the measure of damages is the difference in its value at the time and place it ought to have been delivered and at the time of its actual delivery: Ward vs. The N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 29, 47 N. Y.

EMINENT DOMAIN.

Where power is delegated by the legislature to the common council of a city, to authorize the laying of railroad tracks along or across