it perfect as a present obligation, and is irrevocable: Mack and Person's Appeal, 68 Penn., 231.

HIGHWAYS.

1. The owner of the land over which a highway passes retains the fee and all the right of property not incompatible with the public enjoyment; and whenever the highway is abandoned the owner of the land holds it without incumbrance: (An, gell on Highways, 301); West Covington v. Freking, 8 Bush, 121.

2. The owner of the soil not only retains the fee, but he is entitled to all minerals, etc., that may be discovered imbedded in the highway; and such mines may be used or worked by him in such manner as not to interfere with the public use: Ib. HUSBAND AND WIFE.

1. A mechanic's lien was filed against Woodward for materials furnished to buildings on a lot described as "belonging to the above named Woodward," who was named in the claim "as owner, or reputed owner." In an affidavit of defense by Woodward to a scire facias, he averred that the ground belonged to his wife, that he was in pos session of the lot, and without her consent, but at his own instance and for his benefit, without her knowledge, he contracted for the materials, etc:—

Held, to be insufficient: Woodward v. Wilson, 68 Penn., 208.

2. The creditor alleging in his claim that title was in the husband, could have judgment against the husband, sell and purchase his title, and thus contest the wife's claim to the property by ejectment. Ib.

3. As a general proposition a wife, who does not stand in the relation of a creditor to her husband, can not set aside his voluntary alienation of his personal estate: Bonslough v. Bonslough, 68 Penn., 495.

4. Arrears of alimony can not be collected by the administrator of the wife; aliter if the husband has evaded the payment, and compelled the wife to contract debts, the administrator may recover for benefit of creditors: Ib.

5. A direct conveyance from a husband to his wife will be sustained and upheld in equity in either of the following cases, namely: First, where the consideration of the transfer is a separate interest of the wife yielded up by her for the husband's benefit. or that of their family, or which has been appropriated to him to his uses. Second, where the husband is in a situation to make a gift to his wife, and distinctly seperates the property given from the mass of his property, and sets it apart to the separate, sole, and exclusive use of his wife: Sims, et al., v. Ricketts, 35 Ind., 181.

6. Whenever a contract would be good at law if made by a husband with trustees for his wife, that contract will be sustained in equity, when made by the husband and wife without the intervention of trustees: Ib.

7. The contract of a husband can not create a mechanic's lien upon the real estate of his wife.: Johnson v. Tutewiler, et al., 35 Ind., 353.

ILLEGAL CONSIDERATION.

1. Where a promissory note was given by A. as principal and B. as surety, the consideration of which was the hiring of a substitute in the Confederate States army, and afterwards the surety, at the request of the principal, paid off said note at its value, and the principal gave his note to the surety for the amount paid:-

Held, that the last contract was a new and independent one, founded upon the consideration of money paid at the request of the principal, and that it was not affected by the illegality of the original note, nor by any knowledge which the surety may have had of that fact: Powell v. Smith, 66 N. C., 401.

2. A note founded upon an illegal consideration, payable one day after date, indorsed

one day from its date, can not be recovered on by the indorsee: Bancum v. Smith, 1b. 537.

3. If money be lent to aid in the accomplishment of an illegal purpose, such illegality is not purged by the borrower failing so to apply the money: Kingsbury v. Flemming, Ib., 524.

INFANTS.

1. The right of an infant to show cause against a decree which affects his interests, after he arrives at age, must be limited to this extent, to show cause existing at the rendition of the decree, and not such as arose afterwards. The question must always be, can any cause be shown why the decree, at the time it was rendered, was not a legal and binding decree: Walker's Ex'r et al. v. Page et al, 21 Grattan, 636.

2. C. dies in 1855, leaving a widow and children, some of them infants. Dower is assigned to the widow, and the guardian of the infants files a bill for the sale of their interest in the dower property, making the widow and adult children parties. In March, 1863, there is a decree for the sale of the whole property, and the sale is made, and the proceeds invested in Confederate bonds, the widow to receive the interest during her life. After the infants come of age, they seek to set the sale aside on the ground that it was not for their interest:

Held, if the court that pronounced the decree had jurisdiction of the subject and the parties; if its proceedings were regular and in accordance with the requirements of the law; and the decree is sustained by the evidence then introduced, the infants will not be allowed, as against a bona fide purchaser, to go out of the record to show that, upon facts and events arising since the rendition of the decree, their interests were not promoted by a sale of their real estate. Ib.

3. In this case all the papers in the cause were destroyed, except the decrees; but the decrees showing by their recitals that the proceedings had been regular, and that the Court was satisfied the sale was for the interests of the infants, and the investments and conveyances having been made according to the decree, the sale and investments will be sustained: Ib.

INN KEEPERS.

1. An inn keeper has a lien upon the baggage or goods brought to his house by a guest, for the amount due from the latter for board and lodging, and this even where such goods belong to a third party, but are lawfully in the guests possession: Manwing, et al., v. Hollenback, 27 Wis., 202.

2. Where the inn-keeper, without any fraud being practiced upon him, accepts a draft drawn by the guest in payment of his bill, and voluntarily relinquishes possession of the goods, it seems that his lien is lost, and will not revive if the goods come again into his possession: Ib.

3. But where he is induced to part with his possession by fraudulent representatations of his guest, (as that a draft given by the latter for the amount of his bill is good and will be paid, when he is not in fact, authorized to draw such a draft), there is no waiver of the lien: Ib.

INSURANCE.

1. The application for a policy of insurance, forms a part of the contract of insurance where the policy refers to it as such. And in an action by the insured on such policy, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff.

The application must be set out in the complaint, and being in the nature of a condition precedent, the truth of its representations must be proved by him. A representation as to the value of property insured, is material, even though the policy contains a stipulation to pay two-thirds of the real value or less if the loss

were not so much, but the doctrine of immateriality does not apply in such a case, the representation forming a part of the contract, and being made in response to a direct question.

A charge in such a case, that the application was not a part of the contract, that the declaration as to value by the insured was a mere representation, and that the only question for the consideration of the jury was the value of the property burnt, is erroneous, and the error is not cured by the remark afterwards made to the jury, that unless such statements were fraudulent and false, they would not bar the plaintiffs' right to recover. Even treating the statement as to the value as a representation, it is not a correct principle, that to prevent a recovery, it is necessary to show that the statement was fraudulent, as well as false, and herein lies the difference between a representation as an opinion and a representation of a fact. It is sufficient to avoid the policy that the representations were false, however honestly made—if material they must be perfectly true: Bobbitt v. The L. & L. & G. Ins., Co., 66 N. C., 70. 2. The United Life, Fire, and Marine Insurance Co., and the Kenton Insurance Company, had the same general agent in Louisville. Shea & O'Connell, obtained from said agent a policy on goods, etc., in the company first named, and on the next day they obtained from said agent a policy on the same goods, etc., in the other company. Formal notice was not given to the first insurer, nor was its consent thereto writen upon its policy. In a suit against it to recover for a loss which oc curred more than sixty days after the date of its policy, the United Life, Fire and Marine Insurance Company, as a bar to a recovery, relied on the following conditions in its policy, to-wit: "If there is or shall hereafter be made any further insurance on the property hereby insured without being notified to this company, and its consent thereto written hereon, then and in that case this policy shall be of no binding force on this company."

Held, the second insurance did not render the first contract absolutely void. The company had the election, after notice of the violation of the contract, to cancel the policy by returning a proper proportion of the premium, or to retain the premium and permit it to remain in full force.

Good conscience and fair dealing required the company, in case it was intended to enforce the forfeiture, to take the necessary steps within a reasonable time after notice of the second insurance. The knowledge of the agent was notice to the company. Von Bories &c., v. The United Life, Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 8 Bush, 133.

3. A merchant to whom goods are consigned for sale on commission, with instructions from his principal to insure for his benefit, is bound to obey the instruc tions or indemnify the consignor against any losses. And although usually he has no insurable interest in the goods further than the amount of his probable commissions or profits, yet, in case of such instructions, he may protect himself against losses by insuring the whole property consigned, and to this end he should be considered as insured for the full value of the property, and would be entitled to recover of the insurance company in case of loss. In such case the policy ought to insure to the benefit of the principal, and the agent or consignee ought to be treated as a trustee for the consignor, and the amount of the recovery should go to the principal. And in a suit upon the policy, in the name of the consignee, this may be shown in order to prove that he had an insurable interest as trustee for his consignor: Shaw v. Ætna Ins. Co., 49 Mo., 578.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

If a landlord erects, without the tenant's consent, on land included in the demise of a dwelling house, a permanant structure which renders unfit for use two rooms

that the tenant was using for kitchen and bed-room, the tenant may elect to treat it as an eviction, and give up the premises, and refuse to pay rent: Royce v. Guggenheim, 106 Mass., 201.

LANDOWNER.

An upper landowner has a right to discharge waters which by nature rise in, flow or fall upon his land, upon the lower lands, so long as the natural course of the water or drainage is not diverted: Hays v. Hinkleman, 68 Penn., 324.

LEASE.

1. A lease may be avoided by parol evidence that it was made with the intention that the demised premises should be used for an unlawful purpose, and of their actual use for that purpose, although it contains an express covenant of the lessee to make no unlawful use of them: Sherman v. Wilder, 106 Mass., 537.

2. A lease originally void for illegality of the purpose for which it was made, does not become valid by an assignment of it by the lessee: Ib.

3. By a certain instrument, A. and B. lease to C. and D., their heirs, etc., a certain amount of water, at a certain dam, for four years; and after a covenant by lessees to pay a specified rent, and one by lessors to raise the dam, etc., and a stipulation that lessees might purchase the water in question at a specified price, a clause is added by which lessors "further covenant and agree, that in case lessees shall not purchase the water, as hereinbefore provided, and shall signify their wish to lessors, their heirs, etc., at the expiration of this lease, to have the same extended, they, the lessors, hereby covenant and agree for themselves, their heirs, etc., to extend the lease for the term of ninety-nine years; provided always, that in case said lease shall be so extended," the lesses shall pay a certain aunual rent. Dixon, C. J., was of opinion that this was not merely a covenant to renew, but was a demise for a future term of ninety-nine years, to take effect at lessees' sole option and on the giving of said notice; and that the plaintiff, as assignee of the lessors, could recover in an action upon the lease for rent alleged to have accrued after the expiration of the four year's term, the lessees having given due notice of their election to have the lease extended, and no instrument having ever been executed for the purpose of renewing or extending said lease: Cole, J., was of the opposite opinion; Paine, J., did not sit in the case: Orton v. Noonan, et al, 27 Wis., 272.

4. Former decision in this cause (on demurrer to the complaint), that a certain contract between plaintiff's and defendant's grantors was not a demise of water merely, but of an interest in land, and that the lessors' covenant to renew the lease runs with the land and binds defendant (who took the reversion with knowledg of the lease) followed res adjudicatae: Noonan et al v. Orton, Ib. 300.

5. Covenants to raise a dam to a certain height, to keep the dam and flume in good repair, and to supply lessees with a certain quantity of water, run with the land on which such dam and flume are situate: Per COLE. J., Ib.

LEGISLATURE.

When property has been attempted to be taken by a judicial proceeding, which is void for want of jurisdiction; the legislature can not validate it: Richards v. Rote, 68 Penn., 248.

LIBEL.

One who writes an article in English, and employs another person as his agent to translate it into German and publish it, will be liable if the German article so published is libeilous, although the translation is inaccurate : Wis., 598.

Wilson v. Noonan, 27

LIEN.

The wrongful refusal of a Court to permit a judgment creditor to have execution on his judgment, does not operate (upon the abolition of such court, pending an appeal from such refusal,) to impair any lien acquired theretofore, or which might have been acquired thereafter, but for such refusal, under the maxim actus legis nemini facit injuriam. Hence, where, after judgment obtained in 1861, and executions regularly kept up thereon, a motion was made by a judgment creditor, in 1866, in one of the late County Courts for execution upon his judgment, which was wrongfully refused, and pending an appeal therefrom, such court was abolished, it was held that one who purchased from the debtor pending the appeal, took the legal estate, but subject to such lien as would have been acquired had execution issued.

In such a case, if the judgment creditor had not a complete lien, with a right to perfect by issuing an execution, his proceeding to cause execution to be issued, constituted a lis pendens, of which every one is held to have had notice, and a party purchasing from the judgment debtor, pending the proceedings, is considered as dealing with him under exactly the same conditions and subject to the same liens, as if the County Court had not refused an execution, and the same had been regularly issued. The creditor so delayed must be placed in statu quo, and as a corollary, any such pur. chaser is affected with notice by a presumption juris et de jure.

The above stated rule is founded on the maxim pendente lite nihil innovetur, and is sustained by considerations of public policy: Isler v. Brown, 66 N. C., 556. MORTGAGE.

1. Upon the execution of a mortgage, the mortgagor becomes the equitable and the mortgagee the legal owner, and this relative situation remains until the mortgage is redeemed or foreclosed. Until the day of redemption be past, the mortgagor has a legal right, and after, an equity of redemption.

A mortgagor allowed to remain in possession, by the long acquiescence and implied approval of the mortgagee, is not a trespasser but a permissive occupant, and as such, is entitled to reasonable demand to terminate the implied license before an action can be brought to recover possession. A purchaser of the mortgagor's estate under execution, and, (where he has leased,) his lessees, are entitled to the right of the mort gagor: Hemphill v. Ross, 66 N. C., 477.

2. A crt of equity will never decree a foreclosure of a mortgage until the period limited for payment has expired. It cannot shorten the time given, by express covenant and agreement between the parties, as that would be to alter the nature of the contract to the injury of the party affected: Harshaw v. McKesson, Ib., 266.

3. When a mortgage is executed, and it is stipulated that if the mortgagor "shall well and truly pay and discharge said debts, according to agreement-the one-third part in three years, one-third in four years, and the remainder in five years from date, then the said deed to be void":

Held, that the said mortgage cannot be foreclosed until the last period mentioned, viz: five years. If the said deed had stipulated that the estate should be forfeited on the failure to pay the specified instalments of debts, then on said failure the mortgagee cou'd have called for his money or proceeded to foreclose: Ib.

4. Where a bill to foreclose a mortgage is filed against several defendants, some of whom claim a portion of the lands described in the pleading under a prior mortgage, and they do not ask that the same be sold:

Held, that it is error to decree that said mortgaged premsses be sold for the benefit of the said defendants: Ib.

5. Where a mortgage is executed to secure the payment of several promissory