Held, that they thus gave aid and comfort to the rebellion: Carlisle et al. v. United States, Supreme Court of United States, December Term, 1872.

2. The doctrine of Hanauer v. Doane, reported in 12th Wallace, that "he who, being bound by his allegiance to a government, sells goods to the agent of an armed combination to overthrow that government, knowing that the purchaser buys them for that treasonable purpose, is himself guilty of treason or a misprision thereof,” repeated and reaffirmed: Ib.

3. Aliens domiciled in the United States owe a local and temporary allegiance to the government of the United States; they are bound to obey all the laws of the country, not immediately relating to citizenship, during their residence in it, and are equally amenable with citizens for any infraction of those laws. Those aliens who, being domiciled in the country prior to the rebellion, gave aid and comfort to the rebellion, were, therefore, subject to be prosecuted for violation of the laws of the United States against treason and for giving aid and comfort to the rebellion: Ib. 4. The proclamation of the President of the United States, dated December 25th, 1868, granting "unconditionally, and without reservation, to all and to every person who, directly or indirectly, participated in the late insurrection or rebellion a full pardon and amnesty for the offense of treason against the United States, or of adhering to their enemies during the late civil war, with restoration of all rights, privileges, and immunities under the Constitution and the laws which have been made in pursuance thereof," includes aliens domiciled in the country who gave aid and comfort to the rebellion: Ib.

5. The pardon and amnesty thus granted relieve claimants prosecuting in the Court of Claims for the proceeds of captured and abandoned property, under the act of Congress of March 12th, 1863, from the consequences of participation in the rebellion, and the necessity of establishing their loyalty in order to prosecute their claims, which would otherwise be indispensable to a recovery: Ib.

6. By the proceeding known as a "petition of right," the government of Great Britain accords to citizens of the United States a right to prosecute claims against that government in its courts, and therefore British subjects, if otherwise entitled, may, under the act of Congress of July 27th, 1868, prosecute claims against the United States in the Court of Claims: Ib.

ARBITRAMENT AND AWARD.

A reference to two, with power to choose a third referee, the decision of the referees to be final requires the concurrence of the three to make an award: M. & C. R. R. Co. v. Pillow, Supreme Court of Tennessee, April, 1872.

ATTACHMENT-Bankruptcy Practice.

Attachment bill filed against a debtor who had conveyed property in trust, alleging that the conveyance was void as in fraud of creditors. Trustees replevied. Debtor became bankrupt and pleaded his bankruptcy pending the suit. Court refused to render any personal judgment against the bankrupt, but gave judgment against the trustee for the return of the property or payment of so much of its value as would pay complainant's debt:

Held, right: Nelson v. Eifler, Supreme Court of Tennessee, September, 1872. ATTACHMENT-REPLEVY BOND.

A replevy bond which does not recite any levy on property, nor make any reference to the property, is good where it ascertains the suit, the amount to be paid, and the event in which the payment is to be made. Code, 773, 774: Stephens v. Greene County Iron Works, Supreme Court of Tennessee, Sept., 1872.

ATTORNEY AND COUNSEL.

The appearance of an attorney for a married woman, will be presumed to be upon lawful authority in a proceeding for sale of the lands of the wife on the joint petition of husband and wife: Kindle v. Titus, Supreme Court of Tennessee, April, 1872.

BANKRUPTCY-Fraudulent.

A replication in a State court to a plea of bankruptcy, that it was obtained by fraudulent concealment of assets, is bad. The State Courts have no jurisdiction of the matter: Morris v. Creed, Supreme Court of Tennessee, Sept., 1872.

But a replication that the Court of the United States in Ohio, which discharged the bankrupt, had no jurisdiction, because he was a citizen of Tennessee, and so the discharge void is a good plea in a State Court: Hennessey v. Mills, Nashville, December 14, 1872.

BILLS AND NOTES-Order.

1. A. gave an order on B. for $30.50, which was presented to B., who admitted an indebtedness of $24, and increasing daily, agreeing, when it were up to the amount, to accept. A third party served a garnishment to reach the same debt. B. answered that he owed $26.50, for which judgment was rendered. The holder of the order then sued B:

Held, not entitled to recover: Delequere v. Munson, Supreme Court of Tennessee Sept., 1872.

2. A statement of an account, part of which is not yet due, followed by the words, "Please pay the above amount to D. and C.," is an order, and not an assignment: Ib. 3. A presentation of an order for acceptance, with a promise by the payor to accept when the amount was increased to the sum named, and to notify others presenting orders, followed by a new presentation next day, when no acceptance was made, does not amount to evidence of acceptance: Ib.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE.

1. A bill of exchange drawn in this State, and payable at New Orleans, in the State of Louisiana, is a foreign bill of exchange, and it should be protested for non-payment, as required by the laws of Louisiana: Todd v. Ward, Supreme Court of

Alabama, January term, 1873.

2. Under the general commercial law, the demand of payment on a foreign bill of exchange must be made by the notary himself. A certificate is insufficient which shows that such demand was made by the deputy of the notary, without proof of some local law allowing the deputy to act in lieu of the notary: Bozeman et al. v. Ivey et al., Supreme Court of Alabama, Jan. term, 1873.

BREACH OF TRUST.

1. If there be a clear breach of trust by a trustee, yet if the cestui que trust or ben eficiary has for a long time acquiesced in the misconduct of the trustee, with full knowledge of it, a court of equity will not relieve him, but leave him to bear the fruits of his own negligence or infirmity of purpose: Crosby v. Beale et al., admr. Supreme Court of the United States, Dec. term, 1872.

2. That whether the lapse of time is sufficient to bar a recovery, must depend upon the particular circumstances of each case: Ib.

CERTIORARI MERITS.

In a petition for certiorari by a Constable against whom a judgment is rendered for non-return of an execution, it is not sufficient merits to state that a proper return

was made on the fi. fa., and that the same has been lost, without also showing that the paper was returned to the J. P. at the proper time and filed: Venott v. Carter, Supreme Court of Tennessee, Sept., 1872.

CHANCERY-Bill to Attach a Decree.-Notice before Decree.

Complainants filed a bill to set aside a decree of partition, on the ground that 100 acres of land belonging to one of complainants, had fraudulently been put into the petition as part of an estate in which said complainant, and his wife the other complainant, were interested in common with the defendants. The bill admitted that the fact of the land being included, was known to complainants when the land was surveyed and laid off for partition:

Held, that by failing to take steps before the final decree, the complainants were prescribed from attaching the decree : Luttrell v. Fisher, Supreme Court of Tennes

see, Sept., 1872.

CHANCERY PLEADING.

A party against whom an estoppel is set up by bill, who, in his answer puts his defense upon a denial of his participation in a sale, without asserting the knowledge by the purchaser, of his title, can not be allowed to prove that knowledge in bar of the purchaser's claim: Glenn v. Osborne, Supreme Court of Tennessee, Sept., 1872. CHANCERY PRACTICE-Relief in Alternative..

1. If parties in Chancery are entitled to recover either as heir or devisee, it is not material whether the will under which they claim is properly proved or not, they will have a decree: Buck v. Williams, Supreme Court of Tennessee, April, 1872.

2. It is not material that in the Chancery Court, the parties were required to elect whether they would claim as heirs or devisees, and elected to claim as devisee. They may have a decree without specifying whether as heirs or devisees: Ib., 247. CHANCERY SALE.

1. Where a bill is filed to administer an estate, and sell lands and negroes, to pay debts, and all of the parties having a present interest are made parties, the fact that infant remaindermen in esse are not noticed in the proceeding, will not vitiate the sale: Armstrong v. Harris, Supreme Court of Tennessee, April, 1872.

2. A sale under the act of 1827, ch. Code, for payment of debts, whether made in Chancery or in the County Court, depends for its validity, upon the matters stated in the petition and decree:

3. In such a proceeding, a report and conformation is not an indispensable requisite, as it is an insolvent proceeding: Kindle v. Titus, Supreme Court of Tennessee, April, 1872.

4. In such a case, if the petition aver that the personalty is insufficient to pay the debts, and the petitioners are satisfied that hereafter it will become necessary for the purpose of paying debts and making distribution, to sell the land, and the decree state that the matters stated in the petition appear to be true, the sale can not be supported as a sale under the act of 1827: Ib.

sec.

5. A sale for partition of realty, made prior to the act of 1854, ch.which includes a present estate of the petitioners with a remainder after a dower, is void as to the dower, so far as it disposes of the interest of persons not sui juris: Ib.

See ATTORNEY AND COUNSEL.

COMMON CARRIERS.

1. Common carriers are not chargeable, in cases free from suspicion, with notice of the contents of packages carried by them; nor are they authorized in such cases

to require information as to the contents of the packages offered as a condition of carrying them: John Parrott v. Barney et al., Supreme Court of United States, December Term, 1872.

2. Where there is nothing to excite the suspicion of a common carrier as to the contents of a package carried by him, it is not negligence on his part to introduce the package, when appearing to be damaged, into his place of business for examina. tion, and to handle it in the same manner as other packages of similar outward appearance are usually introduced for examination and handled: 1b.

3. The measure of care against accidents, which one must take to avoid responsi bility, is that which a person of ordinary prudence and caution would use if his own interests were to be affected, and the whole risk were his own: Ib.

COMPOSITION DEED.

1. Parties who sign composition deeds must do so in good faith: Bean, assignee, v. Brookmire et al., United States Circuit Court, E. D. of Missouri, March term, 1873, 2. Secret preferences paid as inducements to obtain signatures of creditors to composition deeds, can be recovered by the debtor himself, or by injured creditors, or by an assignee in bankruptcy, who represents both debtor and creditor: Ib.

3. Such recovery may be at law or in equity: Ib.

4. It is no defense to such an action that the composition deed was invalid, because not signed by all the creditors, pursuant to its terms, it appearing that the greater part of the creditors believed that the composition had been signed by all the creditors in good faith: 1b.

COMPROMISE.

An agreement to compromise a disputed claim upon a policy of insurance at a certain sum must be one which would operate as a satisfaction of the contract of insurance before it can be offered as a defense to an action upon the policy. A compromise agreement, like an accord and satisfaction in order to take away the right of action on the original contract, must be an agreement which is substituted for the pre-existing obligation, and must bind both parties, so that either could enforce it: Benj. Luce v. Springfield Fire & Marine Insurance Company, United States Circuit Court, W. D. of Michigan, March, 1873.

CONFEDERATE MONEY.

The consideration of a promissory note given for borrowed money, is not the check on a bank by which it is to be drawn, but the money obtained by the borrower, and when this money was Confederate currency, the note is without consideration in in a suit upon it by the payee against the maker: Whitfield v. Bishop Tuljord, Supreme Court of Alabama, Jan. term, 1873.

CONTESTED ELECTION.

A contest of an election attacks the election itself, its regularity or fairness, or validity; not the proceeding subsequent thereto, as the certificate and induction: Curry v. Wright, Supreme Court of Tennessee, April, 1872.

CONTINGENT REMAINDER.-Possibility of Issue.

A woman with a life estate in a fund purchased shares of remaindermen to whom the fund was limited, in the event she died without issue; and filed her bill to have the shares paid to her, alleging that she was past child-bearing:

Held, that she was not entitled, as she might still bear children: Garner v. Dowling, Supreme Court of Tennessee, Sept., 1872.

CONTRACT-Compensation for Sale of Real Estate.

Contract by plaintiff declared upon a defendant, the owner of land, to pay plaintiff, a real estate agent, $200 if he sold certain land for $1800, owner to have the right to sell if he could. By means of advertisements made by the plaintiff, a purchaser was put upon inquiry, came to Tennessee from New York, applied direct to defendant, made a parol contract to buy at $1800, but finally bought at $1600: Held, that plaintiff was not entitled to recover: Charlton v. Wood, Supreme Court of Tennessee, Sept., 1872.

DECREE-Order Suspending-"Justice Requiring."

Decree against the Bank of Tennessee to abate the purchase money of a tract of land sold by the bank by the value of a dower interest held by paramount title Leave at the same term to vacate the decree if the defendant showed by affidavit that justice required that he, as assignee of the bank, be allowed to make defense:

Held, that an affidavit showing that defendant had filed a bill enjoining all creditors from filing bills or suing out process in other courts, and to settle and adjust all claims against the bank, did not authorize the court to vacate the decree: Tipton v. Bank of Tennessee, Supreme Court of Tennessee, Sept., 1872.

DEED-Privy Examination.

1. The omission of the word "understandingly," in a certificate of privy examination of a feme covert to her, and of conveyance, is a fatal defect: Anderson v. Bewley, Supreme Court of Tennessee, Sept., 1872.

2. Such defect is cured by the lapse of twenty years from the date of registration: Ib.

ELECTION.

A returning officer of election has no judicial power. He can not reject ballots or adjudicate upon the validity of the election as returned to him by the judges. When he has computed the vote and issued the certificate, his functions and duties are at an end. He can not amend his returns or reject votes: Curry v. Wright, Supreme Court of Tennessee, April, 1872.

EQUITY POWERS.

1. This court will so deal with its equity powers as to make them serve all the purposes of justice to which they can be made applicable: Geo. Keefer, trustee, etc., v. Jos. Emerick, trustee, etc., Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, March 17th, 1873.

2. A dispute between two unincorporated church organizations, as to the use of the church edifice, is within the equity powers of the courts: Ib.

3. A church congregation, limited in the use of a building to the holding of divine service, was restrained from holding a Sabbath School there: Ib.

ESTOPPEL.

1. An equitable estoppel is not available in an action at law: Calvin Branson et al. v. Jacob Wirth, Supreme Court of United States, March, 1873.

2. If one person is induced to do an act prejudicial to himself in consequence of the acts or declarations of another, on which he had a right to rely, equity will enjoin the latter from asserting his legal rights against the tenor of such acts or declarations. But the person charged may explain, and equity will decree according to the justice of the entire case: Ib.

3. A party who has sold land by parol, to enable his vendee to sell to another, who recommends to that other to purchase, and witnesses the bond for title-such purchaser being ignorant of the claim of the parol vendor-can not set up his right