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is only by regarding these questions themselves as of very secondary moment, that the pacification, on which M. Guizot insists, can be accomplished; and whenever this may happen, they will all fade away into a colourless neutrality.

M.

But No, says M. Guizot; each of the powers should preserve its distinctive characteristics. How, however, being reconciled together, can this be? One of their most distinctive characteristics is reciprocal opposition, as a distinctive characteristic of the gospel in the earliest ages of the Church was opposition to Judaism, Paganism, and the schools of the Philosophers. Guizot's argument is absurd, and at contradiction with itself. If it be worth any thing, the apostles at that period alluded to, should have carefully preserved all the distinctive characteristics of their doctrine, and made peace at the same time with the Jews, Pagans, and Sophists. They should have said to the devout Jews, go you and preach the Mosaic laws, we shall not interfere with you; and to the devout Pagans, go you and preach your gods and idolatries, we shall not interfere with you; and to the Philosophers, go you and enlighten the world with your philosophy, we shall not interfere with you. We shall merely address ourselves to the rabble, who believe in nothing, and who have no philosophy. And then they would have established exactly the same kind of pacification that M. Guizot recommends now. He would have Catholics, Protestants, and Philosophers, all act on this system. He would have them avoid all disputes and controversy. Controversy, he assures us, has never done any great good, and asserts, in a passage which we have omitted, that it was never called into prominent action till the time of the Reformation, though it is evident from the Acts of the Apostles, and the Epistles of St Paul, that the inspired ambassadors of Christ were engaged, almost incessantly during their arduous lives, in controversial discussions with all gainsayers.

M. Guizot will not, of course, admit the justice of the parallel we have drawn between the Christians, Jews, and Pagans of ancient times, and the Protestants and Catholics of the present day; and yet the comparison is a just one. The conversion of Papists will ever be in the estimation of genuine Protestants as deeply needful as

the conversion of Jews and Pagans appeared to the primitive Christians, or as the conversion of the most reprobate of the outcasts of society, and vice versa. But M. Guizot would interdict this field of exertion both to Catholics and Protestants. Why? Because he would not have them molest those who have already a creed which he considers, if it be sincerely and cordially embraced, quite sufficient to answer every desirable purpose. He would have religious impressions rife among the populace, but cares not of what kind they are, so they be recog nised in Christendom. And he would have this view adopted by religionists who hold the most opposite doctrines. He would urge upon them the utmost zeal in the propagation of what they deem truth, and impose upon them, at the same time, complete carelessness with respect to the errors which corrupt and destroy the truths for which they are incited to be so zealous. He would thus mate an enthusiastic earnestness with a sterile indifference. A grosser contradiction cannot be conceived.

But it is easy to divine the thought of his heart. It is this: That Catholicism, Protestantism, and creedlessness, which he calls Philosophy, have all good in them, if not in equal measures. He perceives that they have each certain properties, and produce certain effects which he has noted as beneficial. He has observed that the religious sentiment, even where it is denied, is common to them all; and it is this sentiment that he would desire to

see cultivated. Whatever developement it may assume, at least within the range of Christian and philosophic denomination, is to him equal. He wishes spiritual conviction to abound in society, but whilst he would allow these convictions to attach themselves to particular tenets and forms of worship, he would have it, nevertheless, admitted without dispute, that, in their generality, under all their guises, their operation is most excellent. The substance of religion he sees solely in a vague sentiment, resulting in some determined persuasion of the mind; its doctrines he looks upon as mere accidents.

And this view is one very commonly adopted by those who call themselves, in a large and liberal sense, as they say, the friends of religion. They do, no doubt, recollect

that Jews and Pagans, Stoics and Epicurians, and all the other numerous worshippers and philosophers of antiquity, entertained each the kind of sentiments and the kind of convictions they insist upon as constituting the essence of religious truth. But this consideration does not at all disturb their theory. Why? Because there is a profound incredulity at the bottom of all their speculations which have a theological aspect. They regard Christianity chiefly as a historical fact-a fact, they are willing to avow, which has been prolific of immense benefit to mankind. In this sense they may deem it divine, and call it, with some sincerity, a revelation; but that it is a revelation in the rigorous signification of that term,-that it contains an absolute and essential rule and standard of right and wrong with respect to the spiritual and moral na ture of man; that such a rule and standard is any where to be found; that natural truisms do not comprehend the substance of religion; that the doctrines of the Gospel are not mere accommodations and helps to the one universal sentiment of which we have spoken, which pervades all bosoms; that they are not, therefore, plastic to manifold meanings of a Protean complexion; of a chamelion changefulness, compliant to every variety of temperament and humour, and to the social and political changes of the world-they have no notion. Christianity appears to them princi. pally admirable from its vagueness; and its divinity they emphatically see in this viz. that, whether Catholic or Protestant, philosopher or infidel, civil society has been much improved by its influence.

We repeat, however, that this elastic conception of the Christian faith, with whatever plausibility it may be put forward, is rooted in incredulity. It proclaims that there is nothing positive and specific in Revelation of any paramount value; that its general propositions alone which respond to a common feeling and common want in the heart of man, are important; that all the rest is conventional; convenient it may be or not; for the most part effectively useful within a proper narrow sphere; but always to be kept in the back-ground, and never suffered to interfere, by wranglings about its minor matters-differences about what people foolishly call fun

damental doctrines, and such comparative trifles-with these broad generalities, on which all are agreed, and on which the cause of vital religion is represented to depend.

It is impossible to put any other construction than this on M. Guizot's scheme of religious and philosophic pacification in France. But how is it that he is blind to the fact, that this scheme, though now for the first time formally and dogmatically announced and recommended, has, without the expenditure of either wisdom or wit, logic or religious zeal towards its promotion, been in active operation in that country for at least half a century? He gives a most eloquent and fearful picture of the feverous unbelief, not disbelief, and the consequent extreme demoralization of mind which prevails among the overwhelming majority of his countrymen; but in what, we ask, has this state of mind originated, but in the attenuation and dilution of all decided and definite doctrines and opinions with reference to revelation? Superstition produces one effect; infidelity, or a positive denial of the truth of revelation, another; and latitudinarianism, or a willingness to admit and to interfuse the claims to acceptance of diverse creeds, a third; and it is with this last evil of which M. Guizot complains that French society is at present labouring; yet the remedy he proposes, is to carry the evil out to its utmost extent. He fancies, that when it has reached its climax, fervour will coalesce with indifference; that the false proverb, as old as the hills, “that all religions are equally true and good, if they be embraced with sincerity," which is the burden of his essay from beginuing to end, and which, limiting the scope of this proverb to the faith of Christendom, he sets forth as a discovery, would, if cordially received as an unquestionable axiom, kindle an ardour in each separate class of religionists devotedly to propagate their peculiar tenets. This is the jet of his scheme. The scheme itself has, as we have said, been long, and is at present, working spontaneously in various parts of the world, to the production of consequences the very reverse of those which M. Guizot contemplates. But it has not certainly yet attained that full-orbed completion which he anticipates for it, and would urge forward. When that consummation arrives,

which seems, indeed, to be fast ripening, we may see truly much sham conviction, and much futile ardour, strong seeming attachments to particular systems of belief, fantastically conceived, combined with a general embracement of them all in one bond of fraternization. In brief, mysticism, which flimsifies religion and whatever it touches into transcendental sentimentalities, which regards all creedsas bare administrations of occult verities, and which, therefore, can see truth everywhere and error nowhere, will be ascendant. By this mysticism, the accordance, or rather the collusion, the harmony in liberty,-between all churches and all ideas, of which M. Guizot speaks, may doubtless be brought about. Whether he

ed to the term social state? If so, we affirm, what no one will deny, in contradiction to his argument, that the social state of every community, so far from being disconnected from its religion and its philosophy, is mainly derived, constituted, and developed, from these two sources.

aims at this result or not his scheme most assuredly tends towards its realization.

But that distinguished person goes on to mention a further power, in addition to the three already named, to which we beg now to direct the attention of our readers. This fourth power he calls "our new social state," and keeps it aloof and apart from the other three. And if by the words "social state," he means merely state, if he alludes to a form of government, the administration of public affairs, according to constitutional principles, his distinction holds good, as certainly every state regarded in the light of a legal legislative and executive authority is separated in its nature and in its functions from the religious and intellectual convictions and proceedings of its subjects, so long as thereby legal morality and civil order are not contravened. But when we find join ed to the word "state" the word "social," an altogether different signification is conveyed. The term social state includes in its meaning, not merely the public institutions, but the manners, morals, the style of thinking, the habits of life, the prevailing character and situation, domestic as well as political, of a whole people. And it is in this sense, we take it, that M. Guizot uses the phrase, for he makes it synonymous with the France of the Charte, and with " our new Society," neither of which expressions can describe barely a government. Are we, therefore, to believe that we have put the right construction on his words in the true meaning we have affix.

If, however, we are mistaken in both our conjectures with respect to the interpretation he would have attached to the words "social state," as, upon a reperusal of his essay, we are persuaded we are, if by that term he means neither the government nor the general condition of the nation, but emphatically that strong bias of the popular mind which is called "the spirit of the age," - then we would say, leaving philosophy at present out of the question, that if religion rules not the strength of man, the sooner its influence is altogether shaken off the better; but if it should rule this strength, the mention of any other power which is to exert an independent force can result only from the extremest confusion of understanding, or from a desire to perplex and mystify the understandings of the simple. If religion labours under an incapacity of accompanying and giving moral guidance to the mind in all its developements, there is no truth in her; and those who make the distinction M. Guizot has made, and insist upon relegating the religious and the working, discursive, enterprising, speculative intellect of a country, with which society ferments and is moved (consecrating the latter as a separate power), to different spheres of action, prove thereby their thorough disbelief in the Christian Revelation.

We admit, nevertheless, that this separate power, of which the French statesman speaks, does exist-that it is daily on the increase-that it is triumphing, and is likely still further to triumph, especially in France; but far from recognising in the existence of this fact, as he does, matter of hope; far from according to it, not merely our acquiescence, but our approving admiration; far from considering it as sacredly excellent, as an element of national energy, pregnant with benefits to succeeding generations, we regard it as a most terrific evil, as THE EVIL which is the spring-head of all others which afflict nations and individuals, and which it is the grand

work of religion to grapple with and

overcome.

Yet, in the spirit of the view M. Guizot has taken, viz. that the power which he calls" our new social state" is to occupy that master-position in the government of the world's heart which has been occupied heretofore by religion, or by a strong anti-religious reaction, one understands why he places creeds the most at variance with each other on the same level, for, in accordance with his doctrine, they can have but a ministerial underwork to perform, and it must be of extremely small consequence which of them has the precedence, when they are indifferently to be overtopped by a distinct supreme influence, under whose shadow only they are to act.

But this is all a base juggle of words, the perfect quackery of rhetoric, and M. Guizot knows it to be so. knows very well, that the genius of He every people, and all their national destinies, are characterised completely by the religious and philosophic tenets which are received among them. It would have been a task, then, worthy of his high reputation, of his talent, and especially of his position, to have shown how the three powers he speaks of have operated on society. With all the experience of history before him, he could not have failed to have traced the effects of each up to their respective fountain-heads. He had Italy and Spain, affording an unexceptionable illustration of the unqualified working of Catholicism; he had France, to exemplify the fruits of that infidelity which he calls philosophy; and he had Prussia, Holland, England, and America, exhibiting palpably the results of Protestantism. But he has not fulfilled the task which his subject, to be fairly and instructively treated, imposed upon him. He has skimmed it most superficially over. criminated only to shuffle his discriHe has disminations up together in a common heap, the moment after he has made them. He concludes nothing either against or in favour of any one of the three powers he has mentioned above the others. From the three great master-lessons which Christendom, through the long travail of centuries, has brought forth and furnished to mankind, he has determined to learn nothing, to infer nothing, but that these lessons should mutually neutralize each other. He perceives in none

[Oct.

of them the right path, and in none of them the wrong indicated; but maintains that they all contain such a confused mixture of both, that any preference that may be made between them is a matter for private taste to decide upon, and not for any graver or more comprehensive judgment. He guiding lights any where. sees neither warning beacons nor

opinions and views of men, which ocAnd yet, surely, those fundamental casion such immense distinctions, not only betwixt individuals, but betwixt whole nations, merit the most intense and conscientious attention on the part cannot, if they deserve their name, be of statesmen. These high persons neutral on such topics, but must, if tain thereupon the most distinct and they are not mere pretenders, enterpositive convictions; not that thereby may be restrained, but that they may liberty of conscience or of intellect fare of a community consists; and then discern wherein the true moral welby reason and by eloquence, and by every unforced means, encourage the which they may deem most salutary. growth and spread of those principles

zot seemed pointed out by Providence And this is the work which M. Guipassed in grand circumspective reto perform in France. He might have view-a work for which his propensity for generalizing renders him peculiarly apt-the aberrations of his country from Christianity, both in Popery and Infidelity; he might have with which God has endowed her nashown how all the noble qualities tives have been exaggerated and disnant stars of her destiny; and he torted into curses by these two maligmight have put it to his countrymen, seriously to ask themselves whether found between superstition and increthere is no excellent medium to be dulity, other than a barren indifference, or a fantastic metaphysical mysticism. France is well disposed to listen to And it must be confessed too, that reasonings and exhortations of this kind respecting her mental and religious state.

It is now more than half the bond-slavery of Romanism in all a century since she freed herself from but the name; she has got weary, too, a certain blind reaction has taken of the sterile negations of infidelity; place in her bosom towards religion; she invokes even the superstition which she ere while abominated and

threw away; which comes not, however, at her call, though painfully mimicked, and showing signs of animation as a galvanized corpse may imitate the motions of life. She prefers the grossest absurdities of credulity to the craving void which unbelief leaves in the heart; and feels that general sickening swell of fatigued thought, of disappointed hope, of baffled efforts, which, from the very prostration, not final exhaustion, the very fluctuating indecision of mind it produces, is most favourable to the reception of a new mould and recast of character.

Mean-time Protestantism has experienced a partial but most promising revival within the French territory. It is unknown, also, otherwise than historically to Frenchmen in general. And M. Guizot being a Protestant, it certainly became him at this crisis, so full of hope and of fear, in this season of transition, which must terminate, after no considerable interval, in the developement of some new aspect of French energies, to recommend his own creed to the anxious enquiries of his countrymen. That they want religion, he confesses; and he declares also, in the very Essay on which we are commenting, that Catholicism is only fitted for mental imbecility, whilst the reformed faith exercises strongly the intelligence. And he must know that a religion which does not strongly take possession of the mind, which carries not with it the consent of the reason, which is not excogitated with respect to the evidences of its truth, must be, at the present time, perfectly futile; that mankind cannot be lulled back again into the dreaminess of passive credulity; or that, if the weakest portion of a community may be so drugged into a treacherous dormancy, the activities of a people, all their energies which make them what they may be, cannot be controlled and directed by religious convic. tions which are not intellectual as well as spiritual, which will not bear examination, and which do not obtain a manifest superiority and mastery over their leading mundane thoughts and speculations. Now Catholicism can never again obtain this sort of supremacy, which she owed formerly during the dark middle ages sheerly to ignorance, and to the despotic rule of kings and priests, before the will of the multitude had any weight in na

tional councils. But Protestantism has possessed it, and may continue to possess it, in lands where civil freedom has been carried out to its greatest lengths, and where almost every individual has a voice in public affairs. And, as we at present speak of nations, we maintain, from this historic experience, that Protestantism is the last stronghold of Christianity. Those, therefore, who are not bigoted Catholics, and yet take not up their firm stand upon Protestant ground, show thereby that there is some vague tendency of hope within them, some blind inclination in their hearts which would realize an unknown state of things beyond even Christianity it self.

And this reflection, we believe, furnishes the key to unlock the meaning of M. Guizot's production, now under our consideration, from all the intricate involutions of words in which he has shut it up. He talks abundantly of religion, and of the weakest and most contemptible kind of philosophism, the scorn of all but the smallest fry of witlings, which he doubles up with Christian creeds, holding it, as may be thence inferred, as of no unequal importance with divine revelation itself; whilst it is evident, from this very impious association of profane and sacred things, that there is some towering conception within the ken of his mental vision before which he deems Christianity, under its every denomination, should shrink into insignificance.

This perspective, too, explains why, though a Protestant, M. Guizot seems to give his preference to Catholicism. That appalling corruption of the gospel interferes not, or rather can interfere no longer, with reason; and that being the case, it forms a most delectable paradise of shadows, where fatigued and exhausted intellects may find repose, where the imagination may be recreated, and where the conscience of man towards God may be stilled by a retreat into a religious recess, out of the sphere of thought, a recess of enchantments suited to all tempers and all tastes, where even the learned and the active may love to retire at odd moments from the labour of mental exertion to the supine enjoyment of an indolent religiosity. These are charms and qualities which Protestantism possesses not. That creed, on the contrary, is apt to be extremely importu

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