tion. He then returned to the discussion of the note, the action of Sir E. Grey, etc., and wished to tell me again that, though he recognized our legitimate interests and wished to satisfy us thoroughly, our demands should be clothed in a form possible of acceptance by Servia. I said that this was not a matter concerning Russia, but Servia, upon which M. Sazonof stated that Russian interests in this matter were identical with Servia's, so that I put an end to the vicious circle (circulus vitiosus) by changing to another subject." (Extract, July 29, A. R. B. no. 47; cf. F. Y. B. nos. 52, 96.) Thus Austria not only insisted upon taking drastic action against Servia, but refused to allow Russia or the powers to consider the question.

3. Russia considers immediate action necessary

The British Ambassador expressed the hope that Russia would not 'do anything to precipitate a conflict and would defer the mobilization ukase as long as possible.' In reply the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said that 'until the issue of the Imperial ukase no effective steps toward mobilization could be taken, and the Austro-Hungarian Government would profit by delay in order to complete her military preparations, if it were deferred too long.' (Modified quotations, July 27, B. W. P. no. 44.)

Russia felt that mediation between Austria and Servia was urgently necessary, and that meantime 'the military action of Austria against Servia should be immediately suspended, otherwise mediation would only serve as a pretext to delay inordinately the solution of the question, and give Austria an opportunity of crushing Servia completely and securing a dominant situation in the Balkans.' (Modified quotation, July 28, R. O. P. nos. 48; 53.) M. Sazonof declared to the British Ambassador that 'if Servia were attacked, Russia would not be satisfied with any engagement which Austria might take in respect to Servia's integrity and independence, and that the order for mobilization

against Austria would be issued on the day that Austria crossed the Servian frontier.' (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 72.) Russia received notice of Austrian mobilization from her consular and diplomatic representatives in different parts of the Austrian Empire. The Russian Consul-General at Fiume telegraphed his Government 'that a "state of siege" had been proclaimed in Slavonia, in Croatia, and at Fiume, and at the same time the reservists of all classes had been mobilized.' (Modified quotation, July 28, R. O. P. no. 44.) From Vienna the Russian Ambassador had telegraphed his Government that 'the decree of general mobilization had been signed.' (Modified quotation, July 28, R. O. P. no. 47.)

The effect of these measures and Austria's declaration of war against Servia on opinion in Russia was great. (Cf. G. W. B., exhibit 21.) The view of Russia's ally is expressed by the French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a short résumé of the situation communicated to the French representatives in which he declares that 'in the Austrian capital they wish to keep St. Petersburg amused by the illusion that an understanding might result from direct conversations while they in the mean time are taking action against Servia.' (Modified quotation, July 29, F. Y. B. no. 85; cf. R. O. P. no. 53.)

4. Russia partially mobilizes against Austria

On July 29, Russia, as had been expected and feared, replied to the Austrian mobilization by partial mobilization. (July 29, B. W. P. no. 78.) M. Sazonof told the British Ambassador that 'had not Russia by mobilizing shown that she was in earnest, Austria would have traded on Russia's desire for peace, and would have believed that she could go to any lengths,' but at the same time gave him to understand that 'Russia would not precipitate war by crossing the frontier immediately, and a week or more would, in any case, elapse before the mobilization was

completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous situation he considered it necessary that in the interim they should all work together.' (Modified quotations, July 29, B. W. P. no. 78.) When the British Ambassador referred to Germany's fear of being "taken by surprise" (July 27, B. W. P. no. 43), M. Sazonof explained that 'the mobilization would be directed against Austria only.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 78.) At Vienna the Russian Ambassador 'expressed the hope that Russian mobilization would be regarded by Austria as what it was, namely, a clear intimation that Russia must be consulted regarding the fate of Servia, but he did not know how the Austrian Government were taking it. He said that Russia must have an assurance that Servia would not be crushed, but she would understand that Austria-Hungary was compelled to exact from Servia measures which would secure her Slav provinces from the continuance of hostile propaganda from Servian territory.' (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 95.)

Turning to the German point of view, we find that, as early as July 25, the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg had telegraphed his Government his opinion that 'all preparations had been made for mobilization against Austria.' (Modified quotation, July 25, G. W. B. exhibit 6.) 'July 26, the German military attaché reported mobilization at Kieff and Odessa as certain, while at Warsaw and Moscow he considered it doubtful, and elsewhere reported it had probably not been ordered.' (Modified quotation, July 26, G. W. B. exhibit 7.)

The next day, July 27, the Minister of War, acting at the request of M. Sazonof, explained the situation to the German military attaché, and 'gave his word of honor that as yet no mobilization order had gone forth; that for the time being merely preparatory measures were being taken, but that not one reservist had been summoned nor a single horse requisitioned. He said that if Austria should cross

the Servian frontier, the military districts in the direction of Austria - Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan - would be mobilized, but that those on the side of Germany - Warsaw, Vilna, St. Petersburg would not be under any circumstances.' The attaché told the Minister that his Government appreciated Russia's friendly attitude toward them, but must 'look upon mobilization against Austria alone as very menacing.' (Modified quotation, July 27, G. W. B. exhibit 11.) That same day the German Consul in the district telegraphed, "State of war declared in Kovno." (July 27, G. W. B. exhibit 8.) In an interview which he had, on July 29, with the Austrian Ambassador, M. Sazonof concluded by informing the Ambassador, 'that a ukase would be issued that day ordering a somewhat extended mobilization, but that he could assure him absolutely officially that these troops were not destined to attack Austria, but would only be held armed and ready in case Russia's interests in the Balkans should be imperiled. He added that an explanatory note would announce this, since what was contemplated was only a precautionary measure which the Tsar had considered to be justified, not only because Austria had the advantage of being able to mobilize more quickly, but also because she already had so long a start. The Austrian Ambassador called M. Sazonof's attention earnestly to the impression which such a step would make in his country, remarking that he could but doubt whether the explanatory note would soften this impression; whereupon the minister once more gave assurances of the harmlessness (!) of the measure.' (Modified quotation, July 29, A. R. B. no. 47.) The Russian Ambassador, returning to Berlin on July 29, informed the German Government that 'Russia was mobilizing in the four southern districts.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 76.)

5. The Tsar asks the Kaiser to try his mediation

While this mobilization had been going on, the Tsar telegraphed the Kaiser: "I am glad that you are back in Germany. In this serious moment I ask you urgently to help me. A disgraceful war has been declared on a weak nation; the indignation at this, which I fully share, is immense in Russia. I fear that soon I shall no longer be able to withstand the pressure that is being brought to bear upon me, and that I shall be forced to take measures which will lead to war. In order to prevent such a calamity as a European war would be, I ask you in the name of our old friendship to do all in your power to restrain your ally from going too far." (July 29, G. W. B. exhibit 21.) The German Emperor responded to this appeal and made efforts at mediation between Austria and Russia. (R. O. P. no. 49; G. W. B. exhibit 23.)

On July 29, the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg assured M. Sazonof that 'up to that morning there had been no news that the Austrian army had crossed the Servian frontier.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 93 (2); July 29, R. O. P. no. 49.)

To prevent Russia's further mobilization, the sincerity of Austria's assurances in regard to her designs on Servia were emphasized, and it was pointed out that 'AustriaHungary had mobilized only against Servia, and at that she had mobilized a part only of her army.' (Modified quotation, July 30, G. W. B. exhibit 23; cf A. R. B. no. 50.) M. Sazonof, 'informing the German Ambassador of the military measures taken by Russia, said that none of them were directed against Germany, and added that they did not indicate aggressive intentions against Austria-Hungary, since they were to be explained by the mobilization of the greater part of the Austro-Hungarian army.' (Modified quotation, July 29, R. O. P. no. 49.)

That same day, Wednesday, July 29, the German mili