tary attaché at St. Petersburg reported that the 'Chief of the General Staff of the Russian army had told him that he had just come from the Tsar, and had been requested by the Minister of War to reiterate once more that everything had remained in the same state as the Minister had informed him two days ago. The Chief of the General Staff offered him a written confirmation and gave him his word of honor in the most formal manner that mobilization had begun nowhere, that is to say, not a single man or horse had been levied up to that hour, three o'clock in the afternoon. He stated that he could not answer for the future, but could declare most emphatically that no mobilization was desired by His Majesty in the districts touching on the German frontier. But as the attaché had received many items of news concerning the calling out of the reserves in different parts of the country, including Warsaw and Vilna, he told the General that his statements were a riddle to him. On his honor as an officer, the General replied that the information received by the attaché was incorrect, though possibly here and there a false alarm might have been given.' (Modified quotation, July 29, G. W. B., Memorandum, pp. 10-11.) The attaché, informing his Government, commented that 'in view of the abundant and positive information which reached him about the calling out of reserves, he considered this conversation as an attempt to mislead the German Government as to the extent of the measures hitherto taken.' (Modified quotation, July 29, G. W. B. p. 11.)

It would be interesting to know how far this report of the German military attaché was responsible for Germany's preparations and accusations against Russia. There is as yet no available evidence to determine what justification the attaché had for these statements. He might well be expected to emphasize the military preparations, and if, like many of the militarists, he was really anxious to bring on a war, his inclination would have been very likely to

influence his judgment, however sincere his intention. He would have been held responsible if Russia had really got a start toward mobilization without Germany's knowledge. Before such a crushing load of responsibility it would take a man of iron nerves not to pass on for fact what might upon closer investigation have been found to be mere rumors, or exaggerations at least. Perhaps the very efficiency of the Governments in keeping secret their military preparations or arrangements gave rise to baneful rumors, and these, believed and serving as ground for counterpreparations, quickly complicated the situation.

Even as late as July 31, the British Ambassador at Paris informed Sir Edward Grey that 'the Russian Ambassador was not aware that any general mobilization of the Russian forces had taken place.' (Modified quotation, July 31, B. W. P. no. 117.)

But in a dispatch to the Russian Ambassador at Paris, M. Sazonof said: "Since we cannot accede to the desire of Germany [in regard to arresting military preparation] it only remains for us to accelerate our own armament, and to take measures for the probable inevitability of war." (July 29, R. O. P. no. 58.)

July 31, Sir Edward Grey learned from the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that 'it had been decided to issue orders for general mobilization. This decision was taken in consequence of a report received from the Russian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria was determined not to accept the intervention of the powers, and that she was moving troops against Russia as well as against Servia. Russia had also reason, he said, to believe that Germany was making active preparations, and could not afford to let her get a start.' (Modified quotation, July 31, B. W. P. no. 113.)

July 31, Sir Edward Goschen telegraphed Sir Edward Grey that 'the Chancellor had informed him that his efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna had been

seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilization against Austria. He had done everything possible to attain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at the Ballplatz (Austrian Foreign Office). He could not, however, leave his country defenseless while time was being utilized by other powers; and if, as he had learned was the case, military measures were being taken by Russia against Germany also, it would be impossible for him to remain quiet. The Chancellor said he wished to tell him that it was quite possible that in a very short time, that same day, perhaps, the German Government would take some very serious step; he was, in fact, just on the point of going to have an audience with the Emperor. The Chancellor added that the news of the active preparations on the Russo-German frontier had reached him just when the Tsar had appealed to the Emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, and when the Emperor was actually conforming to that request.' (Modified quotation, July 31, B. W. P. no. 108.)

In reply to the Kaiser's telegram pointing out 'the threatening character of the Russian mobilization,' the Tsar answered, July 31, that it was 'a technical impossibility for Russia to halt her military preparations which had been rendered necessary through Austria's mobilization; that Russia was far from desirous of war. So long as the negotiations continued with Austria concerning Servia, his troops would not undertake any challenging action. To that he solemnly pledged his word.' (Modified quotation, July 31, G. W. B. p. 12.)

Sir Edward Grey informed the German Ambassador that, 'as regards military preparations, he did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Servia.' (Modified quotation, July 31, B. W. P. no. 110.) At the same time he suggested that 'if the Russian Government objected to the Austrians' mobilizing eight army

corps, it might be pointed out that this was not too great a number against 400,000 Servians.' (Modified quotation, July 31, B. W. P. no. 110.)

But on August 1, the British Ambassador reported the Russian Ambassador at Vienna as saying that 'the socalled mobilization of Russia amounted to nothing more than that Russia had taken military measures corresponding to those taken by Austria, and that Russia would even now be satisfied with assurance respecting Servian integrity and independence, and had no intention of attacking Austria.' (Modified quotation, August 1, B. W. P. no. 141.)

CHAPTER IV

GERMANY'S SITUATION

Germany's interest in the dispute - Germany declares that the Austrian note was not communicated to her beforehand Germany pledged to support Austria Germany insists upon the "localization" of the AustroServian conflict The responsibility Russia will incur by supporting Servia -The situation between Germany and Russia becomes acute delivers an ultimatum to Russia.

1. Germany's interest in the dispute

Germany

AFTER the Austro-Servian dispute had widened into an Austro-Russian conflict, the next consequence was the entanglement of Germany because of her alliance with Austria.

Defining its views, the German Government declared in a confidential communication to the states of the German Empire: "The attitude of the Imperial Government in this question is clearly indicated. The agitation carried on by the Pan-Slavs in Austria-Hungary has for its goal the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which carries with it the shattering or weakening of the Triple Alliance and, in consequence, the complete isolation of the German Empire. Our nearest interests, therefore, summon us to the support of Austria-Hungary." (Extract, July 28, G. W. B. exhibit 2.)

The German Memorandum says: "If the Serbs continued with the aid of Russia and France to menace the existence of Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection of all the Slavs under the scepter of Russia would be the consequence, thus making untenable the position of the Teutonic race in central Europe. A morally weakened Austria under the pressure of Russian Pan-Slavism would be no longer an ally on whom we could