The next day, July 31, Germany declared Kriegsgefahrzustand, demanded of France what she intended to do, and delivered her ultimatum to Russia. On August 1, Germany and Russia were in a state of war.

If Russia, prior to the issuance of her mobilization order, really made the preparations against which Germany protested, the reason must have been either that Russia wanted war or else that she was convinced that Germany was preparing to force the issue. In a situation like that, if either Russia or Germany wanted war, it would have been most difficult to have avoided it. If, on the other hand, neither really wanted to precipitate the conflict, there was room for the mediation of a friend of both parties. England and Italy, though deeply interested and to a certain degree partisan, were nevertheless the only great powers that were not immediately involved. Hence they alone were able to offer some assistance. Even though Russia or Germany, one or both of them, were intent upon war, a possible way out might have been found if Italy and England had been willing to commit themselves either singly or conjointly by saying at this last moment to Russia: "Demobilize or at least arrest your preparations, and we will guarantee an adequate consideration for your interests and for the protection of the independence of

calling up of reservists were made, and partial mobilization orders signed but not issued. In spite of rumors there is no direct evidence that reservists were on the move on Monday the 27th. On the 28th several correspondents agree that mobilization was in progress, but that it was partial, and one definite statement comes from Reuter that a partial mobilization order was issued on the night of the 28th. On the 29th it was officially announced, and all through this day proceeded steadily. Rumors grew that the districts on the German frontier were being affected, but we have only one definite statement to this effect from the Temps on the 29th, and two other less definite ones. On the 30th, late, a general mobilization order was issued, thus bringing officially the whole military machinery of the Empire into action. It may, therefore, be said that Russia began to put her army from a peace to a war footing early in the week that preceded the outbreak of the general European war, gradually extending the operations till by the 31st the whole machinery was in progress."

Servia in any settlement which may result. Otherwise we will join Germany against you. We insist that Germany also arrest her preparations and come into a conference to settle the Austro-Servian question, unless Russia and Austria can settle their differences by direct negotiations according to the usual method!"

Looking back, we can see that a firm stand taken by England and Italy at this eleventh hour might possibly have avoided the conflict, but independent countries are not willing to involve themselves to such a degree and make it very likely that they will be drawn into a war, the primary cause of which did not in the slightest interest them. What could Sir Edward Grey have said to the British Cabinet, and the Cabinet to Parliament, if by acting with sufficient promptness he had thus involved England in a war? It is just possible that the country might have disavowed him and refused to follow such an adventurous policy; and when Germany had firmly declared that Austria must be left to settle the Austro-Servian dispute without interference, would she have backed down before a threat? And if she had consented, while Russia refused, we should have been treated to the anomalous spectacle of Germany and England combined against France and Russia to humble them after they had made every reasonable effort to preserve the peace threatened by the uncompromising stand of Austria, backed by Germany. We may, then, I think, conclude that at this last moment nothing could have been done to intervene between Germany and Russia to break the fateful chain of mobilizations; and so, uninterrupted, the mobilizations and the futile negotiations accompanying them must needs proceed to their termination.

CHAPTER VII

THE BREAKDOWN OF THE CONCERT

The

European diplomacy in the Balkans - Sir Edward Grey proposes a conference of the powers Germany makes objection to mediation Russia proposes to Austria to enter upon "conversations". The powers employ their good offices at Vienna and St. Petersburg-Efforts to discover a formula for mediation Germany asked to "press the button". San Giuliano suggestion for mediation upon Servia's unconditional acceptance of the ultimatum - The Cambon suggestion of mediation after Austria's occupation of Belgrade-The Grey proposal for a collective guaranty of the powers Germany asks Russia to propose a formula — Austria agrees to mediation The failure to reach a compromise.

1. European diplomacy in the Balkans

THE ordinary course of procedure, when a diplomatic difficulty has arisen in Europe, has been to submit it formally or informally to a conference of the powers. This has been the usual method followed since the establishment of the Concert of Europe after the overthrow of Napoleon. In the course of the last hundred years, the powers have taken counsel together from time to time to avoid recourse to arms; and this method of procedure has been considered as peculiarly appropriate whenever affairs of the Near East were concerned. Up to very recent years, the rivalry of England and Russia was focused in the Balkans, and all the threads of European politics were gathered at Constantinople; but Russia was weakened as a result of her war with Japan, and Turkey's affiliation with the Triple Alliance enabled her to check any Muscovite designs upon her capital. These modifications in the political situation relieved England of the burden of checking Russian advance on Constantinople. British statesmen could likewise count upon the Balkan States and Russia to thwart any designs Germany's ally, Austria, might have on Turkish territory, more particularly on Salonika. England felt sure, in the presence

of the balanced rivalries and immediately conflicting interests of Austria and Russia, that the balance in the Balkans would be maintained. Her diplomatic intervention could always be counted upon to prevent either Austria or Russia from acquiring too great an advantage, but England could be expected to keep her hands off unless the influence of either seemed likely to become predominant. This transformation and substitution of a bipartisan Austro-Russian supervision of Balkan affairs, in place of the time-honored Concert of European Powers, explains in part why the last Balkan War was undertaken in open defiance of the powers. The Balkan States found it possible to get between Austria and Russia. England made an attempt, it is true, to prevent that conflict, fearing that it might cause a general European war, but when it resulted in the disruption of Turkey by the other Balkan powers, the new situation must have fallen in marvelously with her plans, for the outcome of it was the creation of stronger Balkan States able to offer some resistance to either Russia or Austria and to prevent a possible Austro-Russian partition of the peninsula. Besides, the weakening of Turkey had left her less valuable as an ally to Germany. Thenceforth the strengthening of the international control and protection of Constantinople would be more necessary than ever to the Turk to resist the ambitious designs of his neighbors. Hence, England, wishing to maintain this condition, was not willing to take part in a collective effort to force the Balkan States to disgorge. As a result of these changes, England, having no longer the same immediate concern in Balkan questions, preferred to economize her efforts by leaving them to the obviously inefficient bipartisan control of Austria and Russia. The recognition of this system as part of the European political situation explains the lack of in

1 In reality Russia sympathized with the Allies, though she continued to cooperate with the other great powers. This explains why the Balkan States were not interfered with.

terest that England took in the events preceding the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum.1 Even as early as the first week in July, it was recognized by the public in Austria-Hungary, and conceded in government circles elsewhere, that the assassination of Franz Ferdinand must inevitably result in some action against Servia. The unexpected harshness of the terms of the Austrian ultimatum at once made it evident that Austria intended to break with the policy of bipartisan control of Balkan questions, at least as far as Servia was concerned. The danger of a general war at once loomed up threateningly.

In their efforts to preserve peace, the corps of diplomats, like an army, took up the simultaneous defense of their strongest points, and as one after another fell before the advance of war, they transferred their forces to the redoubts still remaining. When they had failed to secure an extension of the time limit, they tried to prevent the outbreak of hostilities between Austria and Servia, and to prevail upon Austria to make the Servian reply the basis of negotiations between herself and Russia. When these attempts had ended in failure, they returned to the suggestion made at the very first: to refer the dispute to the mediation of the powers less directly interested in the Balkan question, in the hope of preventing an immediate clash between Austria and Russia. It will be of interest to trace these successive steps.

2. Sir Edward Grey proposes a conference of the powers In a conversation with the Austrian Ambassador at London, following his communication of the Austrian ultimatum, and the reasons leading up to it, Sir Edward Grey

- of trying to

1 This is a real weakness in England's Balkan policy shelve responsibility so as to avoid being drawn into some future altercation over a Balkan question. In point of fact, this action left it to Russia to take up the care of British interests, and, as there is not the same confidence in Russia as in England, it made the diplomacy of the Balkans still more difficult and perilous, as the result showed.