the principals in dispute to agree to mediation, naturally expecting each one to use its influence to bring the principals to accept this method of procedure.

Sir Edward Grey, in a telegram (July 25) informing the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg of the view he took of the situation, said: "The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian démarche makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilized against each other. In this event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other four powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly coöperate. No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by either Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial, and included the allies or friends of both. The coöperation of Germany would, therefore, be essential." (Extract, July 25, B. W. P. no. 24; cf. F. Y. B. no. 50.)

July 26, Sir Edward Grey instructed the British Ambassadors in Paris, Berlin, and Rome to ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether 'he would be disposed that his ambassador at London join with the representatives of England and the other powers for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications. If the minister consented to do so, it was suggested that the representatives of these powers should, at the same time that they notified the Governments at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg, be authorized to request that all active military operations be suspended pending the results of the conference.' (Modified quotation, July 26, B. W. P. no. 36.)

France agreed to this proposal of Sir Edward Grey's, and sent instructions 'to the French Ambassador at Berlin to

concert with his British colleague as to the advisability of their speaking jointly to the German Government. The French Government remarked, however, that until it was known that the Germans had spoken at Vienna with some success, it would, in the opinion of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, be dangerous for the French, Italian,1 and British Ambassadors to do so.' (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. nos. 42, 51.)

In confirmation, the French Embassy at London communicated on the day following a note declaring: "The Government of the Republic accepts Sir Edward Grey's proposal in regard to intervention by Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, with a view to avoiding active military operations on the frontiers of Austria, Russia, and Servia; and they have authorized M. P. Cambon to take part in the deliberations of the four representatives at the meeting which is to be held in London." (Extract, July 28, B. W. P. no. 52.)

Italy likewise agreed, and the 'Marquis di San Giuliano was ready to recommend warmly to the German Government the suggestion of asking Russia, Austria, and Servia to suspend military operations pending the results of the conference' (modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 49), and telegraphed an acceptance of Sir Edward Grey's proposal. (July 26, B. W. P. no. 35.)

1 The British White Paper has "Russian," perhaps meaning “Italian.” 2 The French note calls the action intervention, but if Germany consented, it could hardly have been anything but mediation.

Sir Edward Grey, in a dispatch of July 28, to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, stated: "I am ready to put forward any practical proposal that would facilitate this [direct exchange of views], but I am not quite clear as to what the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes the Ministers at Belgrade should do. Could he not first mention in an exchange of views with Austria his willingness to coöperate in some such scheme? It might then take more concrete shape." (Extract July 28, B. W. P. no. 69.) This suggestion is referred to in B. W. P. no. 78, where M. Sazonof says he thinks the proposal "was one of secondary importance." This may have some relation to M. Jules Cambon's remarks about collective action in Servia. (F. Y. B. no. 92.)

3. Germany makes objection to mediation

In the case of a serious difference between two states it has been generally acknowledged that it falls to the part of third states to try to help the states at variance to come to some agreement which will be acceptable to both sides and preserve the peace. The first step is for a friendly power or powers to employ its good offices, which simply means to take whatever informal and friendly diplomatic means it considers will be helpful. When a third state is on most cordial footing with both states it may perhaps make informal suggestions, or the parties may decide to entrust the question to the mediation of the third state. Such mediation, if agreed to, only means that the parties are prepared to consider carefully and in conciliatory spirit any suggestion which their common friend may put forward as a basis of agreement or compromise. Neither party is bound to accept the proposal; but consideration for the friendly action of the mediator does exercise a certain moral pressure upon the parties, so that in certain instances a state may prefer to retain its entire liberty of action by refusing to accept offers of mediation. Under the guise of mediation, one or more third states may really dictate a solution, but whenever there is any exercise of pressure, mediation ceases and intervention takes place. The facility with which intervention is disguised under a cloak of mediation is another reason why states are very cautious in accepting it when proffered.

Recourse to mediation in the case of a conflict such as that between Austria and Servia would ordinarily have followed the rupture of negotiations, and when the Austrian Minister withdrew from Belgrade, Servia did appeal to the mediation of the powers; but Austria had let it be known for weeks preceding the presentation of her

1 If the pressure goes no further than diplomatic pressure, it is called diplomatic intervention.

ultimatum that she intended to settle her difference with Servia alone. There was, however, another basis of mediation, which was to prevent an Austro-Russian conflict resulting from Austria's enforcing of her demands against Servia. Whether the mediation was between Austria and Servia, or between Austria and Russia, it was evident that it had no chance of success without the coöperation of Germany (B. W. P. no. 25), for even though Italy was Austria's ally, they had such serious grounds of difference as to make impossible any real sympathy between them. Accordingly, Sir Edward Grey, confident that he could rely upon the support of the other powers, Russia included, launched his proposal for an ambassadorial conference at London. The invitation as issued had not stated whether the mediatory action was to be between Austria and Servia, or between Austria and Russia. Sir Edward had simply asked the representatives of the less interested powers to meet at London in a conference "for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications" (July 26, B. W. P. no. 36); but that mediation was to include all three of the states immediately concerned is indicated by the suggestion that the powers accepting should 'authorize their representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg to request that all active military preparations should be suspended pending the result of the conference.' (Modified quotation, July 26, B. W. P. no. 36; cf. F. Y. B. no. 76.)

M. Viviani, French Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, returning from Russia on the France, had learned from telegrams received at Copenhagen and a wireless dispatch from the Eiffel Tower of the "twofold English proposal," received July 28. He telegraphed in reply: "I entirely approve the combination suggested by Sir Edward

1 The publication of the French Yellow Book shows the pains the Entente Powers took to impress upon Austria directly and through Germany that she ought not to have recourse to force, and that she should show moderation in dealing with Servia. (Cf. F. Y. B., nos. 10, 15, 17.)

Grey, and I am asking M. Paul Cambon directly to acquaint him with this fact." (Extract, July 28, F. Y. B. no. 76.)

The Marquis di San Giuliano, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, informed the British Ambassador at Rome that he 'greatly doubted whether Germany would be willing to invite Austria to suspend military action pending the conference, but he had hopes that military action might be practically deferred by the fact of the conference meeting at once.' (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 57.)

In reply to Sir Edward Grey's statement to the German Ambassador at London, Prince Lichnowsky, on July 24, that 'if the Austrian ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia he had no concern with it' (modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 11), the German Chancellor (in a telegram to Prince Lichnowsky) agreed that 'the distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between the Austro-Servian and Austro-Russian conflict was quite correct. Germany wished as little as England to mix in an Austro-Servian dispute; and first and last, took the ground that this question must be localized by the abstention of all the powers from intervention in it. It was, therefore, their earnest hope that Russia would refrain from any active intervention, conscious of her responsibility and of the seriousness of the situation. If an Austro-Russian dispute should arise, they were ready, with the reservation of their known duties as allies, to coöperate with the other great powers in mediation between Russia and Austria.' (Modified quotation, July 25, G. W. B. exhibit 13.) Similarly Von Jagow told the British Chargé at Berlin that 'if the relations between Austria and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with Sir Edward's suggestion as to the four powers working in favor of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 18.)