burg between M. Sazonof and Count Szapary. Their interruption was due to a misunderstanding, Count Berchtold believing that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs demanded that his interlocutor should be given powers enabling him to modify the terms of the Austrian ultimatum. Count Szapary will only be authorized to discuss what arrangement would be compatible with the dignity and prestige of the two empires, which are to both of them an object of equal care. For the moment, therefore, it will be in this direct form, confined to the two most interested parties, that the examination of the situation will take place which Sir Edward Grey proposed should be undertaken by the four not directly interested powers. Sir M. de Bunsen, who was with me, at once told M. Schebeko that the Foreign Office would entirely approve of this new procedure. Repeating the exposé he made at the Ballplatz, the Russian Ambassador stated that his Government would pay much more regard to the demands of the Monarchy than was supposed. M. Schebeko neglected nothing to convince Count Berchtold of the sincerity of Russia's desire to reach an understanding acceptable to the two empires. The interview was conducted in a very friendly tone, and gave rise to the belief that all hope of localizing the conflict was not lost, and then the news of the German mobilization reached Vienna." (Extract, July 30, F. Y. B. no. 104; cf. B. W. P. nos. 96, 110.)

On July 31, 'Count Berchtold begged the Russian Ambassador to do his best to remove the wholly erroneous impression in St. Petersburg that the "door had been banged" by Austria on all further conversations.' (Modified quotation, August 1, B. W. P. no. 137.)

The day following, that is, the day Germany declared war against Russia, - Sir Edward Grey, encouraged by this friendly attitude of Austria, telegraphed the British Ambassador at Berlin that 'he still believed that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in

time could be gained before any great power began war. The Russian Government had communicated to him the readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia, and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of mediation which was not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested. Things ought not, he thought, to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia were ready to converse, and he hoped that the German Government might be able to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in order to avoid tension.' (Modified quotation, August 1, B. W. P. no. 131.)

5. The powers employ their good offices at Vienna and
St. Petersburg

While these conversations were going on at St. Petersburg and Vienna, between M. Sazonof and the Austrian Ambassador, and between Count Berchtold and the Russian Ambassador, the less interested powers were trying to use their good offices at the two capitals to facilitate the course of the conversations or direct negotiations and to prevail upon Austria and Russia to agree to some method to settle their difference, which threatened to involve all Europe.

Although Germany supported Austria in insisting upon the "localization" of her dispute with Servia, the German Government did nevertheless 'instruct Von Tchirsky on July 26 to "pass on" to the Austrian Government Sir Edward Grey's hopes that they might take a favorable view of the Servian reply if it corresponded to the forecast contained in the telegram of July 25 from the British representative at Belgrade." The German Government con

1 "Good offices" merely means the ordinary friendly diplomatic activity which a power carries on with one or both of the powers in disagreement. Such action consists in offering suggestions or giving explanations and friendly counsel, which may lessen the tension or induce the Governments concerned to come to an agreement directly, or to entrust to one or more third powers the more formal office of mediator.

2 B. W. P. no. 20.

sidered that the very fact of their making this communication to the Austrian Government implied that they associated themselves, to a certain extent, with the hope expressed by Sir Edward. The German Government could not see their way of going beyond that.' (Modified quotation, July 26, B. W. P. no. 34.)

Two days later Von Bethmann-Hollweg told the British Ambassador at Berlin that 'Sir Edward Grey could be assured that he was doing his very best both at Vienna and at St. Petersburg to get the two Governments to discuss the situation with each other and in a friendly way.' (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 71; cf. G. W. B. exhibits 14, 15, 22; R. O. P. nos. 38, 51.) When the Austrian Government replied with a polite refusal, the Chancellor 'advised them to speak openly to assure Russia regarding the object of the hostilities about to be undertaken against Servia. After going so far in giving advice at Vienna, the Chancellor expressed the hope that Sir Edward would realize that he was sincerely doing all in his power to prevent the danger of European complications.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 75.)

Sir Edward Grey replied appreciatively of these efforts on the part of the Chancellor, and said that 'if he could induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from going so far as to come into collision with her, they should all join in deep gratitude to him for having saved the peace of Europe.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 77.) Sir Edward Grey, in reply to a suggestion from the Marquis di San Giuliano as to a possibly acceptable basis for mediation, said that 'he could do nothing in the face of Austria's refusal to accept any form of mediation as between Austria and Servia, but that he should be glad if a favorable reception were given to any suggestion he could make there.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 81; cf. B. W. P. nos. 64, 90.) England, France, and Italy realized that Germany, and Germany alone, could speak at Vienna

with any chance of being listened to. (Cf. B. W. P. no. 111.) Accordingly, while they had been urging upon the German Government the imperative necessity of exercising its influence in favor of moderation at Vienna if it was hoped to avoid an Austro-Russian conflict (cf. R. O. P. no. 42), they had kept begging the Russian Government not to precipitate a crisis by mobilizing. (Cf. B. W. P. no. 104; F. Y. B. 101.)

6. Efforts to discover a formula for mediation

The powers continued to exercise at Vienna and St. Petersburg the same restraining influence that they had from the first brought to bear at Belgrade to induce Servia to return a conciliatory reply to the Austrian note, but they realized how much more effective would be their restraining action if they could succeed in giving whatever counsel was offered the united support of the four less interested powers. (Cf. B. W. P. no. 11.)

Even in the face of Germany's refusal of Sir Edward Grey's proposal for an ambassadorial conference at London, Italy, France, and Russia continued to urge Germany to reconsider her decision. Present in the minds of the diplomats was the success of the same plan when adopted during the Balkan crisis the year preceding. At that time the delicate question of Albania and the Servian frontier had been peacefully settled by means of direct negotiations between the two great powers most immediately interested, Austria and Russia, while at London an ambassadorial conference of the less interested powers had collaborated to reach an acceptable compromise. The happy result of those negotiations made the diplomatists hope to employ again that parallel system consisting of direct conversations between Austria and Russia, advised and restrained by the collective counsel of the ambassadorial conference. (R. O. P. nos. 50, 69; B. W. P. nos. 93 (2), 80, 81, 120, 139; F. Y. B. no. 84.) The advice of the powers was

all the more difficult for Austria and Russia to reject in 1913, because it was the resultant of the views of powers possessing different interests and divided sympathies, and was therefore a compromise between the views of the two powers immediately interested in the fate of Servia. But, as Count Berchtold remarked, Austria considered the solution then adopted as "highly artificial," which means that the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs considered it unsatisfactory to Austria. Entertaining such a view, he wished, as we understand, to avoid a repetition of the procedure which had forced Austria to acquiesce in the solution adopted in 1913. (B. W. P. Miscellaneous, no. 10, 1914; F. Y. B. no. 70.) In 1913, Germany had been willing to join the other powers in carrying through the parallel procedure of an advisory ambassadorial conference at London, but in 1914 she announced that she could not drag her ally before a "European Areopagus" in which the powers should sit in judgment on Austria, and in which the judges opposed to her would outvote those interested in securing the protection of her interests.

When Germany was pressed, she said that she would join the other powers in exercising a mediatory influence between Austria and Russia (B. W. P. no. 18), but she continued emphatically to refuse to participate in a conference to bring pressure to bear on Austria to induce her to reconsider and modify the terms of her note to Servia. (R. O. P. no. 53; G. W. B. exhibit 13, Memorandum, p. 9; F. Y. B. no. 81.)

In the face of this firm stand of Germany, the other powers sought to replace the proposed ambassadorial conference at London by another method of mediation which might be effective in helping Austria and Russia to find some acceptable compromise (F. Y. B. no. 81); what the diplomats designated as the finding of a "formula.”

For a moment, when it was thought that Austria had refused to continue the direct "conversations" with Rus