restricting the question to its juridical limits and eluding the inconvenient political demands of Germany.1

Germany's only resource, then, was to continue a policy of diplomatic obstruction and to attempt to work through Spain, who, because of her proximity, was naturally anxious to retain what she considered her legitimate rights to a reasonable influence in Moroccan affairs. France continued to push her policy of extending French influence and control, which necessitated campaigns to overcome the native resistance. As France secured a firmer control, Germany complained that she was ignoring the principle of the open door, and interfering with the rights assured to German citizens. July 1, 1911, the German gunboat Panther appeared off Agadir just as France was pushing a campaign in the interior of Morocco. Germany claimed that it was necessary to send the warship to protect German interests because of the unrest in Morocco, but all Europe recognized that she was putting forth a claim to a greater interest in the Shereefian Empire.

The Panther was soon replaced by a larger German warship, and both England and France sent ships to Agadir. Lloyd George's speech of July 22 made it clear that England would support France against German aggression. For some weeks the situation was most tense, but in the end an acceptable compromise was reached, November 4, 1911, the effect of which was to settle the Moroccan

1 Germany's interest in the fate of Morocco was more than commercial. To quote from Von Bülow: “In November, 1898, the Emperor William II had said in Damascus: "The three hundred million Mahommedans who live scattered over the globe may be assured of this, that the German Emperor will be their friend at all times.' In Tangier the Emperor had declared emphatically in favour of the integrity of Morocco. We should have completely destroyed our credit in the Mahommedan world, if so soon after these declarations we had sold Morocco to the French. Our Ambassador in Constantinople, Freiherr von Marschall, said to me at the time: 'If we sacrifice Morocco in spite of Damascus and Tangier, we shall at one fell swoop lose our position in Turkey, and therefore all the advantages and prospects that we have painfully acquired by the labor of many years."" (Imperial Germany, pp. 100, 101. New York, 1914.)

question once for all on the understanding that Germany should recognize it as a French protectorate and no longer oppose French designs. In return Germany received a cession of part of the French Congo Ubangi, bordering on her possessions of the Kamerun. The solution was a big disappointment to both countries; Germany had hoped at least to acquire an important port on the Moroccan coast which would have been most valuable to her as a way-station on the commercial routes to South America and South Africa. In France there was a feeling that Germany, by threatening resort to force, had obliged France to give up part of her possessions for a mere recognition of what she already was entitled to. This agreement, however, laid the Morrocan specter.

It had taken three crises threatening the peace of Europe before this satisfactory result was reached; but Europe, relieved of her anxiety in this quarter, had good reason to turn her attention to the Near East, whence have emanated so many baleful international disagreements.

10. The Turco-Italian War

We have already noted how France's seizure of Tunis drove Italy to join the Dual Alliance of Austria and Germany, which thus became the Triple Alliance or Triplice. It was in vain that France intimated that Italy might console herself by taking Tripoli. Italy shut her eyes to the obvious fact that England and France would never allow her to cut the Mediterranean in two and, by controlling the passage between Sicily and the coast of Tunis, to establish a second Gibraltar. Italy went farther afield by attempting a luckless policy of expansion. Her prestige was lowered by a defeat at the hands of Abyssinia, and when the great powers were taking possession of choice morsels of Chinese territory and she cried, "Me too," China faced about and by an emphatic refusal put a quietus on her demands.

Italy had been more successful in building up internally the strength of her country and began to consider favorably the plan to take over Tripoli. In 1900, at the time when France was feeling about for support, Italy came to an understanding with her in regard to the occupation of Tripoli; and now that Germany seemed likely to inherit the land of the Turk, England was not loath to have a power less formidable, like Italy, secure a good parcel. Still Italy seemed in no hurry to make the move until the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria in 1908 spurred her on. Thenceforth Italy pushed the pacific penetration into Tripoli with constantly increasing intolerance of Turkish opposition, and shortly after the subsidence of the acute phase of the Moroccan crisis, she took definite action. At 2.30 P.M. on September 28, 1911, the Italian Government demanded that Turkey, in order to terminate the disorders due to her neglect in Tripoli and Cyrenaica, should, within twenty-four hours, consent to Italy's occupying those provinces. Upon Turkey's refusal, Italy declared war at 3 P.M. September 29, and after a long and difficult campaign occupied Tripoli and Cyrenaica. It was hardly to be expected that Germany would relish this onslaught on her Turkish protégé, but she was powerless to object, because she feared that Italy's flirtation with the Entente might become really serious and amount to a desertion of her partners in the Triple Alliance; but unofficial criticism of what was called Italy's unprincipled and greedy action was not lacking in the Austrian and German press. The nearest approach to an objection was Austria's seeking and obtaining an assurance that the war would not extend to European Turkey. After several months of hostilities, the Turkish and Italian plenipotentiaries met in Switzerland, in July, 1912, to arrange the terms of peace; Turkey, following her usual tactics, attempted to drag out the negotiations. Meantime the exposure of Turkish weakness had whetted the appetite

of the Balkan States, and they were preparing an alliance against the Sultan. Italy, taking advantage of this situation, presented a demand that the Porte accept her conditions or resume the war. In the face of an impending struggle with her Balkan neighbors, Turkey could do nothing but yield, and agreed, by the Treaty of Lausanne of October 18, 1912, to cede Tripoli and Cyrenaica, while Italy was to return the Ægean Islands upon the understanding that certain reforms should be instituted for the benefit of the Christian inhabitants.

So skillfully had Italy applied her diplomatic anæsthesia to the Triple Alliance, that it did not struggle during the whole operation. Nevertheless, it felt the effects of the shock, for at the same time that Italy showed up the weakness of Turkey, she indicated how loosely she was bound to the Triple Alliance and how free she still felt to direct her foreign policy in patent opposition to Germany's wishes.

11. The Balkan Wars

Before Turkey had settled her conflict with Italy, Bulgaria, Greece, Servia, and Montenegro accomplished what had always been considered an impossible feat: an alliance against the Porte. A long experience with the evils of Turkish rule, and the still greater evils of their own mutual antagonisms, had done much for their political education. The Balkan States no longer looked to a benevolent Europe to protect them from the tyranny of the Turk and began to see the folly of their own ceaseless and bloody struggles among themselves. They realized at last the necessity and the feasibility of a combination, of a coalition to rescue their brothers in Macedonia from their intolerable situation. They realized that they might never again find the Turk so weakened as after the Turko-Italian War; they might wait in vain for another occasion such as then presented itself, when jealousies between the

two groups of great powers and the bitter memories of the recent Agadir incident made it difficult for them to present a united front against the allies' attack upon Turkey.

In truth the powers were quick to realize the danger to European peace which a break-up of the Turkish Empire might entail, and on October 8, 1912, they agreed upon a collective note which they presented to the Balkan allies, stating that in event of war they would permit of no modification of the status quo.

But the allies, wise in their generation, estimated these representations of the great powers at their true value, and prosecuted their campaign against Turkey. The glorious successes, first of Bulgaria and then of Servia and Greece, made the disastrous rout of Turkey complete. This unexpected result was too much for the feeble Concert to handle. The Triple Alliance could not prevail upon all the members of the Triple Entente to force the Balkan States to restore to the Turkish Empire its lost possessions. We have not here to follow the interesting course of events leading up to the Treaty of London, when the representatives of Turkey and of the allies met to discuss terms of peace, while at Sir Edward Grey's suggestion a conference of the ambassadors of the great powers carried on a concurrent exchange of views. Turkey wished to settle with each one of the allies separately, but they decided to make their terms with her first, and later on to divide amongst themselves the ceded territory. Turkey had to give up all of Macedonia and most of her territory in Europe, except a small strip about Constantinople, and leave to the decision of the great powers the disposition of the Ægean Islands. 1

"The introduction of our last Army Bill, which had its origin in the change of situation effected by the Balkan War, shows that Turkey's collapse was a blow to us. I never had any illusions about the limits of Turkish ability to act with effect. For that very reason I strove, for many years successfully, to prevent any serious conflict in the Near East. In 1897, during the Cretan affair, in 1908-09, during the crisis caused by the annexation of Bosnia, and in all phases of the Macedonian question, there was great danger that serious trouble in the Balkan Peninsula would have more