the time of Germany's presentation of her ultimatum to Russia, would not have been justified in destroying the growing confidence between England and Germany. A reciprocal desire upon the part of Germany is indicated by Von Bethmann-Hollweg's remark that 'ever since he had been Chancellor, his policy had been, as Sir Edward was aware, to bring about an understanding with England.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 85.) We can sympathize with Sir Edward in trying to emphasize and appeal to this common desire for coöperation when he instructed Sir Edward Goschen, when refusing Germany's offer to secure England's neutrality, to say most earnestly to the Chancellor, as from him, that 'the one way of maintaining good relations between England and Germany was that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if they succeeded in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England would, he believed, be ipso facto improved and strengthened. For that object, adds Sir Edward, the British Government would work in that way with all sincerity and goodwill.'

Sir Edward added further: 'If the peace of Europe could be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, his own endeavor would be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and England, jointly or separately. He had desired this and worked for it, as far as he could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, their relations sensibly improved. The idea had hitherto been too utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe had gone through for generations, be safely passed, he was hopeful that the relief and reaction which would follow might make possible some more definite rapprochement

between the powers than had been possible hitherto."1 (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 101.)

As the Russian Ambassador at London expressed it, 'the English Government was sincerely disposed to collaborate with the German Government in an effort to preserve the peace.' (Modified quotation, July 27, R. O. P. no. 42.)

By taking the stand he did, Sir Edward Grey encouraged, even forced, Germany along the road of peaceful concession, and when she balked herself or blocked the route for others, all the world could judge of the real responsibility for the failure of the negotiations.

5. The Anglo-French Entente

England's refusal to take sides involved the delicate question of what were her obligations toward France and Russia by reason of the intangible Entente. With what admirable aplomb the French Ambassador handled this most difficult discussion! He tactfully pressed Sir Edward Grey to stand with France, and asked for information as to what England's course would be, without ever attempting to tell the British Government what its duty

1 Following is an extract from some observations upon the report of an interview with the German Chancellor after the outbreak of the war. The publication of the observations was authorized by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: "The German Chancellor spoke to the American correspondent of his 'efforts for years to bring about an understanding between England and Germany,' an understanding, he added, which would have 'absolutely guaranteed the peace of Europe.' He omitted to mention, what Mr. Asquith made public in his speech at Cardiff, that Germany required, as the price of an understanding, an unconditional pledge of England's neutrality. The British Government were ready to bind themselves not to be parties to any aggression against Germany; they were not prepared to pledge their neutrality in case of aggression by Germany. An Anglo-German understanding on the latter terms would not have meant an absolute guaranty for the peace of Europe; but it would have meant an absolutely free hand for Germany, so far as England was concerned, for Germany to break the peace of Europe." (London Times, January 27, 1915. Cf. Von Bethmann-Hollweg's speech of December 2.)

What Mr. Asquith said in his Cardiff Speech of October 2 is given in the Documents, post, chap. XIII.

was. In an interview, on July 30, M. Paul Cambon reminded Sir Edward of a letter written him two years previously which read as follows:

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 22, 1912.

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR:

From time to time in recent years, the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be, regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to coöperate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them. Yours, etc.

1 B. W. P. no. 105; encl. 1.

E. GREY.1

FRENCH EMBASSY, LONDON, November 23, 1912.

DEAR SIR EDWARD:

You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22d November, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time; that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other.

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorized to state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an attack from a third power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common. If those measures involved action, the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their General Staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans. Yours, &c.,

1 B. W. P. no. 105, encl. 2.

PAUL CAMBON.1

Having thus recalled to Sir Edward's mind the exact nature of the Anglo-French Entente, M. Cambon went on to say that 'the peace of Europe was never more seriously threatened than it was then. He did not wish to ask Sir Edward Grey to say directly that Great Britain would intervene, but he was desirous of having him say what Great Britain would do if certain circumstances arose. The particular hypothesis he had in mind was an aggression by Germany on France.' (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 105.) The Ambassador handed Sir Edward a paper indicating the extent to which Germany had pushed her preparations for an attack upon France and the efforts the latter was making to preserve peace.1 Sir

1 The War Chronicle, December, 1914, pp. 20-24, gives an English translation of an article which appeared in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (no. 321, December 23, 1914,) attacking the veracity of the documents in the British White Paper on the ground of the inconsistencies contained in no. 105. This criticism, however, was made without reference to the documents in the French Yellow Book.

In making a comparison of the original in no. 106 of the French Yellow Book with the French original of enclosure 3 in no. 105 of the British White Paper, we find that they are almost identical. With the exception of one or two sentences they can be pieced out word for word. This shows beyond question that they are the same dispatch. But the French Yellow Book no. 106 is dated July 30, whereas the first edition of the British White Paper gave the date of its enclosed document as July 31. Directly after the "hier" of the French Yellow Book, no. 106, the British White Paper has "vendredi" in parentheses. This does not occur in the original French Yellow Book, no. 106, since hier - that is, July 29 - would have been Wednesday. Apparently noticing this mistake, the later editions drop out the "vendredi."

Another mistake of a similar nature was made in an attempt to explain the "Saturday" mentioned in the second paragraph of enclosure 3 by the addition of "le jour même de la rémise de la note autrichienne." If Saturday the 25th was referred to, it was the day that the Servian reply was handed in, and not the Austrian note. F. Y. B. no. 106 has simply "Saturday, the 25th." This discrepancy is explained in the Blue Book edition of the document by the addition of a note: "Sic in original."

In the later editions of the British White Paper the date of enclosure 3 in B. W. P. no. 105 is omitted.

If F. Y. B. no. 106 and B. W. P. no. 105 are both correctly dated July 30, it must mean that the French dispatch left Paris and reached the French Ambassador at London in time for him to present it to Sir Edward Grey and have him include it in his dispatch of that same date to the British Am