When it came to the division of the spoils, the political sagacity of the Balkan allies broke down under the strain. One of the principal difficulties arose from the inconvenient determination of the great powers to establish an independent Albania on the Adriatic coast, south of Montenegro, thus cutting Servia off from her outlet on the Adriatic, and robbing Montenegro of her long-cherished hope of securing Scutari. Both Italy and Austria had no desire to complicate their political situation by the advent of a new power on the Adriatic littoral, so they seized upon the convenient excuse of Albanian nationality to establish under the collective protection of the great powers the independent state of Albania. Servia was promised the right of transit and commercial use of port facilities on the Adriatic, but she recognized that the tenure of such a privilege was of necessity precarious, and she felt that she had been robbed of the hope of realizing her legitimate aspiration for an outlet on the sea. For her disappointment she hoped to find some compensation elsewhere, but Bulgaria ungenerously refused to modify the terms of the agreement for the division of conquered territory entered into previously to the war. Greece, for her part, wished to retain territory which Bulgaria considered should fall to her. Bulgaria was supported by Austria, while Servia and Montenegro relied on the support of Russia. Not content with making enemies of her two allies, Bulgaria further antagonized Rumania by refusing to give any satisfactory assurance as to a compensatory rectification of their common frontier. Rumania, although she had taken no part in the contest, thought that she should receive some accession of territory to retain her relative position in the Balkans, alleging that she might have thrown her army against the unfavorable than favorable results for us, as well as for Austria-Hungary, and would not make the European situation any easier for us to deal with. For many a year Turkey was a useful and important link in the chain of our political relations." (Von Bülow, Imperial Germany, pp. 74, 75. New York,

allies, and so have prevented the success of their campaign. Turkey also joined in the attack upon Bulgaria, and Rumania mobilized her forces. Bulgaria's pride was quickly humbled; she appealed to the Rumanian King to intercede with Greece and Servia, and by the terms of the Treaty of Bukharest of August 10, 1913, she was forced to yield up to Servia and Greece larger portions of the conquered territories than they had at first demanded, at the same time that she acknowledged Rumania's claim to a strip of territory of small extent but of great importance from a strategic point of view. Turkey, too, succeeded in regaining Adrianople.

Russia and Austria all but came to blows over the Albanian question, but France and England were unwilling to be drawn into a war over this Balkan question, and considered that Servia should be satisfied with her large accessions of territory even though Austria and Italy had succeeded in thwarting the claims of Servia and Montenegro to the Albanian coast.1 Europe felt a sense of relief that the map of the Balkans had been made over without the outbreak of war between any of the great powers.

Austria with Italy's support had checked Servia's aspirations for an outlet on the Adriatic, either through union with Montenegro or by the acquisition of part of the Albanian coast, but she could not prevent the extension of Servia's territories, which brought with it greater prestige and made her more dangerous as the champion of the PanSerb propaganda, with the avowed purpose of incorporating into a united Servia all Serbs under the Austrian Empire. In other words, Austria could no longer dictate to Servia, but had to contend with a neighbor of no mean strength, who was, besides, backed by Russia. Austria was bitterly disappointed to find her dreams of an outlet on the

1 Any attempt to support Servia would have been particularly ill-advised, since it would have united Italy strongly in support of Germany and Austria and probably brought on a European war under conditions very unfavorable to the Triple Entente.

Ægean through Salonika thwarted by the results of the war and the throwing of a stronger Servia across her path. Prior to the assassination of King Alexander and Queen Draga, Servia had been as much a satellite of the Austrian system as is Portugal now of the British. Afterwards, even though the Government of the regicides was recognized as the pliant tool of Russia, the knife of the assassin could not remove the effect of Austrian proximity and the Dual Monarchy might still entertain a reasonable hope of uniting all the Serbs in one autonomous group like Hungary, while political security would be insured by union with other groups for certain common purposes, such as foreign affairs, war, and the needs of imperial finance. But Servian successes against Turkey and Bulgaria had destroyed this possibility of coöperation. The new Servia considered herself free from Austrian tutelage and dreamed of reëstablishing the glories of the ancient Serb Empire.

Even before the Balkan conflict she had nursed this hope, and had attempted in 1906 to escape from Austrian dictation by drawing nearer to France and Russia, and by concluding a convention with Bulgaria, which facilitated the export of Servian goods through the Bulgarian ports on the Black Sea.1 Austria retaliated by making certain restrictions and discriminatory tariff regulations and held up her exports. This action, which has been known as the "Pig War," quickly whipped Servia back into the Austrian political fold.

Again in 1908, when Austria proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Servia was aroused, for she feared that the tightening of Austria's grip on these provinces would put a definite quietus on the political aspirations nearest her heart that is to say, the incorporation of the Serbs of Bosnia into the Servian Kingdom. Austria also realized that it made more difficult the effecting of a closer union with Montenegro, which should give to Servia 1 See Encyclopædia Britannica, 11th ed., vol. xxiv, p. 695.

an outlet on the sea, and to the kindred kingdoms, through their united action, the exercise of a much greater political influence. So Servia manifested signs of restlessness as if preparing to open up the whole Balkan question by recourse to arms.

The political situation in 1908 seemed very favorable to Servia's plans, for England was irritated and alarmed at what she considered Austria's disregard of the article of the Berlin Treaty regulating the position of the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia, too, was vitally interested in everything relating to the balance of power in the Balkans and might have been expected to give Servia her diplomatic and military support. But Russia had recently tasted of the rigors of war and was not eager to begin again; not, at any rate, until she had reorganized her military system in the light of her recent experience in the Far East. England, for her part, was not ready to be drawn into a general war because of this relatively trivial Balkan question. Both Russia and England must have realized that Austria's proclamation of the annexation had not really materially changed the situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, since it was well understood that Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin, which gave to Austria the occupation and administration of the provinces, had been intended to make her a permanent cession of the territory, yet in such a form as to appear to preserve the integrity of the Turkish Empire. Unless the powers had been looking for a pretext, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina could hardly have afforded an excuse for launching a general European war. So the Concert of Powers applied themselves to soothing and restraining Servia, and prevailed upon her to agree not to carry on an active propaganda to detach the provinces from Austria.1

1 This promise of Servia was made in a note of March 31, 1909, communicated to the powers. See post, p. 52.

The powers were not so naïve as to expect that these promises would be effective in restraining Servia, and no doubt whatever efficacy they may have had was impaired, if not swept away, by the Balkan War. The Minister sent by Russia to represent her at Belgrade became the center of an active propaganda to extend Slav, that is Russian, influence. Another cause of anxiety for Austria was that if Italy should once secure control of the important Albanian port of Avlona, she would make the Adriatic an Italian sea, control the commerce of Trieste, and deprive the Austrian base at Pola of its strategic value. Italy, being nearer at hand, was much better situated for bringing Albania under her influence. Austria had other causes for chagrin, since she had lost prestige and direct influence by backing the losing power in each of the two preceding wars.1 No sooner had the Turk been worsted than she hoped to find in Bulgaria a counterpoise to Russian influence in the Balkans, but her support of Bulgaria's pretensions and urging her to take an unconciliatory attitude had only been the latter's undoing. Embittered by successive disappointments, Austria was in no mood to bear with patience any further interference with the development of her policy in the Balkans. She felt that her prestige as a great power required that she pursue with success some constructive policy to reëstablish her weakened position.2

In Franz Ferdinand, the Dual Monarchy had fortunately what had been lacking for generations - a leader

1 S. P. Duggan, "The Balkan Adjustment," Political Science Quarterly, December 1913, p. 627.

'This attitude on Austria's part is indicated by Count Berchtold's remark to the British Ambassador at Vienna that, "though he had been glad to coöperate towards bringing about the settlement, which had resulted from the ambassadorial conferences in London during the Balkan crisis, he had never had much belief in the permanency of that settlement, which was necessarily of a highly artificial character, inasmuch as the interests which it sought to harmonise were in themselves profoundly divergent." (B. W. P., Miscellaneous, no. 10, 1914.) These remarks should be considered in the light of ex-Premier Giolitti's recent disclosure regarding Austria's intention of making war upon Servia in August, 1913.