ing the steps which brought about the mental and moral mobilization of the country to present against Germany the united strength of the whole people.1

11. England's inquiry relative to Belgium's neutrality

The vital importance to England of maintaining Belgium free from all control of a Continental power is recognized as the principal reason why the régime of neutralization was imposed upon Belgium when she broke away from Holland. Because of the very great importance of Belgian independence to England, it is natural that Sir Edward Grey should have told the German Ambassador at London that, though England could not agree to stay out of the conflict in any event, even if Belgium's neutrality was respected, they would nevertheless consider it a very important factor. It was because of this attitude on the part of the British Government that Sir Edward Grey had on July 31 telegraphed the British Ambassador at Berlin:

"I still trust the situation is not irretrievable, but in view of the prospect of mobilization in Germany, it be comes essential to His Majesty's Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether the German Government is prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium, so 1 For a fuller consideration of the question of Belgian Neutrality, see chapter IX.

2 See "The Barrier Treaty Vindicated," Documents, post, chap. XIII. Grotius wrote in 1632: "The King of England will give up everything before he allows France to receive the ports of Flanders." (Dollot, Les Origines de la Neutralité de la Belgique, p. 58.) Cf. also post, chap. IX, §§ 1, 10. "... With characteristic naïveté and insular selfishness some jingoes imagine that if only the naval armaments of Germany could be stopped, all danger to England would be averted. But surely the greatest danger to England is not the invasion of England; it is the invasion of France and Belgium. For in the case of an invasion of England, even the Germans admit that the probabilities of success would all be against Germany; whilst in the case of an invasion of France, the Germans claim that the probabilities are all in their favor. It is therefore in France and Belgium that the vulnerable point lies, the Achilles heel of the British Empire." (Charles Sarolea, The Anglo-German Problem, p. 43. London and New York, 1912.)

long as no other power violates it. A similar request is being addressed to the French Government. It is important to have an early answer." (July 31, B. W. P. no. 114.) To this Sir Edward Goschen replied:

"I have seen the Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request.

"It appears from what he said that the German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo 1 already.

"I hope to see His Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the matter further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me remote.

"In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it clear that Germany would in any case desire to know the reply returned to you by the French Government." (Extract, July 31, B. W. P. no. 122.)

The desire of the German Chancellor to know what reply was returned by France, before giving Germany's answer, may have been explained on the ground that there was some sincere belief in Germany that France intended to violate Belgium's neutrality. In the latter case it does not do much credit to German political acumen or to her secret service, which has been credited with such a high de

1 As regards the embargo to which Von Jagow refers, documents in the Belgian Gray Paper explain that a provisional prohibition was placed by the Government on certain articles, but this was not intended to apply to articles in transit, and the German Legation was informed, August 3, that the exportation of the grain had been authorized on August 1. (B. G. P. no. 79.)

gree of efficiency. It may, on the other hand, have been a mere play to hold off British action or to avoid an abrupt refusal.

The British Ambassador at Paris reported to Sir Edward Grey in regard to Belgian neutrality: "On the receipt at 8.30 to-night of your telegram of this afternoon, I sent a message to the Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting to see him. He received me at 10.30 to-night at the Elysée, where a Cabinet council was being held. He took a note of the inquiry as to the respecting by France of the neutrality of Belgium which you instructed me to make." (July 31, B. W. P. no. 124.)

In a telegram immediately following he added: "Political Director has brought me the reply of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to your inquiry respecting the neutrality of Belgium. It is as follows: The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure defense of her own security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. The President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day." (July 31, B. W. P. no. 125; cf. F. Y. B. no. 119.)

On July 31, Sir Edward Grey instructed the British representative at Brussels:

"In view of existing treaties you should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs that, in consideration of the possibility of a European war, I have asked the French and German Governments whether each is prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium provided it is violated by no other power.

"You should say that I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost of her power her neu

trality, which I desire and expect other powers to uphold and observe.

"You should inform the Belgian Government that an early reply is desired." (July 31, B. W. P. no. 115.)

He received the following reply (August 1):

"The instructions conveyed in your telegram of yesterday (see B. W. P. no. 115) have been acted upon.

'Belgium expects and desires that other powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, the Minister of Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbors were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies." (August 1, B. W. P. no. 128.)

When Sir Edward Grey said, "I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost her neutrality, which I desire and expect other powers to uphold and observe," he gave Belgium official notice that England would support her in her defense of her neutrality. The evident intention was to stiffen her resistance to German aggression by promise of support. The language used might possibly cover a threat as well. Yet this is hard to reconcile with the attitude of the British Minister at Brussels (July 31), who, after informing the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs that France and Germany had been asked whether they would respect Belgian neutrality, evinced in the course of the conversation which followed 'some surprise at the rapidity with which the Belgian Government had resolved upon the mobilization of their army. The Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that the Netherlands had taken an identical resolution before they had, and that, on the other hand, the recent date of

the putting into effect of their new military régime and the measures made necessary by this transformation imposed urgent and comprehensive measures upon them. Their neighbors, the guarantor powers, ought to view this action as an evidence of their wish to manifest their profound desire to maintain of themselves their own neutrality. The British Minister appeared satisfied with his reply, and said the British Government awaited this reply and assurance of Belgium's intention to defend her neutrality in order to continue negotiations with France and Germany, the conclusion of which negotiations would, he said, be communicated to the Belgian Government.' (Modified quotation, July 31, B. G. P. no. 11; cf. B. W. P. nos. 115, 128.)

'On the morning of July 31, in the course of a conversation which Baron van der Elst, Secretary-General of the Belgian Department of Foreign Affairs, had with Herr von Below, he explained to the German Minister the trend of the military measures which Belgium had taken and told him they were a consequence of Belgium's decision to carry out her international obligations, and that they in no way implied an attitude of defiance toward her neighbors.

"The Secretary-General subsequently asked Von Below whether he had knowledge of the conversation which he had had with the German Minister, his predecessor, Herr von Flotow, and of the reply which the Imperial Chancellor had instructed the latter to make to him.

'In the course of the discussion aroused in 1911 by the consideration of the Dutch scheme regarding the Flushing fortifications, certain newspapers asserted that in the event of a Franco-German war, Belgium's neutrality would be violated by Germany.

'The Department of Foreign Affairs suggested that a declaration made in the German Parliament on the occasion of a discussion of foreign policy would be calculated to appease public opinion and to calm the suspicions,