'Sir Edward Grey pointed out that Great Britain had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that the Government felt that they could not necessarily bind themselves to declare war upon Germany if war broke out between France and Germany the next day, but it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. Great Britain, therefore, thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind her to go to war with Germany, unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet.' (Modified quotation, August 2, B. W. P. no. 148.)

The British Cabinet, in spite of the dissension among its members,1 could on August 2 feel more secure in giving the the Low Countries would be the prelude to our own. We can no more tolerate a German hegemony in Europe than we can tolerate the hegemony of any other power. As our fathers fought Spain and France in the days of their greatest strength to defeat their pretense to Continental supremacy, and their menace to the narrow seas, which are the bulwark of our independence, so shall we be ready, with the same unanimity and the same stubborn tenacity of purpose, to fight any other nation which shows by her acts that she is advancing a like claim and confronting us with a like threat. If any individual member of the Cabinet dissents from this view, the sooner he quits the Government the better. Mr. Asquith may find it no disadvantage to take fresh blood into his Administration, as M. Viviani has undoubtedly strengthened the French Government by the admission of M. Delcassé and M. Clemenceau. The controversy between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that between Austria-Hungary and Russia, have passed away from the eyes of the nation. These are fixed on the German attack upon the French Republic and upon Luxemburg. In that conflict the nation know their duty. With the blessing of Heaven they will do it to the uttermost." (Extract.) 1 The acute Cabinet crisis which paralleled the European crisis is disclosed in the London Times:

"CHANGES IN THE CABINET

"We understand that Lord Morley, Lord President of the Council, and Mr. Burns, President of the Board of Trade, have resigned office. At a late hour last night efforts were still being made to induce Mr. Burns to withdraw his resignation, but Lord Morley's is final.

"The resignation of these Ministers is the result, of course, of a fundamen

above assurance, since on that date Mr. Asquith received the following important letter from the leader of the Parliamentary opposition:

tal difference of opinion with their colleagues over the national policy, as set forth on Monday by Sir Edward Grey, and of a strong desire that at this time of crisis Mr. Asquith should have the support of an absolutely united Cabinet.

"THE INNER HISTORY

"Now that it has reached this point no harm is done by revealing some of the stages leading up to yesterday's decision. It is already a tolerably open secret, indeed, that throughout last week while Germany's intentions were still undeclared and Sir Edward Grey was laboring for the peace of Europe - divergent views were held inside the Cabinet as to the duties and interests of this country in certain — still non-existent — circumstances. There were well-founded rumors of possible resignations first on one side, then on the other side, of the cleavage. But the Prime Minister — feeling, no doubt, that a change of Government under present conditions was impossible-successfully exerted all his powers to keep his colleagues together; and by Sunday the scale had been turned decisively by the news of Germany's action in the matter of Luxemburg and Belgium. On the same afternoon the country was definitely committed to the support of France by Sir Edward Grey's note to M. Cambon, and Monday's speech announced the decision to the world.

"By that time the dissentient element in the Cabinet had been reduced by the logic of events to very small proportions. Four Ministers out of twenty-one were still unconvinced; but there is reason to believe - if only from their continued attendance at yesterday's meeting that two of them have now found it possible to remain in office. The decision of Mr. Burns and Lord Morley was deeper rooted. They had taken it independently and at different stages in the controversy an important fact which completely dispels the notion that there has been anything like an organized secession. In both cases it is satisfactory to know that one of the strongest motives for resignation was the conviction that any rift in the Cabinet must hamper its freedom of action in a great emergency.

"FILLING THE GAPS

"No steps have yet been taken to fill their places. The project of a Coalition Government, which has been discussed in certain quarters, has no present foundation in fact; and indeed it is open to many of the objections which prevent a general 'swopping of horses in mid-stream.' There were renewed rumors yesterday that Lord Haldane was to return to the War Office, but there is reason to believe that they were are least premature. The arguments against such a change, which we set forth elsewhere, are absolutely overwhelming in the circumstances, and the mere thought of it produced a storm of protest in London. On the other hand, the suggestion of the Times that Lord Kitchener's services should be invoked for this purpose was the subject of universal and approving comment in many quarters. No official inspiration attaches to it, but there is reason to believe that, from

2d August, 1914.

Dear Mr. Asquith, -Lord Lansdowne and I feel it our duty to inform you that in our opinion, as well as in that of all the colleagues whom we have been able to consult, it would be fatal to the honor and security of the United Kingdom to hesitate in supporting France and Russia at the present juncture; and we offer our unhesitating support to the Government in any measures they may consider necessary for that object. Yours very truly,

A. BONAR LAW.1

As soon as M. Viviani, French Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, learned of this assurance, he instructed M. Paul Cambon that 'in communicating this announcement members of the Government downwards, the appointment, if it were made, would be received with profound satisfaction and confidence." (London Times, August 5, 1914, p. 6.)

1 This letter was made public at a meeting of the Unionist chairmen held at the Hotel Cecil, December 14, in the course of an address by Mr. Bonar Law. His introductory remarks referring to this letter were as follows:

"Before the war, as you well know, party differences were as acute as they have ever been in this country; party passions were inflamed to such an extent that I saw no possible outlet which would not be disastrous to the country. In a moment the whole situation was changed. The war cloud which had been gathering over Europe, which for years we had looked upon with growing anxiety, suddenly burst, and we realized that we were face to face with the gravest danger which, as a nation, we have ever encountered. We realized also, that that danger could only be overcome if national resources were utilized to the utmost, and we could act as a united nation. Though the Opposition plays a recognized part in our form of government, it has no official position. We recognized, however, that we represent a large proportion of the members of the House of Commons, and in the days of suspense, especially in the days between the time when war had actually broken out and the position of this country became clear, we came to the conclusion that we were bound to state plainly what our views were, and what action we were prepared to take.

"On the eventful Sunday, the 2d of August, when the decision of the Government was still in doubt, a letter was sent to the Prime Minister on the joint authority of Lord Lansdowne and myself, in which we declared that in our belief it was the duty of this country to join her Allies, and in which we promised, in that case, to support the Government. There can be no harm in publishing this letter, and I think it might interest you to hear its exact wording. It was in these terms. (London Times, December 15,

to the French Chambers, he purposed to indicate that the assistance which Great Britain had the intention of giving France, with the view of protecting the French coasts or the French mercantile marine, would be so exerted as to afford equal support to the French navy by the English fleet, in case of a Franco-German conflict, in the Atlantic as well as in the North Sea and in the English Channel. He said, moreover, that he would mention that English ports could not be used as points for the revictualing of the German fleet.' (Modified quotation, August 2, F. W. B. no. 138.)

"Sir Edward Grey has authorized me to tell you that you may inform Parliament that to-day he made declarations in the Commons as to the present attitude of the British Government, and that the chief of these declarations was as follows: 'If the German fleet cross the Straits, or go north in the North Sea in order to double the British Isles, with a view to attacking the French coasts or the French Navy, or to disturbing the French mercantile marine, the British fleet will intervene in order to give the French marine entire protection, so that from that moment on England and Germany would be in a state of war.'

"Sir E. Grey pointed out that the mention of operations through the North Sea implied protection against a demonstration in the Atlantic Ocean.

"The declaration with regard to the intervention of the British fleet, of which I gave you the text in my telegram of August 2, is to be regarded as binding the British Government. Sir Edward Grey assured me of this, and added, that the French Government was therefore in a position to bring it to the knowledge of the Chambers.

"On my return to the Embassy, I learned from your telephonic communication of the German ultimatum addressed to Belgium. I immediately informed Sir E. Grey of it." (Extract, August 3, F. Y. B. no. 143.)

In his speech in the House of Commons (August 3), Sir Edward Grey, after tracing the history and explaining the nature of the Entente1 with France, said:

"I now come to what we think the situation requires of us. For many years we have had a long-standing friendship with France. I remember well the feeling in the House —and my own feeling-for I spoke on the subject, I think, when the late Government made their agreement with France the warm and cordial feeling resulting from the fact that these two nations, who had had perpetual differences in the past, had cleared these differences away. I remember saying, I think, that it seemed to me that some benign influence had been at work to produce the cordial atmosphere that had made that possible. But how far that friendship entails obligation it has been a friendship between the nations and ratified by the nations - how far that entails an obligation, let every man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the obligation for himself. I construe it myself as I feel it, but I do not wish to urge upon any one else more than their feelings dictate as to what they should feel about the obligation. The House, individually and collectively, may judge for itself. I speak my personal view, and I have given the House my own feeling in the matter.

"The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the northern and western coasts of France are absolutely undefended. The French fleet being concentrated in the Mediterranean, the situation is very different from what it used to be, because the friendship which has grown up between the two countries has given them a sense of security that there was nothing to be feared from us. The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is in the Mediterranean, and has for some years been concentrated there because of the feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the two countries. 1 See above, pp. 288-292.