Europe, which I have endeavored to describe to the House, we shall be supported throughout, not only by the House of Commons, but by the determination, the resolution, the courage, and the endurance of the whole country."

The formal assurance which the British Government gave France that her fleets would protect the French coast against a German attack may be looked upon as a conditional declaration of war against Germany, and amounted to England's entry into the war between Germany and France. By the announcement that England made, she intervened just as really as she would have by the sending of troops to defend the French frontiers. Yet if Germany had not invaded Belgium, the war between France and Germany might possibly have been fought out under this condition of English restraint of the German fleet without the exchange of a shot between Germany and England. It is hardly just, therefore, to say that England came into the war because of Germany's violation of Belgium's neutrality. A more accurate statement is that when Germany violated Belgium's neutrality, England decided to change from partial and specially restricted intervention in the war to a general engagement of all her forces against Germany. This is no fine-spun theory, but a statement of fact which might have had the most important consequences. For when the British Government, by Sir Edward Grey's speech in Parliament, had notified the German Government of the fact of the assurance it had given to France, Germany, in the course of a war against France, would have been justified in falling upon the British fleet or British commerce, without further warning, at any moment she might choose. That this situation did not escape the advisers of the British Foreign Office is clearly shown by Sir Edward's remarks, and had the general or full war not broken out, Sir Edward Grey must either have required a formal acceptance by Germany of the condition upon which England refrained from active operations, or

else have continued to hold the British fleet constantly prepared for a sudden attack, which could not have been designated as treacherous.1

16. The British ultimatum

In the dispatch which M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, sent to his Government on Sunday,

1 At the time when Sir Edward Grey, in his speech before the House of Commons (August 3), made public the assurance given to France, he did not know whether Germany had yet declared war on France. The effect of the promise made to France was that when war broke out, England would remain on the watch to prevent the German fleet from making an attack on the French coasts or French shipping. That is to say, upon the outbreak of the war between France and Germany, England was actively involved to the extent of a conditional intervention in case a certain contingency should arise. France, Germany, and England were obligated by their ratification of the Hague Convention "Relative to the Opening of Hostilities" to give a formal notice before attacking, but Germany, when engaged in war with France, was under no obligation to notify England of her intentions in regard to sending her fleet through the Channel or the North Sea to attack France; yet when she attempted to do so, it was certain that she would be attacked by the British fleet. It follows that Germany was free to take any hostile action she thought advisable against England to prevent this interference. In other words, England had made a conditional declaration of war which absolved Germany from the obligation of giving any further notice of an intention to attack England.

Sir Edward Cook says: "This was not a declaration of war, but a contingent obligation to make war." (Why Britain is at War, p. 18. Macmillan, & Co., London, 1914.)

The German Secretary of the Treasury, Dr. Karl Helfferich, has recently stated:

"Therefore, if during the time between August 2 and 4 German warships had passed through the Strait of Calais or the North Sea, a state of war would immediately have arisen between Germany and England, since such an operation would have been immediately taken by the English to mean that the French coast or fleet was to be attacked or, at least, the French merchant marine to be alarmed; and this would have occurred solely because of the obligations which the English Cabinet felt to be imposed upon it by the entente with France, which, on its face, bound England to nothing: all this, moreover, quite irrespective of Germany's attitude toward Belgian neutrality.

One must now deplore that in those days the German fleet did not come out and cause hostile action on the part of the English fleet. Then the fairy tale that England was forced to enter the war solely by the violation of Belgian neutrality at the hands of Germany could never have come up." (New York Times, March 14, 1915.)

August 2, to announce the important decision of the English Government to give France the assurance that the English fleet would protect the French coasts from a German attack, he sagaciously added that 'the preservation of Belgian neutrality was considered so important there that England would look upon its violation by Germany as a casus belli. This was, he said, a peculiarly English interest, and one could not doubt that the British Government, faithful to the traditions of its policy, would make it prevail, even if the business world, where German influence makes tenacious efforts, tried to exert pressure to hinder the Government from engaging itself against Germany.' (Modified quotation, August 2, F. Y. B. no. 137.)

In his speech in the House of Commons next day (that is, Monday, August 3), Sir Edward Grey, after considering the nature of England's obligation to assist France, turned to the question of the neutrality of Belgium. Beginning with the Treaty of 1839, he outlined the history of the question, including a review of the negotiations in course (see post, Documents, chap. XIII), and concluded:"It now appears, from the news I have received to-day, which has come quite recently, and I am not yet quite sure how far it has reached me in an accurate form,1 that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany, the object of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations with Germany on condition that she would facilitate the passage of German troops through Belgium. Well, Sir, until one has these things absolutely definitely, up to the last moment, I do not wish to say all that one would say if one were in a position to give the House full, complete, and absolute information upon the point. We were sounded in the course of last week as to whether, if a guaranty were given that, after the war, Belgian integrity would be pre

1 August 3, M. Paul Cambon reported to his Government: "On my return to the Embassy I learned from your telephonic communication of the German ultimatum addressed to Belgium. I immediately informed Sir E. Grey of it." (Extract, August 3, F. Y. B. no. 143.)

served, that would content us. We replied that we could not bargain away whatever interests or obligations we had in Belgian neutrality.1

1 Sir Edward Grey has been accused of being responsible for the war: (1) Because he did not inform Russia and France that England would not allow a European war to develop out of the Austro-Servian dispute. Sir Edward Grey could not have done this without disrupting the Entente. He could not have guaranteed that his country would intervene to make good his threat, and it is very possible that France and Russia would have made war together against Austria and Germany rather than permit Austria to overthrow the status quo in the Balkans. The disastrous results to England might have been still greater if the war had been thus avoided as a result of England's veto, for Russia and France would have resented England's desertion of them and awaited an opportunity to join Germany in accomplishing her ruin.

(2) Because he did not tell Germany that England would stand by France and Russia. An influential friend and intimate of the Kaiser, Herr Ballin, has recently joined the ranks of those who criticize Sir Edward Grey on this ground. He has said:

"We all feel that this war has been brought about by England. We honestly believe that Sir Edward Grey could have stopped it.

"If, on the first day, he had declared, 'England refuses to go to war because of the internal questions between Servia and Austria,' then Russia and France would have found a way to compromise with Austria.

"If, on the other hand, Sir Edward Grey had said England was ready to go to war, then, for the sake of Germany, probably Austria might have been more ready to compromise.

"But, by leaving his attitude uncertain and letting us understand that he was not bound to go to war, Sir Edward Grey certainly brought about the war. If he had decided at once, one way or the other, Sir Edward Grey could have avoided this terrible thing." (London Times, April 15, 1915, extract from New York World, April 16, 1915.)

The London Spectator (August 8, 1914, p. 193) adopts this view in an article on "The Revelations of the Blue Book." "But we do say that if we had stated firmly and boldly to Germany from the first that we should undoubtedly stand by our friends, it was always obvious to people of the least penetration that we must do so in the end, we should have been saved this appalling war."

The French and Russian diplomatists began to harp on this theme from the moment they learned of the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum. I believe it has been shown that the course Sir Edward Grey pursued was much wiser, since he stimulated both sides to make concessions for a peaceful settlement. As soon as it was believed in Russia that England would be upon her side, those in favor of war seem to have acquired a greater influence. (See Reuter dispatch; Price, Diplomatic History of the War, p. 338.) There are certain indications that at about this period, July 29, when France and Russia felt confident that England might be upon their side, Germany and Austria hesitated to force the issue. Nevertheless, we do not

"Shortly before I reached the House I was informed that the following telegram had been received from the King

find that either Austria or Germany put forward a single suggestion which might have served as a possible compromise. In addition to the reasons just given, Sir Edward Grey could not have made such a declaration, because he could not have been sure that the Government and the country would back him up. Even after several days had elapsed, in which the British public might have convinced itself that Austria and Germany were forcing the issue, and that France and Russia were giving every indication of a conciliatory spirit, there was, nevertheless, a strong British sentiment in favor of remaining neutral. There was a serious split in the Cabinet, and it is rumored that Sir Edward Grey himself considered resigning. Not until Germany refused to respect Belgian neutrality was it possible to unite the Government and the country in the firm support of Russia and France against German aggression. Sir Edward Grey must have felt that England would be dishonored if she did not support France against German aggression. He must have known that his country would come to a realization of her mistake as soon as Germany had crushed France, but that it might then be too late to succor France or wash away England's dishonor.

(3) Because he worked to involve England in a war against Germany. The main argument in support of this contention is that he would not respond to Prince Lichnowsky's request to state the conditions upon which England would remain neutral. In point of fact, he did lay down the conditions upon which England would remain neutral, when, on July 31, he said that if Germany brought forward any reasonable proposal which France and Russia would not agree to, he would have nothing further to do with the consequences. The failure to meet this proposal of Sir Edward Grey showed that Germany was making no efforts at coöperation and made plainer than ever her aggressive purpose. In the face of German aggression upon France, England was bound to come to her support both on the ground of the Entente and on the ground of her general interests to resist the attempt of any nation to acquire dominion on the Continent by conquest of arms. The vast majority of those who were won over by Sir Edward's maneuvers of springing the Belgian question at an opportune moment must have been very thankful to him for making clear Germany's real designs and saving them from making a colossal blunder. I doubt if the British people will ever consider that Sir Edward Grey deceived them. By focusing attention upon the Belgian question he united the whole country for immediate action. As soon as there was time for reflection, it was seen that Belgium was only one of several reasons for joining France and Russia against Germany.

In any event, Sir Edward Grey did tell Prince Lichnowsky, July 29, that he must not be misled into thinking that England would stand aside (B. W. P. nos. 87, 89). Prince Lichnowsky replied that he had already reported to his Government that such was his estimate of the situation (B. W. P. no. 89), and Herr von Jagow told Sir Edward Goschen that he heard the answer of the British Government to the German proposal (B. W. P. no. 85) not exactly with surprise (B. W. P. no. 98). Neither Sir Edward Grey nor any one else could tell with certainty what would be the attitude of the British Gov