course, provided always that she took no action until Germany had been guilty of a violation of Belgian neutrality. As soon as this violation had occurred, Holland, as one of the signatory states of the Treaty of 1839, would be expected to put no obstacle in the way of the other powers in repelling German aggression and making good their guaranty.' If, however, for reasons of policy, Holland decided to remain neutral, she could have no serious ground for complaint against England for using the Scheldt to maintain her connection with Antwerp. In the present war England has been careful to respect the neutrality of the Scheldt, which in reality constitutes part of the neutralized system of Belgium. She knows that if she were to disregard it she would arouse Holland against her, or if Holland were to acquiesce, Germany would probably show her resentment by invading Holland.

The peculiar position which has placed Belgium's principal outlet from Antwerp in the military control of the Dutch is due to historical reasons connected with the whole evolution of Belgian neutrality. It may be maintained with reason that the disregard of the neutrality of Belgium would be a justification for a like disregard of this peculiar provision which restricts the exercise of Belgium's military action.

6. Effect of Belgium's preparations against Germany

Aside from the question of conventional agreements on the part of Belgium, France, and England, the German partisans have expressed the view that Belgian military preparations for the defense of her neutrality, instead of more probably simply indicate apprehension on the part of England at the strengthening of Germany's position on the Continent, since those ports would be most advantageous to Germany if she should overcome the resistance of Holland and Belgium. Germany might conceivably have been able, as the result of possible political transformations, to prevail upon Holland and Belgium to join her in a conflict against the powers of the Entente.

1 It must be remembered that Holland did not sign the article of guaranty.

being impartially directed against the possibility of attack from any of the powers, were made entirely against Germany. This, it is alleged, makes it justifiable to consider the Belgian preparations in the nature of a political coöperation with France and England against Germany, and removes from them entirely the character of an attempt on Belgium's part to live up to her obligations by defending her neutrality.1

Given the obligation of Belgium herself to provide in the first instance for the maintenance of her own neutrality, it must be admitted that she should have taken care to dispose her means of defense on all sides impartially, so as to protect herself against the possibility of attack from every direction. By so doing she would have indicated the perfect impartiality of her policy, and have prevented any inference that a possibility of attack and consequent violation of the solemn treaty obligation on the part of one nation was more probable than from another. She would thus have silenced the assertion that her neutrality was being weakened because of political affiliation with certain of the guarantor powers in opposition to others.

It is not, however, fair to say that Belgium was fortified toward Germany only, since, as the Belgian Minister has pointed out, the fortress of Namur is directed against France and commands the entrance by Chimay, considered a particularly vulnerable spot in the French frontier.2

1 It is sometimes alleged by German writers that Belgium forfeited her position as a perpetually neutral state by her construction of fortifications; and in support of this view reference is made to Article III of the Treaty of London of May 11, 1867, establishing the neutrality of Luxemburg, according to the terms of which article the fortresses of Luxemburg were declared to be 'without object because of Luxemburg's neutralization, and that hence they will be destroyed.' In point of fact, this provision received unanimous acceptance by the plenipotentiaries at the London Conference only because of the annexed protocol, containing a declaration of the Belgian plenipotentiary, that this article could not be considered in any way to limit the right of another neutral [neutralized state] to construct fortifications and make other provision for its defense. (See Annex to protocol IV, British White Paper. Luxemburg, 1867.)

• See statement of the Belgian Minister, post, chap. XIII.

It will be remembered that Talleyrand attempted at the Conference of London to acquire a strip of Belgian territory to strengthen France's frontier at this point.1 Just as Liège has been compared to the neck of a bottle from which the railway lines sweep out, Namur is the neck of another such bottle, so that it would be of the utmost importance for France to capture Namur as soon as possible, even if it were merely to prevent an invasion of her territory.

England would, of course, find it difficult to effect a landing in the face of opposition, and Belgium may be excused for not devoting any great part of her resources to defending her coast. She took great pains to make Antwerp as impregnable as possible, and this would have been a protection against aggression on the part of England, Germany, or Holland. In addition, she might reasonably count somewhat upon the Dutch fortifications of the Scheldt to repel any attempt on the part of the English to force a passage through the Scheldt to violate at one and the same time Dutch neutrality and Belgian neutraliza

1 "... The vulnerable part of the French northern frontier is between the Sambre and the Meuse. Three main lines of railway cross it from north to south one down the valley of the Sambre, one through the famous trouée of Chimay, and one down the Meuse Valley. It was by the trouée of Chimay that a combined Russian-Prussian force under Winzingerode advanced on Paris in 1814, and gave a timely hand to Blücher after his thrashing by Napoleon. Formerly closed by the fortress towns of Philippeville and Marienbourg, the trouée of Chimay is now an open gap. The frontier drawn in 1815 makes a great loop south on purpose to give Philippeville and Marienbourg to Belgium, just as the northern loop of the Swiss frontier gives Schaffhausen to Switzerland. Chimay is, in fact, the Schaffhausen of Belgium.

"The French, however, unlike the Germans at Schaffhausen, are fully alive to the weakness of this part of their northern frontier, and have recently constructed a powerful fort with outworks at Hirson, in order to command the Chimay-Laon railway. Thirty-five miles farther on, the invaders marching on Paris would encounter, in the second line of the French defenses, the new entrenched camps of La Fère and Laon; and as all the roads and railways from this part of the Belgian frontier converge on these camps, their reduction would be indispensable before an advance on Paris could be made." ("Belgian Neutrality" [extract], in Fortnightly Review, CCLXXIII, New Series, September 1, 1889, p. 302; vol. XLVI, July 1 to December 1, 1889.)

tion. Nevertheless it is patent that Belgium has directed her attention principally to fortifying her territory against Germany. In this practical world we can hardly blame Belgium if she spent what money she could afford in strengthening the points at which she was most immediately threatened. Even if we were to consider the English as ready to violate any and every principle of international law, unrestrained by any considerations for the rights of others, we certainly must believe that out of consideration for their own interests they would not be the first to violate the neutrality which they made such efforts to incorporate into the public law of Europe and to place upon a juridical foundation. It seems hardly reasonable to expect that they would have contemplated operations through Belgium unless they were convinced that Germany would in all probability violate Belgian neutrality. In any event, the onesidedness of Belgian defense could at most have constituted but a ground of complaint on the part of Germany.

A study of the events at the commencement of the present war leads me to conclude that from the point of view of the theoretical working of the institution of neutrality, Belgium's action was unjustifiable, and yet, as a practical matter, the need of devoting all her resources to preparation against a German invasion has been clearly demonstrated. Germany, it seems to me, after giving grounds for legitimate apprehension that she might violate Belgian neutrality, has declared that the inevitable Belgian counter-preparations, to which Germany's action gave rise, constituted a perfect justification for the German Government's disregarding Belgian neutrality. In other words, they take as an excuse for the carrying into effect of the unjustifiable German acts which they had previously planned, the perfectly practical and legitimate attempts on the part of the Belgians to defend themselves against this anticipated German violation. It was evident

that Germany was planning such a violation—at least, her expectation of undertaking military operations in Belgium was made perfectly evident. Germany may reply that these preparations were to anticipate a French violation of Belgian territory. The impartial critic will have to form his opinion in part from antecedent probability, and in part from the consideration of the evidence such as that which has been given in the preceding pages.1

7. Alleged violations of Belgian neutrality

Germany has declared that her invasion of Belgium was undertaken only in response to violations of Belgian neutrality on the part of France. The German Government has asserted that the evidences of French preparations to march through Belgium constituted such proof of their intention as to justify an invasion of Belgium on Germany's part.2

1 "The German Government asserts that Belgium had ceased to be neutral and was virtually in alliance with France and Great Britain. [The Case of Belgium, in the Light of Official Reports found in the Archives of the Belgian Government, with an introduction by Dr. Bernhard Dernburg. n. d.] If this assertion could be proved, the strongest prejudice which Germany's conduct of the war has aroused in neutral countries would tend to disappear. In America, at least, few people care whether the Treaties of 1839 were or were not in force and binding upon Prussia. Even if Belgium was no longer a neutralized country, it was apparently a neutral country, and it has been ravaged with fire and steel because so the German armies could reach France most quickly. What, however, has Germany been able to prove? Only that British military attachés had concerted with Belgian military authorities plans of joint action against a German invasion. If, as is insisted, no consultations were held with German military attachés to provide for the defense of Belgian neutrality against a French or British invasion, what does that prove? Only that the Belgians knew well or guessed rightly on which side their neutrality was menaced." (Munroe Smith, "Military Strategy versus Diplomacy," Political Science Quarterly, vol. xxx [1915], p. 59.)

2 "If we had waited longer before taking the offensive, we should not have needed to violate the neutrality of Belgium, nor should we have been able to do it, for by that time the French and English would have been on the way through Belgium; they would have invaded the Rhine country, occupied Aix-la-Chapelle and Trèves, and then, with the strong Belgian strongholds of Liège and Namur as bases, would have been able to push their offensive operations further into the Rhine provinces." (Professor Hans Delbrück, "Germany's Answer," Atlantic Monthly, February, 1915, p. 239.)