from Italy to make clear the quarter from which blew the wind endangering it. (Cf. F. Y. B. nos. 17, 19, 27, 72; B. W. P. no. 80).

On July 17, M. Michailovitch, Servian Minister at Rome, telegraphed M. Pashitch: "I have reliable information that the Marquis di San Giuliano has declared to the Austrian Ambassador that a démarche directed against Servia, which did not treat Servia with the respect due from one nation to another, would be condemned by public opinion in Italy, and that the Italian Government was interested in the maintenance of the complete independence of Servia."1 (July 17, S. B. B. no. 28.)

On July 25, 'the Italian Ambassador cordially approved of what Sir Edward Grey had said to the German Ambassador, and made no secret of the fact that Italy was most desirous to see war avoided.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no 29.)

Italy thus showed a general desire to coöperate with Great Britain in her efforts to preserve peace. (See B. W. P. nos. 57, 86, 90.) From the first the Marquis di San Giuliano supported Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a conference of the four powers at London. (B. W. P. nos. 35, 63.)

The importance of Italy's influence for peace is also disclosed by M. Sazonof's telegram to the Russian Ambassador in Italy: 'Italy might play a rôle of first importance in helping to maintain peace, by exercising the necessary influence upon Austria and by adopting an attitude clearly in opposition to the conflict, for it cannot be localized. It is desirable that you express the conviction that it is im

1 Mr. Price, referring to Sazonof's proposal to the "effect that France and Germany should fall out of the mediation scheme, and that the good offices of two powers only, England and Italy, should be used," writes: "This seems to mean that Russia was attempting to detach Italy from the Triple Alliance, and then use her as a mediator with England." (M. P. Price, The Diplomatic History of the War, p. 31.) The above dispatch of the Servian Minister shows that Servia and hence Russia also were well aware of Italy's attitude and that she had so little sympathy with Austria's projects as to warn her against the course she was about to take.

possible for Russia not to come to the aid of Servia.' (Modified quotation, July 26, R. O. P. no. 23.)

2. San Giuliano's helpful suggestions

On July 27, the Marquis di San Giuliano returned to Rome, and in a conversation which he had immediately after his arrival, with M. Barrère, the French Ambassador to Italy, 'he spoke to him of the contents of the Austrian note, and formally assured him that he had not had any previous knowledge of it. He knew, indeed, that this note was to have a rigorous and forcible character; but he had not suspected that it could take such a form. The Ambassador asked him if it was true that he had given at Vienna, as certain papers alleged, an approval of the Austrian action and an assurance that Italy would fulfill her duties as an ally toward Austria. "In no way," the Minister replied: "we were not consulted; we were told nothing; it was not for us then to make any such communication to Vienna." The Marquis di San Giuliano thought that Servia would have acted more wisely if she had accepted the note in its entirety; that day he still thought that that would be the only thing to do, being convinced that Austria would not withdraw any of her claims, and would maintain them even at the risk of bringing about a general conflagration; he doubted whether Germany was disposed to lend herself to any pressure on her ally. He asserted, however, that Germany at that moment attached great importance to her relations with London, and believed that if any power could determine Berlin in favor of peaceful action, it was England. As for Italy, she would continue to make every effort in favor of peace. It was with that end in view that he had adhered without hesitation to Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a meeting in London of the ambassadors of those powers which were not directly interested in the Austro-Servian dispute.' (Modified quotation, July 27, F. Y. B. no. 72.)

On July 28, as a result of his conversation with the Servian Chargé d'Affaires at Rome, the Marquis di San Giuliano told the British Ambassador that 'he thought that if some explanations were given regarding the manner in which the Austrian agents would require to intervene under Articles V and VI, Servia might still accept the whole Austrian note. As it was not to be anticipated that Austria would give such explanations to Servia, they might be given to the powers engaged in discussions, who might then advise Servia to accept without conditions. In the Austrian official explanation of the grounds on which the Servian reply was considered inadequate, the Marquis considered many points besides explanation such as slight verbal difference in sentence regarding renunciation of propaganda quite childish, but there was a passage which might prove useful in facilitating such a course as was considered practicable by the Servian Chargé d'Affaires. It was stated that coöperation of Austrian agents in Servia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial or administrative measures. Servia was said to have willfully misinterpreted this. He thought, therefore, that the ground might be cleared here. He impressed upon the Ambassador, above all, his anxiety for the immediate beginning of discussion. A wide general latitude to accept at once every point or suggestion on which he could be in agreement with England and Germany had, he said, been given to the Italian Ambassador.' (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 64.)

On July 29, the British Ambassador at Rome learned of 'information received by the Italian Government that Germany was really opposed to a conference, in spite of the statement of Prince Lichnowsky about Germany's acceptance of it in "principle." The Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs informed the ambassadors that he was telegraphing to Berlin to urge adherence to the idea of an exchange of views in London, and suggested that the German Secre

tary of State might propose a formula acceptable to his Government. He was of the opinion that this exchange of views would keep the door open if the direct communications between Vienna and St. Petersburg failed to have any result. He thought that this exchange of views might be concomitant with such direct communications. He also said that he was informing the German Government that the Italian Government would not be pardoned by public opinion in Italy unless they had taken every possible step to avoid war. He was urging that the German Government must lend their coöperation in this. There seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in earnest. As Germany, however, was really anxious for good relations with Great Britain, if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France, he thought it would have a great effect. Even should it prove impossible to induce Germany to take part, he would still advocate that England and Italy, each as representing one group, should continue to exchange views.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 80.)

On July 29, 'the Marquis di San Giuliano1 suggested

1 The London Times of December 5, 1914, prints a Reuter dispatch, an extract from which sums up tersely San Giuliano's direction of Italian diplomacy just preceding the war:

"Since the beginning of July, when, after the murder at Serajevo, the relations between Austria and Serbia became most strained, the Marquis di San Giuliano, the Italian Foreign Minister, thought it his duty to advise Vienna to use moderation and to avoid the intervention of Russia in support of Belgrade. Austria answered that she did not believe that Russia was sufficiently prepared after the Japanese War to undertake military action in favour of Serbia, bringing forward as an example the attitude of Russia during the whole Conference of London after the Balkan War, when she was unable to make her supremacy in the Balkans felt.

"The Marquis di San Giuliano replied that, according to his information, the situation was changed, and Russia would not tolerate any attempt to limit the independence and sovereignty of Serbia or any diminution of her territory. Austria retorted that in such a case the intervention of Russia would be answered by the participation of Germany in the war. The Italian Foreign Minister pointed out the enormous gravity of this plan, as the action of Germany would inevitably mean the intervention of Great Britain. "Both Vienna and Berlin replied that they were convinced that at the

that the German objections to the mediation of the four powers, a mediation that was strongly favored by Italy, might be removed by some change in the form of procedure.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 92.) July 30, 'when the Marquis learned that Austria had refused to continue the direct exchange of views, and believing that Germany was then ready to give Austria more conciliatory advice, he suggested that an exchange of views between the four powers should be resumed in any form which Austria would consider acceptable.' (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 106.)

3. Italian coöperation with England

In a conversation, on July 26, with M. Barrère, the French Ambassador at Rome, Signor Salandra said in regard to the attitude the Italian Government would take: "We shall make the greatest efforts to prevent the rupture of peace: our situation is somewhat similar to that of England. It is possible that we might be able to take some action with England toward maintaining the peace." (Extract, July 26, F. Y. B. no. 51.) The advantage of such a collaboration on the part of the two powers least directly involved in the Austro-Servian controversy is evident, because, even after Germany might have become involved in reply to Russian mobilization and have rallied to the support of her ally, these two powers, one from each group, Entente and Alliance, could still continue their united efforts in the cause of peace.

At St. Petersburg, on July 26, when M. Sazonof pointed out to the Austrian Ambassador why he considered the Austrian note unacceptable, he remarked that 'it would be last moment Great Britain would not take upon herself the risk of entering a European war. The Marquis reiterated that such a view was erroneous, having sufficient foundation for the opinion that the exact opposite would occur, but his warning was in vain. Events were precipitated by the ultimatum to Serbia, which was sent without Italy's either being consulted or notified."