at which we are aiming necessarily renders us pacific. This sounds like a paradox, but it is not.

With the powerful engine into which we are transforming the German army one does not make an attack. If I were to come before you to-day on the assumption that conditions were different from what I believe they are, and should say, "We are considerably menaced by France and Russia; we shall probably be attacked, and as a diplomat, believing my military information in these matters to be correct, I am convinced that it is better for us to have our defense consist of a bold attack, and to strike the first blow now "; and if I should add: "We can more easily wage an aggressive war, and I, therefore, am asking the Reichstag for an appropriation of a milliard, or half a milliard, marks to engage in a war against our two neighbors," then I do not know, gentlemen, whether you would have enough confidence in me to grant my request, but I hope you would not have it.

But, if you had, it would not satisfy me. If we Germans wish to wage a war with the full effect of our national strength, it must be a war which is approved by all who take part in it, all who sacrifice anything for it; in short, the whole nation. It must be a national war, a war carried on with the enthusiasm of 1870, when we were foully attacked. I still remember the earsplitting, joyful shouts in the station at Cologne. It was the same all the way from Berlin to Cologne, in Berlin itself. Waves of popular approval bore us into the war, whether we wished it or not. That is the way it must be, if popular force like ours is to show what it can do. It will, however, be very difficult to prove to the provinces and states of the Empire and their inhabitants that the war is unavoidable, and has to be. People will ask: "Are you so sure? Who can tell?" In short, when we make an attack, the whole weight of all imponderables, which weigh far heavier than material weights, will be on the side of our opponents whom we have attacked. France will be bristling with arms away down to the Pyrenees. The same will take place everywhere. A war into which we are not borne by the will of the people will be waged, to be sure, if it has been declared by the constituted authorities who deemed it necessary; it will even be waged pluckily, and possibly victoriously, after we have once smelled fire and tasted blood, but it will lack from the beginning the nerve and enthusiasm of a war in which we are attacked. In such a one the whole of Germany from Memel to the Alpine Lakes will flare up like a powder mine; it will be bristling with guns, and no enemy will dare to engage this furor teutonicus which develops when we are attacked. We cannot afford to lose this factor of preeminence even if many military men not only ours but others as well - believe that to-day we are superior to our future opponents. Our own officers believe this to a man, naturally. Every soldier believes this. He would almost cease to be a useful soldier if he did not wish for war, and did not believe that we should be victorious in it. If our opponents by any chance are thinking that we are pacific because we are afraid of how the war may end, they are mightily mistaken. We believe as firmly in our victory in a just cause as any foreign lieutenant in his garrison, after his third glass of champagne, can believe in his, and we probably do so with greater certainty. It is not fear, therefore, which makes us pacific, but the consciousness of our strength. We are strong enough to protect ourselves, even if we should be attacked at a less favorable moment, and we are in a position to let divine Providence

determine whether a war in the mean while may not become unnecessary after all.

I am, therefore, not in favor of any kind of aggressive war, and if war could result only from an attack-somebody must kindle a fire-we shall not kindle it. Neither the consciousness of our strength, which I have described, nor our confidence in our treaties, will prevent us from continuing our former endeavors to preserve peace. In this we do not permit ourselves to be influenced by annoyances or dislikes. The threats and insults and challenges which have been made have, no doubt, excited amongst us also a feeling of irritation, which does not easily occur in the case of Germans, for they are less prone to national hatred than any other nation. We are trying to calm our countrymen, however, and we shall work for peace with our neighbors, especially with Russia, in the future as we have in the past. When I say, 'especially with Russia,' I express the opinion that France offers us no assurances of success in our endeavors. I will not, however, say that these endeavors are of no use. We shall never pick a quarrel, nor ever attack France; and in the many little incidents which the proclivity of our neighbors for spying and bribing has occasioned, we have always brought about a very courteous and amicable settlement. I should consider it criminal if we were to inflame a great national war for such bagatelles. These are instances when one should say: "The cleverer of the two will yield."

THE APOCRYPHAL WILL OF PETER THE GREAT

1

(THE SOKOLNICKI TEXT) 1

1. NEGLECT nothing to give the Russian nation European forms and customs; with this purpose engage the different courts and the learned of Europe in particular, whether by interested motives or by the philanthropic principles of philosophy, or any other motive, to contribute to this end.

2. Maintain in the state a system of continuous warfare in order to

1 The ghost of Peter the Great, which has long stalked through Europe in the shape of a so-called "will," setting forth his designs for Russian aggrandizement, can at last be laid to rest, at least in its current versions. Whether Peter did or did not leave behind him some sort of a political testament, we do not attempt to decide, but the source of the document which has masqueraded under his name has been traced beyond cavil, the original having been brought to light from the Public Archives at Berlin, with the name of its utterer, one Sokolnicki. The motive of its fabrication is not far to seek. This Sokolnicki was a Polish officer, a refugee in Paris in 1797, at the time of the Directory, and for the purpose of inciting the French, then posing as the saviors of oppressed peoples, to come to the rescue of his native land, he composed the articles of this instrument, ingeniously contrived to reveal to the French Government the menace of Russian intrigue.

In this brief note it is impossible to go into the picturesque details that attended the birth of the forgery. For them the reader is referred to the authorities given below. It may be well to add that Waliszewski, in his history of Peter the Great, arrives at the same conclusion as to the spuriousness of the will, though he does not seem to be cognizant of the real author of the deception. Yet in a sense the will is genuine, for it merely lends the glamour of pretended prophecy to historical events as they have actually occurred, and in giving expression to the political aims of Russia it states simply what was natural to an empire situated as hers has been, though these aims were immeasurably beyond any dreams of Peter and the Muscovy of his day. I have, therefore, notwithstanding the apocryphal character of the will, given a translation of it in its primitive form, the two later versions (Lesur, 1812, and Gaillardet, 1836) being derivatives, with such variations and embroideries as were convenient at the date of their appearance. See Harry Bresslau, Das Testament Peter's des Grossen, in Sybel's Historische Zeitschrift, vol. 41, p. 385 et seq. (1879), and K. Waliszewski, Peter the Great, English translation (New York, 1900), pp. 548–51.

harden the soldiery and to keep the nation always in training and ready to march at the first signal.

3. Extend by every possible means towards the north along the Baltic, and towards the south. And with this end in view

-

4. Arouse the jealousy of England, Denmark, and Brandenburg against Sweden; as a result of which these powers will shut their eyes to the encroachments that may be made on that country, and in the end it will be subjugated.

5. Interest the House of Austria in driving the Turk from Europe, and under this pretext maintain a standing army and establish dockyards on the shores of the Black Sea, and by continually advancing reach out to Constantinople.

6. Keep Poland in a state of anarchy, influence its Diets, and especially the elections of its kings; get a morsel of it at every opportunity, and end by subduing it completely.

7. Contract a close alliance with England, and keep up direct relations with her by means of a commercial treaty; even permit her to exercise a kind of monopoly in the interior; which will lead imperceptibly to an intermingling of our nationals with English merchants and sailors, who will provide all the means for perfecting and enlarging the Russian navy, by the help of which it should soon be our aim to secure the mastery of the Baltic and the Black Sea. . . . This is a point of capital importance upon which depend the rapid execution and success of the plan.

8. At any cost mix in the quarrels of Europe, either by force or by stealth, especially those relating to Germany. And to this end

9. Always appear to be the ally of Austria, profiting by the smallest ascendancy that you can get over her to drag her into ruinous wars in order to enfeeble her by degrees; sometimes even succor her, and do not cease to make enemies for her secretly in the interior of the Empire by arousing against her the jealousy of the princes. . . . Nota. This article will be all the more easy to carry out since the House of Austria has not ceased up to this time to delude itself with the project of acquiring universal dominion, or at least of reëstablishing the Western Empire, and for that purpose she must before everything begin by subduing Germany.

10. Always choose wives for Russian princes among the princesses of Germany, and thus multiply alliances by the relations of families, interest and influence everywhere in that Empire.

11. Make use of religious ascendancy among the Greek separatists and schismatics who are distributed through Hungary, Turkey, and the southern parts of Poland, bind them to you by every insidious method, get yourselves called their protectors and acquire a title to the sacerdotal supremacy; under this pretext and with their assistance, with Turkey subjugated and Poland encroached upon, the conquest of Hungary will be but a trifle; promising to Austria in the mean while indemnifications in Germany, while the rest of Poland, no longer able to sustain itself either by its own strength, or by political connections, will of its own accord come under the yoke.

12. From then on every moment is precious. Make ready in secret the batteries for the decisive blow and have them put into action with an order, foresight, and rapidity that will give Europe no time to pull herself together. One should begin by proposing separately, very secretly, and with the

greatest circumspection, first to the Court of Versailles and then to that of Vienna, a division of the sovereignty of the universe; calling their attention to this point: that Russia, being in fact the sovereign of the entire East, and having nothing further to gain but the title, can in no wise be open to their suspicion in advancing this proposition. Without doubt this project, on the contrary, cannot fail to flatter them and to enkindle between them a war to the death; a war which will soon become general owing to the connections and the relations extending from these two courts (rivals and natural enemies), and also because of the interest which all the other powers will of necessity take in this quarrel.

13. In the midst of this general turmoil Russia will arrange to be asked for assistance, sometimes by the one, sometimes by the other of the belligerent powers, and after having long hesitated in order to give them time to exhaust themselves and herself to assemble her forces, she will seem finally to decide for the House of Austria, and while she advances her regular troops to the Rhine, she will have them followed immediately by a swarm of her Asiatic hordes; and in proportion as these last advance into Germany, two considerable fleets will set out, the one from the Sea of Azof, the other from the harbor of Archangel, laden with bands of these same hordes, under convoy of the armed fleets of the Black Sea and the Baltic; the fleets will appear unexpectedly in the Mediterranean and on the ocean and will pour forth all these nomad peoples, fierce and greedy for booty, to inundate Italy, Spain, and France, one part of whose inhabitants they will plunder, another part lead off into slavery to repeople with them the deserts of abandoned Siberia; and the rest they will render helpless to shake off the yoke.

THE DECLARATION OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION AT THE FIRST HAGUE CONFERENCE

"ON July 25, 1899, the American delegation at the Peace Conference at The Hague, referring to the convention for the peaceful adjustment of international differences, which was then pending before the conference, made in full session the following declaration:

"Nothing contained in this convention shall be so construed as to require the United States of America to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political questions or policy or internal administration of any foreign state; nor shall anything contained in the said convention be construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States of America of its traditional attitude toward purely American questions.'

"It was under this reserve that the American delegates signed the convention on July 29, 1899." (Report of the United States Commission, July 31, 1899, Holls's Peace Conference at The Hague, 477, 531. See John Bassett Moore: A Digest of International Law, vol. vi, p. 594.)

THE ALLIANCES

TREATY OF ALLIANCE OF OCTOBER 7, 1879, BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND GERMANY 1

CONSIDERING that their Majesties, the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary and the Emperor of Germany and King of Prussia, must esteem it to be their unavoidable duty as sovereigns to watch under all circumstances over the safety of their Empires and the tranquillity of their peoples;

Considering that the two Monarchs will be able, by a solid alliance of the two Empires, in the kind of that which previously existed, more easily to accomplish this duty, as also more efficaciously;

Considering, in fine, that an intimate agreement between Austro-Hungary and Germany can threaten no one, but is rather calculated to consolidate European peace as created by the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin; Their Majesties, the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary and the Emperor of Germany and King of Prussia, promising each other solemnly never to give any aggressive tendency whatsoever to their purely defensive agreement, have resolved to conclude a reciprocal alliance of peace and protection;

In this aim, their Majesties have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:— For his Majesty the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary, his real Privy Councillor, the Minister of the Imperial House, as also for Foreign Affairs, Lieutenant Julius, Count Andrassy, etc.;

For his Majesty the Emperor of Germany, his Ambassador and plenipotentiary extraordinary, Lieutenant-General Prince Henry VII of Reuss, etc.;

Who have both entered into relations with each other to-day in Vienna, and, after showing each other their powers duly recognized as good and sufficient, have settled what follows:

ARTICLE I. If, contrarily to what may be hoped and contrarily to the sincere wishes of the two high contracting parties, one of the two Empires were to be attacked by Russia, the two high contracting parties are bound to lend each other reciprocal aid with the whole of their imperial military power, and, subsequently, to conclude no peace except conjointly and in agreement.

ARTICLE II. If one of the two high contracting parties were to be attacked by another Power, the other high contracting party binds itself, by the present act, not only not to uphold the aggressor against its high Ally, but at the least, to observe a benevolent neutrality with regard to the contracting party aforesaid.

If, however, in the case previously mentioned, the Power attacking were to be upheld by Russia, whether by way of active coöperation or by military measures that should threaten the Power attacked, then the obligation of reciprocal assistance with entire military forces obligation stipulated in Article I of this treaty would immediately become executory, and the 1 Tardieu, France and the Alliances, pp. 128-29. New York. 1909